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Abstract	
	
Background:		Healthcare	policy	encourages	the	use	of	scientific	evidence	in	clinical	practice.		The	complex	reality	of	practice	means	that	dissemination	of	this	evidence	in	clinical	guidelines	is	insufficient	to	change	behaviour	and	reduce	variation.		This	study	took	a	knowledge	mobilisation	perspective	to	assess	the	role	of	evidence-based	medicine	in	orthopaedic	practice	decisions	for	hip	replacement	surgery.				
Objectives:		The	research	sought	to	identify	where,	when	and	how	evidence	and	knowledge	were	used	in	decision-making	and	how	this	contributed	to	variation	in	practice.		It	discovered	factors	which	influenced	orthopaedic	surgery	decision-making	through	an	in-depth	exploration	of	real	life	evidence	use	in	practice.			
Methods:		Three	in-depth	case	studies	were	conducted	at	NHS	hospitals	over	12-months.		Data	collected	included	64	interviews	with	surgeons	and	NHS	staff,	observations	of	day-to-day	practice	and	the	collection	of	121	supplementary	documents.		A	case	study	road	map	method	was	performed	using	thematic	analysis	to	generate	four	themes:	individuals,	groups,	organisations	and	regulation.				
Results:		The	findings	combined	individuals	and	groups,	the	organisational	dynamics	and	environmental	regulation	to	provide	a	nuanced	understanding	of	knowledge	mobilisation	in	orthopaedics.		Group	level	knowledge	was	crucial	in	explaining	variation	to	evidence-based	medicine,	specifically	how	it	influenced	organisational	capacity	and	the	socialisation	of	medical	professionals.		The	characteristics	of	surgeons	also	contributed	to	the	wider	definition	of	evidence	which	was	important	for	clinical	decisions.				
Conclusion:		This	empirical	study	of	knowledge	mobilisation	demonstrated	that	orthopaedic	practice	was	contingent	and	mediated	at	different	levels,	each	of	which	
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contributed	to	variation.		Decision-making	was	dependent	on	a	range	evidence	and	knowledge	sources	that	were	influential	across	the	entire	knowledge	domain.		A	conceptual	framework	was	produced	to	demonstrate	how	knowledge	is	mobilised	in	a	highly	professionalised	organisationally	regulated	context.
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1 Introduction		
	
“In	medicine,	sometimes	we	think	we	know	better	and	maybe	we	don’t…		
…unfortunately,	in	my	experience	there’s	always	a	way	of	justifying	whatever	you	want.”	(Anonymised	surgeon	participants)			This	chapter	presents	the	context	and	rationale	underpinning	my	research,	which	assessed	the	role	of	evidence-based	medicine	in	orthopaedic	surgical	practice	decisions,	together	with	the	research	questions,	objectives	and	methods.		I	provide	an	overview	of	the	findings	in	the	context	of	knowledge	mobilisation	and	indicate	my	contribution	in	understanding	variation	in	NHS	practice	bought	about	by	the	existence	and	use	of	different	types	of	knowledge	and	the	wider	definitions	of	evidence	that	exists.		Finally,	I	describe	the	structure	of	this	thesis.	
1.1 	Context	and	rationale	In	2013-2014,	my	team	and	I	were	involved	in	production	of	National	Institute	for	Health	and	Care	Excellence	(NICE)	guidance	on	hip	implants	for	total	hip	replacement	(THR)	for	end	stage	arthritis	(NICE	TA304,	2014).		This	provided	a	golden	opportunity	to	explore	the	understanding	and	use	of	NICE	guidance	in	the	context	of	evidence-based	medicine	(EBM).		I	used	a	specific	case	of	orthopaedic	surgery	to	address	the	empirical	problem	of	practice	variation	and	variation	to	guideline	uptake	through	a	knowledge	mobilisation	perspective.		
1.1.1. Hip	replacement	surgery	In	England,	patients	who	have	been	diagnosed	with	severe	arthritis	of	the	hip	can	be	offered	surgical	treatment	to	help	relieve	their	symptoms,	as	they	often	suffer	from	pain	and	disability,	leading	to	reduced	function	and	ability	to	perform	daily	activities	(Clarke	et	al,	2014).		NICE	Clinical	Guidelines	state	that	referral	for	joint	replacement	surgery	should	be	considered	for	people	with	these	symptoms	if	they	have	a	substantial	impact	on	their	quality	of	life	(NICE	CG177,	2014).				
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In	2015/16,	a	total	of	98,211	hip	replacement	procedures	were	carried	out	in	England,	in	151	NHS	Trusts	(247	hospitals)	(NJR,	2016).		Individual	patient	characteristics	for	THR	remain	fairly	stable.		In	2015/16,	60%	of	the	primary	procedures	were	carried	out	on	women	and	the	median	age	at	first	THR	across	the	entire	group	was	69	years	(NJR,	2016).		National	Joint	Registry	data	show	an	increased	risk	of	revision	for	younger	patients	(NJR,	2016).		This	need	to	replace	existing	hip	implants	adds	to	the	increasing	demand	for	services	and	resources	in	the	NHS.		In	2015/16,	this	'revision	burden'	comprised	14.8%	of	total	hip	activity	(NJR,	2016).		This	focuses	attention	on	how	surgeons	select	treatments.		Revision	is	a	result	of	‘failure’	of	the	primary	operation	and	an	increasing	revision	burden	is	anticipated	in	line	with	the	ageing	population	in	the	UK	(Briggs,	2012).		
1.1.2. Evidence	of	variation	in	practice	of	THR	Nationally,	there	is	inconsistency	in	the	treatment,	procedure	and	type	of	hip	implant	used	to	treat	patients,	which	cannot	be	explained	by	differences	in	patient	needs	(NHS	Atlas,	2016).				The	2013/14	NHS	Atlas	of	Variation	reported	that	for	Clinical	Commissioning	Groups	(CCGs)	in	England,	there	was	a	3.8-fold	variation	in	use	of	primary	hip	replacement	procedures	(range	55	to	208	per	100,000	population)	(NHS	Atlas,	2016).		Even	after	excluding	warranted	variation	linked	to	the	prevalence	of	disease,	there	is	still	clearly	substantial	variation	in	access	to	hip	replacement	surgery.		There	is	also	variation	in	timing	of	referral	from	primary	care	to	secondary	care,	in	criteria	established	for	undertaking	surgery	and	in	patient	eligibility	criteria	(NHS	Atlas,	2016).		Research	has	demonstrated	that	differences	exist	between	the	provision	of,	and	the	need	for,	surgery	(Judge	et	al,	2010).		Patient	reported	outcome	measures	(such	as	the	“EQ5D”	five	dimensions	quality	of	life	questionnaire)	reveal	that	variation	between	the	best	(31%)	and	worst	(49%)	performing	hospitals	is	large	(Appleby	and	Devlin,	2010).	The	cost-effectiveness	of	interventions	also	varies	considerably	between	hospitals	(Appleby,	2010).				
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More	recently,	the	Royal	College	of	Surgeons	of	England	investigated	variation	in	hip	replacement	and	described	a	situation	that	was	creating	a	“postcode	lottery	
for	access	to	surgical	treatment”	(RCS,	2015).		In	their	research,	they	sampled	a	group	of	CCGs	and	indicated	that	73%	either	did	not	follow	NICE	guidance	on	referral	for	hip	replacement,	or	had	no	commissioning	policy	for	this	procedure.		This	variation	led	to	too	many	or	too	few	referrals.		Forty	four	percent	of	the	CCGs	required	patients	to	be	in	various	degrees	of	pain	or	immobility	(with	no	consistency	across	the	country)	or	required	patients	to	lose	weight	before	surgery	(RCS,	2015).			Together	these	studies	demonstrate	significant	variation	in	the	practice	of	THR	as	patients	in	some	areas	are	able	to	have	hip	replacements	sooner,	potentially	when	they	have	less	pain	or	disability	(Judge	et	al,	2010),	and	some	will	be	more	likely	to	experience	revision.			
1.1.3. 	The	research	gap	Research	on	the	views	and	attitudes	of	orthopaedic	surgeons	about	treatment	selection,	surgical	methods	and	intervention	types	is	limited	and	we	lack	understanding	of	their	attitudes	towards	clinical	guidance	and	evidence	use	in	practice.		Little	is	known	about	how	best	to	influence	their	behaviour	to	enhance	effective	decision-making	in	the	face	of	the	substantial	unjustified	variation,	the	increasing	demand	for	hip	replacements	and	the	growing	revision	burden.		There	is	a	need	to	investigate	evidence	use	in	practice	and	in	context	to	determine	what	factors	are	important	in	decision-making.				My	study	set	out	to	uncover	what	is	required	to	overcome	this	gap	in	our	understanding	of	‘what	works’	for	evidence-based	orthopaedics.		I	explored	one	clinical	speciality	(orthopaedic	surgery)	across	the	NHS	in	England	to	address	the	empirical	problem	of	variation	in	practice	and	in	guideline	uptake,	and	to	explore	the	theoretical	issues	on	the	role	of	EBM	in	orthopaedic	surgical	practice	decisions.		In	particular	I	investigated	the	use	of	THR	for	treating	end-stage	arthritis	of	the	hip	joint.				
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1.1.4. Evidence-Based	Medicine		Prior	to	the	development	of	EBM,	reliance	on	expert	opinion	and	subjective	experience	were	believed	to	be	the	approach	to	medical	decision-making.		This	led	to	variation	in	clinical	practice,	which	was	known	to	exist	when	EBM	was	first	defined	(Sackett	et	al,	1996).		The	drive	to	develop	EBM	was	grounded	in	the	belief	that	changes	were	needed	in	the	way	decisions	were	made	by	healthcare	professionals.		It	was	assumed	that	these	changes	could	be	achieved	by	the	widespread	dissemination	and	uptake	of	relevant	research	evidence	in	practice	(Walshe	and	Rundall,	2001;	Kovner	and	Rundall,	2006).		However,	the	practicality	of	achieving	this	in	day-to-day	work	of	orthopaedic	surgeons	is	debatable	and	variation	occurs	in	practice	(Grove	et	al,	2016).		The	important	questions	for	my	research	are	how	surgeons	determine	what	is	appropriate	and	acceptable	evidence	for	them,	and	how	it	is	mobilised,	adopted	and	used	in	practice.	EBM	and	clinical	guidelines	make	suggestions	about	‘what	works’	and	‘what	does	not	work’	for	patients	being	treated	in	the	NHS.		These	concrete	and	codified	sources	of	knowledge	are	based	on	‘gold-standard’	evidence,	such	as	systematic	reviews	and	randomised	controlled	trials	(RCTs).		The	premise	is	that	this	explicit	evidence	will	provide	valid	and	reliable	results	which	can	be	generalised	into	healthcare	practice.		However,	it	is	difficult	to	maintain	this	view	of	evidence	in	real	world	healthcare	settings.		We	need	to	acknowledge	the	unpredictable,	uncertain	and	contingent	nature	of	these	environments	(Pope,	2002),	coupled	with	the	knowledge	and	context-dependent	decision-making	processes	that	clinicians	go	through	(Dopson	et	al,	2003).			
1.1.5. Can	knowledge	mobilisation	help	understand	variation?		I	address	the	empirical	problem	of	variation	from	EBM	through	a	theoretical	lens.		Others	have	examined	EBM	in	healthcare	organisations	from	a	knowledge	mobilisation	perspective	so	I	draw	on	this	for	insight	(Dopson	et	al	2003,	Dopson	and	Fitzgerald,	2005;	Crilly	et	al,	2010;	2013;	Ferlie	et	al,	2012;	2015;	Kislov	et	al,	2014;	Oborn	et	al,	2010;	Davies	et	al,	2015).			
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There	is	a	perception	in	healthcare	that	knowledge	and	evidence	are	one	in	the	same	(Nutley	et	al,	2007).		In	reality,	they	are	contested	concepts	in	both	literature	and	practice	(Nicolini	et	al,	2008).		Distinctions	are	made	between	tacit	and	explicit	knowledge	(Nonaka,	1994).		In	my	study,	clinical	guidelines	are	a	form	of	explicit	knowledge	grounded	in	clinical	science	and	EBM.		They	contribute	towards,	but	do	not	explain	all	knowledge	that	influences	clinical	decisions.		Variation	occurs	in	practice	when	other	sources	of	evidence	and	knowledge	drive	decision-making.			Tacit	knowledge	reflects	what	we	‘know’	and	is	linked	to	our	embedded	capability	i.e.,	what	we	‘do’	(Orlikowski,	2002;	Nonaka	1994).		The	weight	attached	to	it	is	problematic	for	EBM,	where	context	has	been	removed	from	research	findings	and	evidence	from	RCTs	are	considered	most	important	(Davies	et	al,	2000a).		In	my	study,	I	sought	to	identify	what	constitutes	evidence	and	knowledge	for	orthopaedic	clinical-decision	makers,	and	how	evidence	and	knowledge	is	mobilised	in	practice.		Understanding	the	context-dependent	nature	of	healthcare	was	important	to	explore	the	differences	in	the	way	decisions	are	made.				Previous	research	has	demonstrated	how	evidence	and	objects,	people	and	communities	move	knowledge	inside	and	outside	organisations	and	across	disciplinary	boundaries	(Contandriopoulos	et	al,	2010;	Cooper	and	Levin,	2010;	Fournier,	2012;	Hislop,	2013;	Davies	et	al,	2015).		In	my	research,	I	use	the	viewpoint	of	knowledge	mobilisation	to	investigate	how	factors	spanning	the	entire	knowledge	domain	interact	to	produce	a	system	where	variation	in	use	and	uptake	of	guidelines	exists	despite	the	continued	efforts	from	policy-makers	to	instil	their	use	in	practice.	
1.2 	The	research	questions	The	overall	aim	of	my	study	was	to	assess	the	role	EBM	in	orthopaedic	surgical	practice	decisions.		To	achieve	this,	I	developed	three	research	questions	(RQ)	which	cover	two	areas	of	science,	EBM	in	clinical	science	and	knowledge	mobilisation	in	organisational	sciences.		My	study	of	hip	replacement	surgery	
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decision-making	spans	the	boundary	between	these	domains.		The	research	questions	are	as	follows:	
RQ1.	What	types	of	evidence	and	knowledge	are	considered	important	by	
orthopaedic	surgeons	when	making	clinical	practice	decisions?	
RQ2.	How	are	evidence	and	knowledge	mobilised	in	the	real-world	practice	
of	orthopaedic	surgery	in	the	NHS?		
RQ3.	What	are	the	key	dimensions	of	knowledge	mobilisation	which	
influence	variation	in	decision-making	in	the	orthopaedic	surgery	NHS	
environment?		In	order	to	answer	these	questions,	I	developed	three	main	research	objectives:	1	 To	undertake	observations	and	interviews	with	orthopaedic	surgeons	and	associated	staff	working	in	the	NHS	in	England,	and	analysis	of	associated	documentation,	to	identify	what	types	and	evidence	and	knowledge	are	considered	important	for	decisions-making.	2	 To	integrate	the	findings	from	three	case	studies	of	clinical	practice	to	develop	a	framework	to	understand	knowledge	mobilisation	in	the	context	of	UK	orthopaedic	surgery	decision-making.	3	 To	generate	themes	which	summarise	where,	when	and	how	evidence	and	knowledge	are	used	in	decision-making,	and	to	describe	where	the	mobilisation	of	knowledge	has	the	greatest	influence	on	variation	in	practice.	
1.3 	Original	contribution		My	research	crosses	disciplinary	boundaries	and	brings	together	organisational	and	clinical	sciences	to	examine	knowledge	mobilisation	in	the	professionalised	environment	of	orthopaedics.		By	answering	the	research	questions,	I	provide	an	empirical	study	of	knowledge	mobilisation	using	NICE	guidelines	collected	within	the	orthopaedic	departments	of	three	NHS	hospitals	England.		I	demonstrate	the	real	world	practice	of	knowledge	mobilisation	for	evidence-based	clinical	decisions.		The	knowledge	mobilisation	literature	in	healthcare	and	other	professionalised	organisations	has	tended	to	focus	on,	and	be	explained	as	a	consequence	of	four	
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separate	levels	of	influence	operating	in	isolation	(Mitton	et	al,	2007;	Nicolini	et	al,	2008;	Contandriopoulos,	et	al	2010;	Ferlie	et	al,	2012;	Davies	et	al,	2015).		In	my	study,	I	bring	together	individuals	and	groups,	organisational	dynamics	and	environmental	regulation	to	provide	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	knowledge	mobilisation.		I	explain	the	outcome	of	particular	knowledge	mobilisation	activities	and	how	and	why	they	lead	to	variation	from	clinical	guidelines.		To	achieve	this	more	nuanced	understanding,	I	conducted	three	in-depth	case	studies	over	a	12-month	period	which	included	64	interviews	with	surgeons	and	NHS	staff.		I	was	embedded	in	the	day-to-day	practice	of	each	of	the	case	study	hospitals	for	three	months	(9	months	in	total)	and	I	collected	121	supplementary	documents	to	support	my	analysis.				My	study	demonstrates	that	knowledge	mobilisation	is	mediated	at	different	levels,	each	of	which	contributes	to	variation.		Group	level	knowledge	was	crucial	in	explaining	variation,	specifically	in	how	it	influenced	organisational	capacity	and	the	socialisation	of	medical	professionals.		The	characteristics	of	surgeons	also	contributed	to	the	wider	definition	of	evidence	which	was	important	for	clinical	decisions.		Together,	these	findings	go	beyond	previous	explanations	in	the	existing	EBM	and	knowledge	mobilisation	literature.		I	produced	a	conceptual	framework	to	demonstrate	how	evidence	and	knowledge	are	mobilised	in	this	highly	professionalised	organisationally	regulated	context.		
1.4 	Overview	thesis	structure		This	section	provides	a	brief	overview	of	the	structure	of	the	thesis.				
Chapter	one	is	the	introduction	to	the	thesis.		I	will	address	the	empirical	problem	of	variation	and	EBM	through	the	theoretical	lens	of	a	knowledge	mobilisation	perspective	(Dopson	et	al,	2003;	Dopson	and	Fitzgerald,	2005;	Crilly	et	al,	2010;	2013;	Ferlie	et	al,	2012;	2015;	Kislov	et	al,	2014;	Oborn	et	al,	2010;	Davies	et	al,	2015,	Oborn	et	al	2013b),	and	therefore	Chapter	two	presents	an	overview	of	the	‘knowledge	and	knowing’	literature	which	stems	from	the	field	of	organisational	sciences,	and	provides	theoretical	explanations	of	knowledge	and	knowledge	mobilisation	relevant	to	this	research.	
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Chapter	three	presents	detailed	research	methodology	for	the	case	study	research,	including	the	rationale,	setting,	research	design	and	the	particular	methods	chosen.				
Chapters	four	to	seven	present	the	qualitative	research	results	as	four	distinct	levels	of	analysis.		Chapter	four	discusses	the	findings	related	to	individual	beliefs,	perceptions	and	values	of	the	orthopaedic	surgeons	in	practice.		Chapter	
five	considers	the	influence	of	orthopaedic	communities	of	practice	on	the	use	of	evidence	in	decision-making.		Chapter	six	reviews	the	knowledge,	capacity	and	contingencies	that	existed	in	the	three	hospital	organisations.		These	were	the	main	factors	which	influenced	evidence	use	and	knowledge	mobilisation	in	my	study.		Chapter	seven	discusses	the	influence	of	the	regulatory	environment	in	which	the	three	other	levels	(individual,	groups	and	organisations)	were	situated.			
Chapter	eight	summarises	and	discusses	the	findings	from	each	phase	of	the	research.		I	discuss	the	themes	that	were	introduced	in	the	results	chapters,	and	analyse	my	findings	in	relation	to	the	research	questions.		I	state	my	original	contributions	to	knowledge	to	the	field	of	EBM	through	a	theoretical	lens	of	knowledge	mobilisation.		I	provide	an	in-depth	overview	of	the	strengths	and	limitations	of	my	research	and	finally	I	offer	my	interpretations	of	the	implications	of	the	findings	for	policy,	practice	and	research.				
Chapter	nine	is	the	conclusion,	and	demonstrates	how	the	research	questions	have	been	answered.			An	overview	of	the	chapter	structure	is	provided	in	Figure	1.			
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Figure	1.		Overview	of	thesis	structure	
1.5 	Chapter	Summary	In	this	chapter,	I	have	introduced	this	research	and	presented	the	main	concepts	and	issues	behind	the	study	rationale.		I	have	described	the	overarching	structure	of	my	thesis.		In	the	next	chapter	I	begin	my	literature	review.					 	
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2 Literature	Review:	Knowledge,	knowing	and	
theoretical	perspectives	of	knowledge	mobilisation				
2.1 	Introduction	I	use	the	viewpoint	of	knowledge	mobilisation	to	investigate	how	factors	across	the	knowledge	domain	interact	to	produce	a	system	where	variation	in	use	and	uptake	of	guidelines	exists	despite	the	continued	efforts	from	policy-makers	to	instil	their	use	in	practice.		I	sought	to	identify	what	constitutes	evidence	and	knowledge	for	orthopaedic	clinical	decision-makers	and	how	that	evidence	and	knowledge	can	be	mobilised.		The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	provide	an	overview	of	the	concepts	of	knowledge	and	knowledge	mobilisation	and	the	implications	of	understanding	of	these	concepts	for	healthcare	delivery	and	practice.		This	chapter	introduces	three	theoretical	perspectives	to	explain	knowledge	mobilisation.			
2.2 Definitions	of	knowledge	and	knowing	The	challenge	of	defining	knowledge	has	given	rise	to	a	field	of	philosophy	called	epistemology,	which	investigates	the	theory	of	knowledge.		It	demonstrates	that	the	study	of	knowledge	is	subjective,	context-dependent	and	changeable	(Hislop,	2013;	Ferlie	et	al,	2012;	Crilly	et	al,	2013).		The	Oxford	English	Dictionary	(2015)	defines	knowledge	as:		
“The	fact	or	condition	of	knowing	something:	the	fact	of	knowing	or	being	acquired	with	a	thing	or	person	etc.,	and	
familiarity	gained	by	experiences”	(OED,	2015)		This	definition	implies	that	there	are	several	different	types	of	knowledge	and	that	these	depend	on	our	experiences.		In	the	western	philosophical	tradition,	knowledge	is	described	as	a	justified	true	belief	i.e.,	a	person	who	holds	knowledge	believes	that	it	is	true	(Roberts,	2015).		However,	what	constitutes	a	‘justified	true	belief’	is	open	to	interpretation	and	depends	on	what	we	accept	as	empirical	evidence	and	knowledge.		These	variable	understandings	mean	that	interpretations	can	change	over	time	and	in	different	contexts	(Oborn	et	al,	
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2010;	Crilly	et	al,	2013;	Ferlie	et	al,	2015;	Kislov	et	al,	2014;	Davies	et	al,	2015),	and	knowledge	may	be	viewed	as	socially	constructed	and	variable	between	different	individuals,	organisations	and	contexts.		Policy-makers	promote	clinical	guidelines,	but	if	knowledge	is	a	fundamentally	socially	created	and	dynamic	construct,	then	guidelines	may	not	be	appropriate	in	all	situations.		One	of	the	dominant	themes	in	the	literature	concerns	the	debate	about	‘what	is	knowledge?’	(Crilly	et	al,	2013).		The	terminology	is	not	concrete	and	the	words	‘research’,	‘evidence’	and	‘knowledge’	are	used	often	interchangeably	in	healthcare.		More	commonly,	the	terms	are	viewed	as	existing	in	a	hierarchical	relationship	where	research	is	a	type	of	evidence	and	evidence	is	a	source	of	knowledge	(Nutley	et	al,	2007).		What	is	considered	knowledge	is	highly	contested	and	influenced	by	the	environment	in	which	it	is	used	(Swan	et	al,	2016).		For	example,	power	relationships	can	impact	upon	our	access	to	knowledge	and	the	legitimacy	over	knowledge	claims	(Crilly	et	al,	2013).		This	implies	that	a	rational	definition	and	interpretation	of	knowledge	may	be	inadequate	and	is	too	simplistic	for	my	research	on	the	complexities	of	knowledge	and	evidence	used	in	practice.		More	explanation	and	understanding	is	required	to	demonstrate	how	knowledge	exists	in	various	forms	and	changes	over	time	and	between	contexts.			
2.3 The	characteristics	of	knowledge	and	knowing		
2.3.1 What	is	meant	by	knowledge?		There	has	been	a	preference	to	assume	a	hierarchy	of	knowledge	in	the	academic	literature	(Rowley,	2007),	in	which	data	sits	at	the	lowest	position	and	requires	minimal	human	judgement,	information	sits	in	the	middle,	and	knowledge	and	wisdom	at	the	highest	points	requiring	maximal	judgement	and	interpretation	(Tsoukas	and	Vladimirou,	2001;	Rowley,	2007).		Cook	and	Brown	(1999)	proposed	a	taxonomy	of	four	distinct	types	of	knowledge	(individual,	group,	tacit	and	explicit)	each	equal	to	the	other	three,	and	performing	a	role	that	the	others	
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cannot.		The	difference	between	tacit	and	explicit	knowledge	has	been	discussed	to	a	great	extent	in	the	literature	(Polanyi,	2012;	Nonaka,	1994).		
2.3.1.1 Explicit-Tacit	knowledge		The	distinction	between	the	knowledge	types,	such	as	tacit	and	explicit,	became	a	major	theme	in	the	knowledge	mobilisation	literature	(Nonaka,	1994).		The	term	tacit	knowledge	was	first	introduced	by	Polanyi	in	1958	who	presented	the	idea	that	‘we	know	more	than	we	can	tell’	(Polanyi,	2012).		Tacit	knowledge	can	be	described	as	informal,	as	knowledge	that	people	just	know	and	can	often	find	difficult	to	describe	easily.		For	example	a	surgeon	might	be	able	to	recognise	their	patient	in	a	waiting	room,	but	would	struggle	to	be	able	to	explain	in	words	how	they	recognise	their	face.		According	to	Lam	(2000)	they	are	not	conscious	of	their	knowledge	of	the	individual	features	of	a	patient’s	face,	but	rather	they	recognise	it	as	a	whole,	as	someone	who	is	familiar	to	them.		Explicit	knowledge	on	the	other	hand	is	formal	and	codifiable,	it	can	easily	be	explained	and	possibly	understood	by	another	person	(Hislop,	2013).			Explicit-tacit	knowledge	types	are	linked.		When	an	individual	possesses	knowledge,	it	is	not	‘in’	the	activity	they	are	performing	but	in	the	knowledge	they	use	in	doing	the	activity.		For	example,	a	surgeon	still	possesses	the	tacit	knowledge	of	how	to	perform	an	operation,	even	when	they	are	not	physically	doing	the	activity	in	the	hospital	theatre.		Similarly,	a	trainee	surgeon	may	have	the	explicit	knowledge	to	perform	the	operation,	obtained	from	studying	textbooks.		However,	they	do	not	necessarily	have	the	tacit	knowledge	needed	to	undertake	the	activity	in	the	real	world.		In	order	to	acquire	tacit	knowledge,	the	trainee	needs	to	spend	a	certain	amount	of	time	actually	doing	the	operation,	gaining	procedural	knowledge	and	learning	all	the	complexities	involved,	and	complications	which	might	be	faced.			It	is	generally	easier	to	share	-	or	convey	-	formal,	explicit	knowledge	over	informal	tacit	knowledge.		This	is	because	the	meaning	of	tacit	knowledge	may	not	be	fully	explicable	or	understood	by	others,	which	makes	acting	on	the	knowledge	difficult	(Russell	et	al,	2004).		However,	the	distinction	between	tacit	and	explicit	knowledge	cannot	explain	all	the	necessary	epistemic	work	that	
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individuals	undertake.		The	relationship	between	group	and	individual	knowledge	is	also	important.		
2.3.1.2 Individual-Group	knowledge		There	has	been	a	tendency	to	privilege	individual	over	group	knowledge,	on	the	premise	that	all	learning	takes	place	inside	the	heads	of	individuals.		Hence,	group	knowledge	is	considered	as	fundamentally	made	up	of	lots	of	individuals	who	possess	their	own	knowledge.		This	focus	on	the	individual	has	changed	in	recent	years	with	the	growing	literature	which	treats	groups	and	organisations	as	objects	in	their	own	right	(Davies	et	al,	2015).		Organisations	are	able	to	possess	knowledge	which	is	distinct	from	that	of	its	individual	members	(Brown	and	Duguid,	1991;	Lave	and	Wenger,	1991).			This	literature	investigates	how	individuals	function	as	a	group	by	performing	actions	that	are	characteristic	of	that	group’s	knowledge.		The	group	(not	the	individuals)	is	taken	as	the	primary	unit	of	analysis	and	can	be	examined	(Brown	and	Duguid,	1991;	Lave	and	Wenger,	1991;	Wenger,	1998).		According	to	Cook	and	Brown	(1999),	individuals	and	groups	each	do	epistemic	work	that	the	other	cannot,	for	example,	a	consultant	can	know	how	to	diagnose	a	patient	based	on	their	symptoms,	but	only	the	wider	group	of	surgeons	working	in	England	hold	the	collective	knowledge	of	all	acceptable	surgical	practice	in	England.		The	group	body	of	knowledge	is	held	in	common	by	the	individual	members	of	the	group,	each	one	possessing	bits	of	knowledge	in	their	area	of	expertise	(Blackmore,	2010).		It	is	not	possible	for	individual	members	to	possess	all	the	knowledge	of	their	group.		Instead	members	draw	on	the	body	of	knowledge	to	perform	actions,	in	the	same	way	the	group	draws	on	the	knowledge	to	perform	group	actions	(Lave	and	Wenger,	1991).		This	demonstrates	that	work	done	by	a	group,	informed	by	the	body	of	knowledge	it	possesses,	is	epistemically	distinct	from	work	performed	by	individuals	(Cook	and	Brown,	1999).			
2.3.2 Knowing	as	distinct	knowledge		Orlikowski	(2002)	emphasises	the	role	of	the	person	in	the	activity	to	distinguish	between	knowing	(action,	doing	and	practice)	and	knowledge	(facts	and	processes).		She	suggested	that	embedded	capabilities	were	important,	where	
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knowing	and	doing	are	inextricably	linked.		By	making	this	distinction,	the	human	agency	is	acknowledged	as	an	important	factor.		According	to	Tsoukas	and	Vladimirou	(2001),	individuals	do	not	understand	codified	explicit	knowledge	until	they	are	able	to	test	it	against	their	personal	experience.		People,	therefore	‘know’	by	relating	explicit	knowledge	to	their	particular	circumstance	and	the	contingencies	they	face.				The	act	of	knowing	signifies	an	action	or	a	practice	because	it	is	something	that	people	do,	not	something	they	possess	(Tsoukas	and	Vladimirou,	2001).		If	I	want	to	examine	what	a	clinician	knows,	I	will	have	to	understand	both	what	they	can	do	as	well	as	what	knowledge	they	possess	(Cook	and	Brown,	1999).		Practice	in	this	sense	means	the	real	world	work	of	individuals	and	groups	that	is	informed	by	their	environment,	training	or	organisational	and	group	context.		This	more	inclusive	concept	is	useful	in	my	study	of	healthcare	as	it	includes	not	only	the	knowledge	of	surgery	for	example,	but	the	daily	practice	that	has	evolved	and	is	contributed	to	by	the	individuals	working	in	the	field.	This	distinguishes	knowledge	in	action	and	practice	as	‘knowing’,	compared	to	knowledge	in	possession,	which	is	‘knowledge’.		Both	are	important	to	study	for	people	and	organisations			For	my	research,	knowledge	is	considered	as	the	knowledge	that	an	individual	possesses,	that	is	used	in	practice	to	address	a	particular	problem,	for	example	deciding	on	a	treatment	plan	for	a	patient.		Knowing	requires	an	activity	and	context	and	makes	use	of	knowledge	in	a	productive	and	skilful	way,	for	example,	it	is	knowing	that	enables	a	treatment	plan	to	be	amended,	for	instance	due	to	lack	of	resource	in	a	hip	preservation	clinic.		The	action	of	doing	exemplifies	a	form	of	knowing	which	could	potentially	lead	to	the	production	of	new	knowledge,	such	as	developing	a	new	treatment	protocol	for	community	care	services	outside	the	hospital.			
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2.4 	Theoretical	perspectives	of	knowledge	mobilisation	The	use	or	non-use	of	evidence	in	clinical	decision-making	is	a	knowledge	problem	or	a	problem	related	to	knowledge	mobilisation	(Crilly	et	al,	2010;	2013;	Ferlie	et	al,	2012;	2015).		Variation	in	the	uptake	of	clinical	guidelines	in	practice	is	potentially	a	problem	of	knowledge	acquisition,	mobilisation	and	transfer.		Variation	could	also	be	associated	with	the	way	knowledge	is	privileged	and	adopted	by	individuals	and	groups	within	the	organisation.			The	focus	of	literature	has	moved	away	from	traditional	approaches	which	emphasised	linear,	rational,	instrumental	evidence	transfer	towards	the	broader	field	of	knowledge	mobilisation	(Davies	et	al,	2015).		This	perspective	acknowledges	reported	challenges,	and	incorporates	the	social	and	relational	processes	in	healthcare,	rather	than	excluding	them	(Kislov	et	al,	2014;	Oborn	et	al,	2010).		Many	theoretical	frameworks	have	been	developed	which	aim	to	explain	knowledge	mobilisation	issues.		Those	most	applicable	for	my	research	are	those	that	evolved	from	the	organisational	sciences	field	as	applied	to	healthcare.		Unlike	traditional	clinical	science	models	of	EBM,	theories	from	organisational	sciences	take	the	context	of	practice	into	account.		Using	this	approach	acknowledges	that	clinical	guidelines	are	only	one	source	of	many	types	of	knowledge	that	interact	in	the	social	world	of	healthcare.			The	key	theoretical	frameworks	relating	to	knowledge	mobilisation	are,	clinical	mindlines	(Gabbay	and	Le	May,	2004),	Communities	of	Practice	(CoP)	(Lave	and	Wenger,	1991),	organisational	and	knowledge	boundaries	(Carlile	2002,	2004)	and	capabilities	of	healthcare	organisations	to	absorb	and	use	knowledge	in	practice,	known	as	Absorptive	Capacity	(ACAP)	(Cohen	and	Levinthal	,1989;	1990).		
2.4.1 Replacing	guidelines	with	clinical	mindlines		A	significant	development	in	this	field	was	the	introduction	of	the	concept	of	clinical	mindlines.		Unlike	guidelines,	mindlines	can	be	used	to	reflect	the	amalgamation	of	knowledge,	experience	and	evidence	that	exist	in	real	world	decision-making	(Gabbay	and	Le	May,	2004).		The	authors	defined	mindlines	as:			
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"The	internalised,	collectively	reinforced	tacit	guidelines	that	are	informed	by	clinicians	training,	own	and	each	others	
experience,	interactions	with	role	sets,	reading,	how	they	have	learnt	to	handle	conflicting	demands	and	by	their	
understanding	of	local	circumstance	and	systems"	(Gabbay	and	Le	May,	2004)		Mindlines	are	an	all-encompassing	concept	and	have	been	the	focus	of	much	research	in	the	past	decade	(Wieringa	and	Greenhalgh,	2015).		They	demonstrate	a	more	flexible,	complex,	and	adaptable	approach	to	evidence	and	knowledge	compared	to	clinical	guidelines.		They	incorporate	clinicians’	multiple	roles,	values,	past	training	and	experience	(Gabbay	and	Le	May,	2011).		According	to	Gabbay	and	Le	May	(2011)	mindlines	develop	in	medical	training	but	are	continuously	developed,	amended,	refined	and	reinforced	through	a	clinician’s	career	in	conjunction	with	their	experience	and	contact	with	others.		This	flexibility	allows	the	collective	experience	of	a	group	to	be	considered	as	an	additional	source	of	evidence	to	influence	decisions.		The	same	could	be	suggested	for	the	influence	of	the	wider	organisational,	political	and	contextual	factors.		These	are	the	issues	that	critics	of	EBM	reported	were	missing	in	the	traditional	approach	(Dopson	and	Fitzgerald,	2005;	Timmermans	and	Berg,	2010;	Greenhalgh	et	al,	2014).		Since	mindlines	can	include	multiple	sources	of	evidence,	they	reportedly	give	clinicians	the	capability	to	make	decisions	that	consider	more	than	just	technical	and	clinical	elements	(Gabbay	and	Le	May,	2011).		Clinicians	become	more	flexible	to	change,	and	generate	new	knowledge	and	continue	to	improve	their	performance	by	reflecting	on	their	decisions	and	outcomes	(Gabbay	and	Le	May,	2011).		This	reinforced	and	embedded	knowledge	therefore	allows	clinicians	to	function	by	giving	them	a	sense	of	who	they	are,	what	they	need	to	do	and	how	all	the	potential	sources	of	evidence	fit	into	their	practice	(Wieringa	and	Greenhalgh,	2015).		The	mindline	approach	is	interesting.		However,	mindlines	are	challenging	to	identify,	as	they	are	not	concrete	objects	and	cannot	be	easily	traced	and	understood.			Clinicians	are	reported	to	develop	collective	mindlines,	which	are	shared	across	their	professional	networks	and	groups.		The	collective	mindline	establishes	boundaries	around	what	is	valued	and	considered	evidence	and	knowledge	
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within	the	group	(Gabbay	and	Le	May,	2011).		So	not	only	is	it	challenging	to	identify	an	individual	mindline,	it	may	be	problematic	to	reveal	how	collective	mindlines,	like	the	legitimate	knowledge	present	in	Communities	of	Practice,	influence	clinical	practice	within	orthopaedic	surgery.			The	key	point	here	is	that	clinicians	supposedly	default	to	mindlines	when	making	decisions	or	when	their	practice	is	challenged.		However,	it	does	not	predict	that	mindlines	are	fixed.		According	to	Gabbay	and	Le	May	(2011)	new	knowledge	created	through	mindlines	does	not	replace	the	knowledge	that	went	before.		Instead	it	becomes	integrated.		However,	the	stickiness	of	this	experiential	knowledge	means	that	‘bad’	ideas	can	also	spread	between	individuals	and	groups	working	in	healthcare.		Unlike	guidelines,	mindlines	are	not	right	or	wrong,	good	or	bad,	they	develop	as	required.			Mindlines	are	created	as	part	of	a	continual	social	process	of	negotiation	between	clinicians	(Gabbay	and	Le	May,	2011).		This	process	may	result	in	multiple	sources	of	evidence	and	knowledge	linked	to	the	contingent	requirements	of	the	environment.		What	is	important	to	consider	in	decision-making	for	one	surgeon	at	one	point	in	time	may	not	be	relevant	later.		The	negotiation	process	can	transform	explicit	knowledge	from	research	evidence	into	knowledge	that	is	internalised	in	mindlines	so	that	they	are	useful	in	practice	(May	et	al,	2006).		Over	time,	surgeons	could	favour	or	privilege	these	different	sources	of	evidence	over	others	available	to	them.		In	this	sense,	they	create	their	own	hierarchy	of	evidence	which	incorporates	their	mindlines.		This	hierarchy	could	help	broker	the	sources	of	evidence	important	during	decision-making.		However,	this	knowledge	mobilisation	process	is	unpredictable,	sometimes	unplanned	and	lacks	transparency.				
2.4.2 Legitimate	Peripheral	Participation	and	Communities	of	Practice		The	principal	assumption	of	this	theory	is	that	people	learn	through	a	process	of	participation	in	group	situations.		This	takes	precedence	over	the	one-way	flow	of	information	from	clinical	guidelines.		Although	this	theory	was	not	developed	in	the	context	of	healthcare,	it	is	highly	applicable	to	my	research.		Lave	and	
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Wenger’s	(1991)	instrumental	book	entitled	‘Situated	learning:	legitimate	peripheral	participation’	depict	how	individuals	learn	new	knowledge.				They	suggest	that	in	order	to	absorb	and	mobilise	knowledge,	the	person	who	is	acquiring	knowledge	needs	to	do	more	than	observe	a	group	in	action.		The	aim	of	knowledge	mobilisation	in	Communities	of	Practice	(CoP)	is	via	active	participation.		Individuals	learn	by	absorbing	and	being	absorbed	into	the	context	and	culture	of	a	group.		Over	time,	these	contexts	and	cultures	become	embedded,	and	the	individual	can	intuitively	understand	what	it	is	to	be	part	of	the	community	(Lave	and	Wenger,	1991).		This	type	of	learning	occurs	beyond	the	context	of	the	individual	at	one	point	in	time,	as	it	takes	into	account	wider	cultural	practices	and	the	norms	of	the	group.		Therefore,	it	is	said	to	alter	the	identity	and	skills	of	individuals	(Lave	and	Wenger,	1991).			Legitimate	Peripheral	Participation	(LPP)	is	a	method	of	active	learning	in	context	and	is	important	in	the	hospital	setting,	as	clinicians	in	communities	exist	in	a	constantly	changing	environment	where	NHS	hospital	staff,	infrastructure,	resources	and	systems	are	unstable	(Walshe	and	Davies,	2013).		Therefore,	knowledge	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	clinician	is	constantly	changing,	gets	renegotiated	and	is	updated	in	an	endless	cycle	with	the	social	environment	(Timmermans	and	Kolker,	2004).		The	negotiation	and	renegotiation	of	the	meaning	of	knowledge	and	evidence	is	important	as	it	suggests	that	experience	and	behaviour	constantly	interact	with	meaning.		Knowledge	that	develops	has	a	particular	meaning	for	the	individual,	but	is	also	reproduced	in	the	wider	community.		In	this	sense,	Lave	and	Wenger	(1991)	suggest	that	legitimate	peripheral	participation	is:			
"both	the	development	of	knowledgeably	skilled	identities	in	practice	and	the	reproduction	and	transformation	of	
communities	of	practices"	(Lave	and	Wenger,	1991).			Learning	and	developing	knowledge	allow	a	person	to	become	a	member	of	the	community,	but	when	knowledge	is	owned	by	the	community	as	a	whole	it	can	be	sustained	and	reproduced	in	the	environment.		Group	knowledge	can	be	transferred	from	old	to	new	members	through	learning	(Lave	and	Wenger,	
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1991).		The	characteristics	of	the	group	reflect	the	social	context	in	which	the	CoP	is	located	(e.g.,	academic	clinicians	may	be	more	likely	to	work	in	a	University	hospital	and	form	a	CoP	around	the	use	of	clinical	trials).		Lave	and	Wenger	(1991)	referred	to	this	continual	process	of	knowledge	mobilisation	in	context	as	a	generative	process	of	a	CoP	producing	their	own	future.			I	have	highlighted	that	the	shared	understanding,	norms	and	values	of	groups	are	important	for	obtaining	membership	of	the	community.		This	notion	is	transferable	to	healthcare	settings	where	strong	occupational	groups	exist	and	where	clinicians	develop	natural	epistemic	communities	around	their	clinical	specialties	and	professional	roles	(Crilly	et	al,	2010;	Kislov	et	al,	2011;	Kirmayer,	2012).		In	my	empirical	work,	examining	knowledge	use	in	practice	will	be	important	to	reveal	how	CoP	reinforce	their	knowledge	and	shape	the	behaviour	and	actions	of	their	community	members	(Szulanski,	2000).		This	theory	is	important	for	my	research	as	it	acknowledges	the	importance	of	the	interactions	between	the	individual,	the	activity	(the	clinical	decision)	and	knowledge	and	knowing	in	the	social	world.		
2.4.3 Knowledge	boundaries	and	boundary	spanning		Not	all	groups	within	organisations	are	CoP	(Oborn	and	Dawson,	2010a).		Some	groups	might	work	together	because	of	an	organisational	or	professional	association;	they	represent	a	functional	group	(Oborn	and	Dawson,	2010b).		Divides	between	these	groups	are	often	referred	to	as	cross-community	boundaries	(Hislop,	2013).		The	collaboration	and	knowledge	mobilisation	that	occurs	between	functional	groups	is	known	as	boundary	spanning	(Carlile,	2004).		It	describes	how	individuals	who	sit	on	either	side	of	a	theoretical	or	practical	boundary	have	divergent	identities	and	knowledge	that	can	be	bridged	by	spanning	the	boundary.				
2.4.3.1 Knowledge	sharing	between	functional	groups		Carlile	(2002)	describes	the	divide	between	functional	groups	as	a	knowledge	dimension	and	suggests	that	the	characteristics	of	knowledge	are	important	for	knowledge	mobilisation.		In	my	study,	functional	groups	could	be	managers	and	clinicians,	or	distinct	groups	of	clinicians	such	as	orthopaedic	surgeons.		They	
	 31	
could	even	extend	to	policy-makers	and	whole	hospital	organisations.		Each	one	of	these	groups	could	have	distinct	interpretations	of	what	knowledge	is.			The	identities	that	people	have	in	the	groups	or	contexts	influence	the	dynamics	and	interpersonal	relationships	that	develop.		Consequently,	these	impact	on	the	inter-personal	knowledge	processes	(Carlile,	2002).		The	knowledge	processes	between	different	contexts	and	functional	groups	are	likely	to	be	more	complex	and	challenging	to	manage	compared	to	those	that	exist	within	a	CoP.		This	is	because	identities,	meanings	and	interpretations	are	not	shared	in	the	same	way.			Nevertheless,	collaboration	between	individuals	and	groups	is	required	for	organisations	such	as	hospitals	to	function.		We	cannot	expect	entire	organisations	to	develop	as	a	CoP.		To	understand	knowledge	mobilisation	in	healthcare,	it	is	important	to	understand	how	knowledge	can	be	shared	across	boundaries	and	how	the	lack	of	common	knowledge	and	shared	identity	shapes	knowledge	dynamics.		The	contextual	nature	of	knowledge	develops	within	distinct	functions	of	an	organisation	because	each	function	has	a	specific	focus,	distinctive	problems	and	localised	practices	that	become	the	norm	(Carlile,	2002).		This	implies	that	what	works	for	the	surgeon	may	not	necessarily	work	for	a	finance	manager	within	the	same	organisation.		Collaboration	across	the	distinct	functional	boundaries,	for	example	to	purchase	hip	replacement	prosthesis	constitutes	a	boundary	spanning	process.		The	delivery	of	healthcare	services	involves	multidisciplinary	cross	professional	collaboration.			The	knowledge	base	of	an	organisation	can,	be	considered	as	made	up	of	a	variety	of	localised	groups.		The	difference	in	the	knowledge	of	these	groups	could	lead	to	variation	in	the	practice	of	group	members.		Groups	can	have	some	over-lapping	knowledge,	but	there	will	be	one	who	potentially	possess	more	specialised	and	specific	knowledge	about	a	topic	compared	to	another	(Hislop,	2013).		The	idea	that	knowledge	can	be	mobilised	using	a	boundary	spanning	approach	suggests	that	the	fragmented	knowledge	of	the	distinct	groups	could	be	integrated,	to	achieve	a	specified	goal.			
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2.4.3.2 Knowledge	processes	across	boundaries		Members	of	CoP	share	a	tacit	understanding	of	knowledge	processes	which	makes	knowledge	sharing	easier	(Van	Den	Hooff	et	al,	2003).		When	examining	functional	groups	who	work	across	boundaries,	knowledge	processes	are	not	as	straightforward.		Individuals	working	in	large	hospitals	might	not	necessarily	have	common	knowledge,	similar	values	and	shared	identity.		This	can	lead	to	ineffective	knowledge	mobilisation,	as	the	social	relations	between	individuals	who	are	not	members	of	the	same	group	are	less	conducive	to	effective	knowledge	sharing	(Currie	and	White,	2012).				There	are	two	key	factors	that	make	the	process	of	cross-boundary	knowledge	sharing	challenging	for	healthcare	and	particularly	for	orthopaedic	surgery.		These	are	the	weak	shared	sense	of	identity	between	groups,	and	the	difference	in	the	accepted	and	privileged	knowledge	of	each	boundary	group	(Hislop,	2013).	The	epistemic	differences	between	the	groups	in	my	research	may	also	limit	knowledge	sharing	that	takes	place,	for	example	between	managers,	clinicians	and	administrative	staff	(Jacobson,	2007).		This	is	because	the	different	knowledge	types	are	based	on	different	assumptions,	values	and	world	views	about	what	is	true	and	correct	(Jacobson,	2007).			
2.4.3.3 Different	types	of	boundaries		The	different	types	of	boundary	which	have	to	be	crossed	are	also	important	for	knowledge	mobilisation	and	are	worthy	of	investigation.		Three	distinct	boundary	categories	have	been	described	in	the	literature	(Carlile,	2004).				
Syntactic	boundaries	are	presumed	to	be	the	easiest	to	cross	because	individuals	share	a	common	set	of	ideas	and	values	(Carlile,	2004).		This	boundary	describes	knowledge	sharing	between	two	surgeons	in	the	same	specialty	who	mobilise	knowledge	and	information	together	with	ease.		The	second	type	of	boundary	is	called	a	semantic	boundary.		Knowledge	sharing	here	is	slightly	more	challenging.		People	on	either	side	of	this	boundary	do	not	share	the	same	identity	or	values	of	practice,	and	this	leads	to	differences	in	interpretation	and	understanding	of	the	same	information	(Carlile,	2004),	e.g.,	the	knowledge	contained	in	a	clinical	guideline.		The	most	complex	boundary	is	the	pragmatic	
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boundary	(Carlile,	2004).		This	type	of	boundary	is	problematic	because	individuals	have	significantly	different	views	and	beliefs	about	knowledge,	and	also	contrasting	interpretations	of	the	politics	of	practice	and	of	how	work	should	be	conducted	(Currie	et	al,	2007).		Knowledge	mobilisation	across	pragmatic	boundaries	is	not	easy	to	achieve,	as	both	sides	are	invested	in	their	way	of	thinking	and	behaving,	and	knowledge	sharing	is	restricted	(Kimble	et	al,	2010).				A	key	factor	in	all	three	boundaries	described	by	Carlile	(2004)	is	the	ability	to	work	across	the	boundary	through	the	introduction	of	a	common	ground.		This	could	be	an	object,	a	specific	knowledge	artefact	or	a	knowledge	broker,	e.g.,	an	individual	with	knowledge	and	identify	across	both	sides	of	the	boundary.		These	knowledge	objects	or	brokers	can	act	as	a	vehicle	to	help	smooth	the	crossing	of	boundaries	because	groups	perceive	themselves	to	be	equal	from	both	sides	(Star	and	Griesemer,	1989).		In	this	sense,	boundaries	do	not	always	have	to	engender	the	identity	and	epistemic	challenges	described	earlier,	if	groups	can	develop	a	shared	understanding	or	aim.		However,	in	practice	it	might	be	difficult	to	achieve	when	common	knowledge	is	absent,	for	example	when	evidence-based	knowledge	is	in	direct	competition	with	the	practice-based	knowledge	of	clinicians.				Knowledge	mobilisation	is	nevertheless	necessary	for	healthcare	and	is	fundamental	for	the	effective	use	of	clinical	guidelines	in	practice.		Hence,	focusing	on	understanding	and	improving	the	interaction	and	communication	that	takes	place	across	knowledge	boundaries	will	be	important	for	my	research.		Effective	knowledge	mobilisation	implies	those	involved	in	healthcare	appreciate	and	are	accepting	of	the	differences	in	perspectives	and	knowledge	which	exist	in	the	real	world	NHS.		
2.4.4 Absorptive	capacity	and	the	capabilities	of	healthcare	organisations	
to	mobilise	knowledge		The	theory	of	Absorptive	Capacity	(ACAP)	is	recommended	as	a	way	of	encouraging	knowledge	mobilisation	in	organisations.		It	focuses	on	the	ability	of	
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an	organisation	to	identify,	assimilate,	value,	transform	and	exploit	new	knowledge	from	its	environment	(Easterby-Smith	et	al,	2008,	Oborn	et	al,	2013a).		ACAP	can	be	applied	to	various	units	of	analysis,	including	groups	of	surgeons,	departments,	or	the	entire	hospital	organisation.		ACAP	originated	from	the	study	of	innovation	and	learning	within	organisations	(Cohen	and	Levinthal,	1989).		The	theory	implies	that	organisations	should	strive	to	increase	their	ACAP	because	they	will	be	in	a	better	position	to	obtain	and	understand	external	sources	of	evidence	and	knowledge	to	support	their	work	(Cohen	and	Levinthal,	1989).		ACAP	predicts	that	the	cost	of	obtaining	external	knowledge	is	small	when	the	organisation	has	invested	resources	(such	as	time	and	money	in	staff	training)	to	develop	its	skill	in	identifying,	assimilating	and	exploiting	knowledge	from	the	environment	(Cohen	and	Levinthal,	1989).			ACAP	may	be	particularly	salient	for	healthcare.		However,	Easterby-Smith	and	colleagues	(2008)	argue	that	the	literature	has	failed	to	develop	insights	into	the	processes	of	ACAP.		They	suggest	that	a	process	perspective	on	ACAP	should	include	the	role	of	power	in	how	knowledge	is	absorbed	by	organisations,	and	should	provide	better	understanding	of	the	nature	of	boundaries	within	and	around	organisations	(Easterby-Smith	et	al,	2008).			
2.4.4.1 The	ACAP	framework		A	framework	to	represent	the	theory	of	understanding	ACAP	was	developed	by	Zahra	and	George	(2002)	(see	Figure	2).		This	framework	presents	four	components	of	ACAP	that	are	important	for	knowledge	mobilisation.		This	warrants	its	inclusion	in	my	study.		These	distinctive	components	can	help	to	explain	the	variation	found	in	knowledge	mobilisation	in	healthcare.		The	components	are:	•	Identifying	and	accessing	relevant	knowledge	in	the	environment	•	Analysing	and	interpreting	new	knowledge	through	assimilation		•	Integrating	new	knowledge	with	existing	knowledge		
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•	Transforming	the	knowledge	within	the	organisation	(Zahra	and	George,	2002).		
	
Figure	2.		A	framework	to	represent	the	theory	of	ACAP	(adapted	from	Zahra	and	George,	2002)		Zahra	and	George	(2002)	proposed	two	further	types	of	ACAP.		Potential	Absorptive	Capacity	(PACAP)	which	represents	an	organisation’s	ability	to	acquire	and	assimilate	knowledge,	and	Realised	Absorptive	Capacity	(RACAP),	which	represents	the	organisation’s	skill	at	putting	new	knowledge	into	practice	through	the	process	of	transformation	and	exploitation.		The	overarching	aim	of	the	organisation	is	to	close	the	gap	between	potential	and	realised	ACAP.		In	order	to	achieve	this,	a	hospital	or	department	has	to	understand	their	organisational	capabilities	(Volberda	et	al,	2010).		These	are	the	factors	that	allow	knowledge	to	be	assimilated,	understood	and	used	in	healthcare	practice.		
2.4.4.2 Organisational	capabilities		Organisational	capabilities	describe	the	capabilities	or	tools	that	an	organisation	such	as	a	hospital	requires	to	enable	it	to	obtain	and	exploit	knowledge	from	its	environment	(Volderba	et	al,	2010).		Capabilities	allow	new	sources	of	knowledge	to	be	identified,	incorporated	and	used	within	the	organisation.		Volderba	and	colleagues	(2010)	described	three	tools	which	could	be	used	to	improve	organisational	capabilities.		These	are	co-ordination,	systems	and	socialisation	capabilities	(Volderba	et	al,	2010).		Co-ordination	capabilities	are	the	skills	owned	by	staff	members	who	work	in	the	organisation.		In	my	study,	this	may	be	the	communication	skills	or	the	education	and	training	of	clinicians	and	staff.	The	use	of	boundary	spanners,	and	networked	CoP	may	also	increase	co-ordination	capability	by	increasing	the	use	of	decentralised	authority	(Waring	et	al,	2014).			
Knowledge	sourceExperience PotentialAcquisitionAssimilation RealisedTransformationExploitation Competitive	advantage
Absorptive	capacity
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Systems	capabilities,	on	the	other	hand,	represent	formal	knowledge	of	an	organisation	and	can	include	policies,	procedures	and	clinical	pathways	aimed	at	transferring	codified	knowledge	across	the	organisation	(Volderba	et	al,	2010).	Systems	capabilities	can,	however,	limit	the	discovery	of	new	knowledge	because	staff	become	fixated	on	maintaining	procedures	and	regulating	the	behaviour	of	individuals,	rather	than	searching	for	new	information	elsewhere	(Waring	et	al,	2014).		Therefore,	the	way	in	which	the	knowledge	is	created	and	shared	within	the	organisation	may	influence	whether	it	is	used	or	not.		Finally,	socialisation	capabilities	reflect	the	cultural	factors	within	the	organisation	which	influence	knowledge	sharing.		They	represent	the	shared	norms	and	understandings	of	people	working	in	an	organisation	(Volderba	et	al,	2010).		As	expected,	staff	with	similar	norms	and	understanding	are	better	able	to	transform	and	exploit	new	knowledge	as	they	have	the	same	frame	of	reference.		However,	as	mentioned	previously,	norms	can	also	limit	knowledge	mobilisation	when	they	restrict	knowledge	assimilation	because	it	does	not	fit	with	what	is	expected	(Volderba	et	al,	2010).			According	to	Cohen	and	Levinthal	(1990)	it	is	easier	to	absorb	external	knowledge	when	it	is	linked	to	knowledge	that	already	exists	in	the	organisation.		To	improve	this	process	an	organisation	needs	to	be	able	to	appreciate	and	understand	the	potential	value	of	the	new	external	knowledge	for	their	current	situation,	e.g.,	why	would	the	NICE	guidance	help	them	in	their	practice?		It	will	be	important	to	examine	and	understand	the	system	and	wider	organisational	cultures	of	the	hospitals	in	the	empirical	setting	to	examine	the	organisational	knowledge	and	how	it	is	used.			To	improve	knowledge	sharing	within	hospitals,	it	is	necessary	to	recognise	the	different	processes	(i.e.,	capabilities)	underlying	internal	and	external	drivers	of	knowledge	and	the	interactions	between	them.		In	a	similar	way	to	the	concept	of	clinical	mindlines,	ACAP	is	not	an	object	that	can	be	explicitly	examined	in	isolation.		The	context	of	study	is	important	and	this	needs	to	be	measured	and	captured.		The	external	environment	may	also	determine	incentives	for	
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improving	ACAP,	for	example,	local	competition	between	hospitals	and	new	regulations	may	restrict	or	facilitate	ACAP	activities.		The	internal	environment	is	similarly	important	as	it	will	potentially	influence	the	efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	organisational	ACAP,	but	it	may	also	constrain	what	knowledge	can	be	integrated	and	used.		In	order	to	focus	on	knowledge	mobilisation,	organisations	might	need	to	move	away	from	rigid	structures	towards	a	more	flexible	approach.		A	focus	on	ACAP	could	influence	the	strategies	that	hospital	managers	tend	to	adopt	to	change	the	existing	structures	and	processes	towards	learning	and	innovation.	
2.5 Chapter	summary	The	epistemological	debates	surrounding	knowledge	and	knowing	may,	at	first	glance,	seem	inappropriate	for	the	study	of	how	surgeons	working	in	the	NHS	make	decisions	for	patients.		However,	it	is	essential	for	me	to	ground	the	research	in	the	theoretical	understanding	of	what	knowledge	is	and	how	it	is	mobilised.		The	use	of	evidence	in	clinical	decision-making	for	orthopaedic	surgery	is	a	knowledge	problem,	as	variation	has	been	found	in	the	process	of	knowledge	acquisition,	the	way	evidence	and	knowledge	are	mobilised	in	hospitals	and	the	knowledge	brokering	that	occurs	in	individual	surgeons’	heads	(Grove	et	al,	2016).		Each	of	these	may	be	important	for	understanding	variation	in	practice.			An	outcome	could	be	a	clinical	decision	or	new	innovations,	new	knowledge	or	new	products	or	new	ways	of	using	knowledge	which	neither	tacit	nor	explicit	knowledge	could		have	produced	in	isolation.		It	is	the	context	of	clinical	practice,	the	interaction	with	the	social	and	physical	environment,	which	is	important	for	my	research,	as	clinical	decisions	are	made	in	complex	social	and	physical	environments.		This	leads	to	questions	about	how	organisations	such	as	hospitals	can	encourage	the	sharing	of	knowledge,	including	evidence-based	guidelines,	across	individuals	and	groups.		It	will	also	be	important	during	my	empirical	work	to	try	to	understand	how	to	create	the	social	or	contextual	situations	which	can	support	surgeons,	working	in	hospitals,	to	develop	new	ways	of	knowing	and	new	ways	of	practising	that	are	inclusive	of	EBM.		
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	The	theoretical	perspectives	introduced	in	this	chapter	have	been	developed	to	explain	and	improve	knowledge	mobilisation	between	individuals	and	groups	and	in	organisations.		The	aim	of	including	these	theories	was	to	provide	a	context	and	background	from	which	to	develop	my	empirical	research.		I	described	clinical	mindlines,	Communities	of	Practice,	organisational	knowledge,	boundary	spanning	and	Absorptive	Capacity.		The	theories	of	knowledge	mobilisation	are	clearly	useful	and	applicable	to	my	study,	specifically	because	they	take	account	of	context,	rather	than	excluding	context.		They	help	us	to	understand	how	healthcare	organisations	can	encourage	the	sharing	of	knowledge	among	individuals	and	groups.		Theories	facilitate	ideas	about	the	creation	of	social	or	contextual	situations	which	support	people	and	organisations	to	develop	new	ways	of	knowing	and	new	ways	of	practising	knowledge	mobilisation	in	healthcare.			The	next	chapter	introduces	the	research	questions	and	research	methods	for	my	empirical	work.					 	
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3 Research	Methods		
3.1 Introduction		In	this	chapter	I	present	my	research	questions	and	objectives.		I	begin	by	outlining	the	study	setting	and	my	epistemological	approach.		I	describe	my	research	methods	and	the	methodological	approaches	taken	to	achieve	each	research	objective.		I	provide	a	detailed	account	of	the	stages	of	the	case	study	method.		I	end	the	chapter	by	outlining	the	data	collected	and	the	analysis	techniques	I	used.		
3.1.1 Research	questions,	objectives	and	study	outline		This	study	has	three	research	questions,	and	three	research	objectives	which	were	developed	to	answer	the	questions.		They	are	displayed	in	Table	1.		
Table	1.		Research	questions	and	research	objectives	
Research	questions		
RQ1	
What	types	of	evidence	and	knowledge	are	considered	important	by	orthopaedic	surgeons	when	making	clinical	practice	decisions?	
RQ2	
How	are	evidence	and	knowledge	mobilised	in	the	real-world	practice	of	orthopaedic	surgery	in	the	NHS?	
RQ3	
What	are	the	key	dimensions	of	knowledge	mobilisation	which	influence	variation	in	decision-making	in	the	orthopaedic	surgery	NHS	environment?	
Research	objectives		
1	 To	undertake	observations	and	interviews	with	orthopaedic	surgeons	and	associated	staff	working	in	the	NHS	in	England,	and	analysis	of	associated	documentation,	to	identify	what	types	and	evidence	and	knowledge	are	considered	important	for	decision-making.	
2	 To	integrate	the	findings	from	three	case	studies	of	clinical	practice	to	develop	a	framework	to	understand	knowledge	mobilisation	in	the	context	of	UK	orthopaedic	surgery	decision-making.	
3	 To	generate	themes	which	summarise	where,	when	and	how	evidence	and	knowledge	are	used	in	decision-making,	and	to	describe	where	the	mobilisation	of	knowledge	has	the	greatest	influence	on	variation	in	practice.		
3.2 Study	methodology		In	order	to	conduct	the	empirical	work,	it	was	important	to	consider	three	elements	of	the	research	methodology.		These	are	the	philosophical	assumptions	
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about	what	constitutes	knowledge	claims,	the	strategies	of	inquiry	(e.g.,	qualitative,	quantitative	and	mixed	methods)	and	the	detailed	procedures	of	the	research	(Crotty,	1998;	Creswell,	2009).	
3.2.1 Philosophical	assumptions			A	knowledge	claim	implies	that	the	individual	conducting	research	holds	certain	assumptions	about	how	knowledge	is	developed	and	what	will	be	learnt	during	the	process.		These	philosophical	assumptions	are	referred	to	as	epistemologies	and	ontologies	(Crotty,	1998).		Ontology	is	a	claim	about	a	worldview,	i.e.,	what	knowledge	is,	whereas	epistemology	describes	how	we	know	what	we	know.		It	is	made	up	of	our	values	or	axiologies	(Creswell,	2009).		My	research	takes	a	pragmatic	stance	as	it	uses	methods	deemed	appropriate	for	understanding	the	real	world	variation	in	the	mobilisation	of	knowledge	and	evidence	used	in	decision-making	in	orthopaedic	surgery.			At	the	beginning	of	the	work	I	did	not	set	out	to	conduct	the	research	through	a	particular	theoretical	lens.		Nevertheless,	it	is	important	to	recognise	that	my	research	questions	and	objectives	align	to	a	constructivist	understanding	as	I	seek	to	explore	the	meanings	that	groups	of	NHS	staff	hold	towards	different	forms	of	evidence	and	knowledge	in	practice.		The	traditional	constructivist	approaches	in	qualitative	research	assume	that	truths	are	socially	constructed	and	do	not	exist	separately	from	the	subjective	interpretation	of	a	person	(Sale	et	al,	2002).			By	taking	a	pragmatic	approach	to	the	work,	I	anticipated	that	the	most	appropriate	theories	would	be	induced	from	the	data.		At	the	same	time,	they	would	be	deduced	from	previous	literature	and	existing	theories	described	in	the	literature	reviews.		Consequently,	my	pragmatic	research	approach	is	abductive	in	nature	(Mantere	and	Ketokivi,	2013).		The	structuring	of	my	data	and	findings	will	be	influenced	by	existing	literature	and	theories	of	knowledge	mobilisation	described	in	the	literature	review	(Chapter	2).		I	take	both	objectivist	and	interpretivist	assumptions	at	face	value	(Pratt,	2009).		This		enabled	me	to	combine	the	multiple	representations	experienced	by	staff	at	each	of	the	Trusts.		
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I	was	able	to	group	these	with	my	own	perspectives	and	understanding	of	the	context.		This	idea	of	multiple	representations	and	experiences	is	important	in	the	pragmatic	approach	and	it	emphasises	the	key	role	of	context	in	my	study,	for	example,	how	context	interacts	with	knowledge	mobilisation	in	practice.		Ultimately	this	approach	helped	me	to	understand	real-world	phenomena	as	they	unfolded	throughout	the	research	(Johnson	and	Onwuegbuzie,	2004).		
3.2.2 Strategies	of	enquiry	and	research	design		Mixed	methods	approaches	are	becoming	increasingly	popular	to	investigate	complex	phenomena	(Creswell,	2009).		In	this	research,	I	used		a	mixed	qualitative	design.	I	chose	to	combine	and	interpret	the	findings	of	different	methods	together	throughout	the	case	studies.		All	strategies	of	enquiry	have	limitations.		Using	mixed	methods	helped	to	reduce	the	biases	of	a	single	method	by	overcoming	the	weaknesses	inherent	in	any	one	particular	qualitative	method.		Together	the	mixed	methods	approach	helped	to	expand	my	understanding	from	one	method	to	another,	for	example	allowing	sense	checking	of	data	from	observations	during	the	interviews,	and	in	combining	or	corroborating	findings	from	different	data	sources	across	cases	(Jick,	1979).			I	chose	qualitative	methods	for	the	empirical	work	because	they	allowed	me	to	account	for	the	subjective	attitudes	and	beliefs	of	staff,	and	to	explore	the	context	of	organisational	norms	that	influence	the	delivery	of	orthopaedics	services.		I	considered	my	research	findings	in	the	context	of	each	of	the	individual	services	to	contextualise	them	in	terms	of	the	knowledge,	theory	and	practice	that	were	elucidated	through	my	literature	review.			Three	procedures	for	mixing	methods	have	been	developed,	these	are	termed	sequential,	concurrent	and	transformative	study	designs	(Creswell,	2009;	Tashakkori	and	Teddlie,	2003).		Each	design	differs	in	the	priority	it	gives	to	the	data	type,	the	sequence	of	data	collection	and	the	time	at	which	the	data	integration	occurs,	they	are	described	in	Table	2.	
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Table	2.		Four	general	strategies	for	mixed	methods	research	(Creswell	2009)	
Strategy		 Approach		 Description		
Sequential	
Explanatory	 The	collection	and	analysis	of	quantitative	data	followed	by	qualitative	data.	Priority	is	given	to	quantitative	data	and	qualitative	data	is	used	to	explain	and	interpret	the	quantitative	findings.	Integration	occurs	during	interpretation	of	results	Exploratory	 The	collection	and	analysis	of	qualitative	data	followed	by	quantitative	data.	Priority	is	given	to	qualitative	data	to	explore	a	phenomenon	or	test	a	theory.	Integration	occurs	during	interpretation	of	results		
Concurrent	
Triangulation	 Methods	are	selected	to	cross-validate	or	corroborate	findings	within	a	study	to	overcome	the	weaknesses	within	one	method.	Equal	priority	is	given	to	the	methods	and	the	integration	occurs	during	the	interpretation	phase.	This	helps	to	explain	convergence	of	the	findings	to	strengthen	knowledge	claims,	or	helps	explain	why	there	is	lack	of	convergence		Nested		 Both	types	of	data	are	collected	simultaneously,	but	one	method	is	selected	as	predominant	and	guides	the	study.	The	method	with	less	priority	is	nested	within	the	research.	The	data	are	mixed	during	analysis.	The	aim	is	to	give	a	broader	perspective	as	a	result	of	using	different	methods		
Transformative	
Sequential		 Either	data	collection	method	can	be	used	first,	but	one	occurs	prior	to	the	other.	Generally	a	theoretical	perspective	guides	the	study	and	helps	to	better	understand	a	phenomenon.		Integration	occurs	during	interpretation	of	results			Concurrent	 The	types	of	data	are	collected	at	the	same	time	during	one	data	collection	phase	and	may	have	equal	or	unequal	priority.		The	integration	of	the	data	occurs	during	the	analysis	phase		I	selected	a	concurrent	triangulation	strategy	as	all	the	data	were	collected	simultaneously	within	each	case.		Even	though	the	cases	were	entirely	qualitative,	the	approach	to	mixing	qualitative	methods	aligns	to	the	general	strategy	outlined	by	Creswell	(2009)	and	provided	a	helpful	framework	to	follow.		This	design	combines	three	types	of	qualitative	data	and	each	type	was	treated	equally	in	the	analysis	where	appropriate.		A	diagrammatic	representation	of	the	study	design	is	presented	in	Figure	3.		
	 43	
	
Figure	3.		Diagrammatic	representation	of	the	study	design	used	during	primary	data	collection			In	this	design,	the	data	is	integrated	during	the	interpretation	phase	of	the	research.		The	process	of	integration	and	interpretation	helps	to	explain	the	convergence	of	the	findings	within	and	across	the	cases,	therefore	strengthening	the	knowledge	claims.		It	can	also	help	to	explain	why	a	lack	convergence	or	deviant	instances	might	occur	across	findings.		The	purpose	of	mixing	the	qualitative	methods	was	to	measure	the	overlapping	but	also	different	aspects	of	decision-making	within	orthopaedic	surgery.		According	to	Greene	and	colleagues	(1989),	this	process	helps	to	ensure	an	enriched	and	elaborated	understanding	of	the	phenomenon.			In	this	section	I	have	outlined	my	epistemological	approach	and	have	described	the	rationale,	structure	and	design	of	the	research.		The	next	section	will	provide	a	more	detailed	description	of	the	study	and	the	methodological	approaches	taken	to	achieve	each	research	objective.		
3.3 	Individual	research	components		This	section	presents	a	detailed	description	of	the	research	methods.		Each	research	component	will	be	described	below	including	the	analysis	techniques	used.	
Interviews
Document 
analysis
Observations
Interview 
analysis
Analysis of 
documents
Analysis of 
observations
Data analysisData Collection Data integration
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3.3.1.1 Study	setting	This	study	was	conducted	in	three	National	Health	Service	(NHS)	hospital	Trusts	across	England,	one	in	the	North,	one	the	Midlands	and	one	in	the	South	West.		The	core	study	was	confined	to	public	sector	services	although	some	private	sector	and	third	party	organisations	were	included	as	key	stakeholder	organisations	due	to	their	interaction	with	the	NHS.		See	Box	1	for	supplementary	information	regarding	the	NHS	context	during	the	study.			 	
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3.3.1.2 Reflexivity		Throughout	the	study	I	was	conscious	of	my	role	as	a	researcher	and	my	outsider	status	within	each	Trust.		Despite	my	independent	position,	I	am	employed	by	a	Higher	Education	Institution,	funded	by	the	National	Institute	for	Health	Research	(NIHR)	in	the	UK	and	aligned	to	the	professional	conduct	of	the	British	Psychological	Society.		I	have	a	background	and	training	is	psychology	as	applied	to	health,	and	have	conducted	Health	Services	Research	for	approximately	10	years.		During	this	time,	my	research	interests	have	transitioned	away	from	the	psychology	of	the	individual,	towards	the	sociological	aspects	of	healthcare	and	organisational	sciences.		Prior	to	commencing	my	PhD,	I	was	employed	in	a	Technology	Appraisal	Review	team	who	conduct	clinical	effectiveness	and	cost	
NHS	context		The	NHS	is	financed	mainly	by	general	taxation,	and	is	free	to	users	at	the	point	of	delivery.	NHS	services	are	managed	separately	in	England,	Scotland,	Wales	and	Northern	Ireland.		In	England,	commissioners	pay	healthcare	providers	for	each	patient	seen	or	treated,	taking	into	account	the	complexity	of	the	patient’s	healthcare	needs,	using	a	system	known	as	“Payment	by	Results”	(PbR).		This	set	national	tariffs	for	episodes	of	care	(DH,	2012).			Tariff	prices	have	traditionally	been	based	on	the	average	cost	of	services	reported	by	NHS	providers.		The	introduction	of	“best	practice	tariffs”	(BPT)	in	2010-11	aimed	to	ensure	that	tariffs	are	determined	by	best	clinical	practice	rather	than	average	cost.		The	first	BPTs	were	released	in	2010-11	for	high	volume	service	areas	characterised	by	significant	unexplained	variation	in	practice	and	clear	consensus	of	what	constitutes	clinical	best	practice.		These	included	fragility	hip	fracture,	so	an	additional	payment	is	payable	where	care	complies	with	clinical	characteristics	of	best	practice	(DH,	2012).		The	BPT	was	mandatory	from	1	April	2010	and	applies	to	patients	admitted	from	this	date	(NHFD,	2012).		The	National	Joint	Registry	(NJR)	was	set	up	by	the	Department	of	Health	and	Welsh	Assembly	Government	for	the	mandatory	collection	of	information	on	all	hip	replacement	operations	from	NHS	organisations	and	private	practice,	and	to	monitor	the	performance	of	joint	replacement	prostheses.		Since	2009,	all	NHS	patients	who	are	having	hip	replacement	surgery	are	invited	to	fill	in	Patient	Reported	Outcome	Measures	(PROMs)	questionnaires	about	their	health	and	quality	of	life	before	and	after	their	surgery	(NICE	TA304,	2014).		In	2014/15,	a	new	BPT	for	primary	hip	replacements	was	introduced,	linked	to	data	collected	in	both	PROMs	and	the	minimum	threshold	for	submission	of	data	to	the	NJR	(NJR,	2017).		The	criteria	for	payment	of	the	BPT	are:			a.	the	provider	not	having	an	average	health	gain	significantly	below	the	national	average			b.	the	provider	adhering	to	the	following	data	submission	standards:			i.	a	minimum	PROMS	participation	rate	of	50%			ii.	a	minimum	NJR	compliance	rate	of	75%			iii.	an	NJR	unknown	consent	rate	below	25%	(i.e.	there	should	be	<25%	of	cases	where	patient	consent	was	not	recorded	as	a	‘yes’	or	‘no)’	(NHS	England,	2017)			
Box	1.		NHS	context	during	the	period	of	study	
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effectiveness	reviews	of	health	technologies	for	NICE	and	other	policy	makers.		It	is	important	to	state	that	RCTs	and	EBM	are	the	privileged	sources	of	evidence	in	this	research	environment.		I	was	part	of	the	research	team	who	updated	the	NICE	guidance	for	hip	replacement	in	2014	(see	Introduction	‘Context	and	Rationale’).		I	have	no	additional	conflicts	of	interest	to	declare.				Due	to	the	nature	of	my	research	methods,	my	role	in	data	collection	and	analysis	will	have	been	shaped	by	the	approaches,	decisions	and	choices	I	made	as	the	study	progressed.		In	qualitative	research,	we	have	an	understanding	that	bias	will	happen.		The	aim	of	the	researcher	is	to	understand	how	you	can	reduce	the	impact	that	bias	has	to	make	your	findings	trustworthy,	credible	and	neutral.		Despite	having	planned	a	research	protocol	prior	to	conducting	the	study,	I	chose	to	maintain	flexibility	to	allow	for	progressive	focusing.		Therefore,	I	was	able	to	follow	lines	of	insight	and	potential	avenues	of	interest	as	the	study	progressed.		To	account	for	the	range	of	biases	that	I,	and	my	selected	Trusts,	might	have	encountered	on	this	journey,	I	maintained	a	research	journal.		I	made	notes	of	my	interactions	and	thoughts	after	each	significant	point	of	data	collection	and	considered	how	my	role	as	an	outsider	(and	sometimes	an	insider)	was	reflected	in	the	data	that	I	obtained.		I	have	not	formally	included	this	reflection	in	this	thesis	but	it	helped	to	frame	my	thoughts	and	served	as	a	reminder	during	the	data	analysis.		
3.3.2 Methods			The	mixed	methods	for	each	case	included	interviews,	observations	and	document	analysis.		These	methods	enabled	me	to	observe	the	social,	cultural	and	knowledge	context	of	evidence	use	in	the	three	NHS	hospitals	first-hand.		Given	the	variation	present	across	orthopaedic	centres	and	between	individual	surgeons	(NJR,	2012)	and	their	networks,	I	aimed	to	focus	on	perceptions,	attitudes	and	behaviours	of	orthopaedic	surgeons	and	staff	practising	within	the	three	hospitals.		To	achieve	maximal	sampling	variation,	I	selected	hospitals	which	had	contrasting	local	populations,	service	provision,	professional	composition,	research	capacity	and	management	structures.			
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3.3.2.1 Case	study	research	Case	study	research	focuses	on	understanding	the	dynamics	present	in	single	settings.		These	settings	can	have	multiple	cases	or	multiple	levels	of	analysis	(Yin,	1984).		In	my	research,	the	setting	was	the	hospital	Trust	and	multiple	cases	were	planned.		Case	studies	typically	combine	a	variety	of	data	collection	techniques	in	order	to	provide	descriptions	and	to	test	and	generate	theory	about	the	topic.			There	is	confusion	and	lack	of	clarity	around	the	processes	for	qualitative	data	collection,	and	theory	building	from	case	study	research.		Previous	methods	have	emphasised	continuous	comparison,	which	stresses	the	emergence	of	categories	from	the	evidence	(Glaser	and	Strauss,	1967),	typologies	of	case	study	design	focused	on	replication	logic	and	validity	(Yin,	1984)	and	techniques	for	improving	analysis	without	removing	the	meaning	of	the	data	(Miles	and	Huberman,	1984).		In	an	attempt	to	overcome	this	lack	of	clarity,	Eisenhardt	(1989)	provided	a	roadmap	for	conducting	case	study	research.		I	selected	this	transparent	and	structured	approach	to	my	research.			The	roadmap	method	is	beneficial	in	that	it	is	broken	down	into	eight	steps	which	can	be	followed	systematically.		These	steps	are	presented	in	Table	3.			
Table	3.		The	process	steps	of	building	theory	from	case	study	research	(Eisenhardt,	1989)	
Step	number	 Activity	 Reason	1.	Getting	started		 -Definition	of	research	question	-Possibly	a	priori	constructs	 -Focuses	efforts	-Provides	better	grounding	of	construct	measures	-Retains	theoretical	flexibility		2.	Selecting	cases	 -Neither	theory	nor	hypothesis	-Specified	population		-Theoretical,	not	random	sampling		
-Constrains	extraneous	variation	and	sharpens	external	validity		-Focuses	efforts	on	theoretically	useful	cases	-	i.e.,	those	that	replicate	or	extend	theory	by	filling	conceptual	categories		3.	Crafting	instruments	and	protocols	
-Multiple	data	collection	methods	-Qualitative	and	quantitative	data	combined	-Multiple	investigators		
-Strengthens	grounding	of	theory	by	triangulation	of	evidence	-Synergistic	view	of	evidence	
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-Fosters	divergent	perspectives	and	strengthens	grounding	4.	Entering	the	field		 -Overlap	data	collection	and	analysis,	including	field	notes	-Flexible	and	opportunistic	data	collection	methods		
-Speeds	analysis	and	reveals	helpful	adjustments	to	data	collection		-Allows	investigation	to	take	advantage	of	emergent	themes	and	unique	case	features		5.	Analysing	data	 -Within-case	analysis		-Cross-case	pattern	search	using	divergent	techniques	
-Gains	familiarity	with	data	and	preliminary	theory	generation		-Forces	investigators	to	look	beyond	initial	impressions	and	see	evidence	through	multiple	lenses		6.	Shaping	hypothesis		 -Iterative	tabulation	of	evidence	for	each	construct		-Replication,	not	sampling,	logic	across	cases	-Search	evidence	for	'why'	behind	relationships	
-Sharpens	construct	definition,	validity,	and	measurability		-Confirms,	extends	and	sharpens	theory		
7.	Enfolding	literature		 -Comparison	with	conflicting	literature	-Comparison	with	similar	literature	
-Builds	internal	validity,	raises	theoretical	level	and	sharpens	construct	definitions	-Sharpens	generalisability,	improves	construct	definition	and	raises	theoretical	level		8.	Reaching	closure		 -Theoretical	saturation	when	possible		 -Ends	process	when	marginal	improvement	becomes	small			This	method	suggests	that	a	piece	of	research	is	started	as	close	as	possible	to	the	ideal	of	‘no	theory	under	consideration’.		Eisenhardt	suggests	that	pre-selected	theoretical	perspectives	may	bias	and	limit	research	findings	(Eisenhardt,	1989).		A	detailed	account	of	how	each	step	was	completed	in	my	research	is	presented	in	Table	4.		
Table	4.		A	detailed	account	of	each	roadmap	stage	
Roadmap	step	 Detailed	description		
1.	Getting	
started		
	
	
Concept	
definition:	
	
Evidence	&	
knowledge		
	
	
	
An	initial	definition	of	the	research	question	is	important	for	case	study	research.		This	includes	specification	of	the	key	concepts	of	the	study	as	this	enables	more	accurate	measurement	of	them.		According	to	Eisenhardt	(1989),	definition	and	specification	of	the	research	concepts	allows	for	a	stronger	empirical	grounding	for	any	emergent	theory	that	develops.		The	key	concepts	in	my	research	are	evidence	and	knowledge	and	how	they	influence	decision-making	in	orthopaedic	surgery.			I	described	the	challenges	in	defining	evidence	and	knowledge	in	the	literature	review.		These	are	contested	concepts	in	both	the	literature	and	in	practice	(Gkeredakis	et	al,	2011;	Swan	et	al,	2012).		It	was	important	to	recognise	and	be	reflective	about	the	definition	that	the	participants,	and	I	as	a	researcher,	made	regarding	these	terms.		The	initial	definitions	were	tentative	and	changed	as	the	research	progressed	and	data	
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Decision-
making		
	
	
	
	
	
	
Orthopaedic	
surgery		
collection	evolved.		At	the	beginning	of	the	research,	my	definition	of	evidence	was	grounded	in	the	epistemological	domain	of	clinical	sciences,	where	evidence	represents	an	empirical	construct	which	could	be	tested	using	scientific	methods	to	support	or	refute	a	hypothesis.		This	is	the	definition	taken	within	traditional	EBM	where	evidence	is	structured	in	a	hierarchy	(Sackett	et	al,	1996).				As	the	research	progressed	my	definition	changed.		The	literature	review	informed	my	thinking	and	the	definition	evolved	to	be	more	inclusive	of	other	types	of	evidence	and	knowledge	which	exist	in	the	social	and	organisational	science	domains.		The	updated	definition	I	use	throughout	the	study	is	as	follows:	evidence	is	any	construct	presented	that	supports	a	statement,	irrespective	of	whether	the	statement	is	true	or	false.		This	definition	links	back	to	the	literature	described	in	Chapter	2	where	evidence	and	knowledge	are	closely	tied	to	epistemology.		The	participants	were	able	to	provide	various	definitions	of	evidence.		This	supports	the	pragmatic	approach	selected.					The	definition	of	decision-making	is	generally	more	accepted	in	the	literature	but	is	still	not	concrete.		Within	this	research,	decision-making	is	defined	as:	the	cognitive	process	which	produces	a	selection	of	beliefs	or	courses	of	action	among	several	alternative	options,	for	example	alternative	treatments	for	patients	(Schwartz	and	Bergus,	2008).		Examining	decision-making	allowed	me	to	investigate	and	identify	these	alternatives	based	on	the	values	and	preferences	of	the	participants	who	made	decisions.		Where	possible,	I	examined	the	processes	of	decision-making	and	the	decision	outcomes.				Orthopaedic	surgery	was	defined	as	a	medical	specialty	which	focuses	on	injuries	and	disease	of	the	musculoskeletal	system.		Orthopaedic	surgeons	are	the	clinicians	who	deal	with	problems	of	this	system,	the	bones,	joints,	muscles,	tendons	and	ligaments	(Lock	et	al,	2001).		Within	the	NHS	in	England,	orthopaedic	surgeons	are	registered	with	the	Royal	College	of	Surgeons	of	England.			
2.	Selecting	
cases		
	
The	research	population	is	important	as	it	defines	the	set	of	entities	from	which	the	research	sample	is	to	be	drawn	(Eisenhart,	1989).		The	population	for	this	research	comprised	NHS	hospitals	in	England	and	Wales	who	reported	data	to	the	National	Joint	Registry	in	2012	(225	hospital	units	representing	a	94%	participation	rate	in	2012	[225/240])	(NJR,	2013).		Restricting	the	population	in	this	way	helped	to	define	the	limits	for	generalising	the	findings	of	my	research.		Once	the	population	was	defined,	the	cases	sampled	from	the	total	population	were	selected.			I	chose	three	cases	to	provide	a	characteristic	picture	of	diverse	NHS	hospitals	providing	hip	replacement	procedures.		The	cases	were	purposively	sampled	because	they	were	geographically	separate	and	show	variation	in	proximity	to,	and	association	with,	an	academic	institution	and	by	implication	to	an	academic	research	environment.		Drawing	on	the	earlier	review	of	the	literature,	I	observed	a	relationship	between	academic	and	non-academic	clinicians	in	their	beliefs	about,	and	use	of,	evidence	in	practice.		To	investigate	this	further,	I	selected	three	orthopaedic	departments	including	a	teaching	hospital,	a	non-teaching	hospital	and	another	designated	academic	orthopaedic	department	located	within	a	teaching	hospital.			This	could	also	be	viewed	as	theoretical	sampling,	as	I	predicted	that	there	may	be	some	relationship	between	teaching,	research	and	practice	and	evidence	use	in	each	case.		However,	I	attempted	to	maintain	the	notion	that	there	was	no	theory	under	consideration,	this	relationship	(positive,	negative	or	non-existent)	forms	one	of	many	avenues	of	investigation.		Pettigrew	(1990)	suggested	that	researchers	should	select	cases	which	represent	extreme	situations	and	polar	types,	where	the	process	of	interest	is	transparently	observable.		Therefore,	the	goal	of	my	sampling	was	to	choose	cases	that	were	likely	to	extend	emergent	ideas	present	in	existing	systematic	reviews	of	literature	(Grove	et	al,	2016).			Within	each	case,	I	took	a	multi-level	case	study	approach	at	three	vertical	levels	within	hospitals:	the	managerial,	the	non-clinical	(to	include	all	types	of	administrators)	and	the	clinical.		This	multi-level	approach	allowed	for	analysis	of	the	interdependence	between	these	organisational	dimensions	(Pettigrew,	1990).		At	the	managerial	level,	I	was	able	to	assess	how	managers	and	members	of	the	hospital	board	understood,	discussed	and	implemented	new	evidence	and	dealt	with	associated	issues.		I	spent	time	within	hospital	departments	to	appreciate	how	groups	of	administrators	and	associated	surgical	staff	talked	about,	interacted	with,	and	
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mobilised	knowledge	and	evidence.		Within	each	case,	I	focused	on	how	procedures	and	decision	choices	were	received	and	produced	by	individual	surgeons,	and	their	beliefs	about	the	importance	of	different	types	of	knowledge	and	evidence	in	decision-making.		
3.	Crafting	
instruments	
and	protocols		
Multiple	data	collection	methods	are	typically	used	in	case	studies.		The	rationale	for	this	is	similar	to	other	empirical	research	where	triangulation	across	multiple	data	collection	methods	is	possible	and	provides	corroboration	of	constructs	and	results	(Eisenhardt,	1989).		Using	multiple	methods	to	support	or	refute	the	findings	helps	to	understand	the	developing	theory	underlying	the	relationships	observed,	whilst	also	enhancing	confidence	in	the	results.		In	each	case,	I	planned	to	conduct	interviews,	analyse	documents	and	conduct	observations.		Nine	separate	data	sets	were	recorded	and	included	in	the	final	analysis.		I	followed	the	road	map	method	to	be	as	systematic	and	transparent	as	possible	in	the	collection	of	data	(Mays	and	Pope,	1995).		I	developed	instruments	and	protocols	for	the	three	data	collection	methods	prior	to	entering	the	field.		
3a.	Interviews		 I	conducted	semi-structured	interviews	with	key	participants	within	each	case	to	encourage	the	emergence	of	theory	from	my	data.		A	draft	topic	guide	was	developed,	and	this	was	granted	ethical	approval	at	each	Trust.		The	topic	guide	was	piloted	on	a	small	group	of	staff	(n=3)	with	the	necessary	amendments	made	prior	to	its	use	in	the	larger	scale	study	(see	Appendix	5).		This	process	helped	me	to	avoid	confusion	or	bias	in	the	wording	of	the	questions	and	prompts,	and	the	participants	could	ask	for	clarification	where	necessary.				In	interviews,	I	sought	to	understand	the	approaches	and	beliefs	of	participants	regarding	evidence,	in	order	to	reveal	the	strategies	used	by	professionals	when	making	decisions.		Questions	explored	the	extent	of	professionals’	beliefs	regarding	NICE	and	the	involvement	and	impact	of	clinical	guidance	on	surgical	practice	within	their	hospital.		The	semi-structured	format	meant	that	participants	were	free	to	expand	on	topics	of	interest.		I	wanted	to	discover	what	professionals	considered	to	be	evidence	and	knowledge	in	practice,	rather	than	focusing	on	any	pre-existing	definition	which	may	have	limited	my	research	findings.		All	interview	information	was	detailed	in	an	interview	database	created	prior	to	data	collection.			
3b.	Document	
analysis			 A	document	log	database	was	developed	to	record	each	document	obtained.		This	included	the	date	it	was	developed,	received	and	its	intended	purpose.		As	the	case	progressed,	documents	collected	were	scanned	and	saved	electronically	for	further	reading	and	inclusion	in	data	analysis.		Documents	helped	to	set	the	scene	for	each	case	and	allowed	me	to	understand	the	local	context	of	decisions	made	within	each	Trust.		As	a	minimum,	I	set	out	to	obtain	the	hospital	Care	Quality	Commission	(CQC)	report,	the	hospital	annual	reports,	papers	from	at	least	one	hospital	board	meeting	and	one	departmental	meeting,	in	addition	to	the	local	hip	replacement	policy	and	clinical	pathway.		Where	possible,	I	would	collect	papers	from	meetings	with	local	Clinical	Commissioning	Groups	(CCGs)	and	other	stakeholder	groups.		I	set	out	to	obtain	papers	from	the	NICE	board	meetings	that	took	place	nationally,	when	they	were	within	the	region	of	my	three	hospitals.		Supplementary	documents	deemed	relevant	to	each	case	were	also	recorded	in	the	document	log	as	the	study	progressed.				
3c.	
Observations	 Within	each	case,	I	conducted	a	period	of	in-depth	observation.		An	observation	log	was	created	to	record	the	demographic	details,	such	as	the	date	and	time	of	observation	and	the	setting	and	participants	being	observed.		The	observations	were	planned	or	on	an	ad	hoc	basis,	to	maintain	the	flexible	approach	of	my	research.		I	took	a	progressive	focusing	stance.		This	was	important	to	allow	me	to	examine	areas	of	interest	or	to	follow	particular	events	as	they	unfolded	in	the	field.		I	developed	a	field	note	template	to	record	a	summary	of	the	observation,	the	setting	and	atmosphere,	key	moments,	my	raw	notes	and	reflexive	accounts	and	analytical	comments	during	the	observations.				
4.	Entering	
the	field			 During	case	study	research,	there	is	often	an	overlap	between	collection	and	the	analysis	of	the	data.		This	flexible	approach	is	a	key	feature	of	case	study	research	and	allowed	me	to	adjust	data	collection	processes	as	the	study	developed	in	the	field	(Eisenhardt,	1989).		Overlap	and	flexibility	enabled	me	to	further	investigate	emergent	themes	and	take	advantage	of	special	opportunities	that	arose.		It	was	important	to	
	 51	
maintain	reflexivity	throughout	the	field	work	to	allow	for	additional	insights	to	be	made	during	data	analysis.			In	the	first	instance,	I	aimed	to	conduct	three	months	of	field	work	at	each	site.		In	reality,	this	was	influenced	by	the	time	at	which	data	saturation	was	reached,	as	analysis	and	other	data	collection	could	take	place	concurrently.		Patterns	in	the	data	became	evident	as	my	second	case	progressed,	and	become	more	prominent	in	the	third.		When	I	entered	the	field	in	my	third	case	I	felt	more	confident	and	able	to	understand	the	processes,	language	and	practices	within	the	hospital.		In	cases	two	and	three,	I	was	able	to	adapt	my	field	work	to	obtain	data	to	support	a	point	or	to	examine	issues	which	appeared	interesting	or	deviant	in	each	case.			Throughout	the	field	work,	I	aimed	to	understand	each	case	individually	and	in	as	much	depth	as	was	feasible.		I	took	advantage	of	the	flexible	data	collection	methods	and	made	adjustments	where	required	during	the	process.		I	followed	avenues	of	interest	and	themes	that	became	important	only	once	the	field	work	had	commenced.		During	this	time,	my	data	collection	remained	as	systematic	and	transparent	as	possible	through	the	use	of	the	pre-planned	databases	and	templates.			
4a.	Interviews	 Interviews	were	planned	with	approximately	60	participants	selected	from	various	levels	within	the	orthopaedic	departments	of	the	three	hospitals	(clinical	academics,	consultant	grade	staff	and	surgical	trainees	[ST	5-6]).		I	interviewed	senior	orthopaedic	nurses,	allied	health	professionals,	theatre	staff	and	department	managers	and	administrators	to	achieve	a	system-wide	perspective.		Care	needed	to	be	taken	in	reporting	findings	from	these	different	staff	as	samples	were	small	and	individuals	were	possibly	identifiable	within	sites.		My	interview	questions	followed	up	particular	points	relevant	to	the	research	or	emerging	theory;	often	these	questions	were	not	planned,	but	instead	became	relevant	as	the	interviews	occurred,	as	suggested	by	Stake	(1995).		I	drew	out	relevant	concepts	in	the	interviews	without	explicitly	stating	the	aim	of	the	work	or	questions,	to	allow	themes	to	reveal	themselves	and	in	order	to	reduce	the	possibility	of	interviewer	bias.				Where	possible,	I	attempted	to	interview	members	of	the	Community	of	Practice	(CoP).		CoPs	can	have	an	impact	upon	the	mobilisation	of	knowledge	within	and	across	healthcare	organisations	(Lave	and	Wenger,	1991;	Contu	and	Willmott,	2003),	and	interviewing	participants	who	were	part	of	the	CoP	was	important	to	try	to	understand	how	knowledge	was	transferred	in	and	out	of	groups.			In	the	interviews,	I	gathered	professional	narratives	around	the	influence	of	pre-existing	regulatory	practice,	and	explored	the	importance,	implementation	and	integration	of	evidence	in	practice.		I	sought	to	discover	the	objectives	of	individuals,	groups	and	organisations	in	the	decision-making	process	and	to	allow	comment	on	the	interaction	between	professionals	and	other	stakeholder	groups,	for	example	hospital	management	or	commissioners.		In	addition	to	the	hospital	interviews,	I	conducted	supplementary	key	informant	interviews	(KII)	from	clinical	guidance	producers	such	as	staff	at	NICE	and	the	British	Orthopaedic	Association	(BOA).		This	was	to	gain	a	wider	perspective	of	‘evidence-based	orthopaedics’	across	the	larger	orthopaedic	and	policy	communities.				
4b.Observations			 Given	that	evidence	and	knowledge	are	tacit	as	well	as	shared	face-to-face	in	real	time,	it	was	necessary	to	complement	interviews	with	observation	in	the	field.		My	primary	aim	was	to	observe	knowledge	sharing	and	evidence	implementation	within	the	orthopaedic	community	as	problems	and	treatment	decisions	arose,	hence	the	observations	were	focused.		Observations	were	crucial	as	they	allowed	me	to	really	immerse	myself	in	the	field	and	to	develop	a	rapport	with	individuals.		It	was	through	the	observations	that	I	learned	and	reflected	upon	how	case	study	departments	functioned	day-to-day,	to	provide	me	with	much	of	the	contextual	information	for	my	analysis.			To	add	to	my	understanding,	I	attended	internal	meetings,	such	as	commissioning,	monthly	departmental,	clinical	audit	and	quality	and	innovation	meetings	within	each	case	study.		Observations	also	consisted	of	opportunistic	shadowing	on	the	wards,	watching	clinic	and	teaching	sessions	and	attendance	at	planned	operating	sessions,	particularly	the	pre-theatre	preparation	time.		Other	parts	of	daily	work	were	observed,	including	meetings	and	seminars,	lunch	and	break	periods	and	ad	hoc	
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teaching	of	junior	staff.		During	this	time,	I	sought	examples	that	demonstrated	how	mobilisation	of	knowledge	was	hindered	or	facilitated	within	each	case.		The	observations	also	allowed	for	more	informal	discussion	with	the	surgeons	and	staff	as	they	went	about	their	daily	tasks	and	provided	me	with	the	opportunity	to	ask	why	certain	actions	or	processes	and	decisions	occurred.		To	supplement	the	hospital	observations,	I	attended	many	peripheral	events	throughout	the	twelve-month	period.		This	included	conferences	and	meetings	organised	by	external	stakeholders	including	the	Department	of	Health,	NICE,	Royal	Colleges	and	project	teams	at	the	associated	Clinical	Commissioning	Groups	(CCGs).		These	events	were	useful	in	providing	the	regional	and	national	context	for	my	research.			Where	possible	during	the	observations,	I	made	hand-written	notes	and	diagrams	recorded	in	field	journals.		These	field	notes	provided	a	running	commentary	about	what	was	happening	during	the	observation,	but	also	included	my	personal	reflections	and	notes	about	analysis	that	I	felt	were	important.		When	it	was	not	possible	to	take	notes,	for	example	when	I	felt	it	would	change	the	atmosphere	of	the	observation,	I	wrote	them	up	as	soon	as	possible	after	the	observation	period	had	ended.		Following	this,	I	completed	the	field	note	template	to	ensure	that	I	maintained	a	similar	depth	and	breadth	of	observation	across	my	cases.		The	templates	reported	my	observations	but	also	were	reflexive,	asking	questions	such	as	‘what	am	I	learning?’	and	‘how	does	this	case	differ	from	the	last?’		
4c.	Document	
analysis			
Additional	relevant	documentation	was	collected	to	supplement	planned	document	collection.		This	included	government	policy	documents,	national	and	local	clinical	guidance	and	published	or	unpublished	information	made	available	to	me	during	the	field	work.		The	analysis	of	these	documents	helped	me	to	understand	and	frame	the	intentions	of	practice	change	or	issues	within	the	orthopaedic	departments,	and	to	provide	a	wider	understanding	of	the	context	within	which	decisions	were	made.		
5.	Analysing	
within	and	
across	case	
data		
The	three	types	of	collected	data	were	analysed	separately	before	being	integrated	together	to	form	each	case.		I	describe	the	planned	analysis	techniques	below:				
	
5a.	Interviews		 The	delivery	and	management	of	healthcare	and	the	decision-making	that	takes	place	are	often	value-laden	(Esterberg,	2002).		Interviews	enabled	me	to	discover	how	participants	understood	or	responded	to	evidence	and	the	values	they	attached	to	different	types	of	knowledge.		These	interpretations	helped	me	to	identify	a	level	of	meaning	and	interpretation	that	would	not	be	accessible	through	other	data	collection	techniques.		I	selected	thematic	analysis	as	my	main	method	of	analysis,	as	I	was	concerned	with	the	narrative	that	the	participants	held	and	shared	within	their	CoP	and	hence	the	commonality	of	views	between	my	participants	(Bernard	and	Ryan,	2010).		I	included	interviews	to	exemplify	the	participant’s	voices	about	the	topic	rather	than	my	own	personal	interpretations,	which	is	consistent	with	my	pragmatic	epistemological	approach.			I	took	an	abductive	approach	to	analysis	of	the	interview	data	(Mantere	and	Ketokivi,	2013).		The	process	of	thematic	analysis	follows	various	stages	that	occur	in	sequence,	but	there	was	some	moving	backwards	and	forwards	in	the	process.		I	supported	the	thematic	analysis	by	reading	and	checking	the	collected	documents	and	observation	notes	I	made.		They	acted	as	a	reminder	and	cross-reference	to	specific	points	mentioned	in	the	transcripts.			Stages	of	thematic	analysis	included	transcription,	data	familiarisation,	coding	and	developing	categories	from	codes	(Pope	and	Mays,	2000).		Once	the	categories	were	identified,	they	were	interpreted	and	developed	into	the	key	themes	of	research.		This	was	achieved	by	cutting	and	sorting	the	categories,	developing	word	lists	of	similar	phrases	and	identifying	key-words-in-context	that	could	allow	me	to	group	the	categories	into	appropriate	themes	(Bernard	and	Ryan,	2010).		During	the	analysis,	I	searched	for	repetition	within	the	text	to	identify	narrative	connectors	and	consider	where	there	could	be	missing	examples	in	each	case.		Throughout	this	process,	I	highlighted	examples	that	I	believed	would	exemplify	each	of	the	themes.			
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5b.	
Observations			 Field	notes	from	the	observations	were	transcribed	into	the	observation	template	and	synthesised	with	the	aim	of	providing	a	rich	picture	of	each	case.		I	sought	prominent	and	emergent	examples	of	where,	when	and	how	evidence	is	used	and	implemented	in	decision-making	in	practice	(Mays	et	al,	2005),	and	also	of	how	groups	from	different	professions	and	levels	within	the	organisation	contributed	to	decisions.		I	aimed	to	follow	this	through	in	the	analysis	by	grouping	the	observation	examples	around	the	emergent	issues,	looking	for	similar	or	contrasting	themes.			I	took	a	similar	approach	to	that	used	in	the	analysis	of	the	interview	data,	I	read	and	reread	the	templates	looking	for	codes,	categories	and	themes.		I	was	able	to	refer	to	the	themes	identified	in	the	interviews,	but	also	searched	for	data	items	that	were	a	code	or	category	in	their	own	right.		This	added	to	the	overall	richness	and	later	interpretation	of	the	data.		I	searched	the	observation	data	for	‘key	moments’	that	could	be	used	to	support	the	themes	and	to	describe	and	evidence	the	findings.		Throughout	this	process,	I	was	able	to	refer	to	my	field	notes	to	reinforce	my	thinking	and	to	act	as	a	reminder	to	the	reflective	notes	I	made	during	the	observations.		
	
5c.	Document	
analysis		 Document	analysis	was	conducted	in	stages,	first	searching	for	the	fundamental	information	(Bowen,	2009).		This	included	the	descriptive	information	included	in	the	document	database	(for	example	the	author	and	audience)	but	also	searching	for	why	the	document	was	composed.		I	aimed	to	discover	whether	the	document	was	produced	as	evidence	in	itself	or	whether	it	aimed	to	convince	or	motivate	others	to	use	a	type	of	evidence.		It	was	important	to	understand	the	intended	audience	and	the	key	messages	in	the	document.		This	helped	me	discover	the	assumptions	of	the	author	about	the	intended	reader,	and	the	relationships	between	the	individuals	or	organisations	who	accessed	the	document.			The	second	stage	involved	asking	the	less	obvious	questions,	for	example	‘what	are	the	assumptions	and	values	in	the	document?’	(Bowen,	2009).		I	analysed	whether	the	assumptions	and	values	were	explicit	or	if	the	person	reading	the	document	should	infer	them.		I	looked	for	concepts	the	author	believed	the	reader	would	share,	including	key	words,	terms	or	particular	use	of	insider	language.		For	example,	‘Was	‘evidence’	used	to	refer	to	published	scientific	evidence	or	to	local	learning?’		Finally,	I	asked	myself	more	reflective	questions	about	the	document,	such	as:	‘Can	I	believe	this	document?’	‘Do	I	believe	its	assumptions	are	true?’	‘What	can	I	learn	from	document?’	and,	‘Does	it	have	any	personal	meaning	for	me?’		This	last	question	was	important	as	it	allowed	me	to	identify	key	documents	or	sections	which	supported	or	refuted	the	themes	that	developed	from	the	observations	and	interview	data	analysis.		
	
5d.	Within	and	
across	case	
study	analysis		
A	number	of	data	analysis	iterations	took	place	in	my	development	of	the	key	themes	across	the	whole	case	study.		I	reflected	on	my	perceptions	of	the	observations	and	the	issues	evident	in	the	interview	and	documents	analysis.		I	re-read	my	notes,	transcripts	and	documentation	to	fully	immerse	myself	in	my	data.		Towards	the	end	of	the	analysis	I	further	analysed	and	cross-referenced	the	coded	data	extracts	for	their	empirical	relevance,	internal	consistency	and	thematic	relationships.		This	helped	me	to	develop	categories	and	themes	across	the	entire	data	set	to	summarise	the	individual	cases.		Throughout	the	process	of	analysis,	I	worked	from	the	relevant	passages	of	transcribed	text	from	interviews,	observation	templates	and	documents	to	identify	emergent	themes,	detailed	descriptions,	accounts,	beliefs	and	shared	assumptions.		This	enabled	me	to	develop	an	overarching	framework	which	captures	my	entire	research	findings.		By	combining	multiple	methods	and	empirical	materials	in	this	way,	I	hoped	to	overcome	the	weakness	or	biases	that	emanate	from	a	single	method	(Dixon-Woods	et	al,	2004).		To	make	the	results	tangible	I	produced	detailed	case	study	write-ups	for	each	site.		These	provided	pure	descriptions	of	the	current	situation,	but	were	central	to	generating	insight	(Pettigrew,	1990).		They	also	helped	me	to	condense	the	very	large	amount	of	data	I	had	collected	by	this	stage.		The	aim	of	this	step	was	to	become	familiar	with	each	case	as	a	standalone	entity	(Eisenhardt,	1989).		This	process	allowed	patterns	within	the	cases	to	emerge,	and	allowed	me	to	develop	familiarity	across	all	the	cases	together.		The	aim	of	the	whole	case	comparison	was	to	search	for	further	patterns	in	the	data	beyond	those	I	had	discovered	through	analysis	of	the	individual	data	sets.		It	was	important	for	me	not	to	develop	premature	and	false	conclusions	early	in	the	analysis,	as	this	would	reflect	information-processing	biases	on	my	part	(Miles	and	Huberman,	1984).		I	achieved	this	by	examining	the	data	in	
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different	ways,	for	example	I	selected	individual	categories	and	themes	and	then	looked	for	within-group	similarities	and	inter-group	differences	in	the	other	cases.		Where	possible,	I	compared	several	categories	at	once	and	then	listed	similarities	and	differences	between	each	category	to	enhance	my	overarching	findings,	for	example	in	comparing	the	professional	identity	of	the	individuals	across	the	cases.			I	compared	the	data	by	data	collection	method	to	investigate	the	unique	insights	obtained	from	the	different	methods.		I	was	able	to	see	whether	findings	from	the	interviews	were	supported	by	observations	and	document	analysis	and	vice	versa.		According	to	Eisenhardt	(1989),	when	the	evidence	from	one	source	corroborates	a	pattern	from	another,	the	finding	is	stronger	and	better	grounded.		I	searched	for	examples	of	where	data	from	different	methods	conflicted,	as	it	provided	an	interesting	opportunity	for	me	to	investigate	the	meaning	of	the	differences.		This	comparison	process	forced	me	to	develop	a	more	sophisticated	understanding	of	my	data,	as	it	made	me	break	down	the	individual	themes	and	initial	ideas	that	I	had	developed	in	the	early	stages	of	data	analysis	(Yin,	1984;	Eisenhardt,	1989),	allowing	me	to	form	new	categories	and	concepts	across	the	cases	that	I	had	not	anticipated	until	I	examined	the	bigger	picture.		This	process	also	improved	the	accuracy	and	reliability	of	my	findings	as	the	final	themes	represent	a	close	fit	to	the	data.	
	
6.	Shaping	
hypothesis			 Throughout	steps	1-5	of	the	road	map	method,	the	overall	impressions,	themes,	concepts	and	relationships	between	the	data	sources,	and	then	between	the	cases,	began	to	emerge	(Eisenhardt,	1989).		The	next	three	steps	required	a	higher	level	of	interpretation	to	allow	a	theoretical	explanation	of	the	results.			In	my	research,	the	themes	generated	from	the	observations,	interviews	and	document	analysis	were	combined.		I	was	able	to	develop	an	understanding	of	the	real-world	use	of	evidence	in	orthopaedic	decision-making	and	of	how	the	mobilisation	of	knowledge	factored	into	variation	in	practice.		The	depth	and	breadth	of	this	analysis	has	produced	results	which	will	be	more	meaningful	in	the	context	of	orthopaedic	practice.		It	is	important	to	note	that	the	triangulation	of	my	data	helped	to	facilitate	the	validation	of	my	data	through	the	cross	verification	from	more	than	two	data	sources	(Olsen,	2004).		I	compared	the	overall	findings	with	the	evidence	from	each	case	systematically	in	order	to	assess	how	well	or	poorly	each	fits	with	the	other.		The	aim	was	to	develop	an	overarching	understanding	about	the	phenomenon	I	investigated.		To	achieve	this,	I	went	through	a	process	of	constantly	comparing	the	emerging	theory	with	the	data,	searching	for	similarities	but	also	for	differences	that	I	could	explain	in	a	reasoned	way.		According	to	Eisenhardt	(1989),	a	close	fit	to	the	data	is	important	to	building	good	theory	because	it	takes	advantage	of	the	new	insights	possible	from	the	data	and	produces	an	empirically	valid	theory.			Shaping	theory	required	two	steps.	In	the	first,	I	refined	the	theoretical	constructs	and	collected	examples	from	within	each	of	the	three	cases	to	measure	the	strength	of	each	construct.		For	example,	achieving	a	definition	of	what	constitutes	evidence	for	orthopaedics	required	me	to	search	within	data	categories	to	find	similar	meanings	and	interpretations.		This	occurred	through	constant	comparison	between	the	data	and	the	developing	constructs	so	that	evidence	from	different	data	collection	methods	converged	on	a	single	well-defined	construct	(Eisenhardt,	1989).		In	the	second	step,	I	ensured	that	the	emerging	relationships	between	the	constructs	fitted	well	with	the	data	in	each	case.		The	underlying	assumption	of	this	process	is	that	a	replication	of	findings	and	constructs	across	the	cases	confirms	or	disconfirms	the	developing	theory	(Yin,	1984).		The	cases	which	confirmed	the	relationships	enhanced	my	confidence	in	the	results.		This	process	also	provided	an	understanding	of	the	dynamics	underlying	the	relationships	between	the	findings	and	helps	to	demonstrate	the	theoretical	reasons	for	why	the	relationships	exist.		This	helps	to	increase	the	internal	validity	of	my	results.		
	
7.	Enfolding	
literature		
	
The	penultimate	step	in	the	roadmap	required	me	to	compare	my	findings	with	previous	literature.		I	looked	for	similarities	and	contradictions	and	tried	to	develop	an	understanding	of	why	they	existed.		The	aim	of	this	stage	was	to	provide	deeper	insight	into	the	emergent	theory	and	to	discover	the	reasons	for	possible	disagreements	(Eisenhardt,	1989).		Where	my	findings	supported	the	literature,	it	helped	to	develop	and	extend	theories	related	to	knowledge	mobilisation	more	
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generally.		However,	it	was	also	important	to	state	the	limits	of	my	research	and	its	generalisability,	for	example	cases	might	be	limited	within	a	certain	field	of	literature.		The	result	of	this	stage	is	that	the	theory	has	stronger	internal	validity,	wider	generalisability	and	a	higher	conceptual	level.		
	
8.	Reaching	
closure		
	
The	final	step	of	the	process	is	known	as	reaching	closure.		This	is	the	point	when	theoretical	saturation	has	been	reached,	in	the	same	way	as	reaching	saturation	in	my	data	collection	and	analysis.		This	point	signifies	the	end	of	the	analysis	where	only	small	gains	were	being	made	in	my	thinking	and	interpretation	of	the	findings.		This	is	also	the	point	at	which	I	would	need	to	collect	additional	data	to	allow	me	to	test	my	findings	and	theory	in	another	field.		An	example	would	be	testing	the	theory	in	a	different	group	of	orthopaedic	departments	to	see	if	my	findings	held	true.		For	my	research,	theoretical	saturation	was	reached	and	I	believe	that	I	summarised	and	reported	the	data	in	its	entirety.			
		A	detailed	protocol	of	the	study	was	published	in	Implementation	Science	and	is	available	to	download.		I	have	provided	a	copy	in	Appendix	1.		The	citation	is	as	follows:	
Grove,	A.,	Currie,	G.,	and	Clarke,	A.,	2015.	The	barriers	and	facilitators	to	the	implementation	of	
clinical	guidance	in	elective	orthopaedic	surgery:	a	qualitative	study	protocol.	Implementation	
Science.	10(1)81	DOI	10.1186/s13012-015-0273-6.		
	
3.3.2.2 Ethics		Ethical	approval	was	granted	by	the	University	of	Warwick	Biomedical	Research	Ethics	Committee	on	the	[reference	no:	REGO-2014-645]	and	via	the	Research	and	Development	(R&D)	department	of	each	of	my	three	hospital	sites	(Appendix	3).		All	participants	gave	informed	consent	to	take	part	in	the	interviews,	and	consent	to	conduct	observations	was	obtained	by	the	lead	R&D	representative	at	each	Trust.		
3.3.2.3 Sample		A	case	study	design	with	mixed	qualitative	methods	was	used.		A	description	of	the	three	cases	is	provided	in	Table	5.		The	regulatory	healthcare	context	at	the	time	of	study	is	presented	in	Box	2.		
	
Table	5.		A	description	of	the	three	cases	included	in	my	study	
Case	 Hospital	description		
Case	A	
	
Case	study	site	A	is	specifically	designated	as	an	academic	orthopaedic	department	and	orthopaedic	trauma	centre	linked	to	an	Academic	Health	Science	Network.		The	department	works	in	partnership	with	the	local	University	Medical	School	and	is	also	a	teaching	hospital.		There	is	an	integrated	clinical	academic	training	scheme	in	orthopaedics.		The	research	team	conduct	effectiveness	and	cost-effectiveness	studies,	mainly	national	RCTs,	of	various	techniques	and	treatments	within	orthopaedic	surgery.		The	clinical	service	provides	
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specialist	musculoskeletal	care	alongside	the	departments	of	Rheumatology,	Physiotherapy,	Radiology	and	Paediatrics.		The	clinical	staff	comprise	consultants,	clinical	fellows,	specialist	registrars	and	allied	health	professionals	(AHPs).		Many	of	the	surgeons	hold	joint	academic/clinical	posts	at	the	Trust	and	the	University.				
Case	B	
	
Case	study	site	B	is	small	District	General	Hospital	Trust	with	a	specialist	practitioner	physiotherapist	service.		Site	B	operates	as	a	split	site,	therefore	the	services	are	separated	across	two	hospital	buildings	which	are	approximately	20	miles	apart.		This	site	is	not	affiliated	to	an	orthopaedic	academic	department	or	University	and	is	not	a	teaching	hospital.		The	clinical	team	provide	general	orthopaedic	services	to	the	local	population	and	are	supported	by	a	group	of	designated	AHPs	who	provide	a	specialist	musculoskeletal	assessment	interface	between	General	Practitioners,	patients	and	the	orthopaedic	department.				
Case	C	
	
Case	study	site	C	is	a	large	orthopaedic	department	in	a	teaching	hospital	Trust	with	specialist	trauma	centre.		Unlike	site	A,	it	is	not	a	designated	academic	orthopaedic	department	with	a	specific	clinical	academic	training	scheme.		It	is	one	of	the	largest	orthopaedic	surgery	units	in	England	and	receives	national	referrals	for	complex	hip	implant	revision	surgery.		The	clinical	department	provides	a	range	of	orthopaedic	treatments	and	surgery	delivered	by	a	multidisciplinary	team	of	specialists.		Site	C	is	a	teaching	hospital	and	therefore	has	a	small	academic	team	that	carries	out	research,	development	and	training,	for	example	site	C	acts	as	a	‘spoke’	data	collection	site	in	national	RCTs.		Clinical	professionals	at	site	C	may	or	may	not	participate	in	academic	work,	depending	on	their	own	capacity	and	willingness.		
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ODEP	at	the	three	hospital	cases		Within	orthopaedic	surgery,	one	of	the	largest	comparisons	is	data	(Orthopaedic	Device	Evaluation	Panel)	that	is	collected	to	monitor	the	evidence	rating	of	implants	used	in	hip	replacement	surgery.		The	three	hospitals	included	in	my	study	had	ODEP	ratings	that	achieve	the	national	standard.		This	suggests	that	none	of	the	hospitals	were	deviating	from	the	evidence-based	recommendations	in	terms	of	implant	selection	decisions.		However,	there	were	differences	in	the	data,	which	hospitals	could	use	for	benchmarking	purposes.		I	have	presented	data	below	(Table	B1)	to	provide	an	overview	of	variation	in	the	use	of	implants	across	the	three	sites	during	my	study	period.		It	is	important	to	note	that	this	data	does	not	distinguish	between	high	and	low	ODEP	evidence	ratings	(10A-3B)	as	it	represents	a	threshold	(the	implant	had	received	a	rating)	rather	than	a	ranking	(i.e.,	what	the	rating	actually	was)	(see	Appendix	2	for	a	general	explanation	of	ODEP	ratings).			
Table	B1.		Use	of	ODEP	rated	implants	for	elective	THR	as	reported	in	the	NJR.	Data	for	1st	April	
2014	to	31	March	2015.		
Implant	type		 No.	of	primary	
procedures	using	an	
ODEP	rated	implant	
No.	of	primary	procedures	
without	use	of	an	ODEP	Rated	
implant	
%	of	procedures	using	
an	ODEP	rated	implant	Hip	stem	Site	A	 429	 3	 98%	Hip	cup	Site	A	 433	 2	 99%	Hip	stem	Site	B	 358	 2	 99%	Hip	cup	Site	B	 358	 0	 100%	Hip	stem	Site	C	 433	 0	 100%	Hip	cup	Site	C	 436	 0	 100%	
(Doc	analy	ODEP	Trust	data	2014/2015	http://www.njrreports.org.uk		280416			BPT	at	the	three	hospital	cases		Table	B2	shows	a	comparison	of	the	BPT	data	for	the	three	hospitals	I	examined	during	the	12	month	data	collection	period.		All	sites	were	compliant	with	BPT	guidelines,	achieving	over	75%	compliance	with	NJR	data	collection	and	below	25%	of	cases	where	consent	was	listed	as	‘not	known’.		This	replicates	the	findings	regarding	compliance	with	evidence	ratings	in	relation	to	ODEP.		However,	in	the	BPT	data	there	was	some	variation	in	practice.		Site	A	out-performed	both	B	and	C.		Site	B	performed	slightly	better	than	C	in	terms	of	compliance,	but	notably	better	for	consent	‘not	known’.		I	have	included	the	data	on	number	of	procedures	to	demonstrate	that	the	rate	of	surgery	taking	place	at	each	of	the	three	sites	was	comparable.		Hence	this	is	unlikely	to	be	the	reason	for	the	observed	variation.				
Table	B2.		BPT	Primary	hip	and	knee	replacement	outcomes	data	for	sites	A-C	
Date	 Site	 Compliance	No.	of	Hip	and	
Knee	Procedures	
Compliance	
Hips	
Consent	No.	of	Hip	and	
Knee	Procedures	
Consent	Not	
Known	Hips	12	Dec	14	 A	 1,419	 95%	 1,480	 0%	17	Mar	15	 A	 1,473	 92%	 1,558	 0%	22	June	15	 A	 1,558	 91%	 1,599	 0%	12	Dec	14	 B	 1475	 85%	 1412	 1%	17	Mar	15	 B	 1546	 88%	 1575	 2%	22	June	15	 B	 1566	 88%	 1428	 4%	12	Dec	14	 C	 1393	 86%	 1458	 10%	17	Mar	15	 C	 1404	 84%	 1447	 11%	22	June	15	 C	 1412	 83%	 1498	 14%	
(Doc	analy	NJR	NHS	Trust	data	2014/2015	http://www.njrreports.org.uk/Best-Practice-Tariff	280416				
Box	2.		Study	regulatory	context:	ODEP	rating	and	Best	Practice	Tariff	(BPT)	rating	
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3.3.2.4 Participants	and	settings		The	participant	sample	was	purposive.		A	snowball	sampling	technique	was	also	used	to	support	this.		The	sampling	frame	was	identified	from	staff	contact	lists	at	each	of	the	hospital	sites.		This	included	clinical	and	non-clinical	administrative	staff	and	hospital	managers	(see	Table	6).				
Table	6	A	matrix	representation	of	the	three	vertical	levels	of	participants	within	each	case	
H
os
pi
ta
l	l
oc
at
io
n	
Case	A	 Case	B	 Case	C		Managerial		
	Managerial	 	Managerial	
	Non-clinical		
	Non-clinical		 	Non-clinical	
	Clinical		
	Clinical	 	Clinical	
	Site	lead	contacts	were	the	Trauma	and	Orthopaedic	Leads/Managers	who	represented	each	hospital	Trust	and	assisted	in	participant	identification.		I	invited	approximately	equal	numbers	of	people	from	each	group	(clinical,	non-clinical,	managerial)	and	from	all	three	organisations	to	be	interviewed.		Total	final	numbers	interviewed	were	30	clinical	staff,	15	non-clinical	staff	and	11	managers.		As	planned,	I	did	not	interview	patient	participants.		Individuals	who	participated	in	key	informant	interviews	(KII)	were	selected	from	local	and	national	stakeholder	organisations.			
3.3.2.4.1 Interviews		Initial	invitations	were	sent	to	each	identified	participant.		Emails	detailed	the	nature	of	the	study	and	what	would	be	expected	of	them.		The	study	participant	information	sheet	was	attached	to	the	email	(Appendix	4).		If	interest	was	indicated,	I	sent	a	follow	up	email	outlining	how	the	interviews	were	structured	and	the	topics	which	might	be	discussed,	and	arranged	a	time	and	place	to	meet	the	interviewee.		In	snowball	sampling,	participants	would	suggest	colleagues	with	whom	I	should	make	contact	to	try	to	arrange	an	interview.		Often	these	
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individuals	played	a	key	role	in	delivering	hip	replacement	services	but	were	not	easily	identifiable	through	the	organisation’s	website.				Interviews	took	place	between	December	2014	and	December	2015.		Each	interview	was	digitally	recorded	and	transcribed	professionally.		A	hard	copy	of	the	consent	form	was	signed	before	the	planned	interview	commenced,	or	verbal	consent	was	obtained	for	ad	hoc	interviews.		During	each	interview,	I	followed	my	topic	guide	(Appendix	5).		The	guide	was	divided	into	two	parts.		The	first	included	structured	questions	aimed	at	obtaining	general	information	about	the	individual’s	role,	responsibilities,	time	in	post,	position	within	the	hospital,	academic	links	and	external	positions,	for	example	if	they	sat	on	a	hospital	board	or	national	organisational	committee.		The	second	included	unstructured	questions	about	the	participant’s	overall	experiences,	beliefs	and	attitudes	towards	evidence	and	clinical	practice.		Each	interviewee	was	immediately	given	an	ID	label	to	maintain	confidentiality.		Labels	were	divided	into	three	groups	within	each	site,	hence	each	of	the	three	sites	A,	B	and	C	contained	interviews	from	‘C’	(clinical),	‘A’	(non-clinical	administrators)	and	‘M’	(managers).			Of	the	102	formal	requests	for	interview	that	were	sent	(purposive	and	snowball	sampled),	50	participants	agreed	to	be	interviewed	and	48	interviews	actually	took	place.		Of	the	two	drop-outs,	one	failed	to	attend	for	the	interview	and	the	second	was	unable	to	find	a	suitable	time	for	interview	during	the	three-month	period	when	I	was	located	at	the	Trust.		Of	the	further	52	formal	requests	which	did	not	result	in	interviews,	most	people	did	not	respond	and	a	small	number	declined	due	to	lack	of	time	available.	These	figures	do	not	include	the	16	ad	hoc	interview	requests	that	were	made	during	observations	at	each	site.		Often,	these	were	completed	there	and	then,	such	as	after	observations	of	meetings	or	during	coffee	breaks.				As	planned,	there	was	a	relatively	balanced	number	of	participants	from	each	of	the	sites	and	across	the	three	professional	groups.		Please	see	Table	7	for	a	breakdown	of	these	participants.				
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Table	7.		Participant	numbers	detailed	by	site	and	by	professional	group	
Professional	group	 Site	A	 Site	B	 Site	C	 KII	(from	local	and	national	
stakeholder	organisations)	Clinical	(C)	 12	 10	 8	 4	Non-clinical	(A)	 4	 5	 6	 2	Managers	(M)	 2	 4	 5	 2	Sub-total		 18	 19	 19	 8	Total		 64		Interviews	ranged	from	28	minutes	to	1	hour	35	minutes	(one	hour	on	average).		Most	interviews	were	conducted	in	offices,	personal	and	shared,	located	within	the	hospital	Trusts.		Some	interviews	were	undertaken	in	the	hospital	coffee	shop	or	canteen	at	the	request	of	the	participant	(for	example	if	they	shared	an	office	and	did	not	want	to	be	overheard	or	disturb	colleagues).		All	of	the	eight	KII	interviews	were	conducted	off	NHS	Trust	sites,	such	as	at	the	offices	of	NICE,	the	CCG	offices	and	at	national	conferences	located	across	the	country.		
3.3.2.4.2 Observations	and	document	analysis	At	each	site,	approximately	three	months	of	observation	took	place.		This	time	did	not	include	weekends,	time	dedicated	to	other	academic	commitments	or	periods	of	annual	leave,	hence	overall	observation	time	represented	just	over	one	full	calendar	year	from	1st	December	2014	to	11th	December	2015.		Observations	ranged	from	7.00am	to	8.00pm,	to	include	morning	and	evening	meetings	that	were	often	scheduled	outside	traditional	core	working	hours.		Site	A	observation	was	conducted	first,	between	1st	December	2014	and	1st	February	2015;	site	B	took	place	between	1st	March	2015	and	30th	June	2015	and	site	C	between	1st	July	2015	and	11th	December	2015.		Observations	in	Site	C	were	for	an	extended	period	of	calendar	time	to	compensate	for	my	other	academic	commitments	taking	place	during	this	time.		However,	my	actual	time	dedicated	to	data	collection	was	similar	in	all	three	sites.		This	was	to	ensure	consistency	across	data	collection.			An	outline	of	the	key	documents	included	in	the	analysis	is	provided	in	Table	8.	Reading	and	referring	to	these	documents	throughout	my	time	at	the	organisations,	and	afterwards	during	data	analysis,	enabled	me	to	understand	
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the	wider	context	of	the	hospitals	and	to	help	frame	the	decisions	that	were	made.		For	example,	board	meeting	reports	stated	the	financial	situation	of	the	hospital	and/or	where	planned	cuts	would	be	made,	which	allowed	me	to	understand	the	financial	pressures	facing	management	teams	responsible	for	purchasing	orthopaedic	implants.			
Table	8.		Document	type	and	quantity	by	case	study	site	
Document	type	 Site	A	 Site	B	 Site	C	Clinical	pathways	 5	 3	 6	Protocols	 17	 2	 4	Meeting	notes		 7	 5	 11	Strategy	documents		 2	 1	 0	Quarterly	and	annual	reports	 14	 18	 17	Internal	presentations	 2	 5	 2	Sub-total		 47	 34	 40	Total		 121		
3.3.2.5 Validation		I	ensured	rigour	in	my	research	in	relation	to	the	reliability,	consistency,	auditability,	validity,	credibility,	applicability	and	neutrality	of	my	qualitative	data	throughout	the	data	collection	process	(Sandelowski,	1986;	Mays	and	Pope,	1995;	Creswell,	2009).		I	read	through	each	transcript	whilst	listening	to	recordings	and	noted	any	mistakes	and	comments	on	the	printed-out	document.		I	crosschecked	transcription	errors	as	I	coded	and	analysed	the	data.		To	ensure	that	initial	coding	reflected	the	data	and	not	any	interpreted	meanings	or	definitions,	I	coded	one	interview	from	each	of	the	three	participant	groups	as	they	became	available.		This	produced	an	initial	list	of	potential	codes	for	each	group.		Following	this,	I	was	able	to	revise	redundant	codes	and	to	refine	unclear	codes	as	I	proceeded	to	code	the	remaining	interviews.		To	ensure	consistency	across	the	coding,	one	transcript	was	selected	and	reviewed	by	the	supervisory	team	early	in	the	process	to	assess	my	original	codes.			All	participants	were	asked	if	they	would	like	a	copy	of	their	transcript	to	ensure	that	the	data	provided	an	authentic	account.		All	but	one	participant	declined,	instead	some	opted	to	receive	a	copy	of	the	final	research	executive	summary.		
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As	a	concluding	stage	in	determining	authenticity,	I	presented	the	results	of	the	research	and	a	summary	of	themes	to	each	hospital	Trust	prior	to	ending	the	period	of	observation.		This	allowed	me	ask	the	participants	if	they	recognised	my	findings	as	a	true	account	of	their	organisation.		It	also	enabled	me	to	obtain	further	feedback	and	reflections	on	the	research	findings.		This	feedback	could	itself	act	as	a	source	of	data.	To	identify	discriminant	validity,	I	noted	disconfirmatory	cases	within	and	across	each	site	to	ensure	the	range	of	views	present	in	the	analysis	was	represented.		Outliers	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	results	chapters.		
3.3.2.6 Data	coding	process		A	professional	transcriber	transcribed	the	interviews	verbatim.		Once	the	first	batch	of	transcriptions	was	complete,	I	was	able	to	conduct	an	initial	read-through	of	a	printed	copy	of	the	interviews.		This	familiarisation	process	enabled	me	to	get	to	know	the	data	and	the	narratives	that	were	beginning	to	emerge	across	the	data.		I	read	the	transcripts	in	the	order	that	they	were	received.		This	approach	allowed	for	progressive	focusing,	where	interviews	in	the	later	stages	of	the	data	collection	process	were	able	to	focus	down	on	particular	issues	of	interest	(Parlett	and	Hamilton,	1976;	Stake,	1995).		All	data	was	uploaded	and	stored	in	NVivo	11	(QSR,	2015),	in	order	to	help	code,	sort	and	analyse	the	data.		Documents	collected	as	part	of	the	document	analysis	process	were	also	uploaded	into	the	database,	according	to	site	reference.		Observation	field	notes	were	hand-written	in	field	journals	and	hence	were	not	uploaded	into	the	database	as	text	files.		These	notes	were	used	to	support	my	analysis	and	framing	of	the	situations	I	observed.		Examples	I	used	were	taken	directly	from	my	observation	log	and	were	selected	and	transcribed	personally.			I	selected	one	interview	from	each	group	(n=3)	as	available	and	coded	each	one	line-by-line	using	the	highlight	and	nodes	features	of	NVivo	11.		These	codes	represented	varying	levels	of	abstraction	in	the	data.		As	an	example,	codes	such	as	‘implant	selection’	reflected	high-level	coding	whereas	‘changing	innovators’	used	the	exact	words	that	were	present	in	the	transcript.		An	initial	coding	framework	was	developed	throughout	the	coding	process.		This	acted	as	a	
		 63	
thought	aid	to	help	structure	the	new	and	developing	codes	as	they	emerged	during	the	data	collection.			Once	all	transcripts	had	been	coded,	404	individual	codes	had	been	generated.		I	assessed	the	similarities	and	differences	between	codes	and	expanded	or	collapsed	them	into	groups	where	appropriate.		These	codes	were	presented	to	the	supervisory	team	for	discussion.		After	this	process,	328	codes	remained.		The	fully-developed	coding	framework	was	used	to	help	organise	the	328	codes	into	larger	categories.		This	next	stage	of	consideration	resulted	in	29	categories,	which	enabled	me	to	collapse	codes	and	reduce	the	overall	number.		A	category	summary	description	was	produced	to	enable	me	to	explain	the	meaning	of	the	category	and	the	codes	it	represented.		This	helped	me	to	remain	consistent	throughout	the	process	of	data	collection	and	analysis,	which	occurred	simultaneously	at	each	site	and	sequentially	across	the	three	sites.		Presenting	the	codes	and	category	summary	ensures	transparency	in	the	data	analysis	and	helps	to	establishing	the	robustness	of	the	research	process.		Table	9	presents	the	final	categories	and	corresponding	codes	of	the	data.		Throughout	this	coding	and	categorisation	process,	I	noted	points	of	interest	and	queried	parts	of	text;	I	referred	to	these	notes	as	reflexive	coding	summaries.		I	was	able	to	refer	back	to	particular	sections	of	key	documents	and	the	field	journals	that	reported	my	thoughts	after	the	interviews	had	been	conducted.		These	helped	me	to	further	interpret	my	reflective	account	of	what	was	said	and	how	it	linked	to	my	developing	ideas.
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Table	9.		Final	categories	and	codes	in	thematic	analysis	
Category	summary	 Codes	included	
Group	decisions:	decisions	made	by	more	than	one	person		 Stakeholder	meetings,	Group	decision,	Multidisciplinary	decision	making,	Stakeholder	complexity		Different	views,	Conflict,	Collective	decision-making,	Collaboration	under	competition,	Multidisciplinary	engagement		
Exceptions:	instances	and	examples	of	when	normal	practice	did	not	occur	 Clinician	not	response,	Variation	for	a	special	case,	Clinician	error,	Confidence	in	ability	(to	make	an	exception),	Deviant	behaviour,	Deviate	from	guidelines,	Make	exceptions,	Special	care	surgeon,	Just	in	case	decisions,	knee	jerk	decisions,	Confidence	to	disobey	guidelines		
Cost:	any	reference	to	cost	or	finance	that	included	a	decision		 Cost	rationalisation,	Service	improvement	driven	by	cost,	Loan	kit	cost,	Surgeon	knowledge	of	cost,	Cost	based	decisions,	Cost	as	a	driver	to	change,	Cost	and	efficiency,	Volume	and	cost	decisions,	Cost	versus	quality,	Value	for	money		
Learning	on	the	job	/	mentor:	examples	of	learning	or	knowledge	acquisition	from	a	respected	other	 Role	model,	Apprenticeship,	Mentors,	What	I	was	trained	in,	What	my	consultant	taught	me,	Knowledge	acquisition,	Learned	in	practice,	Learned	from	Seniors,	Learn	on	the	job,	Sharing	information		
Personal	experience:	examples	of	a	person’s	prior	experience	that	influenced	their	decision	making		 Its	established	practice,	Typical	patients	do	not	need	evidence,	The	way	we	do	it,	It	becomes	normal,	Personal	experience,	What	I’ve	always	done,	Surgeon	philosophy,	It	worked	before,	Light	bulb	experience,	Experience	over	implant,	Practice	based	evidence,	Works	in	my	hands,	My	decision	to	operate		
External	influence	/	political:	reference	to	factors	outside	of	the	organisation	that	could	impact	on	practice		 External	influence,	Changing	patient	demographics,	Policy,	External	environment,	Quality	Care	Commission,	Political	influence,	Best	Practice	Tariff,	Policy	for	cost	reduction,	Indemnity	of	implants,	National	priorities			ODEP,	Political	strategy,	Political	conflict,	Clinical	Commissioning	Groups		
Off	table	on	table	decisions:	examples	of	decisions	that	do	not	follow	the	norm	or	that	can	change	based	on	contextual	contingencies	 What	takes	clinical	priority,	Outcomes	are	variable,	Off	table	decisions,	Depends	on	the	situation,	Individual	versus	public	decisions,	Inside	outside	influence,	Layered	decisions,	Balancing	acts,	Need	to	balance	new	and	old,	Internal	verses	external	problems,	Just	do	what	you	like		
Intangible	/	legacy:	knowledge	and	evidence	that	cannot	be	identified	in	the	physical	form		 Intangible	decision,	Value	of	legacy	knowledge,	Insider	knowledge,	Historic	events,	Narrative	decisions,	Intangible	knowledge,	Beliefs	in	treatment		
Compliance:	reference	to	areas	where	compliance	and	rule	following	is	expected		 Governance	reporting	to	Trust,	Monitoring,	Influence	of	commissioners,	Internal	audit,	Assumed	compliance,	Mandates	from	NICE,	Scrutiny	of	outcomes,	Rule	following,	Monitoring	and	reporting		
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Leading	lights:	instance	of	people	who	take	the	role	of	influence	and	whose	opinions	can	be	a	source	of	evidence		 Expert	opinion,	Surgeon	at	the	policy	level,	Kudos,	Reputation,	Credibility,	The	face	of	research,	National	influence,	Interface	role,	Leading	light,	Opinion	leader,	Influential	people	
Professional	networks:	examples	of	other	orthopaedic	surgeons	acting	as	a	source	of	influence	over	decisions		 Learning	from	colleague,	Conversations	with	colleagues,	Only	trust	in	surgeons,	The	norms	of	surgery	Surgical	community,	Personal	relationships,	Relationship	management,	The	‘team’,	Talk	the	same	language,	Peer	pressure,	Group	think,	Everyone	does	it,	Socialised	knowledge,	Common	knowledge,	Group	behaviour,	Conform	to	colleagues		
Professional	hierarchy:	reference	to	the	impact	of	the	hierarchy	that	exists	within	the	hospital	organisation	 Allied	Health	Professionals,	Management	versus	clinicians,	Clinical	lead	for	NICE,	Differences	between	professional	groups,	Dependence	on	one	person,	Understanding	professional	groups,	Hierarchy	of	staff,	Professional	fit,	What	my	consultant	taught	me,	Position	in	theatre,	Who	dictates	decisions,	Professional	politics,	Experience	equals	respect,	Differences	between	groups,	Role	conflict		
Beliefs	about	orthopaedic	surgery:	individuals	beliefs	about	surgeons	as	a	type	of	person	and	orthopaedics	as	a	clinical	specialty		 Beliefs	about	orthopaedic	surgery,	Surgeons	only	do	surgery,	Challenges	to	orthopaedic	surgery,	Orthopaedics	is	different,	Evidence	based	orthopaedic	surgery,	Clinical	engagement	control,	Job	description,	Change	surgeons’	behavior,	Job	role,	Play	to	egos,	Surgeon	individual	differences,	Surgeon	autonomy,	Surgeon	personality,	Surgeon’s	learning	curve,	Variation	by	specialty,	Surgeon’s	power,	Variation	by	area	and	surgeon,	Surgeons	are	competitive,	Surgeons	do	not	understand	the	bigger	picture		
Patient	factors:	features	that	influence	decisions	that	are	directly	related	to	patients	being	treated		 Decision	for	patient	surgery,	Patient	demographics,	Patient	factors,	Patient	experience,	What	is	best	for	the	patient,	Patient	evidence,	What	the	patient	wants,	Patient	expectations,	Public	expectations		
Training	and	development:	reference	to	the	surgeons	training	and	how	that	influences	decisions	that	they	make	 Training,	Develop	staff	to	problem	solve,	Education,	Influence	of	trainer,	Staff	development,	Fellowship	training,	Academic	credibility,	Academic	training,	Level	of	training		
NICE-specific	beliefs:	all	references	about	NICE	and	their	relevance	to	clinical	practice	and	clinical	decision	making		 Beliefs	about	NICE,	Challenge	NICE,	Is	NICE	applicable	to	the	Trust,	Use	NICE	for	own	benefit,	NICE	is	a	carrot	or	a	stick,	Make	guidance	fit	for	purpose,	Guidelines	are	too	general,	We	do	NICE	already,	Too	much	guidance,	Open	to	interpretation,	NICE	dissemination	and	access,	Guideline	resistance,	Implementation	problems,	Whose	responsibility		
Implant	discussion:	examples	of	evidence	that	influence	how	implants	are	selected	for	patients		 Car	analogies,	Buying	and	contracting,	Implant	selection	same	for	everyone,	Product	availability,	Implant	selection	using	hard	data,	Passion	for	a	joint,	Implant	selection,	What’s	in	vogue,	Implant	selection	justify	to	Trust,	Price	variation,	Implant	selection	conflict	and	uncertainty,	Implants	made	available	by	Trust,	Shiny	new	kit	
Process	internal:	all	reference	to	the	internal	process	of	the	hospital	and	how	it	is	run	as	an	organisation		 Coding	process,	Feedback,	Communication,	Process	variation,	Internal	protocols,	Process	transparency			Local	polices,	Process	black	holes,	NICE	internal	processes,	System	wide	thinking,	Lack	knowledge	of	the	process,	Ownership,	Traditional	services,	Standardisation,	Pragmatic	choices,	Medicine	is	repetitive,	Efficiency	savings		
Innate	drivers:	evidence	that	stems	from	intangible	assets	of	the	decision	makers		 Craft	versus	science,	Skill	versus	science,	Innate	passion,	Confidence,	Fear,	Refuse	to	change,	Enthusiasm,	Personal	reflection,	Mind-set,	Perception	of	outcomes,	Blame,	Responsibility	for	surgery,	Ownership	of	the	process	and	surgery				
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Management:	all	reference	to	managers	working	within	hospitals		 Management	versus	surgery,	Non-clinical	managers,	Joint	roles,	Top-down	support,	Management	decisions,	Leaders	and	business	style,	Management	influence,	Management	support,	Management	power,	Board	level	decision-making,	Management	control	or	lack	of	control			
Organisational	issues/operational:	all	reference	to	the	organisation	and	its	mechanisms		 Organisational	benchmarking,	Staffing	issues,	Organisational	business	and	structure,	Theatre	availability,	Organisational	culture,	Proactive	versus	reactive	decisions,	Organisational	restraints,	Organisational	mentality,	Price	benchmarking,	Priorities	of	the	organization,	Procurement	procedure	of	implants,	Organisational	flexibility,	Time	constraints		
Evidence-based	medicine	(EBM):	all	examples	of	evidence	linked	to	the	traditional	definition	of	EBM		 Beliefs	about	EBM,	Learning	EBM,	Time	to	do	EBM,	Levels	of	evidence	in	practice,	Academic	influence	practice,	Changing	practice	towards	EBM,	Codified	evidence	base,	Develop	services	based	on	EBM,	Multiple	sources	of	guidance	or	evidence,	Journal	articles,	National	drivers	for	EBM,	Inappropriate	evidence,	Access	to	evidence,	EBM	limited	use	in	practice,	Attitudes	towards	EBM	
Gaming	and	incentivisation:	examples	of	issues	that	go	against	what	would	be	expected	within	the	organisation		 Incentives,	Hidden	agendas,	Tariffs,	Performance	not	influence	your	pay,	Playing	the	clinical	card,	Game	playing,	Targets,	Plant	the	seed	and	let	it	grow,	Who	shouts	the	loudest,	Tick	box	compliance,	Incentive	decision	making		
Innovation	versus	routine	practice:	reference	to	new	technology	and	treatment	when	compared	to	established	technology	and	treatment	 Bad	innovation,	Stifle	innovation,	Early	adoption,	Tinkering	around	the	edges,	Established	implant	technology,	Barriers	to	innovation,	Experimental	procedures,	Production	line	services,	Innovation	within	an	RCT,	Commodity	services	(hips),	Personalisation	agenda		
Professional	societies:	examples	of	the	wider	community	of	orthopaedic	surgeons	acting	as	a	source	of	influence	over	decisions	 Conferences,	Comparison	outside,	Professional	societies,	Benchmarking	to	societies,	Trust	in	own	society,	Professional	guidelines		
NHS	versus	private	practice:	all	reference	to	non-NHS	work	and	how	it	influences	decision-making		 Influence	of	private	practice,	Private	practice	is	different,	Public	versus	private	decisions		
Data	/	big	data:	the	importance	of	data	as	a	source	of	evidence	at	all	levels	of	practice		 Internal	data	at	Trust,	Poor	data	quality,	Trusting	data,	Need	to	access	data	yourself,	Influence	of	National	data,	Feedback	and	monitoring,	Data	monitoring	decisions,	Personal	data	is	our	responsibility,	Try	to	understand	data,	Baselining,	Control	over	data,	Information	is	power,	Data	interpretation		
Ethics:	all	reference	to	ethical	issues	and	decision	making		 Ethical	considerations,	Faith	to	do	the	right	thing,	Not	clinically	safe	(to	change),	Ethical	decision	making,	Ethical	targets	
Big	Pharma.	/	manufactures:		the	influence	of	external	organisations	who	develop	and	sell	orthopaedic	implants	on	decisions	that	are	made		 Influence	of	manufacturing	companies,	Training	provision,	Pharmaceutical	representatives,	Relationships	with	reps,	Commercial	decisions,	Rep	access,	Control	over	reps,	Incentives	from	manufactures,	Provision	of	research	and	evidence,	Marketing	influence,	Loyalty	to	company	
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3.3.2.7 Data	analysis		I	analysed	the	data	using	the	One	Sheet	of	Paper	(OSOP)	technique	for	thematic	analysis	devised	by	Ziebland	and	McPherson	(2006).		I	compiled	one	sheet	of	paper	for	each	category	and	listed	the	codes	included	in	each	category	on	post-it	notes	on	the	paper.		This	process	allowed	me	to	look	for	the	similarities	and	differences	of	participant	views.		I	was	also	able	to	seek	out	the	views	shared	by	individuals	and	how	they	were	contextualised	in	each	of	the	three	hospital	settings.		Using	the	traditions	of	thematic	analysis,	I	moved	back	and	forward	iteratively	between	the	developing	considerations	and	those	that	had	been	noted	in	my	reflexive	coding	summaries.		During	this	process,	the	categories	could	be	separated	and	grouped	into	five	smaller	subgroups,	where	the	subgroups	represented	particular	similarities	across	a	larger	number	of	categories.		For	example,	categories	about	‘beliefs	about	orthopaedic	surgery’,	‘patient	factors’	and	‘personal	experience’	could	all	be	grouped	into	a	subgroup	called	‘individual	beliefs	and	experiences’.			To	extend	the	analysis	further,	another	phase	of	OSOP	took	place.		For	each	of	the	five	subgroup	categories,	an	OSOP	was	conducted	following	the	same	process	described	above.		These	OSOP	charts	were	synthesised	together	to	make	up	the	final	category	OSOP.		Figure	4	illustrates	this	process	in	a	flowchart.		This	stage	merged	into	what	became	the	theme	development	stage	of	analysis	described	in	the	case	study	road	map.			
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Figure	4.	Example	OSOP	process	flowchart		I	developed	each	theme	through	an	iterative	process	of	refining	emerging	ideas	and	expanding	on	developing	concepts	presented	in	each	of	the	five	categories	(see	Figure	5	for	an	example	of	the	organisation	category	and	OSOP	production).		I	compared	the	data	to	the	theoretical	assumptions	detailed	in	the	literature	review.		This	enabled	me	to	develop	more	meaningful	themes	which	examined	theoretical,	empirical	and	practical	issues	in	the	data.		I	examined	these	clustered	issues	and	noted	similarities	and	differences,	discriminant	cases,	gaps	in	data,	the	importance	of	context	and	the	varying	points	of	view	between	and	within	the	cases.				Part	of	the	OSOP	technique	is	to	develop	a	reflective	account	of	the	methods.		To	achieve	this	I	reflexively	asked,	‘what	is	really	going	on	in	the	data?’,	‘do	I	believe	this	is	a	truthful	representation	of	views	and	what	was	said?’	and	‘how	might	these	views	match	or	come	together	when	compared	to	the	views	of	other	participants?’.		Being	reflexive	in	this	way	ensured	I	was	satisfied	that	the	analysis,	and	that	it	was	a	true	representation	of	the	data,	rather	than	my	personal	thoughts	and	ideas	regarding	what	participants	said.			
328 codes 29 categories
5 sub-categories4 themes
OSOP codes/
categories
OSOP categories
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Figure	5.		Example	of	a	category	and	its	organisation	and	OSOP	production		An	important	aspect	of	thematic	analysis	is	the	ability	to	move	seamlessly	back	and	forth	between	raw	data,	initial	codes,	category	summary	descriptions	and	the	final	OSOP	diagrams.		Throughout	the	process	of	identifying	emerging	themes,	I	searched	for	quotations	from	original	interviews,	observation	logs,	key	documents	and	notes	in	the	field	journals	to	illustrate	and	validate	the	consistency	of	the	theme	with	the	initial	data.		As	recommended	by	Creswell	(2009)	I	completed	a	final	crosscheck	of	my	interpretation	of	the	OSOP	categories	with	my	original	field	journal	notes	and	quotations.		I	repeated	this	process	and	reflexively	recorded	emerging	themes	until	I	considered	that	the	final	four	themes	formed	a	complete	representation	of	the	data.		The	final	four	themes	are	presented	in	the	overview	data	structure	diagram	in	Figure	6.		The	aim	of	the	data	structure	diagram	is	to	present	the	findings	in	a	transparent	fashion,	therefore	establishing	the	robustness	of	the	subsequent	narratives	presented	in	the	results	chapters.			
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Figure	6.	Overview	data	structure	diagram	
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3.3.3 Thematic	findings		The	four	themes	which	form	the	findings	of	my	research	are	listed	below.		The	structuring	around	individuals,	groups,	organisations,	and	environment	developed	a	priori	as	I	compared	the	data	to	the	theoretical	assumptions	detailed	in	the	literature	review.		A	brief	description	of	the	themes	is	below:		
1.	Individual	beliefs,	perceptions	and	values	of	orthopaedic	practice:	illustrate	issues	related	to	personal	circumstance,	personality	and	characteristic	behaviour.		Important	in	this	theme	are	the	knowledge,	method	of	learning	and	understanding	of	individuals	about	sources	of	evidence	and	their	influence	and	importance	for	individual	practice.	
2.	Orthopaedic	Communities	of	Practice:	represent	the	networks	and	communities	to	which	groups	of	professionals	belong.		This	is	particularly	important	for	knowledge	mobilisation	and	evidence	sharing	between	individuals	and	across	organisations.		This	theme	focuses	on	the	professional	norms	of	this	particular	group	of	clinicians.		
3.	Knowledge,	Capacity	and	Contingency	in	Organisations:	characterises	the	operational	issues	related	to	the	hospital	as	a	functioning	organisation.		These	include	financial	status	and	pressure,	staffing,	service	planning	and	processes.		This	theme	covers	the	emphasis	on	achieving	internal	standards	and	how	they	balance	with	resource	constraints	and	demands	of	the	NHS.		
4.	The	influence	of	the	Regulatory	Environment:	the	final	theme	reflects	knowledge	and	evidence	which	acts	upon	the	NHS	and	healthcare	as	a	wider	system.		It	includes	the	cultural	and	national	influences	which	positively	or	negatively	impact	on	individuals,	groups	and	organisations	attempting	to	deliver	orthopaedic	services	in	England.	
3.4 Chapter	summary		This	chapter	served	a	dual	purpose.		I	described	my	research	methodology	and	research	methods.		I	described	the	organisation	of	data	collection	and	the	analysis	process	to	demonstrate	how	I	conducted	the	thematic	analysis.		I	closed	the	chapter	by	introducing	my	key	four	thematic	findings.		In	the	next	four	
		 72	
chapters	I	will	demonstrate	how	the	context	and	contingencies	of	NHS	practice,	and	the	knowledge	mobilisation	which	occurs,	can	help	to	explain	the	variation	in	orthopaedic	practice	across	the	four	levels.				Chapters	4-7	encompass	the	four	results	chapters	of	my	thesis.		Each	chapter	represents	one	of	the	thematic	findings	described	earlier.		The	results	describe	the	individual	beliefs,	perceptions	and	values	of	orthopaedic	practice;	and	portray	the	influence	of	the	orthopaedic	Communities	of	Practice	that	were	observed	in	my	study.		I	go	on	to	describe	the	knowledge,	capacity	and	contingency	found	in	the	hospitals,	before	illustrating	the	influence	of	the	regulatory	environment	in	the	final	results	chapter.		I	will	explain	within	and	across	case	differences	that	I	found	during	my	research	in	each	results	chapter	with	representative	examples	provided	from	my	interviews,	observation	and	key	documents.		These	four	results	chapters	provide	a	full	representation	of	my	data	and	demonstrate	how	evidence	is	used	in	practice	and	in	decision-making.				 	
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4 Results	1:	Individual	beliefs,	perceptions	and	values	in	
orthopaedic	practice		
4.1 Introduction		In	this	chapter	I	illustrate	the	ways	in	which	the	practice	of	orthopaedic	surgery	is	contingent	on	the	individual,	and	the	nature	of	variation	in	the	work	of	orthopaedic	surgeons.		I	identify	what	the	surgeons	understood	to	be	the	source	or	sources	of	variation	in	their	practice.		I	examine	their	individual	beliefs,	perceptions,	characteristics	and	values	in	the	context	of	orthopaedic	practice.		The	use	of	clinical	evidence	derived	from	RCTs	has	developed	relatively	slowly	in	orthopaedics.		In	the	1990s,	when	the	EBM	movement	was	spreading,	the	evidence	base	for	surgery	was	particularly	weak	as	there	were	few	trials	comparing	differing	surgical	interventions	and	techniques.		When	considering	how	knowledge	spreads,	it	was	important	for	me	to	go	beyond	the	concepts	of	dissemination	and	translation	of	RCT	findings	and	clinical	guidelines.		Instead,	in	this	chapter	I	explore	tacit	knowledge,	mindlines	and	the	interactive	human	processes	which	created,	enacted	and	shared	knowledge	in	practice.			
4.2 Defining	concepts	and	determining	meanings	for	this	
chapter		In	this	theme,	I	refer	back	to	the	traditional	clinical	definition	of	EBM:		
	
“Evidence	based	medicine	is	the	conscientious,	explicit,	and	judicious	use	of	current	best	evidence	in	
making	decisions	about	the	care	of	individual	patients.		The	practice	of	evidence	based	medicine	
means	integrating	individual	clinical	expertise	with	the	best	available	external	clinical	evidence	
from	systematic	research.”	(Sackett	et	al,	1996)		The	growth	of	EBM	in	orthopaedics	began	around	2000,	in	recognition	of	the	need	to	integrate	clinical	expertise	with	the	best	available	systematic	research	in	the	field.		A	few	years	later,	one	of	the	leading	journals	in	the	field	of	orthopaedics	(The	Journal	of	Bone	and	Joint	Surgery),	announced	that	all	clinical	articles	submitted	for	publication	would	need	to	include	a	“level	of	evidence”	
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rating,	to	enable	editors	and	readers	to	classify	the	quality	of	study	(Obremskey	et	al,	2006).		For	this	purpose,	five	levels	of	evidence	in	orthopaedics	were	defined,	the	lowest	being	expert	opinion	and	the	highest	being	RCTs	or	systematic	reviews	of	RCTs.		There	has	been	a	continuing	increase	in	such	studies	in	this	field.		
4.2.1 The	meaning	of	EBM	for	the	orthopaedic	surgeons		The	classification	of	evidence	into	a	hierarchy	permits	research	evidence	to	be	weighted	by	individuals	before	the	results	are	incorporated	into	their	practice.		It	appeared	to	be	common	knowledge	among	the	surgeons	I	interviewed.		The	quote	below	is	a	surgeon	explaining	the	classifications	to	me:			
“So	level	one	evidence,	you	know,	RCTs,	I	think	as	surgeons	we	love	randomised	control	trials,	blah,	
blah,	blah	because	we	go,	oh,	yes,	that’s	definitely	the	best,	and	then	you	get	down	to	level	five,	
expert	opinion,	which	is	we	know	best	because	we’re	always	do,	you	know,	it’s	anecdotal,	you	know,	
its	low	down.”	(INT	C	37010)	
	Many	surgeons	did	not	have	the	time	or	inclination	to	scrutinise	even	the	well-presented	evidence	from	within	their	field.		This	was	despite	the	recent	emphasis	on	high	level	evidence.		The	quote	below	demonstrates	that	it	was	not	clear	how	the	surgeons	would	be	able	to	directly	translate	current	research	findings	into	better	care	for	patients,	either	because	it	was	too	complicated	or	because	of	the	large	quantity	of	evidence:		
“So,	first	of	all	it’s	really	complicated	all	right?	And	I	think	as	a	layperson,	the	lay	orthopaedic	
surgeons,	there’s	a	massive	disconnect	between	papers	and	orthopaedic	surgeons’	behaviours.	I	
think	it’s	very	difficult	for	me	to	be	totally	up	to	date	on	all	the	best	practice	on	this,	that	and	the	
other.	But	I’m	also	aware	that	I	don’t	look	at	every	single	thing.”	(INT	C	37010)		A	lack	of	confidence	in	the	evidence	presented	in	journals	and	guidelines	appeared	to	be	an	important	issue.		They	reported	being	able	to	find	evidence	in	an	article	to	prove	any	point	of	view	on	a	topic:		
“It	happens	all	the	time	and	often	the	evidence	is	mixed	so	you	know	that’s	often	the	situation;	one	
person	will	provide	evidence	in	favour	of	doing	something	and	the	other	might	show	another	bit	of	
evidence	against.	And	I	think	that	happens	a	lot	in	orthopaedics	because	generally	the	quality	of	the	
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evidence	is	so	weak	it	swings	both	ways.”	(INT	C	218011)		In	this	sense,	clinical	evidence	was	not	seen	as	one	correct	source	of	evidence,	instead	it	was	flexible	and	adaptable	to	fit	the	needs	of	the	user.		The	codified	evidence	became	an	object	which	served	a	specific	purpose	for	the	individual,	as	demonstrated	in	the	excerpt	below:			
“I	think	the	great	strength	of	guidance	is	it	can	empower	you	as	a	doctor.	So	for	example	if	the	
patient’s	pressuring	you	for	a	particular	sort	of	treatment	you	can	say,	look	that’s	not	what	NICE	
says.	It	really	is	a	huge	if	you	like	big	brother	standing	over	your	shoulder,	telling	them	to	go	away	
because	I	can’t	do	that.”	(INT	C	218007)		This	flexible	approach	to	evidence	replicates	the	practice	I	observed	in	the	hospitals.		My	data	from	clinical	practice,	meetings,	conferences	and	encounters	with	surgical	staff	demonstrated	that	orthopaedic	surgeons	performed	the	same	named	procedures	differently.		Despite	the	evidence,	a	THR	was	not	an	identical	procedure	across	the	three	sites.		A	variety	of	different	surgical	procedures	were	used	and	it	was	apparent	that	there	was	considerable	variation	in	the	implants	that	were	selected	and	how	the	operations	were	performed.		A	significant	factor	in	this	selection	process	appeared	to	be	the	discretion	and	autonomy	of	the	individual	surgeon.		NICE	guidelines	were	beneficial	to	the	clinical	specialty	but	were	seen	as	directly	‘attacking’	the	discretion	of	the	surgeon.		How	the	surgeons	enacted	this	discretion	would	vary,	as	reflected	in	the	summary	note	from	my	observations	at	case	C,	demonstrating	that	multiple	THR	options	were	available	within	one	hospital	Trust:		
“Surgeons	would	discuss	using	standard	total	hip	replacements	with	either	posterior	or	anterior	
approaches,	applying	a	minimally	invasive	technique	and	even	using	resurfacing	arthroplasty	when	
the	patient	was	considered	appropriate.	A	wide	variety	of	procedures,	old	and	new,	were	being	used	
during	the	time	of	the	data	collection,	and	this	appeared	to	be	a	normal	practice.	The	differential	
factor	in	the	procedure	that	was	selected	seemed	to	be	which	consultant	surgeon	the	patient	was	
‘under’	and	which	hospital	they	had	accessed.”(OBS	notes	Case	C)				It	is	important	to	state	that	differences	were	not	classified	as	non-evidence-based	practice.		Variation	was	a	normal	element	of	orthopaedic	surgery	across	all	
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three	sites.		The	selection	of	treatment	options	seemed	to	depend	on	the	contingencies	of	practice	and	the	enactment	of	‘surgical	philosophy’	or	beliefs,	rather	than	what	the	clinical	evidence	suggested.		These	enduring	beliefs	were	not	explicit	or	written	down	for	others	to	access.		One	surgeon	described	the	importance	of	his	‘philosophy’	or	belief	in	the	selection	of	prostheses:			
“So	my	philosophy	for	what	it’s	worth	is	I	think	cemented	hips	are	brilliant,	okay?	So	I’m	very	happy	
using	a	cemented	hip	and	have	those	on	the	shelf,	and	then	on	the	cup	side,	but	I	think	un-cemented	
hips	are	good	for	younger	people	because	I	can	then	decide	what	bearing	I	wanted	to	use,	that’s,	
kind	of,	kind	of	philosophy	that	you’ve	been	brought	up	with.”	(INT	C	198005)	
	The	use,	or	misuse,	of	evidence	was	not	sufficient	in	itself	to	explain	the	clinical	decision-making	and	variation	that	occurred	in	orthopaedics.		It	could	not	account	for	personal	choice	and	surgeon	beliefs.		It	is	important	to	reflect	on	the	factors	which	influenced	the	knowledge	and	evidence	privileged	by	individual	orthopaedic	surgeons	in	my	study.		These	were	linked	to	characteristic	surgeon	types,	and	the	beliefs	and	values	they	held	about	orthopaedic	practice.		
4.3 Individual	differences	and	characteristic	types	of	surgeon		I	anticipated	that	I	would	see	individual	surgeon	differences	in	attitudes	and	beliefs	towards	EBM	across	and	within	the	three	sites.		I	assumed	that	this	would	be	due	to	their	personal	characteristics,	how	they	were	trained	and	when	they	were	introduced	to	the	concept	of	EBM.		The	research	process	of	EBM	removes	the	context	from	practice.		It	aims	to	find	a	causal	relationship	between	two	variables	which	can	be	altered	systematically	and	independently	of	context	to	produce	the	optimal	evidence-based	outcome	(Gray,	2009).		In	contrast,	the	real	world	practice	I	observed	demonstrated	the	vital	importance	of	context,	individual	discretion	and	autonomy.				Decisions	were	often	made	through	a	variety	of	factors,	including	but	not	limited	to:	learning	from	one-off	experiences,	patterns	of	practice	observed	over	time,	formal	and	informal	training,	social	and	organisational	processes	surrounding	the	individuals,	and	the	wider	cultural	and	historic	forces	at	play.		Together,	these	factors	interact	and	could	be	associated	with	distinct	characteristic	types	
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which	developed	amongst	orthopaedic	surgeons.		I	recognised	that	the	personality	traits	of	surgeons	are	likely	to	be	fundamental	to	their	use	of	evidence	and	interpretation	of	knowledge.		However,	I	did	not	set	out	to	explore	this	level	of	detail	in	my	study.		Instead,	I	was	interested	in	characteristic	types	of	surgeon	in	relation	to	the	evidence.			
	The	majority	of	data	presented	in	this	chapter	came	from	interviews	with	surgeons	about	their	work.		However,	some	data	originates	from	other	respondents’	opinions	about	orthopaedic	surgeons	as	a	particular	type	of	clinician.		These	views	were	important	to	allow	me	to	corroborate	or	challenge	my	emerging	findings	and	to	understand	what	it	was	like	for	others	to	work	with	surgeons	day-to-day.		During	the	interviews,	I	asked	each	surgeon	to	describe	in	detail	how	they	decided	which	surgical	procedures	and	implants	they	selected	for	treating	arthritis	of	the	hip,	and	why	this	was	the	case.		This	helped	me	to	determine	what	type	of	knowledge	they	privileged	during	these	decisions	and	to	understand	their	individual	characteristics.		This	was	not	an	easy	task	for	some	of	the	surgeons.		They	struggled	to	explicitly	state	the	tacit	‘how’	and	‘why’	reasons	behind	their	choice	of	certain	treatments.		To	adapt	Polanyi’s	(2012)	phrase	they	‘knew	more	than	they	could	tell’.		The	two	quotes	below	demonstrate	the	importance	of	‘just	knowing’	and	personal	familiarity	in	decision-making:				
“You	just	know,	I	think,	you	just	know	when	somebody	who	really	needs	it	comes	in,	it’s	obvious.	I	
think	I	also	just	know	when	somebody	absolutely	doesn’t	need	it.	That’s	a	hard	one	particularly	if	
they’re	coming	expecting	something.	And	then	there’s	definitely	a	grey	area	where,	you	don’t	know	
…	I	tend	to	come	down	to	what	I	judge	is	right.”	(INT	C	37077)		For	others,	this	question	was	responded	to	rather	mechanically	as	a	series	of	steps	that	would	be	taken	to	achieve	their	goal.		They	would	describe	their	general	approach	as	a	story;	first	I	do	this,	then	I	do	this,	then	this	in	a	matter	of	fact	fashion.		For	most	of	these	surgeons,	the	story	started	with	the	patient	consultation	and	ended	with	the	operative	event.		They	would	provide	details	of	their	methods	including	how	they	selected	patients	and	their	decision-making	around	the	choice	of	implant	and	technique.		An	example	of	this	narrative	is	provided	below:		
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“I	would	say	that	the	way	we	decide	about	a	patient	and	whether	it	is	appropriate	to	offer	them	a	
joint	replacement	is	to	first	of	all	obviously	get	a	feel	for	the	level	of	the	symptoms	they	have	and	
how	much	they	interfere	with	their	pain	function	and	quality	of	life	and	then	the	next	questions	to	
ask	are,	are	they	fit	enough	for	the	surgery	at	the	moment,	are	there	any	barriers	to	proceeding	
straightaway,	and	if	there	are	barriers,	are	they	modifiable	or	are	they	fixed?	Fixed	in	respect	of	
whether	they	would	prevent	a	patient	proceeding	and	then	once	those	boxes	are	ticked,	I	guess	the	
next	question	is	to	decide	what	sort	of	prosthesis	might	be	appropriate	and	that	really	I	operate	
within	a	fairly	limited	framework	of	prostheses.”	(INT	C	190004)		Very	rarely	was	a	consideration	of	the	best	available	evidence	reported	as	the	reason	why	a	surgical	procedure	or	implant	was	selected.		The	hierarchy	of	evidence	did	not	appear	salient	or	useful	in	these	decisions.		In	the	quote	below,	a	consultant	surgeon	describes	how	he	categorises	the	evidence	and	privileges	experience	and	expert	consensus:			
“Typically	it	falls	into	a	few	categories;	it	can	be	sort	of	local	evidence	so	it	might	be	experience	of	
surgeons	in	our	unit	who	have	done	that	type	of	thing	before	or,	your	own	experience	of	having	done	
so	many	types	of	procedure	and	what	your	results	might	be	in	your,	in	your	practice.	Sometimes	it	
involves	knowledge	of	recent	published	papers	in	that	area	and	that	is	either	case	series	or	rarely	
sometimes	randomised	clinical	trials.	But	that’s	...	generally	you	feel	confident	doing	that	because	
you	know	that	that’s	supported	by	consensus	amongst	experts.”	(INT	C	218011)		In	addition	to	the	interview	data,	I	observed	and	shadowed	surgeons	going	about	their	daily	work.		This	helped	me	to	understand	the	typical	language	each	surgeon	used	and	how	they	tended	to	make	decisions.		I	specifically	looked	for	examples	where	the	surgeon	would	draw	upon	a	source	of	evidence	and	knowledge	to	make	decisions	in	real	time.		This	helped	to	illustrate	and	describe	the	practice	variation	across	the	distinct	groups.		I	will	describe	three	empirically-derived	characteristic	types	which	emerged	from	the	data	collection	and	analysis.		I	have	called	these	Innovators,	Mavericks	and	Gold-Standard	surgeons.		
4.3.1 Empirically	derived	surgeon	characteristic	types		During	interviews,	the	surgeons	and	associated	staff	would	talk	about	themselves,	other	groups	of	surgeons	and	hypothetical	types	of	surgeon	as	
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conforming	to	particular	stereotypes.		The	language	of	the	participants	to	label	these	characteristic	types	has	been	directly	used	for	the	categorisation	in	this	section.		Individuals	did	not	always	act	consistently	with	their	characteristic	type.		As	would	be	expected,	individuals	could	and	would	change	their	typical	behaviour	and	decision-making	practice	in	relation	to	contextual	contingencies.		In	this	sense,	the	types	provide	summaries	of	the	typical	clusters	of	behaviours	which	I	observed	during	my	empirical	work,	and	not	fixed	states.			
4.3.2 Characteristic	types:	Innovators	An	innovator	surgeon	was	characterised	by	their	desire	to	want	to	try	new	implants	and	techniques	in	a	quest	to	improve	the	orthopaedic	field.		This	visionary	approach	appeared	somewhat	naïve	and	possibly	over-optimistic.		These	surgeons	really	believed	that	they	were	making	a	difference	to	patients	having	orthopaedic	surgery.		The	surgeon	below	describes	their	positive	stance	on	innovation	in	their	work:		
“When	I	started	doing	it,	I	started	testing	it	on	a	few	patients	of	my	own	and	when	it	seemed	to	be	
working	and	I’d	got	it	to	a	point	where	it	was	now	becoming	useful,	I	then	approached	my	three	or	
four	key	colleagues	who	do	most	of	the	hip	replacements	and	said,	look,	this	is	what	I’ve	done	and	
what	do	you	think	and	showed	them	how	it	worked.”	(INT	C	218007)		The	key	driver	for	these	surgeons	was	a	desire	to	move	the	technology	forward	in	search	of	the	“perfect	hip”	(INT	C	218007).		There	was	also	an	aspiration	for	personal	and	career	development.		These	types	of	surgeon	did	not	appear	to	act	in	a	non-evidence-based	way	intentionally.		Instead,	innovators	saw	themselves	as	the	“engineers	of	orthopaedic	surgery”	(INT	C	198005).		The	quote	below	demonstrates	the	confidence	this	surgeon	has	in	the	improvement	that	he	could	make:			
“Yes,	so	I	came	up	with	an	idea	for	a	new	kind	of	wrist	splint	to	treat	patients	who	have	got	a	wrist	
fracture.	I	was	very	clear	in	my	own	head	that	this	was	a	definite	innovation,	it	would	definitely	
potentially	make	a	difference.	They	just	didn’t	get	it.	It’s	like	…	they	didn’t	seem	to	fathom	the	
concept	of	it,	despite	me	explaining	it	and	sending	them	pictures	and	3D	drawings,	they	just	didn’t	
get	it.	It	wasn’t	something	I	could	manufacture	myself	on	my	kitchen	table,	like	I	did	with	the	other	
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one.”	(INT	C	218007)			I	observed	one	surgeon	giving	a	seminar	on	innovative	practice	during	my	period	of	data	collection.		I	had	attended	this	seminar	regularly	during	my	fieldwork	at	this	hospital.		The	audience	were	used	to	standard	academic	research	presentations,	but	this	talk	was	met	with	applause	and	congratulations	for	his	achievements.		These	were	a	summary	my	thoughts	following	his	presentation:		
“He	gave	a	strong	message	to	the	audience	regarding	the	importance	of	innovation	and	change	for	
surgery	so	that	“we	can	move	the	specialty	forward,	and	not	stagnate”.	He	showed	pictures	of	him	
working	on	his	prototypes	and	then	bringing	them	into	the	hospital	to	try	them	out	on	patients.	This	
talk	was	exciting	for	the	audience,	there	was	a	buzz	in	the	room	which	was	unusual.”	(OBS	notes	site	
A)			Not	all	the	orthopaedic	surgeons	I	interviewed,	however,	viewed	innovators	in	a	favourable	light.		The	quote	below	gives	an	example	of	the	negative	connotations	others	associated	with	uncontrolled	innovation:		
“I	don’t	think	you	can	convince	these	people	that	they’re	taking	massive	risks	with	people’s	quality	
of	life	because	they’re	innovators,	they’re	there	to	make	things	better.	They	have	an	unshaken	belief,	
you	know,	it’s	a	bit	like	a	personality	disorder,	I	think.	A	true	innovator	must	have	some	degree	of	
variance	from	a	normal	personality	traits.”(INT	C	190004)		These	negative	views	appeared	to	stem	from	a	belief	that	innovators	were	attempting	to	improve	practice	within	the	context	of	their	clinical	work,	not	in	the	context	of	large	clinical	trials,	and	changes	to	techniques	and	implants	could	not	be	scaled	up	in	the	same	way	as	RCTs.		Innovators	did	not	privilege	clinical	evidence	over	their	practical,	experience	based	learning.		This	appeared	to	represent	some	danger	to	colleagues	who	practised	EBM.		The	quote	below	reflects	these	problems:			
	
“Yes	going	back	to	what	you	were	saying	about	innovation,	so	within	that	yes	you	might	find	small	
sub	groups	of	patients	where	you	want	to	push	the	envelope	a	little	bit	with	one	technique	or	
another.	But	that	should	not	be	being	done	by	a	lone	surgeon	in	a	lone	department	somewhere	with	
no	research	support	and	no	ability	to	follow	up	the	results,	no	actual	research	question	that	they	are	
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asking	in	the	first	place	they	are	just	tinkering	and	trying	a	few	things.”	(INT	C	218009)	
	There	was	an	apparent	divide	between	those	surgeons	who	saw	innovation	of	any	type	to	be	beneficial	for	their	specialty	and	those	who	did	not.		The	surgeons	who	did	not	innovate	tended	to	believe	that	innovation	should	be	confined	to	R&D	facilities,	clinical	studies	and	RCTs.			
	
4.3.3 Characteristic	types:	Mavericks		Mavericks	possessed	what	some	consider	to	be	the	stereotypical	traits	associated	with	orthopaedic	surgeons.		This	type	of	surgeon	was	the	‘showman’	of	their	field	and	had	an	unbounded	confidence	in	their	surgical	ability.		The	maverick	type	is	a	hypothetical	type	described	and	inferred	by	other	surgeons	and	surgical	staff.		Unlike	innovators,	mavericks	did	not	describe	themselves	directly	as	‘mavericks’.		However,	others	would	label	surgeons	mavericks.		Surgeons	who	aligned	to	this	type	would	describe	themselves	positively	as	a	“rebel”	or	the	“trouble-maker”	in	the	department	(OBS	notes	Hip	Conference	
2016).		They	seemed	to	know	that	the	way	they	acted,	the	autonomy	they	possessed,	and	the	discretion	they	held	over	decisions,	went	against	the	norms	of	their	hospital	and	community.		The	quote	below	regarding	the	use	of	surgical	drains	demonstrates	this	point:		
“So	I	got	told	three	years	ago	I	can’t	use	drains	for	my	replacements,	okay?	Which	I	found	
repugnant,	because	I	was	told	by	somebody	who	isn’t	a	surgeon,	I	can’t	use	a	drain.	I	think	that	is	
awful	because	you’re	undermining	the	surgeon	who’s	trying	to	do	the	operation.	They	argue	they	
make	no	difference,	well,	you	know,	you	can	look	at	the	difference	in	my	patients…	You	know,	but	I	
always	get	told	I	can’t	do	these	things	(laughs).”	(INT	C	37010)		During	an	observation	session	a	nurse	working	closely	with	a	maverick	surgeon	referred	to	him	as	“thinking	he	was	god”	because	of	his	inherent	belief	in	his	own	skills	and	ways	of	working	(INT	C	218005).		The	mavericks	were	reluctant	to	relinquish	control	over	their	decisions	and	actions.		There	were	consequences	for	surgical	teams	when	a	maverick	surgeon	did	not	get	their	way,	for	example	mavericks	might	display	their	anger	by	throwing	instruments	and	raising	voices.		One	surgeon	refers	to	a	group	of	specialists	he	works	with	as	“absolute	
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mavericks”	in	the	quote	below	and	demonstrates	how	they	are	able	to	“get	away	
with	(it)”:		
“You	think	they	are	bad	here?...(Hospital	name)	is	the	Wild	West	of	orthopaedics.	You	think	you’ve	
got	a	problem	meeting	some	orthopaedic	surgeons,	you	wait	and	see	some	revision	surgeons,	
absolute	mavericks,	some	of	them.	Really	fascinating	…	implants	that	are	far	more	expensive	than	
standard	hips	and	knees.	Nowhere	near.		People	are	too	frightened	of	those	surgeons.”	(INT	C	
377011)		Maverick	surgeons	had	a	tendency	to	be	the	trendsetters	in	their	hospital	or	their	field.		A	common	theme	amongst	the	maverick	surgeons	was	that	they	were	more	inclined	to	favour	the	“shiny	new	kit”	over	the	industry	standard	supplies	
(INT	C	119014).		There	seemed	to	be	little	negative	consequence	in	ordering	an	expensive	next	generation	implant	versus	a	cheaper	generic	implant.		This	was	described	by	surgeons	working	at	all	sites,	and	evidenced	below	with	quotes	from	two	surgeons	at	site	B:		
“So	I	know	some	surgeons	who	are	mavericks,	who	see	a	shiny	new	piece	of	kit	and	go,	oh,	I	like	that,	
I	will	have	that,	and	I	will	use	this.	I’m	going	to	use	that	and	implant	it	and	see	how	they	go.	Right?”	
(INT	C	37010)	
	Unlike	the	innovators	who	were	driven	by	technical	improvement	and	a	desire	to	develop	and	test	implants	in	practice,	the	mavericks	appeared	to	want	to	use	what	they	personally	determined	to	be	the	new	best	piece	of	equipment	or	technique.		It	was	not	clear	what	was	‘best’	as	it	seemed	to	be	a	personal	interpretation,	and	the	driver	behind	the	decisions	was	not	evident	through	my	observations.				Interestingly,	when	I	listened	to	surgeons	speak	at	conferences,	some	would	be	individually	sponsored	by	manufacturing	companies	to	promote	a	product.		The	entire	presentation	appeared	to	be	an	advertisement	for	a	new	implant	or	piece	of	equipment.		These	surgeons	did	not	report	the	results	of	trials	through	research	council	funding	or	report	their	affiliation	to	university	departments.		There	was	a	sense	of	competition	between	maverick	types	as	to	who	could	
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“shout	the	loudest”	at	conferences	(OBS	notes	Hip	Conference	2016).		These	individuals	would	make	a	concerted	effort	to	have	their	opinion	and	voice	heard	in	discussions	and	presentations	by	colleagues.		
4.3.4 Characteristic	types:	Gold-Standard	surgeons		The	gold-standard	surgeons	took	a	production	line	approach	to	practice.		In	this	sense,	these	surgeons	would	characteristically	perform	the	same	types	of	surgery	using	established	prostheses	repeatedly,	because	to	them	these	procedures	were	effective	and	proven.		A	number	of	surgeons	I	interviewed	described	their	hip	replacement	practice	as	“run	of	the	mill”	(INT	C	218008)	or	a	“production	line”	(INT	C	190004).		These	surgeons	seemed	to	know	what	their	typical	practice	should	be,	and	the	outcomes	they	could	routinely	achieve	for	their	patients	by	selecting	evidence-based	standard	implants.		Gold-standard	surgeons	appeared	to	have	little	motivation	to	change	practice	unless	they	were	given	a	valid	and	evidence-based	reason	to	do	so.		The	quote	below	reveals	this	desire	to	follow	the	established	practice:			
“Well	orthopaedics	is	fortunate	in	that	we	have	got	quite	a	few	operations	that	work	well	with	large	
treatment	effects.	So	you	don’t	need	to	tinker	too	much	with	it	because	the	treatment	effects	are	so	
large	that	the	patients	are	going	to	do	very	well.		So	yes	just	deliver	the	service	as	simply	and	safely	
and	as	reproductively	as	you	can	which	is	where	following	protocols	is	best.”	(INT	C	218009)		In	my	study,	gold-standard	surgeons	represent	two	elements	of	standard	practice.		One	group	aligned	to	the	standardisation	which	emanates	from	closely	following	the	clinical	evidence	base	and	standards	for	implant	selection	established	by	organisations	such	as	ODEP	and	NICE.		The	second	group	had	developed	a	standardisation	in	their	practice	from	a	lifetime	of	performing	the	same	surgery.		These	elements	are	represented	in	the	quote	below:		
	
“I	operate	within	a	fairly	limited	framework	of	prostheses,	all	of	which	are	ODEP	10A	rated.	I	don’t	
do	any	experimental	procedures	on	patients	at	all,	and	the	choice	of	prosthesis	I	think	would	come	
down	to	really	essentially	the	same	prosthesis	but	minor	variations	in	the	bearing	surface.	So	for	
example,	at	the	moment	I	have	for	hip	replacement	all	patients	receive	some	variant	of	a	(brand).	In	
the	over	70s,	it’s	a	metal	on	plastic	bearing.	If	you’re	between	60	and	70,	it’s	a	ceramic	femoral	head,	
and	if	you’re	under	60,	the	emphasis	is	more	towards	a	ceramic	on	ceramic	bearing.	I	think	the	
evidence	base	for	the	latter	two	is	fairly	strong.	The	evidence	base	for	the	under	60s	is	probably	not	
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as	strong	as	it	could	be.”	(INT	C	190004)			The	theatre	nurse	who	coined	the	term	“gold-standard	surgeon”	in	my	research	was	describing	a	surgeon	with	whom	he	had	worked	for	nearly	twenty	years,	whose	practice	was	so	predictable	that	the	theatre	nurse	could	“set	his	watch	by	
him”	(INT	C	218013).			It	appeared	that	two	different	types	of	evidence	were	important	for	the	gold-standard	surgeons.		First,	their	personal	experience	that	an	intervention	is	effective,	and	secondly	that	clinical	evidence	in	academic	literature	suggests	certain	options	are	preferable	when	compared	to	others.		In	both	of	these,	there	was	a	focus	on	attaining	proof	over	long	periods	of	time.	These	surgeons	were	reluctant	to	change	their	practice	overnight	to	match	the	trends	of	innovative	or	maverick	colleagues.		The	surgeon	below	reflects	on	the	long	term	negative	consequences	of	changing	practice:		
	
“I	don’t	think	it’s	helpful	or	innovative	for	me	as	a	surgeon	to	be	trying	something	new	on	my	own	in	
the	hospital,	whereas	lots	of	surgeons	would	genuinely	believe	that	but	they,	I	don’t	think	they	fully	
understand	what	they’re	doing	or	the	implications	of	what	they’re	doing	and	that’s	because	they	are	
not,	they’re	not	research	trained	to	understand	like	that,	they’re	trained	surgeons,	they	know	how	to	
put	the	implants	in	but	they	may	not	really	fully	understand	the	implications	of	what	they’re	doing	
and	that’s	the	issue.		So	on	a	very	personal	level	they	feel	that	they’re	doing	something	useful	for	
them	and	the	patients	but	actually	probably	something	really	rather	unhelpful	for	everyone.”(INT	C	
218011)	
4.3.4.1 The	use	of	metaphor	to	describe	the	characteristic	types			The	surgeon	types	represent	characteristics	types	of	behaviour	and	decision-making	processes	that	appeared	to	be	dependent	on	the	evidence	each	characteristic	type	deemed	important.		For	the	innovators,	seeing	something	new	work	first	hand	was	key.		The	mavericks	needed	to	have	the	latest	products	for	their	practice.		The	gold-standard	surgeons	would	perform	what	the	clinical	evidence	and	surgical	tradition	suggested	was	best.				Throughout	the	interview	process,	the	surgeons	repeatedly	used	metaphors	to	describe	their	practice	and	the	characteristics	and	stereotypes	of	their	
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colleagues.		One	particular	metaphor	is	linked	to	cars	and	vehicle	manufacturing.		For	example,	a	gold-standard	surgeon	compared	the	use	of	traditional	metal-on-polyethylene	hip	replacements	to	the	Ford	Model	T	car.		The	production	of	this	car	is	renowned	for	its	standardised	processes,	and	focus	on	effective	replication.		He	was	suggesting	that	a	similar	approach	should	be	used	for	hip	replacements	in	the	NHS.		He	also	compared	the	technologically	advanced	and	more	expensive	hip	replacements	to	a	Rolls	Royce,	and	argues	against	their	selection	in	the	quote	below:			
“I	don’t	think	the	NHS	was	ever	built	to	give	every	patient	a	Rolls	Royce	implant.		And	I	think	there's	
too	many	Rolls	Royces	being	put	in	…	it’s	unnecessary.	They	could	have	the	Ford	Model	T,	they	could	
have	a	metal	and	plastic.	I	think	a	huge	number	could	have	been	metal	and	plastic.”	(INT	C	37011)			The	surgeon	below	describes	the	innovation	between	new	types	of	hip	implant	by	comparing	it	to	small	differences	in	the	performance	between	two	types	of	supercar.		He	suggests	that	hip	replacement	surgery	is	well-established,	and	therefore	only	small	improvements	can	be	made	through	innovation:		
	
“The	innovation…[of	different	hip	replacement	types]	has	got	to	a	point,	really,	where	you’re	
tinkering	between	the	performance	between	a	Maserati	versus	a	Ferrari	in	terms	of	your	particular	
performance	domain,	you	know,	you’ve	got	to	be	really	confident	that	you	know	what	you’re	doing	
to	mess	with	that.”	(INT	C	190004)	
	When	reflecting	on	the	maverick	behaviour	amongst	himself	and	his	colleagues,	the	surgeon	quoted	below	suggests	that	“most	people”	want	the	latest	and	greatest	car,	not	the	unrefined	Beetle.		This	was	a	metaphor	for	the	next	generation	implants	compared	to	the	established	and	reliable	prostheses:		
“It’s	like	when	you	go	to	buy	a	car.		Do	you	say	I	want	the	latest	and	greatest	car	with	all	the	
features	on	it	or	do	I	want	a	VW	Beetle	from	1970s	because	they	never	broke	down.	Some	people	like	
the	idea	of	a	car	that	just	never	breaks	down.	It’s	not	the	most	refined	thing,	but	it	does	the	job.	Then	
obviously	most	surgeons	probably	think	well	I	want	to	go	for	the	latest	thing.	I	just	think	we’ve	got	
to	always	have	an	eye	on	the	next	generation.	Otherwise	we’ll	never	get	beyond	…	essentially	we’ll	
live	with	the	obsolete.	We’ll	be	driving	around	in	Volkswagen	Beetles	forever.”	(INT	C	218007)		
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The	important	feature	of	these	surgeon	characteristic	types	is	that	the	variation	in	individuals	and	their	typical	behaviour	may	lead	to	variation	in	the	practice	of	hip	replacement	across	sites,	and	across	the	country.		The	characteristic	surgeon	types	were	associated	with	the	preferences	of	surgeons	in	relation	to	their	autonomy	and	the	discretion	they	enacted	over	decisions.		These	preferences	varied	and	differences	were	enacted	in	practice.		I	observed	representative	examples	of	each	type	of	surgeon	at	each	case	study	site.		The	only	seemingly	majority	group	was	at	site	A,	where	the	surgeons	tended	towards	the	gold-standard	type.		I	believe	that	this	was	linked	to	their	focus	on	academic	research	and	EBM.		However,	I	also	observed	maverick	and	innovator	types	in	site	A.		In	practice,	patients	scheduled	for	hip	surgery	would	not	know	which	type	of	surgeon	would	be	operating	on	them.		This	variability	amongst	surgeons	and	their	choices	might	be	a	legitimate	source	of	concern,	if	decisions	regarding	the	type	of	procedure	and/or	the	implants	selected	were	driven	by	the	characteristics	of	the	individual	treating	them,	not	by	the	evidence-base.	
4.4 Autonomy,	discretion	and	decisive	decision-making		One	distinguishing	trait	consistent	across	all	these	surgeon	types	was	the	autonomy,	discretion	and	decisiveness	that	each	surgeon	held	over	their	decision-making	and	practice.		This	was	a	function	of	their	role	and	identity	as	an	orthopaedic	surgeon,	not	the	result	of	their	characteristic	type.		I	propose	that	autonomy	and	decisiveness	are	associated	with	their	elite	professional	status	within	hospitals.		The	short	quotes	below	demonstrate	the	autonomy,	discretion	and	decisive	decision-making	that	were	the	norm	across	all	three	sites:			
“I’m	confident	that	what	we	do	is	the	right	thing	to	do.”	(INT	C	198003)		
“I	am	confident	about	the	decision.	It	might	not	be	the	right	decision.	There	is	an	old	adage	about	
Trauma	and	Orthopaedic	Surgeons	that	“they	are	often	wrong,	but	they	are	never	in	doubt!”.”	(INT	
C	218008)		
	
“Whereas	a	physician	might	sit	back	and	go	and	think	about	a	problem	in	the	sort	of	coffee	room	
there	and	deliberate,	our	job	isn’t	like	that.	You	know,	it’s	sort	of	immediacy,	you	need	to	have	an	
immediate	decision.	And	you	have	to	recognise	that	some	of	your	immediate	decisions	are	often	
incorrect	and	accommodate	to	that.”(INT	C	37011)	
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	Orthopaedic	surgeons	are	a	professional	elite	with	a	prestigious	occupation	within	the	medical	profession.		Their	decisive	sense	of	discretion	and	ownership	over	their	decisions	was	aimed	particularly	towards	the	individuals	outside	their	elite,	such	as	managers,	researchers	and	policy-makers.		Surgeons	who	are	not	autonomous	and	decisive	might	look	and	feel	out	of	place	in	their	working	environment.		The	quote	below	shows	how	these	surgeons	believed	that	colleagues	and	patients	would	lose	confidence	in	them	and	their	skills	if	they	showed	indecisiveness:		
“There’s	a	sense	that	you	sort	of	have	to	make	decisions	and	you	become	very	sort	of	quick	to	make	
decisions.	“Okay	let’s	do	this	and	we	stick	to	it”	because	as	you	can	imagine	uncertainty	for	patients	
is	quite	difficult	to	comprehend,	“Oh	bloody	hell	I’m	not	having	an	operation	with	that	person”	and	
so	you	...	and	I	think	for	whatever	reason	patients,	well	patients	don’t	like	uncertainty	and	if	you	
show	that	to	patients	they	lose	confidence.”	(INT	C	218011)	
4.4.1 Tactics	surgeons	used	to	change	the	evidence	through	resistance,	
power	and	enactment	of	their	views	The	characteristic	types	of	surgeons	functioned	in	parallel	to	the	contingencies	of	the	groups,	the	constraints	of	the	organisation	and	wider	regulatory	forces	which	I	describe	in	the	other	three	results	chapters.		Together	these	elements	enabled	me	to	understand	the	nature	of	orthopaedic	surgical	work	and	the	knowledge	mobilisation	that	occurred	in	context.		It	has	allowed	me	to	describe	what	happened	in	the	real	world,	and	to	capture	a	sense	of	an	understanding	of	the	play	of	chance	and	uncertainty	in	clinical	practice.		I	was	able	to	examine	the	dependency	that	existed	in	practice,	i.e.,	that	decision-making	was	conditional	on	other	factors	such	as	the	availability	of	a	chosen	implant.		The	characteristic	types	of	surgeons	interacted	with	contingent	factors	of	context	in	three	key	ways.		I	have	identified	these	as	resistance,	power	and	enactment.		The	findings	also	revealed	that	surgeons	used	their	behaviour	as	a	tactic	to	change	or	manipulate	the	evidence	towards	their	own	preferences.		
4.4.1.1 Resistance:	beliefs	about	evidence	and	NICE	for	informing	practice		During	my	study,	everyone	I	interviewed	uniformly	believed	that	a	hip	replacement	was	a	good	thing	to	do	given	the	right	circumstances.		It	is	a	highly	effective	treatment,	which	produces	significant	improvement	in	patients’	quality	
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of	life	and	symptoms	post-surgery.		The	surgeon	below	describes	the	benefits	of	THR:		
“Now,	I’m	a	hip	surgeon	so	I’m	a	bit	biased.	But	hip	placements	are	amazing,	you	know,	and	they	
only	maybe	get	beaten	by	maybe	heart	surgery	and	having	your	cataracts	done,	okay.	So	if	you’re	
going	to	spend	your	tax	pound,	you	don’t	spend	it	on	bunions,	you	spend	it	on	hip	replacements	as	
they	are	amazing.	If	you	look	at	your	quality	of	adjusted	life,	your	quality	goes	bosh,	it	goes	straight	
up	after	those,	right.”(INT	C	37010)		This	positive	treatment	effect	is	the	message	outlined	in	the	clinical	guideline	produced	and	disseminated	by	NICE.		Hence	the	original	guidance,	and	the	subsequent	update	were	seen	by	many	surgeons	as	common	sense	and	therefore	unnecessary	and	of	little	benefit	in	practice.		These	assumptions	were	made	on	the	premise	that	surgeons	already	possessed	the	knowledge.		The	quotes	below	illustrate	the	strong	negative	beliefs	surgeons	held	about	NICE	guidance:		
“NICE,	is	irrelevant.	They	don’t	tell	me	anything.	Well,	it’s	just	that,	you	know	…	which	orthopaedic	
surgeons	sit	on	that	panel…?	None,	no	I	don’t	see	that	as	hugely	applicable	to	my	everyday	practice	
particularly	if	it	was	divergent	with	the	BOA	(British	Orthopaedic	Association)	guidance.”	(INT	C	
37011)		
“I	think	the	drivers	they’re	striving	for	are	ones	that	I	would	entirely	espouse	and	everything.	But	
they	have	broad	brushstrokes,	because	they	haven’t	said	that	much	about	joint	prostheses	and	they	
didn’t	even	come	out,	you	know	when	the	hip	resurfacing	implants	were	first	developed.	This	was	an	
experimental	procedure	in	the	same	way	that	they	would	do	about	drugs,	you	know,	so	they	should	
have	been	more	on	the	ball	then,	so	that’s	a	weakness	of	NICE.	NICE	are	not	being	proactive	enough,	
I	would	say,	in	terms	of	making	recommendations	on	prostheses	and	they	could	do	a	lot	more	to	
stop	the	maverick	innovation.”	(INT	C	190004)	
	However,	despite	the	common	knowledge	that	hip	replacements	work,	there	seemed	to	be	little	consensus	about	the	treatments	that	exist	and	which	are	most	appropriate	in	what	circumstance.		In	2000	NICE	published	its	first	clinical	practice	guidance	on	hip	replacement	(TA	2)	informed	by	scientific	evidence	on	surgical	treatments.		In	February	2014,	NICE	released	the	latest	update	(TA	304).		I	was	therefore	able	to	assess	how	this	particular	guidance	influenced	orthopaedic	surgical	practice	in	real	time,	since	my	data	collection	started	in	
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December	2014.		Hospitals	have	three	months	from	the	date	of	release	of	guidance	to	ensure	that	NICE	Technology	Appraisal	(TA)	recommendations	are	met:		
“The	NHS	is	legally	obliged	to	fund	and	resource	medicines	and	treatments	recommended	by	NICE's	
technology	appraisals.	When	NICE	recommends	a	treatment	'as	an	option',	the	NHS	must	make	sure	
it	is	available	within	3	months	of	its	date	of	publication.”	(Doc	analy	NICE	TA	guidance)			Surgeons	considered	that	NICE	guidance	was	out	of	date	or	irrelevant	and	this	was	mentioned	as	soon	as	I	broached	the	topic	with	them.		This	point	is	shown	in	the	statement	below:		
“The	other	thing	with	NICE	guidance	is	it’s	never	get	reviewed,	does	it?		So	you	can	have	NICE	
guidance	that’s	about	ten	years	old,	fifteen	years	old,	with	long,	long	gaps	between	reviews.”	(INT	C	
37003)		There	was	a	lack	of	awareness	about	the	NICE	update	amongst	staff	responsible	for	managing	the	orthopaedic	departments.		Conversations	with	managers	revealed	that	they	were	unaware	that	the	guidance	had	been	updated	in	2014.		The	lack	of	awareness	was	bolstered	by	a	lack	of	trust	and	appreciation	of	NICE	as	an	organisation	and	of	the	clinical	guidance	it	produced.		These	elements	together	created	resistance	to	the	evidence	being	used	in	practice.		I	observed	this	trend	from	the	junior	surgeons	in	training,	right	through	to	board	members	responsible	for	running	hospitals.		The	quotes	below	demonstrate	how	this	resistance	plays	out	across	the	hospital	hierarchy:		Hospital	board	member:		
“I	mean,	a	candid	opinion	from	me	is	I	think	NICE	guidance	is	very	much	just	seen	as	another	layer	
of	administration	for	clinicians	until	it	becomes	relevant	in	a	clinical	sense.	I	think	in	the	general	
sense	if	no	one’s	looking	at	whether	you’re	following	NICE	guidance	or	not.	They	will	just	sit	on	a	
shelf,	unless	you	have	a	very	active	team	of	clinicians	who	take	this	on	board.	But	that’s	not	a	
consistent	thing,	it...	And	I’m	talking	not	just	here	but	across	my	experience	in	other	big	Trusts.”	
(INT	C	37003)		Consultant	surgeon:	
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“First	of	all	I	think	when	NICE	first	came	out,	I	thought	its	aims	were	very	laudable.	I	think	it	became	
quite	political	quite	quickly,	which	was	probably	inevitable.	But	I	think	NICE	probably	does	have	
some	limitations.	So,	but	I,	so	I	think	NICE	in	itself	is	far	too	over	complicated.	So	I	think	it’s	really	
over	complicated	as	an	organisation,	personal	opinion,	and	I	think	it’s	complicated	for	even	doing	
things	which	we’d	class	as	relatively	straight	forward.	I	think	they’ve	almost	been	given	too	much	of	
a	mandate.	They’ve	been	told	to	do	too	much.	So	I	don’t	know	how	focused	they	are,	to	be	honest.”	
(INT	C	37010)		Trainee	surgeon	reflecting	on	the	attitudes	of	their	seniors:		
“I’m	not	quite	so	convinced	that	doctors	are	convinced	by	evidence	they’ll	look	up	something	and	if	it	
happens	to	coincide	with	what	they	want	they’ll	quote	it.”	(INT	C	198001)	
	The	only	site	to	show	a	distinctly	different	trend	in	their	trust	and	appreciation	of	clinical	guidance	was	site	A.		I	consider	that	this	may	be	due	to	their	focus	on	research	and	academic	output	and	beliefs	regarding	the	importance	of	NICE	and	the	EBM	approach.		A	quote	from	a	surgeon	working	at	site	A	illustrates	this:			
“So	there	are	some	very	common	conditions	that	we	see	and	I	am	mainly	based	around	the	hip	now	
where	we	do	try	as	much	as	possible	to	follow	the	basis	of	evidence	which	is...So	the	types	of	typical	
patient	would	be	one	with	where	we	would	need	to	use	evidence.	There	is	not	much	of	a	dilemma	
about	someone	with	end	stage	osteoarthritis	as	the	guidance	shows	the	pathway	that	they	should	
take,	so	joint	replacement	is	the	way	to	go.”	(INT	C	218009)		The	few	academic	surgeons	employed	at	site	C	(the	large	teaching	hospital)	demonstrated	significant	variation	in	their	individual	beliefs	regarding	NICE.		Those	that	were	located	full-time	at	the	University	site	tended	towards	more	positive	opinions	of	NICE	guidance	and	clinical	evidence	when	compared	to	those	located	full-time	at	the	hospital.		Interestingly,	all	four	individuals	in	this	role	held	the	academic	title	of	Professor.		This	suggests	that	the	physical	location	of	a	surgeon	could	have	an	important	influence	on	their	beliefs	and	usual	practice.			Nevertheless,	a	common	thread	throughout	the	data	collection	was	that	clinical	evidence	and	guidelines	could,	and	sometimes	should,	be	resisted	by	the	surgeons	in	practice.		The	hierarchy	of	evidence	promoted	by	leading	orthopaedic	journals	seemed	to	be	largely	irrelevant,	and	sometimes	inverted	in	
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practice.		The	quote	below	reflects	individual	beliefs	about	the	lack	of	usefulness	and	appropriateness	of	evidence	and	NICE	guidance	for	day-to-day	work:			
“There	is	very	little	sort	of	robust	evidence	to	guide	practice	so	you	rely	on	other	peoples’	anecdotal	
experience	and	normal	practice	to	help	guide	what,	what	works	and	what	doesn’t	and	so	if	you’re	
perceived	as	doing	something	that	most	surgeons	wouldn’t	do	then	you	would	be	worried	that	
you’re	doing	something	either	...	well	either	you’re	doing	it	on	purpose	to	be	a	maverick	or	you’re	
doing	something	which	you	shouldn’t	be	doing.”	(INT	C	218016)		This	section	highlights	how	resistance	to	EBM	and	NICE	guidance	were	widespread.		
4.4.1.2 Power:	retaining	power	over	evidence	and	decisions	and	the	belief	
that	orthopaedics	is	different		One	key	notion	that	arose	consistently	during	the	data	collection	was	that	orthopaedics	is	‘different’,	and	therefore	orthopaedic	surgeons	are	‘different’.		The	element	of	difference	was	variable	and	seemed	to	be	applied	to	many	parts	of	clinical	practice,	such	as	the	requirement	and	appropriateness	of	guidelines,	conducting	surgery	and	having	to	conform	to	organisational	rules.		Being	‘different’	appeared	to	allow	the	surgeons	to	retain	power	over	their	decisions	and	actions,	and	to	reject	EBM,	as	illustrated	below:			
“There	were	still	people	who	don’t	follow	sort	of	policy	evidence	based	guidance.	I	think	it’s	
orthopaedic	tradition	that,	I	think	it’s	just	more	characteristic	of	orthopaedic	surgeons.”	(INT	C	
218011)		The	‘difference’	argument	used	by	surgeons	fell	into	two	general	categories.		The	first	was	identifying	problems	with	the	evidence	base,	particularly	the	appropriateness	of	RCT	data	for	orthopaedics.		Surgeons	would	suggest	that	trial	evidence	was	lacking,	or	that	it	was	low	quality	or	conducted	on	inappropriate	patient	groups,	as	demonstrated	below:		
“99%	of	what	we	do	though	in	orthopaedics	is	evidence	free,	most	of	what	we	do,	is	we	do	what	we	
do	and	you	can’t	really	provide	any	evidence	basis	for	it	you	know	it’s	what’s	been	done	and	
apparently	works	and	seems	to	work.”	(INT	C	218011)		
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Within	the	specialty,	the	historical	lack	of	RCTs	has	been	linked	to	the	reluctance	of	surgeons	to	participate	in	trials.		This	was	not	the	case	for	surgeons	in	site	A,	but	more	so	in	case	B	and	C	where	the	majority	did	not	conduct	or	participate	in	trial	data	collection.		When	asked	why	this	was	the	case,	they	suggested	that	clinical	equipoise	was	absent	(e.g.,	if	one	treatment	is	already	known	to	be	preferable,	it	should	be	offered	and	not	denied	to	trial	participants	by	randomisation	to	an	inferior	treatment)	or	because	of	logistical	constraints	or	organisational	restrictions.		A	surgeon	at	site	B	commented	that	“we	are	not	set	
up	here	to	do	trials”	(INT	C	37011).		The	surgeons	who	did	align	to	EBM	traditions	were	seen	as	outsiders.		Surgeons	at	sites	B	and	C	suggested	that	clinicians	who	participate	in	trials	are	often	fanatics	or	innovators,	located	in	Universities	and	therefore	“not	your	normal	surgeons”	(INT	C	119003):	
	
“Me	basically,	I	suppose	it’s	research	attached	to	clinical	work,	rather	than	you	know,	my	colleague	
here	who	just	is	in	university	and	he’s	more	of	a	rat	doctor.	Yes.	Doing	good	work	but	doing	what	I	
call	a	real	sort	of	scientist	rather	than	we’re	just	sort	of	teaching	consultants.”	(INT	C	198003)	
	The	second	issue	was	with	the	type	of	evidence	that	the	surgeons	were	expected	to	use.		EBM	evidence	often	fails	to	take	into	account	the	human	element	of	surgical	practice	and	lacks	a	consideration	of	the	clinicians’	mindlines.		The	key	phrases	that	the	surgeons	used	to	summarise	this	notion	was	that	orthopaedic	surgery	is	an	“art”	or	a	“craft”	and	therefore	not	a	science	which	can	be	guided	by	scientific	evidence.		In	essence,	knowledge	originating	from	EBM	was	not	fit	for	purpose	because	it	could	not	account	for	the	implicit	knowledge	or	beliefs	of	the	surgeons.		The	surgeon	below	describes	his	decision-making	process	as	a	faith:	
	
“So	your	craft	and	experience	will	shape	the	way	you	believe	something	should	be	done.		But	there’s	
almost	an	element	of	faith	about	it.	It’s	like	we’re	all	Christians,	but	there’s	some	Catholics	and	
there’s	some	Protestants.	We	all	know	basically	where	it	needs	to	be.	But	there	will	be	those	of	us	
who	feel	strongly,	actually	I	want	to	do	it	this	way	and	others	I	want	to	do	it	that	way.	Nobody	
knows	which	is	right.”(INT	C	218007)		The	limits	of	the	evidence	base	enabled	surgeons	to	retain	a	sense	of	power	over	their	decision-making.		Unlike	art	and	craft	skills,	scientific	evidence	assumes	that	treatments	and	interventions	have	predictable	effects,	i.e.,	that	intervention	
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A	can	predict	the	occurrence	of	outcome	B	in	all	patients.		However,	as	suggested	earlier,	the	surgeons	in	my	study	did	not	automatically	translate	knowledge	from	RCTs	to	the	patients	in	front	of	them.		Instead,	experience,	patient	symptoms	and	their	training	appeared	to	take	precedence.		This	process	of	bringing	together	different	types	of	‘evidence’	to	make	a	clinical	decision	could	not	be	planned	rationally,	and	therefore	represented	a	type	of	craft	work.		A	definition	of	craft	work	in	healthcare	is	provided	below	for	clarity:			
“Medical	craftsmanship,	characterised	by	the	relationship	between	the	craftsman,	the	material	and	
the	tools,	constitutes	a	professional	ability	to	encounter	complex	tasks	requiring	individual	choices	
and	judgements."	(Malterud,	1995)		However,	this	belief	in	the	art	and	craft	of	practice	was	not	the	view	held	by	all	the	surgeons	I	interviewed.		Some	maintained	that	this	was	a	myth	that	is	used	to	justify	particular	behaviours:		
“I	don’t	think	there’s	much	art.	I	don’t	think	there’s	much	artistry	involved,	it’s	based	on	evidence	
and	if	you	get,	if	you	get	some	reasonably	respected	people	to	look	at	that	evidence	and	develop	
policy	that’s	reasonable	and	respected	then	that’s	really	useful	to	people.”	(INT	C	218010)		It	is	true	that	orthopaedic	surgery	cannot	be	directly	compared	to	many	other	interventions	in	medicine,	such	as	taking	prescription	medication.		Often	medication	which	has	been	approved	by	NICE	has	been	refined	and	is	proven	to	have	comparable	outcomes.		In	surgery,	each	procedure	introduces	an	element	of	variability	as	the	people	and	situation	cannot	be	controlled	and	predicted	in	the	same	way.		Therefore,	surgery	requires	some	form	of	real	time	judgement	according	to	individual	patients	and	surgeons.		In	my	study,	this	judgement	as	applied	to	the	patient	in	the	consultation,	appeared	not	to	originate	from	the	codified	technical	knowledge	of	scientific	evidence,	but	from	experience	learned	over	years	in	practice	(mindlines).		This	vague	and	non-codified	individual	knowledge	seemed	to	exist	alongside	technical	knowledge	of	clinical	science.		Knowing	what	to	do	was	referred	to	as	“instinct”	or	the	“gut	feeling”	that	guided	practice.		This	innate	belief	is	described	in	the	quote	below:		
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“Instinctive	reactions	can	vary	in	different	operations;	sometimes	things	work	and	sometimes	they	
don’t.	You	don’t	know	until	you	are	‘in’	there.”	(INT	C	198005)		As	well	as	the	knowledge	the	surgeons	held	in	their	heads,	they	reported	that	they	had	to	respond	to	the	current	situation	in	their	hands.		The	‘feel’	of	the	surgery,	and	the	intrinsic	perception	of	whether	it	was	right	or	wrong	was	influential	to	decision-making,	particularly	during	the	operation.		The	use	of	the	phrase	“in	my	hands”	was	quite	common	amongst	the	surgeons	when	asked	to	describe	what	they	do	and	why.		As	described	here	as	the	surgeon	explains	why	he	selects	a	certain	implant:		
	
“Well	that	might	be	the	case	but	I	haven’t	been	trained	to	use	this	type	of	implant	or	device	and	in	
my	hands	that	wouldn’t	be	a	good	choice	and	therefore	I	should	use	this	because	this	is	the	thing	I’ve	
always	put	in	and	me	changing	practice	might	actually	be	more	harmful	or	dangerous	than	sticking	
to	what	I	know.”(INT	C	218011)	
	In	my	study,	this	gut	feeling	could	be	used	to	justify	almost	any	decision.		The	process	was	difficult	to	understand,	monitor	or	change	by	those	hospital	managers	on	the	outside,	because	they	did	not	possess	the	correct	knowledge	and	skills	to	allow	them	to	make	a	judgement.		Maintaining	a	sense	of	difference	therefore,	could	be	seen	as	a	way	that	the	surgeons	retained	power	over	their	decision-making	processes.			When	examining	the	data,	it	is	difficult	to	determine	whether	there	is	a	real	difference	between	the	practice	of	orthopaedic	surgeons	and	those	in	other	clinical	specialties	who	work	with	similar	patients,	such	as	nurses	and	physiotherapists.		The	fact	the	surgeons	were	responsible	for	actually	performing	an	operation	on	patients	was	an	obvious	distinguishing	feature.		The	work	was	literally	‘in	their	hands’.		It	seemed	as	though	this	inherent	responsibility	for	the	life	of	the	patient	and	their	outcomes	resulted	in	a	drive	to	trust	and	privilege	implicit	types	of	knowledge,	over	and	above	those	promoted	through	EBM.		These	other	sources	of	knowledge	were	directly	linked	to	the	individual	surgeon,	such	as	their	practical	experience	and	education.		Therefore,	this	allowed	variation	in	knowledge	used	for	decision-making	to	be	observed.		
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	This	section	has	described	the	power	that	surgeons	exert	in	their	day-to-day	practice	in	relation	to	EBM,	other	professionals	and	their	patients.		I	have	described	the	way	in	which	concepts	of	the	‘difference’	of	orthopaedic	surgery	and	the	‘art	and	craft’	of	orthopaedic	surgery	play	into	the	power	surgeons	are	able	to	exert.		
4.4.1.3 Enactment:	experiential	knowledge	and	surgical	education		My	findings	suggest	that	the	most	influential	factors	in	decision-making	at	the	level	of	the	individual	surgeon	were	their	personal	experience,	their	experiential	knowledge	and	their	training	and	formal	education.		Training	and	experience	were	mentioned	in	all	of	the	interviews	when	asked	why	each	surgeon	made	a	decision	in	practice.		This	finding	could	have	been	anticipated	prior	to	my	data	collection,	but	what	was	surprising	was	the	level	of	influence	it	held	for	surgeons,	as	echoed	in	the	quote	below:			
“I	think	the	key	is	what	you’ve	been	brought	up	with	it.	If	it	worked	for	your	boss	you	tend	to	do	
what	he	did.	Okay,	with	time	things	have	changed.	I	think	you	see	what’s	out	there,	who	uses	it	and	
what’s	got	a	decent	track	record.”	(INT	C	198003)		Common	responses	throughout	the	data	collection	included	statements	such	as:	“that	is	what	my	consultant	taught	me”,	“it’s	worked	for	me	before”	and	“that’s	
what	I’ve	always	done”.		Often	there	was	no	other	justification	provided	or	believed	necessary.		These	learned	behaviours	and	long-standing	decision-making	processes	seemed	to	be	the	first	port	of	call	for	the	surgeons.		They	did	not	appear	to	consider	this	type	of	knowledge	as	an	evidence	source,	as	to	them	it	was	the	normal	and	innate	way	of	thinking,	acting	and	behaving.		The	surgeon	below	describes	the	enactment	of	this	type	of	knowledge:		
	
“Well	there’s	the	theory	of	it	and	then	there’s	the	practice	of	it.	So	the	theory	is	well-established,	it’s	
in	the	textbooks,	it’s	in	medical	papers.	That’s	something	you	learn	as	you	go	through	the	training,	
this	is	where	things	ought	to	be.	But	then	obviously	there’s	the	practical	aspects	of	doing	a	joint	
replacement.	So	you	would	learn	that	as	a	student	mentor	thing	with	your	consultant	and	you’d	talk	
through	where	you	were	going	to	put	the	hip	socket	in	this	particular	operation.	You’d	watch	where	
the	boss	puts	it	and	you	might	do	one	and	he’d	say	yes,	that	looks	about	right	and	you’d	look	at	the	
X-rays	and	agree	together,	was	it	about	right?		So	there’s	that	combination	of	learning	methods	if	
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you	like.	Then	obviously	as	you	become	a	consultant	you’re	then	doing	it,	then	you	learn	from	your	
own	experience,	you	learn	from	your	own	complications.”	(INT	C	218007)		In	the	UK,	orthopaedic	surgeons	generally	follow	the	same	training	pathway	starting	in	medical	school	followed	by	foundation	doctor	rotations	and	specialty	training	before	reaching	consultant	status.		Therefore,	we	would	expect	little	variation	in	the	practice	of	junior	doctors	as	the	regulators	responsible	for	training	closely	control	their	work	and	curriculum.		It	is	not	until	later	on,	when	surgeons	are	able	to	work	closely,	often	one-on-one,	with	a	senior	consultant	in	an	apprentice-style	role.		This	type	of	training	may	allow	for	differences	in	practice	and	techniques	to	emerge.		The	learning	that	takes	place	in	practice	seemed	to	be	very	important	to	surgeons	when	developing	their	experiential	knowledge.		It	is	during	this	time	that	the	surgeons	said	they	were	able	to	“try	
things	out	for	themselves”	(INT	C	218009).		This	combination	of	experience	and	training	appeared	to	stay	with	the	surgeons	and	influenced	their	practice	until	they	reached	consultant	level	and	beyond.		A	junior	surgeon	and	a	mentor	describe	the	importance	of	gaining	a	variety	of	experience	during	surgical	training:			Junior:	
“All	three	of	the	consultants	do	different	things,	and	you	learn	different	things	from	all	of	them.”	
(INT	C	198001)	
	Mentor:	
“Yes,	so	when	our	trainee	comes	he	just	sees	me	using	these	implants,	and	I	say	to	is,	when	you’re	
training	you	want	to	see	as	many	different	implants	as	possible,	there	might	be	certain	things	about	
implanter	technique	or	something	that	you	like,	and	you	also	learn	what	you	don’t	like,	don’t	you	
really.	Yes,	so	training	is	really	important.”	(INT	198005)		The	consultant	below	reflected	on	the	transition	from	instrumental	to	experiential	learning	once	they	were	appointed	as	a	consultant:		
“I	thought	I	was	trained	well.	But	then	I	was	on	a	really	good	programme,	(name’s)	training	
programme	is	excellent,	fantastic	really.	So	training-wise	I	haven’t	changed.	I	don’t	know,	you	truly	
sort	of	learn	when	you	are	appointed	as	a	consultant	actually.	I	think	you’ve	just	got	to	work	it	out	
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for	yourself	then.”	(INT	C	37011)	
	Surgical	practice	was	not	fixed	for	an	entire	career	and	many	surgeons	were	undergoing	additional	training	to	amend	their	work	during	the	period	of	data	collection.		However,	certain	changes	were	difficult	to	implement	if	they	appeared	to	have	originated	from	outside	the	individual	surgeon	or	colleague	group.		In	site	A,	the	entire	clinical	group	had	adopted	standardised	protocols	for	performing	arthroplasty	(joint	reconstruction).		This	had	been	part	of	an	improvement	process	to	reorganise	the	patient	pathway.		One	nurse	mentioned	the	problems	she	faced	when	challenging	the	normal	routines	of	the	surgeons,	despite	a	strong	evidence	base	to	do	so:		
“It	caused	a	lot	of	stress	here.	But	my	sense	is	that	probably	the	more,	the	bigger	a	department	is,	
the	less	flexible	a	department	can	be	for	lots	of	different	types	of	device	or	technique	or	whatever.	
Things	have	to	be	standardised	or	that	becomes	a	bit	unworkable.”	(INT	C	218004)		The	training	and	experiential	knowledge	of	surgeons	was	found	to	be	a	limiting	factor	in	their	practice.		They	suggested	that	the	range	of	procedures	they	used	was	restricted	by	their	particular	specialty.		For	example,	surgeons	who	saw	themselves	as	hip	surgeons	were	reluctant	to	perform	a	knee	arthroplasty	and	increasing	sub-specialisation	at	the	complex	end	of	the	spectrum	meant	that	experience	was	less	well-maintained	at	the	lower	technical	end	of	hip	arthroplasty	work.		The	quote	below	shows	how	specialist	surgeons	differentiate	their	work	from	‘standard’	hip	surgeons:			
“I	think	the	advantage	for	us	is	that	all	the	guys	here	were	just	purely	specialist	hip	surgeons,	
whereas	in	the	periphery	the	guys	have	to	do	a	bit	more	standard	work	–	so	they’re	appointing	guys	
more	with	the	specialist	interest	here.”	(INT	C	198003)		This	lead	to	some	clear	demarcation	between	the	different	sub	specialties,	for	example	surgeons	made	reference	to	being	a	hip	surgeon	or	a	specialist	hip	revision	surgeon.		This	was	particularly	the	case	in	site	C	where	they	had	a	‘super	elite’	group	of	surgeons	who	were	referred	specialist	patient	revision	cases	from	elsewhere	in	the	region.		Observations	of	these	super	elites	revealed	their	
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negative	attitude	toward	the	more	generalist	hip	surgeons,	who	they	identified	as	“boring	hip	guys”	“on	the	treadmill…making	money	and	having	an	easy	life”	
(OBS	notes	general	site	C).		I	observed	these	informal	professional	boundaries	elsewhere.		For	instance,	I	attended	a	multinational	conference	and	there	was	an	obvious	difference	between	surgeons	trained	in	different	locations.		The	excerpt	from	my	field	notes	summarises	my	thoughts	on	the	use	of	experiential	knowledge	and	education,	and	how	this	coupled	with	location	enabled	surgeons	to	refer	to	themselves	by	their	surgical	technique:			
“The	message	from	the	USA	surgeons	seems	to	be	that	they	can’t	or	won’t	perform	cemented	hip	
replacements.	One	presenter	said	that	he	had	“lost	[the]	skill”	and	then	over	time	within	the	hospital	
certain	techniques	”just	become	phased	out”.	These	surgeons	were	not	only	limiting	themselves	by	
specialty,	i.e.,	hip	surgeons,	but	also	by	the	specific	technique,	i.e.,	cementless	hip	surgeons.”	(OBS	
notes.	Hip	International	2104)	
	The	variation	that	results	from	experiential	knowledge	is	slightly	more	complex	to	examine	than	knowledge	gained	from	formal	training	or	the	routine	hospital	processes.		It	refers	to	contingencies	that	could	arise	from	the	enactment	of	socialisation,	lived	experiences,	innate	responses	to	events	and	the	ability	and	skills	each	surgeon	brings	to	his	or	her	practice.		The	decision-making	and	the	selection	of	evidence	seemed	to	be	conditional	on	the	surgeon,	and	therefore	on	their	character	and	disposition.		A	possible	driver	of	variation	in	training	and	learning	process	is	the	fact	that	no	classification	system	or	criteria	exist	for	hip	replacement	surgeons	to	abide	by.		There	are	no	sets	of	rules	for	what	constitutes	an	ideal	hip	replacement,	only	recommendations	which	include	various	techniques	and	implant	options.		For	a	group	of	individuals	who	tend	towards	decisiveness	and	autonomous	behaviour,	it	may	be	difficult	to	introduce	a	set	of	rules	as	it	would	be	challenging	to	inform	surgeons	that	their	years	of	education	and	experience	were	incorrect	or	misinformed,	and	should	be	changed.			In	this	section	I	have	described	the	enactment	of	experience	and	surgical	training	to	highlight	the	strength	that	these	types	of	knowledge	hold	over	decision-
		 99	
making	practice	for	orthopaedic	surgeons	in	my	study.	
4.5 Individual	contingencies	of	surgical	practice		In	the	second	half	of	this	chapter,	I	describe	the	contingencies	of	surgical	work	that	were	important	and	influential	to	practice	at	the	individual	level	of	analysis.		I	will	also	discuss	the	variation	in	practice	that	I	observed	between	the	individuals	and	what	the	surgeons	thought	of	this	variation.			
4.5.1 What	influenced	the	decision	to	operate?	Within	orthopaedic	surgery,	the	surgical	operation	itself	was	the	key	decision	event	for	the	surgeons.		The	actions	and	practices	of	a	particular	operation,	or	the	general	approach	to	hip	surgery	is	what	they	mostly	described	when	I	asked	them	to	detail	their	practice	and	decision-making.		However,	orthopaedic	practice	is	more	than	the	act	of	orthopaedic	surgery.		I	observed	a	great	deal	of	clinical	and	non-clinical	activity	which	took	place	before	and	after	the	operative	event,	in	addition	to	all	the	managerial	and	administrative	elements	of	daily	work.		Despite	this	being	important	work	for	the	delivery	of	arthroplasty	services,	it	did	not	appear	to	be	held	in	high	esteem	by	the	surgeons.		Their	focus	during	the	interviews	was	generally	on	the	act	of	surgery.			Across	the	three	cases,	the	surgeons	typically	encountered	patients	at	an	outpatient	clinic	who	had	referred	from	their	General	Practitioner	(GP).		Case	B	differed	slightly,	as	they	had	an	intermediate	triage	service	stage.		The	patients	met	with	the	consultant	surgeon	or	specialist	registrar	in	a	general	arthroplasty	clinic,	where	the	surgeons	would	consult	on	a	variety	of	patients	at	different	stages	of	treatment.		The	aim	of	this	meeting	seemed	to	be	understanding	the	patients’	problems	and	finding	out	if	they	were	“for	surgery”	or	not	(OBS	notes.	
gen	case	A).		This	surgeon	describes	the	general	process	he	goes	through:		
“So	my	steps	are	first	of	all	introducing	myself	to	the	patient,	and	then	try	to	work	out	a	diagnosis	
whether	that’s	more	investigations	or	getting	a	senior	person	to	give	their	thoughts,	and	then	once	
you’ve	reached	a	diagnosis	then	explaining	that	to	the	patient	and	explaining	the	potential	
treatment	options.	Then	you	give	them	a	chance	to	weigh	up	those	options.	So	that’s	a	sort	of	typical	
journey	you’d	go	on	with	a	patient	in	clinic	and	for	all	new	patients	that’s	pretty	much	the	scheme	
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you’d	follow.”	(INT	C	218011)		The	surgeons	displayed	differences	in	their	responses	regarding	the	aim	of	the	consultation.		Some	openly	stated	that	they	wanted	to	avoid	or	delay	surgery	in	favour	of	medical	management	such	as	pain	relief,	as	shown	below:			
“It’s	much	quicker	sometimes	in	a	consultation	to	say	yes	to	surgery	than	no	to	surgery.	It’s	a	much,	
much	easier	…	well,	look,	it’s	fine,	hip	replacement,	these	are	the	risks,	I’m	off,	you	know.	Whereas	
‘no’	is	much	harder	and	slower	and	takes	more	discussion	and	deliberation	which	I	don’t	mind,	I’m	
quite	happy.	But,	yeah,	the	style	of	practices	is	hugely	variable.”	(INT	C	198005)		Others	saw	a	hip	replacement	as	an	inevitable	outcome	for	patients	with	arthritis.		Consequently,	they	took	the	view	that	they	“might	as	well	just	get	them	
on	the	list	sooner	rather	than	later”	(INT	C	198005).				It	was	difficult	to	pinpoint	the	driver	of	the	difference	here.		It	could	have	been	linked	to	attempts	to	reduce	overall	surgical	numbers,	because	of	pressure	from	the	CCGs	(as	was	the	case	at	Site	A).		Equally,	the	difference	may	be	due	to	the	belief	that	medical	management,	where	appropriate,	was	better	for	patients	in	the	long	run	as	it	delays	intervention	and	therefore	reduces	the	risk	of	subsequent	hip	revision	surgery.				
4.5.1.1 Patient	evidence	and	its	effect	on	decision-making		I	observed	two	key	decisions	being	made	at	this	point	in	the	process.		The	first	was	questioning	if	the	patient	was	suitable	for	surgery,	and	the	second	was	selecting	which	procedure	would	be	conducted.		Despite	the	promotion	of	shared	decision-making	and	the	importance	of	patient	preferences	in	NHS	healthcare	(Barratt,	2008),	the	surgeons	rarely	mentioned	the	views	of	patients.		This	was	the	case	across	all	three	hospital	sites.		The	quote	below	describes	the	views	of	a	surgeon	regarding	patient	input	in	their	practice:			
“You	know	that	you	can	influence	someone	on	this	decision	based	on	what	you	say.	That’s	inevitable	
and	you’ve	got	to	be	a	bit	careful	about	it	but	the	reality	is	if	you	have	a	particular	decision	in	mind	
then	that	inevitably	is	the	decision	the	patient	makes.	Ultimately,	it’s	always	them	that	say	yes	or	no	
but	in	my	experience	that	is	very	much	surgeon-dependent.	What	I’m	trying	to	say	I	suppose	is	yes	
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patients	in	theory	do	make	shared	decisions	but	often	that’s	led	by	a	surgical	decision	already.	Very	
rarely	does	a	patient	make	their	own	decision	in	my	view.”	(INT	C	218011)		Some	of	the	surgeons	seemed	to	distinguish	between	conditions	deemed	to	be	the	fault	of	patients,	for	example	obesity,	and	those	linked	to	behaviour	or	lifestyle,	as	opposed	to	those	not	deemed	a	result	of	patients’	lifestyle	choice.		Interestingly,	there	was	a	difference	in	the	perceived	acceptance	of	good	and	bad	lifestyle	choices.		Growing	numbers	of	younger	patients	are	being	treated	for	advanced	arthritis	because	they	have	worn	joints,	for	example	because	of	sport.		In	my	study,	there	was	reference	to	long-distance	runners,	horse	riders	and	footballers	who	had	received	a	hip	replacement.		These	patients	were	talked	about	in	a	positive	light	and	it	was	important	for	the	surgeons	who	treated	them	to	try	and	get	them	‘back	to	where	they	were	before’.		The	old	or	obese	patients,	on	the	other	hand,	would	be	discussed	more	negatively,	and	seemed	to	be	considered	fortunate	to	be	offered	the	opportunity	to	obtain	a	better	quality	of	life	post-surgery.		Surgeons	thought	these	patients	should	not	to	expect	too	much	from	surgery.		This	is	reflected	in	my	observation	notes	below	regarding	the	use	of	language	by	surgeons:		
“I	observed	a	surgeon	today	and	noticed	the	language	he	used	changed	and	it	seemed	to	be	
dependent	on	who	he	was	treating.	For	example,	with	talking	about	an	older	female	patient	he	used	
phrases	such	as	“we	can’t	be	sure”	and	that	“we	hope	it	will	relieve	some	pain”.	Whereas	when	I	
asked	him	how	he	would	select	an	implant	for	a	young	fit	patient	for	comparison	he	said	“what	like	
for	you?,	for	you	definitely	ceramic	on	ceramic,	its	proven	better”.	(OBS	notes	site	B	clinic)			This	use	of	language	symbolised	innate	beliefs,	perceptions	and	values	that	the	surgeons	held	about	the	health	and	illness	behaviour	of	their	patients.		The	age	of	patients,	both	biological	and	physical,	was	a	subjective	but	very	important	factor	in	decision-making.		Although	this	balance	between	age	and	procedure	selection	is	well-reported	within	the	clinical	evidence,	the	individual	decision	was	a	judgement	call	made	each	time	by	the	surgeon.		Surgeons	would	talk	about	the	‘older	more	active	patients’	needing	to	be	treated	in	the	same	way	as	‘younger	less	active	patients’,	as	they	were	at	risk	of	wearing	their	hip	out	and	needing	a	revision	procedure.		This	was	not	the	case	for	all	surgeons,	as	some	held	strict	
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criteria	in	their	heads	for	selecting	one	procedure	over	another,	as	described	by	this	consultant:			
“Well	it’s	easy,	isn’t	it	because	pretty	much	they	can	either	get	a	cemented	or	un-cemented	total	hip	
replacement	depending	on	patient	factors.	And	that's	going	to	be	straight	forward.	But	then	when	it	
comes	to	hips,	of	course	it’s	physiological	age	rather	than	chronological	age.	And	it’s	always	going	
to	be	a	cemented	stem	and	for	an	elderly	patient	low	demand,	it’s	always	going	to	be	a	cemented	
cup.	And	for	anyone	else	it’s	going	to	be	an	un-cemented	cup.”	(INT	C	37011)		Interestingly	and	unexpectedly,	the	surgeons	rarely	mentioned	symptom	severity	of	as	a	key	driver	for	a	decision	to	operate.		For	example,	pain	would	be	recorded	as	a	symptom	in	the	clinical	notes,	but	a	patient’s	description	of	pain	seemed	less	important.		It	may	be	because	pain	was	subjective,	and	needed	to	be	taken	into	consideration	with	other	variables.		However,	it	may	also	reflect	the	fact	that	only	patients	deemed	to	have	symptoms	severe	enough	to	warrant	surgery	were	referred	by	the	GP	to	the	surgeon.		The	patient	selection	in	these	cases	emphasised	the	interaction	between	patient	and	surgeon.		A	decision	to	operate	depended	on	the	patient	reporting	the	correct	evidence	(i.e.,	symptom	list)	and	the	surgeon	privileging	the	elements	of	the	list	as	important	in	his	or	her	context.		For	example,	surgeons	weighed	the	symptoms	of	one	patient	against	other	patients	they	had	seen	that	week	who	had	been	deemed	appropriate	for	hip	surgery.			Ultimately,	the	decision	to	operate	and	the	choice	of	procedure	relied	heavily	on	symptoms	of	individual	patients	and	the	examination	that	took	place.		Surgeons	working	in	the	NHS	did	not	appear	to	treat	patients	unnecessarily.		However,	thresholds	for	intervention	appeared	to	vary	more	in	different	situations.		This	senior	surgeons	from	site	A	describe	the	influence	of	private	practice	below:		
	
“I	think	they	have,	sometimes	I	think	some	people	have	to	say	they	are	doing	exactly	in	my	private	
practice	what	I	do	in	my	NHS.	It’s	a	fact.	Sometimes	if	you	have	discrepancies	in	your,	in	your	NHS	
and	your	private	practice	you	can	get	judged	on	that.	By	your	peers,	your	clients,	you	know	
solicitors,	lawyers,	GMC	(laughter).”	(INT	C	218006)	
	It	is	important	to	note	that	there	were	no	clinical	criteria	or	checklists	for	
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deciding	exactly	if	and	when	a	patient	needed	to	be	given	a	hip	replacement.		The	current	clinical	guidance	states	that:		
“The	diagnosis	of	arthritis	of	the	hip	is	usually	based	on	individual	patient	history	and	clinical	
examination	assessing	joint	pain,	deformity	and	reduced	range	of	movement…Clinicians	should	first	
offer	patients	non-surgical	treatments	including	exercise,	physical	therapy	and	analgesics,	and	
should	consider	referring	patients	for	joint	replacement	surgery	if	they	have	ongoing	pain,	joint	
stiffness,	reduced	function	and	a	poor	quality	of	life.”	(Doc	analy	NICE	TA	304)		The	text	above	is	clear,	but	demonstrates	the	lack	of	an	identifiable	objective	threshold.		Therefore,	it	was	up	to	the	surgeon	to	decide	if	the	patient	was	‘for’	or	‘not	for’	surgery.		This	flexible	choice	could	explain	the	variation	observed	in	time	to	access	surgery.		The	surgeons	I	interviewed	described	different	approaches	to	making	this	key	decision,	which	included	indication	of	a	particular	symptom	such	as	“lack	of	sleep”	(INT	C	218008),	achieving	a	score	on	an	“outcome	
measure”	(INT	C	37010)	or	“just	knowing”	when	it	was	the	right	time	to	perform	the	operation	(INT	C	37011).				The	surgeon	gathered	many	pieces	of	information	during	the	consultation,	and	these	acted	as	sources	of	evidence	for	decision-making.		The	information	included	both	clinical	(age,	range	of	movement)	and	environmental	elements,	such	as	the	ideal	level	of	activity	for	the	patients.		Any	previous	examinations	or	investigations	and	scans	would	also	be	discussed.		The	patients	had	to	judge	the	severity	and	impact	of	their	pain	on	their	daily	living.		This	meant	that	the	surgeon	had	to	consider	self-report	and	clinically	assessed	symptoms	together.		All	this	information	was	combined	and	appeared	helpful	in	defining	symptoms	and	ruling	out	other	diagnoses.		It	seemed	that	this	type	of	evidence	was	added	into	a	surgeons’	mental	decision	matrix,	which	contained	the	other	sources	of	evidence	and	knowledge	which	they	identified	as	important.		
	
4.5.2 What	influenced	procedure	and	implant	decisions?	The	second	major	decision	that	took	place	was	the	decision	about	which	procedure	to	conduct,	and	to	some	extent,	which	implant	to	use.		Sites	A	and	B	were	restricted	in	their	choices	and	often	had	only	one	or	two	options	made	
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available	to	them	by	the	Trusts.		Site	C,	on	the	other	hand,	had	a	free	choice	of	implants.		However,	all	surgeons	could	select	their	procedures	and	surgical	techniques,	for	example	whether	to	do	a	cemented	or	cementless	hip	replacement	or	a	hip	resurfacing	arthroplasty.		There	is	much	debate	in	the	literature	as	to	which	of	these	procedures	is	preferable.		This	is	often	related	to	patient	physical	and	biological	age	and	their	influence	on	likely	treatment	outcomes	(NJR,	2015).		The	use	of	NJR	data	was	recognised	as	an	influential	source	of	evidence	for	this	decision,	as	described	below:			
“I	think	you	go	with	that,	and	so	(brand)	you	could	justify	why	you	did	it	to	your	trust	but,	you	know,	
as	the	best	combination,	and	there	is	a	large	evidence	base	from	the	National	Registry	to	support	
that.”	(INT	C	190004)		Despite	the	decision	to	operate,	there	were	waiting	lists	at	all	three	case	study	hospitals.		Time	from	GP	referral	to	appointment	for	orthopaedic	patients	included	a	wait	of	between	19	(Site	B	and	C)	and	25	(site	A)	weeks.		Patients	then	had	to	wait	for	surgery	once	the	surgeon	had	agreed	it.		Therefore,	it	was	often	several	months	before	a	patient	was	admitted	to	hospital	for	surgery.		Generally,	once	the	surgery	had	been	decided	it	took	place.		I	did	not	hear	of	patients	changing	their	minds	about	hip	replacement,	but	some	did	select	private	practice	to	be	treated	earlier.			The	operation	was	the	key	event	for	the	surgeon.		It	involved	technical	planning	beforehand	to	ensure	that	the	selected	implant	aligned	to	the	bone	structure	of	the	patient	and	that	the	key	measurements	and	alignment	were	known	prior	to	surgery.		This	pre-operative	planning	was	conducted	on	specialist	hospital	computer	software	(See	Figure	7).			
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Figure	7.		An	example	image	from	typical	computer	software	used	for	orthopaedic	surgery	planning	
(OBS	notes	general)		The	planning	and	positioning	seemed	to	be	innate,	as	the	surgeons	often	performed	it	without	consultation	with	others	and	without	explicit	evidence	to	hand.		From	the	outside,	it	looked	like	an	advanced	jigsaw	puzzle,	where	only	the	surgeon	possessed	the	knowledge	of	which	pieces	fitted	where.		However,	there	was	variation	in	the	use	of	the	software,	as	identified	by	this	surgeon:		
“The	idea	being	when	you	come	to	plan	your	operation,	that’s	when	you	can	see	it	on	the	X-ray.		
Then	the	software	that	we	use	now	for	planning	the	operation	automatically	will	find	the	
calibration	marks	and	calibrate,	scale	your	X-ray	accordingly.	But	occasionally	it	doesn’t	get	used.		
So	some	surgeons	might	just	carry	on	anyway	without	it	and	just	guess.	Then	there’d	be	those	of	us	
like	me,	who’d	be	not	prepared	to	do	that.”	(INT	C	218007)		At	each	of	the	three	sites,	the	operating	theatres	were	located	away	from	the	surgical	offices	and	outpatient	clinic	areas.		When	the	surgeons	were	in	theatre,	they	did	not	have	a	presence	in	the	rest	of	the	hospital.		It	could	be	suggested	that	this	separation	is	important	in	creating	and	reinforcing	the	clinical	power	that	the	surgeons	hold.		Only	authorised	people	were	allowed	into	operating	areas	and	these	had	to	be	‘scrubbed	in’	wearing	operating	gowns	etc.		This	was	to	protect	the	sterile	environment.		Locked	doors	and	theatre	uniform	distinguished	the	surgeons	and	surgical	staff	from	everyone	else	working	in	the	hospital.		You	had	to	be	authorised	to	enter	this	space,	and	it	provided	an	
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opportunity	to	keep	unwarranted	and	unwanted	people	out.		This	exclusion	was	observed	on	more	than	one	occasion	across	all	the	sites.		The	physical	separation	was	a	problem	mentioned	by	the	departmental	managers	who	wanted,	but	could	not	easily	obtain,	access	to	the	surgeons.		I	describe	this	in	my	observation	notes	from	site	A	below:		
“I	spent	the	day	with	the	theatre	manager.	He	spent	a	lot	of	time	trying	to	track	down	the	surgeons	
to	ask	them	questions,	or	check	whether	the	decisions	he	had	made	were	suitable.	Particularly	
around	theatre	scheduling.	He	would	refer	to	the	surgeons	as	“hiding	in	theatres”.	Often	this	seemed	
to	be	true,	as	the	surgeons	would	choose	to	sit	in	the	theatre	lounge	rather	than	the	offices	or	coffee	
room.	Every	time	he	went	into	the	clean	area	he	had	to	get	changed,	he	said	that	some	days	he	“just	
leaves	his	scrubs	on”.”	(OBS	notes	site	A	TherMang)	
4.5.3 Nature	of	variation	in	the	practice	of	orthopaedic	surgery		As	discussed	above,	the	practice	of	orthopaedic	surgery	was	dependent	on	a	wide	range	of	factors.		For	example,	the	different	surgeon	characteristics	and	their	various	approaches	to	work	were	clear	from	the	beginning.		I	was	able	to	build	on	these	observations	during	the	data	analysis	to	try	to	identify	the	nature	of	variation	in	practice.		The	reasons	behind	the	variation	were	multifactorial	and	changeable.		When	I	asked	the	surgeons	why	they	decided	on	one	particular	hip	replacement	over	another	I	was	often	told	‘it	depends	on’	X,	Y	and	Z.		These	factors	were	inherently	tricky	to	predict.		A	wide	range	of	factors	appeared	to	influence	decisions	and	it	was	challenging	to	understand	how	the	individual	surgeons	brokered	these	evidence	and	knowledge	sources	during	decision-making.		One	surgeon	describes	how	he	attempts	to	weigh	up	patient	evidence,	training,	experience	and	best	practice:			
“I	don’t	think	we	all	think	we’re	super	clever	but	you	do	have	different	indications	for	different	ages,	
right,	so	I’m	sure	you’re	aware	of	this,	the	thing	that	I’ve	been	brought	up	with,	which	I’ve	seen	has	
worked	for	me,	and	is	then	a	bit	of	a,	it’s	not	a	trade	off,	it’s	a	trade	off	with	best	practice.”	(INT	C	
198005)		The	way	this	selection	takes	place	has	obvious	consequences	for	the	variation	in	patient	selection,	access	to	surgery,	procedure	and	implant	selection.		Differences	in	outcome	have	been	widely	reported	in	the	literature	(Judge	et	al,	
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2010;	Appleby,	2010).		Some	factors	related	to	the	patients,	for	example	if	a	patient	was	a	severely	disabled,	older	(65+	years),	and	female,	procedure	selection	seemed	to	be	much	more	standardised	across	the	hospitals.		This	surgeon	knew	what	was	best	for	this	specific	patient	group:			
	
“We’ve	stuck	to	guidelines	in	the	sense	that	the,	you	know,	over	70,	definitely	is	all	cemented,	metal	
and	poly.	60-70	you	have	a	bit	of	ceramic	coming	in;	below	60’s	generally	un-cemented	with	
ceramics,	with	exceptions.	So	we’ve	been	pretty	conservative	in	our	selection	here.”	(INT	C	198003)		Other	factors	centred	on	the	surgeon	and	their	characteristics,	for	example	their	surgical	preferences,	normal	routines	and	years	in	practice.		The	junior	surgeons	were	much	more	inclined	to	practise	the	way	their	mentor	or	consultant	had	taught	them,	whereas	the	older	surgeons	seemed	to	be	influenced	by	their	training,	but	also	by	their	mindlines,	which	reflect	experiential	knowledge	built	up	over	their	career,	which	tended	to	carry	more	weight.		What	was	important	was	what	worked	‘in	their	hands’.			Further	variation	came	from	the	type	of	equipment	or	“kit”	available	to	the	surgeons,	including	whether	implant	choices	were	restricted	or	not.		Surgeons	at	site	A	stated	that	they	had	learned	to	“make	do	with	what	is	there”	(INT	C	
218011).		This	was	because	site	A	had	moved	toward	single	supplier	contracts	which	restricted	access	to	equipment.		This	was	not	the	case	at	site	C,	where	surgeons	had	more	choice:		
“By	and	large,	being	a	very	big	trust,	we	have	a	fair	range	of	options	on	the	shelf	already,	and	so	it’s	
not	a	particular	problem.	But	in	some	trusts,	some	smaller	trusts,	the	choice	of	prosthesis	is	very	
fixed.	There	will	be	one	cement-less	prosthesis	that	you	can	use,	one	cemented	prosthesis	that	you	
can	use,	and	that	will	be	based	on	tariff	and	local	negotiation	and	prosthesis	costs	that	do	still	vary	
between	trusts.”	(INT	C	190004)		Linked	to	this	was	the	logistical	arrangement	of	the	orthopaedic	services	and	the	hospitals,	for	example,	in	case	C	the	surgeons	reported	that	there	were	not	enough	theatres	available	to	meet	local	demand.		This	restricted	their	ability	to	schedule	surgery	they	believe	was	required.		These	contingencies	are	worth	
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emphasising	here	because	they	had	an	impact	on	the	decisions	that	could	be	made	by	individual	surgeons	each	day.			Equally	important	to	the	surgeons	was	the	quality	and	skill	of	theatre	assistants	and	teams	during	the	operations,	and	also	post-operative	aftercare.		Variation	can	be	introduced	by	the	performance	and	skill	of	surgical	staff	ranging	from	theatre	nurses,	junior	surgeons	and	anaesthetists.		The	senior	ward	nurses	at	sites	B1	and	B2	had	very	different	approaches	to	recovery	of	hip	replacement	patients.		Patients	received	a	differing	care	pathway	depending	on	which	site	they	were	admitted	to	(OBS	notes	site	B).		The	competency	of	the	surgical	assistants	appeared	to	have	a	large	impact	on	the	confidence	of	the	surgeon	during	surgery.		The	surgeons	tended	to	have	favourite	support	staff,	and	this	was	acknowledged	and	implicitly	understood	by	theatre	staff	and	the	managers	responsible	for	theatre	scheduling.		This	preference	is	reflected	in	the	quote	below:		
“He	is	my	consultant.	I	know	what	he	likes,	we	go	through	a	whole	operation	without	saying	a	word	
to	each	other,	we	know	exactly	what	happens	next.”	(INT	C	11904)		The	need	to	have	a	consistent	and	familiar	team	appeared	in	some	way	to	act	as	a	reassurance	to	the	surgeons.		They	believed	that	it	enabled	them	to	maintain	consistency.		However,	the	emphasis	on	closed	teams	who	conform	to	individual	surgeon	preferences	might	generate	and	sustain	variation	in	practice.				Evidence	from	national	data	registries	was	referred	to	by	many	of	the	surgeons.		This	was	particularly	important,	as	the	surgeons	have	recently	(2013)	undergone	monitoring	and	ranking	according	to	their	treatment	choices	and	patient	outcomes.		The	National	Joint	Registry	now	routinely	collects	data	on	all	orthopaedic	surgeons	performing	hip	replacements	in	the	NHS:	
	
“The	information	being	published	covers	elective	hip	and	knee	replacement	surgery	and	includes	
details	on	the	number	of	procedures	undertaken	and	overseen	by	each	Consultant	in	Charge,	the	
units	where	they	have	worked	and	the	mortality	within	90	days	of	surgery.”	(Doc	analy	NJR	2014)		
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Hip	surgeons	were	also	monitored	on	their	use	of	evidence-based	implants	as	a	proportion	of	their	total	hip	practice.		This	evidence	rating	was	in	accordance	with	the	implant	ODEP	ratings.		The	quotes	below	show	how	the	surgeon	had	contrasting	views	on	this	issue	of	national	monitoring	of	practice:		
“It	means	that	people	are	accountable	and	if	you’re,	if	you’re	accountable	then	it	focuses	your	mind	
into	sort	of	making	proper	and	right	decisions.”	(INT	C	218011)	
	
“Again	colleagues	of	mine	might	have	said	this	that	on	the	one	hand	you	want	to	use	something	
which	you	know	is	reliable	and	works	well	and	that’s	what	the	whole	ODEP	thing	is	about.”	(INT	C	
218007)		I	also	witnessed	a	conversation	about	the	ratings,	an	excerpt	is	provided	below:		
“It	states	the	consultant	in	charge,	yes	they	may	be	the	consultant	in	change	of	the	patient	but	that’s	
not	necessarily	me.	I	am	not	always	doing	the	operation,	and	I	certainly	do	not	know	what	is	
happening	in	recovery	and	with	the	physios.”	(OBS	notes	site	C)			These	surgeons	queried	the	quality	of	the	date	collected:		
“But	yeah,	the	surgeon	data	at	the	moment	I	think’s,	is	way	off	the	mark.		I	don’t	think	it’s	checked.”	
(INT	218002)		
“There’s	so	many	inconsistencies	in	it,	but	if	we	don’t	get	our	own	data	right,	you	suddenly	become	
an	outlier,	and	it’s	only	because	of	where	you	put	your	standard	deviations,	that	means	you’re	a	
good	surgeon	or	a	bad	surgeon.	I	think	actually,	you	know,	that’s	kind	of,	quite	the	worst	thing	that	
could	happen	to	you	as	a	hip	surgeon	is	somebody	saying,	actually	(name),	you’re	not	very	good	at	
your	job.”	(INT	C	218006)		This	monitoring	system	is	freely	available	and	allows	patients	and	others,	to	access	the	surgeons	‘practice	profile’	over	one	and	three	year	periods.		However,	the	surgeons	I	spoke	to	questioned	whether	patients	would	ever	know	this	information	existed,	or	how	to	find	it.		As	described	in	this	quote:		
“People	have	concerns	about	how	patients	and	people	might	use	the	information	but	generally	the	
sense	is	that	patients	don’t	actually	look	at	it.”	(INT	C	218011)	
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	I	have	included	an	example	of	one	‘practice	profile’	in	Figure	8	as	an	illustration	of	this	process.		According	to	the	data,	this	surgeon	performed	53	primary	hip	replacements	between	1st	April	2015	and	31st	March	2016	(A),	and	132	since	records	began	in	2013	(C).		They	used	ODEP	rated	hip	implants	(both	stem	and	cup)	for	100%	of	their	replacement	procedures	(B)	and	had	a	risk-adjusted	90	day	mortality	in	line	with	the	national	average	(D),	leading	to	the	conclusion	that	this	surgeon	was	performing	well	within	the	remit	of	evidence-based	practice.				
	
Figure	8.		Anonymous	NJR	data	recorded	for	one	surgeon	(A	Operation	type	primary,	B	Implant	type,	
C	Operation	type	primary	and	revision,	D	Surgeon	risk	adjusted	90-day	mortality)		Surgeons	were	keen	to	state	that	the	implants	they	used	were	ODEP-rated,	and	therefore	they	believed	they	were	performing	satisfactorily	with	little	variation.		However,	this	was	not	the	case	for	all	surgeons,	and	some	had	particular	issues	with	this	high	level	of	external	judgement	and	lack	of	discretion	regarding	their	practice:				
“Most	of	my	colleagues	it’s	98	percent,	99	percent	ODEP	rating,	mine’s	50	percent	because	I’m	doing	
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this	work	with	this	company	in	Switzerland	to	do	this	3D	printed	guides.		Because	it’s	a	Swiss	
company,	they’ve	never	bothered	with	ODEP.		They	never	have	it.		They’ve	not	done	ODEP	because	
it’s	not	a	priority	for	the	Swiss	market.	So	the	unintended	consequence	of	ODEP	is	that	people	like	
me	who	are	hopefully	trying	to	push	the	boundaries	think	it’s	not	worth	it.		It’s	just	another	barrier	
to	innovation.		So	that’s	frustrating.”	(INT	C	218007)		During	my	observation	and	throughout	the	interviews	with	surgeons,	it	seemed	as	though	this	national	monitoring	process	was	another	activity	that	needed	to	be	completed	on	paper,	in	the	same	‘tick	box’	fashion	as	complying	with	NICE	guidance.		However,	it	became	contentious	when	data	suggested	that	they	were	performing	badly.		As	long	as	the	surgeons	were	seen	to	be	achieving	the	designated	standards,	this	monitoring	seemed	to	have	little	impact	or	influence	on	their	clinical	work	and	day-to-day	decision-making.		This	contrasts	with	the	message	promoted	by	policy-makers,	codified	in	the	guidance,	and	even	endorsed	by	their	professional	organisation.		The	President	of	the	BOA	at	the	time	stated	that:			
“This	is	an	important	first	step	towards	greater	transparency	of	surgical	outcomes.	I	am	pleased	
that	this	demonstrates	that	standards	in	orthopaedics	are	high	–	with	very	low	levels	of	mortality	
and	no	surgeons	classed	as	outliers	in	terms	of	their	individual	performance.”	(OBS	notes	conf	BOA)	
	Nationally,	the	data	monitoring	appeared	to	benefit	the	field.		However,	individual	surgeons	held	very	different	views	regarding	national	and	transparent	data	collection.		There	was	a	consistent	message	that	they	should	not	be	held	accountable	as	individual	clinicians,	for	the	outcome	of	surgery	conducted	by	multidisciplinary	groups.		A	surgeon	provides	his	view	below:		
“But	now,	the	information	in	the	public	domain	is	just	ridiculous.	I	wrote	to	(name)	when	he	was	
BOA	head,	saying,	consultant	level	data,	you	can’t	send	that	out.	So	I	have	no	say	over	antibiotic	
prophylaxis,	our	trust	won’t	give	us	any	antibiotics	because	it	causes	C.	diff,	they	don’t	care.	I	have	
no	say	over	how	many	physiotherapists	are	on	the	ward,	and	that	must	affect	rehab,	and	if	not	
earlier	results,	maybe	later	results.	I	have	no	say	over	the	implants	I	use	now.	I	have	no	say	over	the	
staffing	levels	in	theatre.	Basically	what	I’m	saying	is	it	is	not,	you	know,	if	you	go	back	ten,	maybe,	
twenty,	thirty	years,	you	know,	the	surgeon	has	an	awesome	amount	of	responsibility,	and	could	
actually,	in	my	opinion,	could	actually	affect	that	by	making	sure	things	happen.	I	can’t	control	
every	aspect	of	my	patients	care,	why?,	it’s	a	team	thing,	you	know,	it’s	such	a	team	thing.	And	they	
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put	my	name	on	the	top	of	it,	and	I’m	expendable,	you	know,	my	NJR	data.”	(INT	C	198005)		Although	data	collected	by	the	NJR	was	recognised	as	important,	it	did	not	appear	to	be	a	key	driver	of	decision-making	for	surgeons.		Instead	contextual	dependencies	were	more	influential.		These	non-traditional	sources	of	evidence	can	be	grouped	into	themes	around	different	types	of	‘dependency’.		Variation	could	be	dependent	on	patient	factors	(bone	structure,	pain),	surgeon	factors	(personal	preferences,	routine	practice)	and	environmental	factors	linked	to	the	orthopaedic	department	or	wider	hospital	organisation	(which	implant	devices	the	hospital	purchased).		These	sources	of	evidence	appeared	to	be	more	powerful	influencers	of	decision-making	than	traditional	EBM	guidelines	or	nationally	collected	data.		
4.5.4 What	surgeons	believed	are	the	sources	of	evidence	and	variation	in	
practice?		On	the	whole,	the	surgeons	did	not	talk	about	variation	in	orthopaedic	practice	in	their	day-to-day	work.		I	did	not	observe	any	instances	of	surgeons	openly	referring	to	variation	in	their	own,	their	peers’	or	their	hospitals’	practice.		It	seemed	to	be	accepted	that	‘the	way	things	are	done	around	here’	was	the	norm	at	each	hospital	site.		Therefore,	it	was	standard	practice	that	activities	and	procedures	would	be	changed	by	individuals	or	over	time.		This	was	in	relation	to	the	enactment	of	surgeon	preferences,	contextual	contingencies	and	the	practice	dependencies	described	above.			This	lack	of	awareness	was	particularly	evident	amongst	the	senior	consultants	who	had	generally	been	in	post	for	a	long	time.		Junior	surgeons	who	were	undergoing	rotations	between	hospitals,	or	who	had	conducted	part	of	their	surgical	training	elsewhere,	were	more	able	to	provide	insight	into	the	differences	they	saw	between	hospitals.		The	quote	below	is	from	a	junior	surgeon	describing	implant	selection	decisions:		
“I	think	it’s,	there	are	slightly	different	reasons	because	the	hips	guys	are	different,	the	only	thing	I	
can	really	compare	it	to,	because	the	only	I	know,	is	(name	1).	I	mean,	I’ve	worked	in	(name	2)	and	
(name	3).	(Name	2)	teaching	hospital	had	everything,	every	different	brand.	It’s	changed	now.	
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Places	like	(name	3)	used	to	have	three	or	four	brands,	and	(name	1)	had	something	like	18	
different	combinations	of	doing	a	hip	replacement.”	(INT	C	119010)	
	It	is	possible	that	variation	was	not	well	understood	or	appreciated	by	the	surgeons	working	in	the	hospital.		Their	frame	of	reference	was	generally	at	the	individual	and	local	level	(their	teams	and	colleagues	to	a	certain	extent	and	the	patient	sitting	in	front	of	them,	their	consultation	room,	or	the	group	of	patients	in	the	outpatient	waiting	room).		Decision-making	appeared	to	be	very	much	made	on	a	one-to-one	basis.		Seeing	variation	at	this	individual	patient	level	is	more	challenging.		This	is	reflected	in	this	consultant’s	statement	about	implant	selection:		
“A	lot	of	us	feel	very	uncomfortable	putting	ages	limits	on,	you	can	only	have	ceramic	up	to	65,	
because	if	you’re	66	and	you	act	like	a	46	year	old,	there’s	probably	an	argument	for	giving	them	a	
ceramic,	if	you	believe	strongly	in	that	argument.	You	know.	So	that’s,	so	I	think	policies	have	to	be	
carefully	worded	because	if	you	then	go	outside	of	policy	and	then	somebody	comes	knocking	on	
your	door	saying,	“Why	are	you	doing	this?”	You’re	suddenly	going	to	get	stress	built	up,	and	you’re	
just	trying	to	do	your	best	for	that	one	patient	who’s	sat	in	front	of	you	and	you’re	getting	
lambasted	left,	right	and	centre.”	(INT	C	218002)		This	contrasts	with	a	NICE	approach	for	example,	where	decisions	are	made	for	populations	of	patients	at	the	national	level.		When	considering	population	level	data,	the	trends	and	patterns	in	the	data,	including	the	variation	that	is	observed,	can	be	more	obvious.		National	variation	becomes	less	meaningful	for	an	individual	with	a	patient	who	has	a	specific	set	of	symptoms	which	need	to	be	treated,	given	the	limits	of	a	surgeon’s	personal	skill,	departmental	constraints	and	hospital	funding.		This	is	the	situation	that	most	of	the	surgeons	I	interviewed	were	working	under,	as	described	here:			
“I	may	subconsciously	be	sort	of	following	NICE	guidance	but…	it’s	not	helpful	to	me	sitting	there	
with	a	patient,	if	we	are	talking	joint	replacement	and	threshold	for	joint	replacements?		I	can't	
imagine	it’s	going	to	be	very	helpful	at	all.”	(INT	C	37011)		One	surgeon	group	varied	from	the	others	in	these	views.		At	site	A,	surgeons	had	an	awareness	of	EBM	and	research	concepts	such	as	statistics,	sample	size	and	
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standard	deviation.		They	were	accustomed	to	answering	questions	using	a	bigger	population	frame	of	reference.		Therefore,	they	were	perhaps	more	able	to	apply	this	knowledge	in	their	work	and	scale	it	down	to	understand	what	it	meant	for	their	individual	patient.		Two	surgeons	from	site	A	gave	their	account	of	this:			
“They	(NICE	guidelines)...help	you	look	at	cost	effectiveness	a	lot	more	than	I	think	about	in	my	daily	
practice	as	an	individual	orthopaedic	surgeon,	because	my	responsibility	during	the	consultation	is	
directly	to	that	patient	whereas	actually	I	do	have	a	responsibility	to	the	NHS	to	allocate	resources	
appropriately.		But	it	is	very	difficult	to	marry	those	two	together	in	an	individual	consultation.		So	
it	is	helpful	to	have	that	input	there.”	(INT	C	218009)		
“I	tell	my	patients	that.	You	know,	I’m	giving	you	a	hip	which	has	got	the	least	chance	of	failure.	If	
they	say	to	me,	“Why	can’t	I	have	ceramic?”	I	say,	because	that’s	got	a	higher	revision	rate	if	you	
look	at	everybody	across	the	country.	So	best	practice	and	evidence,	hopefully	come	together,	but	
they	don’t	always,	and	price	is	important.	I	think	we	are	getting	there	with	the	NJR,	which	is	a	huge	
data	resource	which,	you	know,	is	fantastic.”	(INT	C	218016)	
	The	surgeons	working	at	site	A	were	also	keen	to	stress	though	that	they	conduct	trials	and	practice	EBM	in	a	pragmatic	way,	i.e.,	they	wanted	the	evidence	to	fit	the	context	so	that	it	worked	in	practice	and	not	just	in	academic	journals.		An	academic	clinician	describes	this	clearly	below:			
“So	to	that	extent	the	research	we	do	will	always	remain	pragmatic	and	that’s	the	stats	that	NIHR	
have	as	well	and	support.	You	might	want	to	do	specialist	research	in	the	very	early	stages	when	
you’ve	got	a	new	procedure	and	you	want	to	find	out	if	it	works,	but	then	you	get	to	the	point	of	is	it	
cost	effective	and	when	you’re	answering	those	questions	you	want	to	know	about,	does	it	work	in	
everybody’s	hands?	So	we	will	always	argue	that	point	essentially,	it’s	not	being	done	in	specialist	
centres	it’s	got	to	be	done	in	all	centres,	for	those	reasons	research	will	always	be	pragmatic.”	(INT	
C	218012)	
	In	summary,	the	surgeons	believed	that	the	sources	of	evidence	were	contingent	and	dependent	on	their	particular	circumstance.		The	variation	that	this	produced	was	consequential	not	intentional	and	reflected	their	practice	in	their	context.		This	did	not	appear	to	be	considered	as	variation	to	evidence	or	best	
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practice.		Instead	it	was	considered	as	the	‘wider	evidence	base’	that	is	available	to	the	surgeons	to	make	decisions.			
4.5.4.1 Surgeon	perception	and	beliefs	about	EBM	In	this	section	I	will	present	further	data	to	support	my	findings	that	the	decision	to	operate	and	the	procedure	and	implant	selected	are	not	overtly	linked	to	traditional	EBM	recommendations.		The	beliefs,	perceptions	and	values	of	individual	surgeons	appeared	to	be	much	more	influential	to	practice	and	the	decisions	made	than	traditional	EBM.		The	surgeons	decided	whether	each	patient	constituted	a	suitable	candidate	for	treatment,	and	whether	they	wished	to	operate	on	that	patient	on	a	particular	day.				Some	surgeons	reported	that	difficult	operations	were	emotionally	uncomfortable	and	this	emotive	response	affected	their	choice	of	procedure.		For	example,	this	surgeon	states	that	he	transfers	patients	to	colleagues	when	he	is	not	comfortable	with	a	case.		He	believes	that	the	opinion	of	his	colleagues	is	importance	in	his	treatment	choices:		
“If	anything	gets	a	bit	spicy	in	the	hip	arena	for	me	either	before	surgery	and	in	clinic	and	I’ve	
spotted	it	I’m	passing	the	case	on.		And,	post	operatively,	I	want	to	know	that	I've	used	implants	that	
the	colleagues	I’m	going	to	refer	onto,	if	I’ve	got	into	trouble,	are	going	to	be	happy	with.”	(INT	C	37011)				Another	surgeon	quoted	below	referenced	their	emotional	responses	when	making	treatment	decisions	and	how	these	impacted	their	ability	to	perform	the	surgery.			
	
“I	know	for	some	people	they’re	really	stressed	by	it	and	upset	and	I	don’t	think	that’s	been	attended	
to.	Ultimately	you	don’t	have	to	look	after	your	surgeons	but	if	you’ve	got	a	stressed	surgeon	doing	a	
slightly	difficult	operation,	I	wouldn’t	want	them	operating	on	me.	I’d	want	them,	you	know,	happy	
and	confident	in	what	they're	doing	really.”	(INT	198005)		In	certain	situations	the	emotional	response	had	a	positive	outcome	and	was	an	important	factor	in	decision-making.		Surgeons	would	refer	to	only	performing	
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surgery	that	they	would	be	comfortable	“doing	on	my	own	grandmother”	(INT	C	
198005).		Traditional	EBM	approaches	would	struggle	to	deal	with	this	level	of	subjectivity	and	the	emotional	beliefs	of	individuals.		It	appeared	that	decisions	might	have	been	influenced	by	their	attitudes	towards	patients.		For	example,	this	surgeon	formed	a	positive	belief	that	a	patient	needed	surgery	so	that	he	could	continue	his	hobby:		
“I	thought	he	should	have	it,	so	that	he	can	get	back	on	the	golf	course.	That	is	just	as	important	to	
him.”	(OBS	notes	site	C	general)		Although	you	can	appreciate	that	increased	physical	function	after	hip	replacement	is	a	valid	reason	to	conduct	surgery,	the	attitude	of	the	surgeon	regarding	the	importance	of	golf	to	himself	may	have	played	a	part	in	this	decision.		This	personal	projection	is	innate	and	might	even	be	unconscious.		In	a	similar	way,	their	opinion	about	the	presence	of	other	diseases	and	medical	conditions	affected	decisions	to	operate.		They	contributed	to	the	symptoms	which	the	patients	reported	and	could	increase	the	risk	of	adverse	events	during	the	surgery.		For	example,	when	discussing	a	patient	who	had	a	high	body	mass	index	(BMI),	this	surgeon	suggested:	
	
“He	(the	patient)	had	a	high	BMI	and	therefore	is	at	more	risk	for	surgery	and	revision…	but	I	can’t	
discriminate	based	on	that.”	(INT	C	218008)	
	Surgical	techniques	appeared	to	be	aligned	to	surgical	training,	but	there	was	a	perception	that	apprenticeship-style	training	had	an	important	role	to	play	in	implant	selection	in	particular.		This	surgeon	describe	the	process	of	teaching	that	“spawned”	knowledge	throughout	generations	of	consultants:		
“Okay,	if	you’re	a	teaching	hospital,	remember	I	said	who	I	was	taught	by,	so	if	you	can	keep	the	
teaching	hospital	surgeons	happy	to	use	your	produce,	they’ll	be	training	two	different	trainees	a	
year,	plus	fellows	and	everybody	else.	If	every	one	of	those	goes	away	and	uses	the	same	kit,	you	are	
like	spawning	a	generation	of	people	using	your	kit.	Because	I	know	that	you’ll	be	teaching	a	
generation	of	new	guys	coming	through	the	next	generation.”	(INT	C	37010)		Although	surgical	techniques	varied	between	surgeons,	even	within	the	same	
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hospital	site	(for	example	a	posterior	versus	an	anterior	approach)	it	appeared	to	be	less	important	to	the	surgeons	than	types	of	procedure	that	was	conducted,	e.g.,	performing	a	total	hip	replacement	instead	of	a	hip	resurfacing	arthroplasty,	or	a	cemented	versus	a	cementless	procedure.		Different	surgical	techniques	can	result	in	the	same	clinical	outcome	and	therefore	this	was	less	of	an	area	for	discussion	between	the	surgeons	when	reviewing	patient	cases.				The	surgical	procedure	seemed	to	be	generally	open	for	debate	between	the	surgeons	in	meetings.		This	was	not	the	case	when	examining	the	decisions	made	about	implant	type.		These	discussions	provided	the	opportunity	to	observe	potential	variation	in	practice	as	different	surgeons	selected	different	options.		This	included	variation	within	and	between	the	three	sites,	but	also	variation	as	to	what	the	EBM	recommendations	might	be.		I	observed	orthopaedic	meetings	where	the	surgeons	would	discuss	treatment	plans	for	operations	and	noted	the	following:			
“Some	of	the	surgeons	at	today’s	meeting	reported	not	being	able	to	perform	either	a	cemented	or	
cementless	replacement	because	they	had	not	“routinely	done	them	in	their	previous	role”.	Others	
stated	that	they	only	carried	out	one	type	of	procedure	purely	out	of	personal	preference	and	beliefs	
that	it	was	better	than	another	option.	One	surgeon	said	“So	I’ve	changed	from	cemented	to	un-
cemented	for	young	patients.	Why?		You	could	argue	because	cement	is	a	hassle	and	it’s	an	extra	15	
minutes,	un-cemented	is	as	good	as	cemented	and	overall	probably	can	work	out	cheaper	if	you	do	
more	cases	per	list.	The	decision	over	which	procedure	to	use	was	not	discussed	in	relation	to	EBM.”	
(OBS	notes	site	B.	Team	meeting)		This	choice	in	treatment	options	could	significantly	influence	the	variation	observed	in	practice.		It	appeared	that	variation	from	the	evidence	reported	in	the	academic	literature	was	accepted	as	normal	because	the	evidence	itself	varied	so	much.		The	surgeons	implied	that	their	own	preferences	and	established	ways	of	working	were	a	deciding	factor	in	the	choice	of	hip	procedure.			
4.5.5 Section	summary		This	section	and	the	examples	provided	have	demonstrated	how	the	individual	
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surgeon’s	beliefs	and	perceptions	about	surgical	work	were	privileged	over	and	above	the	clinical	evidence	presented	in	EBM	guidelines.		Decisions	might	be	aligned	to	the	clinical	evidence,	or	to	other	sources	of	evidence	or	knowledge	both	about	whether	to	offer	surgery	and	which	type	of	surgery	to	offer.		
4.6 	Cross-case	analysis:	Individuals		This	section	has	focused	on	the	orthopaedic	surgeon	as	an	individual	clinical	professional	making	a	decision.		These	individuals	were	examined	in	the	context	of	the	three	hospital	case	study	sites.		Therefore,	there	are	likely	to	be	some	individual	characteristics	driven	by	the	distinctive	influence	of	working	in	a	particular	hospital,	for	example,	the	trend	for	surgeons	in	site	A	to	reference	scientific	evidence	in	decision-making.		The	contextual	drivers	contributed	to	the	variation	which	originated	from	the	individual	surgeons.		The	decision	each	surgeon	made	might	have	been	constrained	or	shaped	by	the	contingent	and	dependent	factors	discussed	in	this	chapter.		Table	10	presents	an	overview	of	these	individual	level	factors	by	hospital,	highlighting	where	each	hospital	sits	in	comparison	to	the	others.				 	
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Table	10.		An	overview	of	the	individual	level	factors	by	hospital	
Theme	features	 Site	A	 Site	B	 Site	C	Presence	of	traditional	EBM	in	practice		 EBM	and	innovation	as	core	to	the	hospital		 Limited	–	compliance	to	monitored	standards		 Limited	in	the	hospital.	EBM	identified	in	those	
surgeons	located	at	the	
University.		Empirically-derived	surgeon	characteristic	types			
Strong	majority	of	gold-
standards.	Some	
mavericks	and	innovators		
Mixed	types		 Mixed	types	with	
tendency	towards	gold-
standards	
Autonomy	and	decisive	decision-making	by	the	surgeons		
Shared/open	approach	to	
practice	with	discussion	
to	facilitate	training	of	
juniors	
Strong	professional	
autonomy		
Strong	professional	
autonomy	within	
orthopaedics		
Resistance:	beliefs	about	evidence	and	NICE	informing	practice			
Strong	influence	of	EBM	
as	the	value.	Little	
resistance	in	practice		
Little	influence	from	
board	to	ward.	Strong	
resistance	by	senior	
surgeons		
Some	resistance;	more	
likely	to	favour	local	
guidelines	over	national	
guidance	and	evidence		
Power:	retaining	power	over	the	evidence	and	decisions	and	the	belief	that	orthopaedics	is	different		
Power	was	aligned	to	
evidence	and	RCTs	to	
inform	decisions.	
Orthopaedics	not	
different	
Retained	significant	
power	over	knowledge	
and	evidence.	
Orthopaedics	is	different	
Strong	group	
membership	to	retain	
power	through	specific	
orthopaedic	practice	
and	knowledge.	
Orthopaedics	is	different		Enactment:	experiential	knowledge	and	education		
EBM	experience	was	
important,	all	surgeons	
trained	in	EBM	as	
standard	
Strong	professional	
hierarchy	and	belief	in	
experience	over	
evidence		
Strong	influence	of	
education.	Most	
surgeons	at	this	site	had	
trained	and	remained	
there	so	formed	
experiences	together.	
Demonstrated	strong	
norms	shared	by	
individuals	Nature	of	variation	according	to	national	data		
Individual	surgeons	were	
compliant	to	ODEP	rating	
98-100%	of	the	time		
Individual	surgeons	
were	compliant	to	ODEP	
rating	99-100%	of	the	
time		
Individual	surgeons	
were	compliant	to	ODEP	
rating	100%	of	the	time		
	
4.7 	Summary	of	the	theme	In	this	theme,	I	assessed	the	role	of	EBM	and	the	use	of	different	types	of	
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knowledge	in	decisions	made	by	the	individual	surgeons.		Within	the	literature,	theoretical	assumptions	regarding	tacit	knowledge	and	mindlines	have	challenged	the	rationalist	view	of	EBM	and	guidelines.		Traditional	EBM	assumes	that	a	single	knowledge	reality	exists	and	can	be	written	down	and	shared	in	practice.		This	is	associated	with	the	risk	of	apparently	removing	the	contextual	elements,	constraints	and	contingencies	of	healthcare,	and	replacing	them	with	universal	generic	rules	of	practice.		On	the	other	hand,	knowledge	developed	through	experience	and	over	time	is	considered	to	be	grounded	in	a	dynamic,	embodied	and	subjective	view	of	evidence,	where	context	is	purposefully	acknowledged	as	important,	and	where	conflicting	and	parallel	versions	of	reality	appear	to	coexist.			This	theme	has	demonstrated	how	this	wider	subjective	view	of	evidence	and	knowledge	interacts	with	practice	and	the	different	ways	that	knowledge	is	mobilised.		This	allows	for	variation	in	practice	at	the	individual	surgeon	level.		I	considered	the	views	of	each	surgeon	regarding	their	clinical	practice	by	examining	what	they	saw	as	the	source	or	sources	of	evidence	and	knowledge	for	their	practice	and	I	considered	how	these	might	contribute	to	variation.		My	investigation	uncovered	individual	beliefs,	perceptions	and	values	of	orthopaedic	surgeons	as	reasons	for	variation	in	surgery.		More	importantly,	I	reflected	on	how	these	innate	drivers	were	enacted	in	the	delivery	of	services.		One	important	factor	appeared	to	be	the	lack	of	importance	attached	to	the	evidence	and	knowledge	emanating	from	traditional	EBM	approaches.				Variation	in	views	and	beliefs	was	observed	both	across	and	within	the	three	sites.		Surgeons	displayed	differing	levels	of	trust	and	acceptance	towards	EBM	and	NICE	guidelines.		The	findings	suggest	that	these	differences	were	linked	to	characteristics	types	which	influenced	behaviour,	decision-making	and	actions.		Interestingly,	the	three	types	of	surgeon	(innovator,	maverick,	gold-standard),	all	demonstrated	similar	levels	of	autonomy,	discretion	and	decisiveness	in	their	decision-making	practices,	but	these	were	differently	enacted	in	practice.		This	autonomous	way	of	working	appeared	to	be	unrelated	to	the	privileging	of	evidence	and	instead	reflected	the	view	that	orthopaedic	surgery	is	‘different’.		
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	The	importance	attached	to	evidence	and	knowledge	from	traditional	EBM	approaches	and	the	variation	in	views	and	beliefs	observed	appeared	to	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	practice	of	hip	replacement.		It	seemed	to	influence	the	level	of	resistance	to	use	of	evidence	in	practice,	such	as	NICE	guidelines	or	national	data.		This	resistance	enabled	surgeons	to	retain	power	over	their	decision-making	preferences.		Resistance	and	individual	power	seemed	to	be	supported	by	a	strong	reliance	on	experiential	knowledge	drawing	from	an	apprenticeship-style	education	and	training.			This	theme	has	provided	an	assessment	of	traditional	evidence,	and	the	meaning	of	EBM	for	orthopaedic	practice	within	my	three	sites.		For	the	surgeons,	the	selection	of	patients	and	the	choice	of	procedure	and	implant	were	clearly	dependent	on	a	wide	range	of	patient,	surgeon,	environmental	and	contextual	factors	which,	although	they	included	traditional	EBM,	varied	considerably.		In	the	interviews,	the	surgeons	suggested	that	difference	could	be	considered	a	normal	part	of	orthopaedic	practice,	but	this	notion	of	‘normal	orthopaedic	practice’	was	constantly	adjusted	to	deal	with	each	individual	patient	in	each	particular	situation.				 	
		 122	
5 Results	2:	Orthopaedic	Communities	of	Practice			
5.1 	Introduction		This	theme	represents	the	small	networks	and	communities	to	which	individual	orthopaedic	surgeons	belong.		It	illustrates	the	influence	of	groups	of	professional	in	knowledge	and	evidence	mobilisation	between	individual	surgeons	and	across	hospital	organisations.			This	theme	explores	the	professional	norms	found	in	orthopaedic	CoP	and	how	they	appeared	to	impact	on	practice	and	how	decisions	were	made.		Mentors	were	influential,	and	there	was	a	dominant	trend	for	situational	learning	in	each	case.		This	might	be	because	the	group	norms	defined	what	behaviour	and	decisions	were	acceptable	practice	for	each	group.		Norms	were	linked	to	group	decision-making	but	allowed	for	individual	exceptions	or	deviation	from	the	organisational	standards.			Norms	that	originated	from	wider	national	and	international	orthopaedic	groups	were	consistently	present	in	the	data.		This	higher	level	of	influence	covered	how	professional	networks,	professional	societies	and	influential	experts	in	the	field	of	orthopaedics	manipulated	individual	and	group	decision-making.		This	orthopaedic	CoP	theme	highlights	the	central	role	that	implant	manufactures	and	their	representatives	play	in	decisions	made	about	treatment.		This	external	commercial	influence	was	frequent	and	the	findings	suggest	that	it	had	the	most	effect	on	the	group	as	the	unit	of	analysis.		Throughout	this	section	I	will	provide	examples	to	demonstrate	how	local	and	national	group	norms	establish	variation	in	the	use	of	evidence,	and	how	this	affected	the	knowledge	mobilisation	within	each	hospital.		
5.2 Defining	concepts	and	determining	meanings	for	this	
chapter		The	key	concept	that	needs	to	be	defined	for	this	chapter	is	the	meaning	of	a	group	and	where	the	established	group	boundaries	lie.		Findings	from	the	three	
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hospitals	and	individual	interviews	illustrate	various	meanings	of	what	constituted	a	group.		There	was	a	mismatch	between	the	group	as	the	wider	orthopaedic	department,	i.e.,	all	surgeons	working	at	the	hospital,	the	group	as	the	immediate	closed	colleague	membership	as	defined	by	the	individuals,	e.g.,	their	team,	or	the	orthopaedic	group	which	encompassed	all	orthopaedic	surgeons	working	in	England	i.e.,	members	of	the	Royal	College	of	Orthopaedic	Surgeons.			What	the	individuals	considered	a	group	during	interviews	remained	fairly	stable	and	participants	distinguished	between	the	levels	of	the	group	using	their	own	language,	for	example	referring	to	my	colleagues,	the	hip	guys	or	my	
network.		However,	the	lines	between	the	group	boundaries	blurred	when	I	observed	surgeons	working	or	talking	about	situations	outside	their	normal	organisation,	such	as	at	national	conferences.		In	this	sense,	the	surgeons	would	classify	themselves	by	the	area	of	the	body	that	they	specialised	in,	for	example	hip	surgeons	or	knee	surgeons.		These	closed	groups	had	requirements	for	entry,	e.g.,	membership	of	the	British	Hip	Society,	but	were	not	confined	to	the	geographical	location	in	which	the	surgeon	worked.		The	majority	of	surgeons	demonstrated	this	flexibility	in	their	group	boundary	definition,	depending	on	their	current	situation.		
5.3 Characteristics	and	professional	norms	of	orthopaedic	
surgeon	groups		My	research	suggests	that	orthopaedic	surgeons	are	a	particular	type	of	professional	group	whose	behaviour,	performance	and	decision-making	is	driven	by	many	factors,	including	those	mentioned	in	the	previous	chapter,	such	as	personal	identity,	beliefs	and	values	and	job	role	status.		Over	and	above	these	factors,	the	data	revealed	the	strong	influence	of	wider	group	membership	and	professional	norms	on	practice.		These	professional	norms	develop	when	professionals	working	in	the	same	occupation	share	a	specialised	or	theoretical	knowledge.		Norms	can	encourage	professionals	to	act	and	make	decisions	in	a	similar	way,	despite	the	influence	of	their	organisation,	industry	and	personal	incentives.		Within	orthopaedics,	there	appeared	to	be	strong	professional	norms	
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that	standardised	the	behaviour	of	the	surgeons.		The	surgeon	below	describes	how	they	learned	to	act	in	accordance	with	their	team	and	colleagues:			
“Yeah,	I	think	it	depends	where	you	are	to	be	honest	and	where	you’re	trained	and	who	is	around	
you,	are	you	heavily	influenced	by	your	peers	and	your	seniors.	Medicine	is	quite	repetitive	so	the	
more	you,	the	longer	you	are	in	medicine	the	more	things	you	see	commonly,	the	less	novel	they	
become	and	the	behaviour	becomes,	you	know,	more	standardised.”	(INT	C	218010)			Group	norms	are	not	specific	to	the	orthopaedic	surgery	profession	as	every	group	generally	has	a	set	of	norms	that	guides	their	behaviour.		Norms	can	act	as	a	‘code	of	conduct’	about	what	is	deemed	acceptable	behaviour	for	the	group.		This	is	evidenced	in	the	quote	below	when	the	surgeon	states	that	“it’s	very	
difficult	to	function”	if	he	did	not	conform	to	the	standards.		The	norms	across	the	groups	in	my	study	varied,	some	would	be	strictly	adhered	to	whilst	others	allowed	for	a	range	of	behaviours	amongst	the	surgeons.		I	asked	the	consultant	quoted	below	to	describe	his	decision-making	around	implant	selection.		He	suggested	that	the	group	he	worked	in	factored	into	the	selection	process.		However,	he	also	highlights	that	not	all	members	of	the	group	consistently	adhere	to	the	norms:			
“That’s	a	really	good	question,	and	if	you	ask	ten	orthopaedic	surgeons	in	a	room	you	get	ten	
different	answers	right…?	But	that’s	not	strictly	true.	What	your	colleagues	use,	okay?	So	the	
question	is,	why	do	I	use	what	I	use?	There’s	no	point	in	me	saying	I’m	going	to	do	all	un-cemented,	
if	the	clinical	director	comes	up	to	me	and	says	(name),	we’re	not	doing	that	because	we	don’t	like	it	
and	it’s	too	expensive.	In	site	B	we	only	ever	use	one	hip.	I	thought,	okay,	fair	enough,	and	I	kind	of	
think	if	you’ve	been	trained	appropriately	you	can	use	different	implants,	there’s	a	learning	curve	
and	you	have	to	be	aware	of	that.”	(INT	C	37010)	
	Group	norms	were	usually	hidden	or	implicit	to	members	of	the	group	and	new	consultants	appeared	to	find	it	difficult	to	understand	and	conform	to	these	implicit	norms.		For	example,	when	a	new	member	of	staff	joined	the	department	at	site	A	he	was	consciously	aware	that	group	norms	existed	but	it	took	him	a	significant	time	in	practice	to	discover	what	they	were,	and	then	how	to	conform	appropriately.			
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5.3.1 Deviation	from	group	norms	and	conflict	across	groups		Deviation	from	the	established	group	norms	appeared	to	result	in	both	covert	and	overt	disapproval	by	other	colleagues.		I	observed	and	discussed	this	departure	from	the	norm	at	the	intra-departmental	group,	the	organisational	groups	and	at	the	national	group	level.		An	example	taken	from	my	field	notes	of	the	BOA	conference	in	2015	demonstrate	this	point.		I	observed	the	open	discrediting	of	a	speaker	by	audience	members	because	the	surgeon	presented	findings	that	contradicted	the	established	norms	of	the	audience:		
“His	talk	argued	against	the	dangerous	use	of	‘mix	and	match’	implants	from	multiple	
manufactures.	However,	there	were	multiple	(and	I	felt	unnecessary)	interruptions	from	audience	
members	who	stated	that	“well	we	all	do	it”	and	that	it	was	“normal	practice	everywhere”	with	one	
member	even	saying	that	“the	implants	are	all	made	in	the	same	factory	so	why	does	it	even	
matter”.	This	final	comment	resulted	in	laughter	from	the	rest	of	the	audience.	It	appeared	that	for	
this	conference	you	should	only	present	topics	that	will	be	acceptable,	otherwise	you	may	be	
ridiculed”.		(OBS	notes	BOA	2015)		I	observed	multiple	groups	with	distinctive	norms	across	and	within	the	three	hospitals.		This	was	specifically	the	case	at	site	B,	where	disagreement	about	the	norms	of	practice	appeared	to	lead	to	conflict	and	separation	amongst	the	orthopaedic	team.		There	were	two	distinct	groups	who	appeared	to	possess	divergent	group	norms	and	beliefs	regarding	treatment	and	implant	selection	decisions	(B1	and	B2).		The	observations	I	made	during	‘rationalisation	meetings’	within	the	department	demonstrated	confusion	and	conflict	about	norms	which	led	to	frustration	by	staff,	disagreement	and	lost	momentum	in	the	hospital’s	rationalisation	process.		Eventually	this	process	was	delayed	by	four	months.				In	the	meetings,	the	surgeons	from	the	opposing	groups	struggled	to	agree	on	which	hip	implant	to	use	across	both	sites.		When	asked	why	they	cannot	select	one	type	there	were	statements	including	“we’re	not	using	that”	and	“there’s	no	
junk	kit	here”.		They	appeared	not	to	want	to	select	the	implant	devices	that	the	opposite	group	were	using.		There	were	also	comments	that	reflected	their	beliefs	about	having	to	perform	surgery	with	an	implant	that	was	not	the	established	norm	for	them	“will	‘I’	have	to	change?”	and	“It’ll	be	a	risk	to	the	
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patient”	(OBS	notes	B1M	2015).			At	site	B,	the	overall	discussion	of	norms	by	both	groups	simultaneously	hindered	the	progress	of	the	department	and	Trust	as	each	set	of	norms	was	deemed	inappropriate	by	the	other	group.		This	appeared	to	reflect	the	strong	emotional	bonds	that	the	surgeon	groups	held	over	their	particular	norms	regarding	implant	choice.		These	were	very	difficult	to	shift	and	change	through	intervention	by	both	management	teams	and	other	orthopaedic	colleagues,	despite	the	level	and	type	of	evidence	presented	in	support.		The	managerial	leads	of	the	rationalisation	process	reveal	in	the	quote	below	the	difficulty	and	“fallout”	they	had	in	trying	to	complete	their	work	on	this	project.		In	the	end	they	had	to	escalate	the	issue	to	the	surgical	board	to	force	a	decision	to	be	made:		
	
“So	they	passed	it	in	the	surgical	board.	Okay,	so	then	it’s	done.	So	we	said	to	them,	“It’s	done.”	So	
then	there	was	the	fallout	because	they	didn’t	actually	think	we	would	ever	do	it.	So	then	there	was	
the	fallout	and	lots	and	lots	of	threats	and	whatever	but,	you	know,	they	could	actually	get	on	with	
it.	Soon	after	that	we	did	that	there	was	lots	of	fighting	there	because	they...	It	was	so	difficult.”	(INT	
M	37005b)	
5.3.1.1 Special	case	surgeons		During	the	data	collection	I	encountered	individual	surgeons	working	as	part	of	a	group	who	could	be	classified	as	an	exception	to	the	norm,	or	a	special	case	surgeon.		They	were	special	because	their	behaviour	deviated	from	the	group	norms	but	they	appeared	to	be	able	to	maintain	their	respected	position	within	the	group.		The	deviation	was	accepted	or	minimised	by	their	colleagues	during	interviews,	rather	than	reported	as	a	source	of	conflict.		The	ability	of	these	surgeons	to	achieve	this	special	case	status	appeared	to	be	linked	to	their	seniority	or	specialisation	within	their	group.		For	example,	the	deviant	surgeons	in	site	A	and	C	performed	techniques	and	selected	implants	that	other	group	members	would	not	use	or	openly	recommend.				Some	of	the	special	case	surgeons	had	“been	around	a	long	time”,	and	nobody	including	the	departmental	manager	felt	able	to	challenge	their	established	practice.		The	quote	below	from	a	manager	of	orthopaedic	services	describes	
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how	this	played	out.		In	the	end	the	manager	waited	for	the	implant	to	be	discontinued	rather	than	challenging	the	choice	of	the	surgeon:		
“It	is,	it	is	very	hard,	it’s	very	hard	to	change	them,	because	I’ve	been	doing	this	job	for	so	long	I	sort	
of	understand	it	and	I’ve	worked	with	some	of	these	guys	for	years.	And	we	had	only	one	consultant	
that	used	to	use	it	(brand	name)	here	but	that	was	his	hip	so,	whatever	and	they	phased	it	out	and	
he	didn’t	want	to	move	on	to	the	new	replacement	if	you	like.	So	it	came	to	the	stage	where	I	had	to	
say	to	him,	you	know,	you	can’t	get	it	any	more,	you	can’t	replace	the	parts	that	you	are	using,	it’s	
gone,	it’s	finished.”	(INT	A	37016)			Site	A	was	slightly	different	because	one	special	case	surgeon	was	allowed	to	deviate	for	what	appeared	to	be	positive	reasons.		This	was	due	to	the	belief	that	he	was	the	innovator	of	the	group.		His	practice	opposed	that	of	his	colleagues,	but	he	was	able	to	justify	it	to	them	and	others	through	the	claims	of	improving	the	current	state	of	the	art	in	orthopaedics.		It	appeared	that	EBM	was	the	accepted	group	norm	at	site	A,	but	he	was	able	to	do	things	differently	because	innovation	is	what	he	does	as	“Mr	Innovation”.		This	belief	was	also	endorsed	across	the	hospital	with	promotional	leaflets	and	showcases	of	his	work.		When	I	interviewed	this	surgeon	he	understood	that	he	was	different	and	aligned	himself	to	being	an	outsider	of	the	group,	but	with	the	ability	to	influence	to	group.		An	excerpt	of	the	interview	demonstrated	this	belief:				
“When	I	started	doing	it,	I	started	testing	it	on	a	few	patients	of	my	own	and	when	it	seemed	to	be	
working	and	I’d	got	it	to	a	point	where	it	was	now	becoming	useful,	I	then	approached	my	three	or	
four	key	colleagues	who	do	most	of	the	hip	replacements	and	said,	look,	this	is	what	I’ve	done	and	
what	do	you	think	and	showed	them	how	it	worked.	Because	I	got	on	with	them	and	we	were	
friends,	they	were	very	open	and	receptive	to	it…I’m	Mr.	Innovation.”	(INT	C	218007)	
	
5.3.1.2 Stereotypical	orthopaedic	surgeon	groups		Not	all	knowledge	of	the	group	norms	was	implicit	and	restricted	to	the	orthopaedic	surgeons.		The	managerial	and	administrative	staff	appeared	to	use	the	norms	of	the	surgical	group	to	develop	categorical	stereotypes	of	surgeon	behaviour.		Examples	of	these	stereotypical	orthopaedic	group	norms	included	the	open	expression	of	their	beliefs	and	views,	interrupting	or	challenging	a	meeting	chair,	volunteering	their	own	opinion	as	‘evidence’	and	the	importance	
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of	making	their	voice	heard.		This	appeared	to	be	independent	of	the	topic	under	discussion	and	reflected	type-cast	behaviours	of	the	surgeon	groups.		I	observed	how	these	common	norms	amongst	orthopaedic	surgeons	played	out	during	multidisciplinary	meetings.		The	quote	reflects	a	meeting	demonstrating	how	staff	stereotyped	the	“orthopods”:		
“And	we	had	to	temper,	because	they	would	have	been	more	aggressive	than	we	were.	So,	you	know,	
we	did	have	to	temper	them.	You	know,	as	you	would,	and	it	was	difficult.	Even	the	hip	one…was	
openly	hostile.	You	know,	they’re	all	fine	individually.”	(INT	M	37005b)	
	These	stereotypical	assumptions	might	reinforce	the	behaviour	of	the	surgeons	who	then	enacted	a	self-fulfilling	prophecy	about	how	they	are	allowed	to	perform	in	meetings.		It	appeared	that	the	surgeon	group	knew	it	was	assumed	that	their	specialty	would	behave	this	way	and	that	this	seemed	to	be	tolerated	by	others.		However,	this	appeared	only	to	be	the	case	at	middle-level	management	meetings	and	below.		When	I	attended	and	observed	higher-level	hospital	board	meetings,	the	surgical	representation	and	behaviour	conformed	to	the	norm	of	the	organisation,	and	the	conduct	of	meetings	at	that	senior	level.		At	a	certain	implicit	level	within	the	hospital	hierarchy,	it	appeared	that	the	surgeons	recognised	where	their	professional	norms	ended	and	they	behaved	appropriately,	i.e.,	to	the	wider	organisational	norm.			
5.4 Types	of	knowledge	that	act	at	the	level	of	the	group	During	my	data	collection,	decisions	appeared	to	be	largely	dependent	on	processes	of	decision-making	specific	to	each	hospital	site.		For	example,	site	B	tended	towards	individualistic	and	hierarchical	processes,	whereas	sites	A	and	C	seemed	to	favour	a	group	consensus	approach.				What	was	considered	a	valued	source	of	evidence	was	important,	particularly	for	how	the	groups	of	surgeons	privileged	different	types	of	evidence	and	knowledge	during	decision-making.		Within	this	theme,	the	findings	revealed	four	key	sources	of	evidence	and	knowledge	which	appeared	to	influence	group	decision-making	across	the	hospitals.		These	include	the	impact	of	professional	
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orthopaedic	societies	and	networks,	the	role	of	situational	learning	and	mentors,	insights	from	surgical	opinion	leaders	and	the	influence	of	implant	manufacturers	and	their	representatives.		Each	will	be	discussed	in	turn	in	the	next	few	sections,	with	empirical	data	to	illustrate	the	ideas.	
5.4.1 Professional	societies	and	networks			Dopson	and	colleagues	(2002)	suggest	that	it	is	important	for	individual	providers	of	healthcare	to	belong	to	an	established	profession.		The	orthopaedic	surgeons	in	my	study	appeared	to	take	great	pride	in	their	membership	of	professional	societies	and	networks	such	as	the	BOA,	The	Royal	College	of	Surgeons	and	The	British	Hip	Society	amongst	others.		These	types	of	memberships	acted	as	a	‘badge	of	honour’	and	a	method	of	differentiation	and	distinction.		They	could	also	be	seen	as	a	means	of	establishing	power	and	retaining	substantial	autonomy,	authority	and	control	over	decisions	made	within	their	sub-specialty	group	and	organisation	as	a	whole.		The	quote	below	demonstrates	how	one	surgeon	felt	that	he	had	to	comply	with	the	societies’	norms	even	though	it	went	against	the	results	of	a	recent	RCT:	
	
“You	know	you	look	at	your	peers	who	do,	so	you	go	to	meetings,	Society	meetings,	and	they’re	all	
talking	about	how	they	fix	them	and	stuff	like	that,	so	you	feel	almost	that	you’ve	got	do	what	they	
do,	to	fit	in	with	the	society	sometimes,	but	now	because	of	the	trial	I’ve	definitely	fixed	a	lot	less	but	
it’s	not	very	cool	as	you	know,	but	you	know	people	in	the	Society	no	matter	what	you	say	are	going	
to	fix	it.”(INT	C	218006)	
	The	knowledge	from	the	specialist	societies	appeared	to	be	a	highly	privileged	source	of	evidence	which	could	enable	the	orthopaedic	surgeons	to	resist	external	intervention	from	outside	the	group.		When	hospital	management	or	policy-makers	attempted	to	change	orthopaedic	practice,	it	would	not	be	deemed	as	important	to	the	surgeon	because	it	had	not	originated	from	within	their	professional	society.		This	is	reflected	in	the	quote	below	from	a	surgeon	who	would	prefer	guidelines	to	originate	from	his	professional	society	rather	than	from	“random	people”	at	NICE:	
	
“I	have	looked	on	who	was	on	the	steering	group	for	that	particular	(NICE)	appraisal,	and	it	wasn’t	
an	overwhelming	number	of	orthopaedic	surgeons,	it	worries	me	that	it’s	almost	imposed	rather	
than	…	what	I	would	say	you	should	do	is	go	and	get	a	specialist	society	the	BOA,	to	get	their	hip	
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guys,	someone	like	me	to	go	and	look	at	it,	rather	than	having	the	most	random	people,	who	I	don’t	
really	connect	with.”	(INT	C	198005)	
5.4.1.1 The	group	insider-outsider	dynamic		I	found	many	examples	of	a	group	insider-outsider	dynamic	in	the	data.		For	example,	my	observations	revealed	that	when	surgeons	and	managers	met	to	review	service	redesign	plans	at	site	B,	any	reference	to	a	procedural	protocol	or	service	design	which	had	not	been	developed	within	site	B	was	generally	not	accepted	as	a	valid	evidence	source	(OBS	notes	site	B	SRD).		This	was	an	instance	of	‘not	invented	here	syndrome’	which	has	been	observed	in	other	areas	of	the	NHS	and	reflects	the	dominance	of	organisational	culture	as	well	as	group	norms	(Millward	et	al,	2005).		Within	my	study,	it	was	the	tendency	of	the	individual	surgeon	in	the	hospital	organisation	to	reject	a	seemingly	suitable	and	sensible	idea	that	had	originated	from	a	source	outside	the	group,	in	favour	of	an	internally	developed	solution.		During	my	observations,	this	rejection	ranged	from	a	mild	reluctance	to	share	best	practice	from	another	Trust,	to	the	outright	refusal	to	even	consider	it	as	an	option,	often	without	any	apparent	consideration.		In	an	orthopaedic	meeting	I	attended,	one	surgeon	said,	“I’m	not	using	that”	and	pushed	a	document	to	the	edge	of	the	table	when	he	was	asked	to	review	a	form	from	another	department	
(OBS	notes	site	B	SRD).		However,	I	could	not	identify	any	concrete	evidence	that	the	outside	approach	would	be	inferior,	or	that	the	internal	approach	would	be	superior	or	vice	versa.		This	signified	to	me	the	importance	of	the	surgeon	group	in	being	able	to	identify	and	define	‘their’	own	reputable	sources	of	evidence	in	‘their’	department	and	hospital.		As	highlighted	in	the	previous	quote,	the	surgeon	appeared	to	accept	treatment	guidelines	from	the	BOA	over	and	above	those	disseminated	by	NICE,	because	they	had	been	developed	by	a	group	of	insiders,	i.e.,	other	surgeons.				The	professional	organisation	was	also	considered	an	effective	source	of	evidence	to	assist	day-to-day	decision-making	for	the	groups	of	surgeons.		There	were	many	instances	of	guidelines	and	reports	from	professional	bodies	being	used	in	decision-making	and	teaching	in	the	departments.		I	often	saw	excerpts	
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and	diagrams	from	these	documents	displayed	on	the	walls	of	the	orthopaedic	departments	and	offices.		It	appeared	that	their	presence	was	the	norm	when	compared	to	outsider	organisations	such	as	NICE.		This	quote	illustrates	a	surgeon	referring	to	BOA	guidance	as	“simple”	and	useful:		
“A	good	example,	if	you	look	at	the	BOA	things…they	were	one	page	guidelines,	how	to	treat	open	
fractures,	and	they	have,	I	can	send	you	some	if	you	remind	me,	but	they	are	really	useful	clinically.	I	
haven’t	got	any	on	me.	There	are	some	up	in	theatre.	They’ve	just	produced	a	few	more,	but	they’re	
simple	and	we	can	use	them.	So	I	don’t	know	what	we	need	to	do	with	NICE.”	(INT	C	198005)		On	the	whole,	the	norms	of	the	professional	orthopaedic	networks	and	societies	appeared	to	lead	professionals	from	the	same	group	to	behave	and	act	similarly.		This	was	regardless	of	their	particular	specialty	interest	and	personal	incentives.		When	interviewing	the	surgeons	about	their	process	of	knowledge	selection,	they	would	often	refer	to	being	influenced	by	discussions	and	presentations	that	took	place	at	national	conferences.		These	appeared	to	achieve	a	wider	reach	and	memorable	impact	on	the	surgeons.		They	often	declared	that	they	“saw	
something	at	a	conference”	and	then	wanted	to	bring	it	back	into	their	practice.		The	consultant	quoted	below	reflects	on	hearing	a	“brilliant”	talk	at	a	conference,	and	being	inspired	to	change	practice,	based	on	what	he	had	heard	at	a	presentation	the	day	before:		
	
“You	know	getting	into	the	presentation	on	fractures	that	was	presented	at	the	Society,	and	it	was	
brilliant,	it	was	the	best	presentation	I	think	I’ve	ever	seen.	I’ve	taken	the	view	that	I	generally	
believe	in	the	study	and	you	know	it’s	the	grey	area.”	(INT	C	218006)	
5.4.1.2 Trust	in	evidence	that	originates	from	professional	groups			The	findings	revealed	that	the	use	of	professional	evidence	in	decision-making	was	likely	to	be	complex	and	fraught	with	political	challenges.		Interview	participants	often	also	discredited	or	approved	of	information	from	conferences	due	to	beliefs	about	the	particular	individual	presenting,	or	the	academic	group	where	the	work	originated.		This	issue	of	trust	might	be	linked	to	how	surgeons	maintain	their	elite	position	in	the	wider	clinical	field.		As	described	in	the	literature	reviews,	professionals	privilege	the	normative	knowledge	of	their	group	and	therefore	their	own	clinical	specialty	over	information	produced	by	
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others	in	the	field.		For	example,	presentations	delivered	by	other	academic	groups	would	be	privileged	over	and	above	clinical	guidelines	produced	by	policy-makers	such	as	NICE.			This	seemed	to	be	particularly	the	case	if	they	felt	that	a	report	or	guideline	might	have	a	negative	impact	on	the	discretion	they	exercised	in	their	group	and	over	their	practice.		Various	surgeons	reported	concerns	regarding	the	wider	political	influence	from	the	Government	on	guidelines	that	are	produced.		This	surgeon	suggests	politicians	are	interfering	with	NICE	guidelines:	
	
“So	NICE	has	a,	you	know,	it’s	a	tight	rope,	but	it	is	at	a	whim,	like	the	NHS	is,	of	being	interfered	
with	by	politicians.	I	think	most	doctors	just	hate	that,	don’t	we	really?.	Like	when	[politicians	
name]	said	we’ll	stick	an	extra	£200	million	into	the	cancer	drug	budget,	you	know,	why	should,	why	
are	they	any	more	needy.	They’re	politically	emotive	decisions.”	(INT	C	198005)		In	addition	some	sites	did	not	trust	evidence	that	came	from	implant	manufacturers,	preferring	more	‘impartial’	sources,	for	example	within	site	A,	the	group	norm	was	to	conduct	and	promote	EBM,	hence	this	group	appeared	to	privilege	knowledge	resulting	from	RCTs	and	journal	articles.		One	example	is	shown	below:		
“Yeah,	I	mean	I’d	say	in	our	department	it’s	very	openly	discussed	but	more	so	because	we’re	a	
clinical	academic	department.	So	there’s	posters	everywhere	for	trials	that	are	currently	happening	
and	I	suppose	an	example	we	recently	completed	a	trial	looking	at	distal	radius	fractures	which	is	a	
very	common	simple	thing	that	comes	through	clinic	all	the	time.	These	patients,	these	particular	
patients	need	an	operation	and	we	compare	two	different	types	of	operation	and	we	found	that	
there	was	no	difference	between	them	but	one	of	the	operations	is	a	lot	cheaper	than	the	other	one,	
so	there’s	a	cost	effectiveness	element	to	it.	So	as	a	result	of	that	coming	through	just	in	the	last	
couple	of	months	the	unit’s	changed	practice	and	we	no	longer	use	the	other	operation.	So	that’s	an	
example	of	how	evidence	does	directly	influence	what	happens	within	the	department.”	(INT	C	
218012)	
	Surgeons	in	site	A	talked	about	being	cautious	of	the	underlying	message	of	conference	presentations	and	who	was	paying	for,	or	“sponsoring”	the	talk.		They	appeared	to	take	a	critical	stance	on	evidence	that	came	from	elsewhere	and	were	strict	about	which	conferences	members	of	staff	were	“allowed”	to	present	
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at	(OBS	notes	site	A	gen).		To	me,	there	was	an	assumption	that	individuals	at	conferences	would	be	influenced	by	the	implant	manufacturer	who	had	paid	for	the	attendance	and	presentation	of	particular	surgeons.		Orthopaedic	surgeons	at	site	A	were	reluctant	to	take	sponsorship	in	any	way	as	they	believed	it	negatively	impacted	on	their	competing	interest	declaration	statements	for	journals	and	grant	applications.		This	is	shown	in	the	quote	below.		I	did	not	observe	this	at	any	of	the	other	sites	I	visited	and	it	demonstrates	the	power	of	this	group	norm	at	site	A.				
“They	always	have	stands	in	the	foyers	always	advertising	the	next	new	thing,	whatever	they’re	
doing.	And	they	sponsor	a	lot	of	things	as	well,	so	they’ll	take	a	group	of	registrars	or	orthopaedic	
consultants	out	for	dinner	and	pay	for	drinks	or	…	there’s	a	lot	of	wining	and	dining	in	the	hope	that	
they	will	then	use	their	particular	prosthesis.	In	some	cases,	because	we’re	quite	a	clinical	academic	
department	there’s	obviously	issues	with	conflict	of	interests	so	certainly	all	my	colleagues	don’t	
engage	in	those	activities,	just	because	if	you	do	engage	in	them	you	then	have	to	declare	it	on	your	
grants	and	publications.	It’s	all	a	bit	of	a	headache,	all	for	a	free	dinner!	Not	worth	it.”	(INT	C	
218012)		
5.4.2 Situational	learning	and	mentors	I	have	described	how	professional	norms	can	establish	the	knowledge	base	of	groups,	and	therefore	determine	the	type	of	knowledge	deemed	acceptable	for	those	who	belong	to	that	group.		My	findings	demonstrate	that	the	knowledge	deemed	acceptable	in	orthopaedics	was	not	always	stable.		The	norms	and	recommendations	that	appeared	to	be	commonly	known	and	used	by	the	members	of	the	different	groups	often	varied	by	hospital,	and	even	within	single	orthopaedic	departments.		Previous	research	(described	in	Chapter	2)	suggests	that	this	is	associated	with	how	the	groups	of	surgeons	learned	to	practise	within	their	own	particular	situation.				My	empirical	work	revealed	that	the	knowledge	of	what	it	was	to	be	an	orthopaedic	surgeon	was	nuanced,	and	at	site	A	differed	from	sites	B	and	C.		This	is	demonstrated	in	the	statement	below	from	a	consultant	surgeon	at	site	A.		He	recognises	that	the	practice	of	his	trainee	surgeons	is	built	on	the	EBM	approach	because	that	is	what	they	have	learned	to	do	in	his	group.		This	enables	them	to	function	within	the	department:		
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“I’ve	got	20	or	30	trainees	at	any	time	in	the	program,	because	the	clinical	trial	stuff	in	particular	
has	been	embedded	in	their	training	for	as	long	as	they	can	remember	it’s	normal.	So	our	guys	don’t	
have	any	…	it’s	second	nature	to	them	to	include	people	in	clinical	trials	and	they’ll	be	randomised	
and	we’ll	decide	what	intervention	on	whatever	basis	and	what’s	been	randomised.	So	for	them	it’s	
normal.	So	I	guess	they’re	…	but	they’re	an	outlier	probably	in	the	UK.”	(INT	C	218008)		This	situational	learning	might	make	it	difficult	as	an	outsider	to	understand	the	granularity	and	variety	of	knowledge	that	exists	within	the	orthopaedic	groups.		The	universality	assumption	by	organisations	such	as	NICE	that	codified	clinical	guidelines	can	be	implemented	in	a	‘one	size	fits	all’	approach	appears	to	be	wholly	inappropriate	to	this	clinical	situation.		My	findings	revealed	that	even	the	‘home-grown’	Trust	policies	were	difficult	to	consistently	uphold	in	the	three	sites.		
5.4.3 Group	knowledge	differentiation	Throughout	the	period	of	observation,	it	became	clear	that	the	three	sites	had	developed	specialist	expertise	which	enabled	group	differentiation.		In	site	C	this	was	knowledge	of	complex	hip	revision	surgery,	whereas	site	B	promoted	their	ability	to	use	a	particular	type	of	implant	consistently.		This	differentiation	created	asymmetry	in	the	information	and	knowledge	that	was	used	between	the	groups	of	surgeons.		For	example,	it	appeared	that	the	surgeons	in	site	B	might	not	have	the	knowledge	and	technical	skill	to	perform	the	complex	revision	surgery	which	took	place	at	site	C.		Similarly,	the	non-academic	surgeons	at	site	C	might	not	be	able	to	function	in	a	group	who	structure	their	orthopaedic	services	around	the	ongoing	RCTs	(site	A).				According	to	the	literature	reviewed	for	this	research,	the	tacit	knowledge	existed	within	the	orthopaedic	groups	and	remained	within	the	group	because	it	could	not	easily	be	controlled,	codified	and	spread.		The	specialist	group	knowledge	included	things	like	the	stage	at	which	hip	replacements	were	conducted,	the	complexity	of	a	technique,	the	recommended	waiting	time	for	surgery	and	the	types	of	implants	that	were	normally	used	in	each	site.		Over	time,	through	the	training	and	development	of	group	members,	the	specialised	knowledge	appeared	to	develop	as	the	norm	at	each	hospital	site.		This	was	
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described	earlier	in	the	example	of	training	surgeons	to	adopt	EBM	as	standard	practice.		This	difference	between	the	groups	is	a	source	of	variation	in	practice	which	has	been	reported	in	the	literature.	
5.4.4 The	transfer	of	knowledge	within	groups	The	within-group	legacy	knowledge	which	I	observed	appeared	to	be	linked	to	situational	learning	and	the	status	and	influence	of	mentors	or	important	peers.		Within	the	orthopaedic	specialty,	learning	traditionally	takes	place	in	an	apprenticeship	style	i.e.,	learning	one-on-one	from	a	senior	colleague.		The	senior	colleagues	appeared	to	be	highly	influential	in	the	development	of	knowledge	of	the	junior	surgeons	in	the	group.		During	my	observations	of	departmental	meetings	or	patient	planning	sessions	there	were	many	references	to	“when	I	
was	training”,	or	“what	MY	consultant	did	in	this	situation”	(OBS	notes	general).			
	This	evidence	source	appeared	to	be	particularly	influential	in	decision-making	when	no	other	obvious	option	existed,	for	example	when	a	patient	had	an	abnormal	bone	structure.		In	my	observation	notes	of	a	morning	planning	meeting,	one	senior	surgeon	suggested	that	he	contact	his	previous	consultant	who	was	retired	“as	he	may	know	what	is	best”	in	this	situation.		The	other	surgeons	in	the	meeting	were	not	opposed	to	the	idea	(OBS	notes	site	C	TPM).		This	type	of	learned	knowledge	persists	in	the	future,	when	the	surgeon	takes	up	a	consultant	role	and	begins	to	train	the	next	generation	of	juniors.		It	appears	that	this	cycle	of	relying	on	the	experience	of	seniors	and	trainers	is	perpetuated	and	reinforced	by	surgeons	working	as	a	group	who	access	and	implement	the	same	knowledge	base	as	their	colleagues.		I	have	included	a	quote	below	from	an	interview	with	a	surgeon	to	show	how	long-term	knowledge	within	groups	influenced	decisions	about	treatment	pathways:			
“I’ve	been	here	now	24	years	and	I	think	that’s	partly	our	background,	what	I	was	brought	in	to.	So,	
we’ve	sort	of	looked	at	different	regimes	with	different	patients	and	come	down	to	the	fact	that	you	
don’t	need	many;	we	still	believe	that	and	we	still	practice	that.	I’ve	been	very	fortunate	with	the	
guys	that	work	here,	most	in	fact	were	my	trainees	anyhow.”	(INT	C	198003)		
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5.4.5 Challenges	to	group	norms	Despite	the	established	in-house	training	processes,	all	the	orthopaedic	departments	I	visited	mentioned	the	need	to	maintain	their	group	status	in	the	long	run.		To	do	this	they	reported	challenging	what	they	thought	was	bad	or	deviant	practice	before	it	became	widespread	and	therefore	difficult	to	overcome.		I	found	very	few	specific	examples	of	direct	challenges	between	group	members	in	my	data	and	observations.		This	was	the	case	at	the	consultant	peer-to-peer	level	and	also	between	junior	and	senior	staff.		However,	I	did	observe	challenges	from	senior	to	junior	surgeons,	although	this	would	be	expected	in	a	hierarchical	system.		For	example,	a	senior	surgeon	at	site	A	reprimanded	the	technique	of	a	junior	surgeon,	stating	that	“it	didn’t	matter	what	
he	did	elsewhere,	because…	this	is	how	we	do	it	here”	(OBS	notes	site	A	gen).		The	surgeon	below	describes	how	there	was	pressure	for	the	trainees	to	“sit	back	and	
listen”	and	conform	to	the	norms	of	practice	within	the	sites,	rather	than	challenge	what	was	discussed	in	larger	group	conversations:		
“I	think	most	of	the	time	you	sit	back	and	listen,	if	I’m	honest,	although	I	think	you	will	have	your	
own	opinion,	unless	asked	in	that	meeting	you	probably	would	not,	you	know,	voice	your	opinion	
unless	you	felt	really	strongly.”	(INT	C	218010)		Both	sites	B	and	C	mentioned	one	example	of	challenging	practice	when	a	minority	group	of	consultant	surgeons	decided	to	implement	a	new	surgical	technique	(hip	resurfacing)	into	the	standard	hospital	practice.		The	surgeon	quoted	below	illustrates	that	not	all	surgeons	within	the	group	immediately	followed	this	apparent	innovation:			
“Some	did,	less	so	now.	I	think	the	resurfacing	business	was	a	big	one	where	everybody	saw	it	in	the	
papers	and	all	they	saw	was	this	so-called	great	news,	so	the	resurfacing	that	was	quite	pushy	for	a	
time	and	less	so	now.”	(INT	C	198003)	
	Years	later	when	the	technique	was	shown	to	be	ineffective	and	possibly	harmful	to	patients,	the	consultants	were	quick	to	describe	how	the	deviant	practice	went	against	the	group	norms,	had	lowered	the	standards	of	the	hospital	and	caused	problems	with	data,	finances	and	hospital	outcomes.		The	consultant	below	
		 137	
states	that	the	majority	of	surgeons	in	his	group	were	happy	to	“sit	back	and	wait	
to	see”	what	happens	with	new	technology,	before	they	changed	their	practice	or	challenged	their	colleagues:			
“We	work	as	a	group	in	the	sense	that	we	meet	every	week	and	we	discuss	cases,	usually	what’s	
planned	going	forward.	And	there	were	some	cases	which	you	know,	something	has	gone	wrong,	so	
we	sort	of	critique	each	other’s	performance	to	a	degree.	So	we’ve	kept	our	own,	well	we	have	done	
for	years	here,	we	know	it	works.	And	then	these	new	things	come	along	and	we’ve	sort	of	looked	at	
them	from	distance,	and	thought,	“Well	hang	on,	that	may	work	for	case	‘X’,	let’s	talk	about	it”.	
Others	have	brought	it	in	and	used	it.	But	we	haven’t	sort	of	jumped	at	the	latest	tool.”	(INT	C	
198005)		The	situated	learning	from	group	members	appeared	to	be	a	source	of	practice-based	evidence	that	could	not	be	found	elsewhere	(i.e.,	in	the	guidelines,	journals	or	professional	society	reports)	but	was	very	important	to	the	surgeons	in	my	study.		The	group	knowledge	reflected	the	complex	brokering	of	evidence	that	takes	place	by	the	surgeons	as	a	combined	unit	or	CoP.		Using	the	example	above,	the	group	of	surgeons	weighed	up	the	evidence	that	originated	from	the	implant	manufacturers	with	the	established	norms	of	their	group	of	colleagues.		They	came	to	the	conclusion	that	they	“know”	their	established	practice	works	and	decided	not	to	implement	the	hip	resurfacing.		However,	the	surgeons	reported	difficulty	in	brokering	their	practice-based	group	knowledge	against	recommendations	from	outside	organisations	such	as	NICE,	as	demonstrated	in	the	quote	below:			
“You	were	talking	about	where	surgeon’s	(knowledge)	base	is,	what	we	all	think	we	do	as	surgeons,	
but	we	really	don’t,	is	look	at	levels	of	evidence	don’t	we?	Are	you	aware	of	that?	We	know	best	
because	we	always	DO.	There	is	some	of	that	of	orthopaedics,	or	experience,	I’ve	done	a	million	of	
these,	and	it	works	if	you	do	this,	which	isn’t,	you	know,	it’s	anecdotal,	you	know,	its	low	down.	But	I	
think	where	NICE	is,	NICE	allegedly,	does	take	the	facts	into	account,	whatever	you	call	the	facts,	
you	can	prove	whatever	you	like	with	a	paper.”	(INT	C	37010)	
5.4.6 Retaining	group	autonomy	over	decision-making	It	is	important	to	reiterate	that	even	though	the	surgeons	in	my	study	were	members	of	a	profession,	they	possessed	individual	professional	status	with	the	authority	and	discretion	to	change	their	own	practice.		The	group	membership	
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did	not	guarantee	that	all	individuals	conformed	to	established	group	norms.		The	surgeon	below	reveals	how	“strong	minded	surgeons”	usually	win	out	when	it	comes	to	implant	selection	decisions	within	his	Trust:			
“I	don’t	know	how	it	happens	actually	and	I	don’t	think	most	consultants	do	either.		I	don’t	...	it’s	
usually	in	collaboration	but	you	see	the	strong	minded	surgeons	who	get	involved	and	if	that	strong	
minded	surgeon	happens	to	want	the	most	expensive,	least	cost	effective	solution	in	a	particular	
hospital	then	that	is	what	happens	unless	someone	takes	that	decision	away	from	them.”	(INT	C	
218011)		
	It	appeared	that	autonomy	over	decisions	could	not	be	withheld	from	the	professionals.		This	was	the	case	for	both	their	close	colleagues	and	particularly	the	hospital	management	and	policy-makers.		What	seemed	to	influence	variation	in	practice	were	the	individual	differences	between	the	surgeons	and	how	these	manifest	themselves	within	the	groups.		The	motivation	to	follow	group	norms	can	be	both	intrinsic	and	extrinsic.		Group	norms	developed	through	practice,	and	were	internalised	as	the	best	way	to	do	orthopaedics	for	each	particular	group	within	the	three	hospitals.		The	desire	to	appear	credible	in	the	eyes	of	professional	peer	groups	and	especially	professional	mentors	seemed	to	be	a	strong	determinant	of	behaviour	and	of	evidence	use	for	the	surgeons	I	interviewed.				Situational	learning	provided	group	knowledge	which	was	seen	as	a	collective	good	for	the	surgeons.		It	appeared	to	be	indispensable	to	practice	as	well	as	generating	power	and	autonomy	for	the	surgeons	within	the	organisation.		This	relates	to	the	existence	and	enforcement	of	formal	and	informal	professional	norms	that	were	an	important	part	of	orthopaedic	surgeon	identity.		During	my	observations,	an	area	of	particular	conflict	between	surgeons	at	site	A	and	the	local	CCG	emerged.		It	was	about	the	allocated	thresholds	for	hip	replacement	surgery.		Interviews	and	observations	of	meetings	at	the	CCG	revealed	their	aim	to	set	thresholds	for	providing	surgery	linked	to	patients’	BMI	and	fitness	for	surgery.		It	appeared	that	the	evidence	base	for	these	decisions	was	lacking,	and	the	surgeons	I	spoke	to	made	assumptions	that	it	was	linked	to	cost	reduction	or	an	attempt	to	reduce	demand	for	hip	replacement	in	their	area.			
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	Observations	of	meetings	at	site	A	revealed	that	orthopaedic	services	were	“under	pressure	to	reduce	the	number	of	hip	replacements	they	were	conducting	as	
they	have	already	gone	over	their	allocated	budget	spend	for	the	year	during	the	
third	financial	quarter”	(OBS	notes	CCG	Site	A).		The	collective	group	of	surgeons	was	able	to	assume	authority	and	challenge	the	CCG’s	position	to	prevent	the	arbitrary	cut	off	for	THR	surgery.		They	provided	a	consensus	statement	detailing	established	orthopaedic	criteria,	where	no	cut	off	exists.		This	evidence	from	the	wider	orthopaedic	group	seemed	to	carry	significant	weight	with	the	decision-makers	at	the	CCG.		An	attempt	by	the	hospital	management	or	an	external	body	(such	as	the	CCG)	to	sanction	decisions	made	by	the	surgeon	group	appeared	to	backfire.		The	group	were	powerful	in	their	opposition	to	the	proposal.			The	conflicts	produced	by	specific	clinical	decisions	taken	for	financial	reasons	and	as	a	result	of	financial	pressures	were	evident	during	my	study.		Across	all	three	sites,	I	observed	a	struggle	to	balance	supply	and	demand	in	orthopaedic	services.		Often	discussions	took	place	between	surgeons	regarding	decisions	‘for	surgery’,	for	example	how	long	a	patient	should	have	to	wait,	and	could	they	be	referred	elsewhere	for	treatment,	such	as	a	physiotherapy	department.		The	final	decisions	appeared	to	depend	on	their	subjective	view	of	what	was	appropriate	for	their	context;	this	looked	to	be	contingent	on	their	practice	and	current	situation.				At	site	B,	surgeons	appeared	comfortable	and	confident	when	signposting	patients	to	physiotherapy	services,	instead	of	offering	surgical	consultations.		Surgeons	revealed	that	they	had	learned	through	trial	and	error	that	this	extra	level	of	triage	could	help	to	delay	or	prevent	“consultant	contact”	and	essentially	“reduce	their	workload”	and	the	“level	of	inappropriate	referrals”	(OBS	notes	site	B	
gen).		The	lead	physiotherapist	in	the	department	acted	as	a	mentor	and	national	figure	for	musculoskeletal	disorders	and	was	able	to	reinforce	this	decision	and	demonstrate	success	in	the	hospital.		She	described	how	her	recognised	status	within	the	wider	NHS	context	might	have	enabled	her	to	be	viewed	as	a	
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respected	colleague	at	‘service	redesign’	meetings	attended	by	orthopaedic	surgeons.		This	contradicted,	in	her	view,	the	professional	and	organisational	norm	that	“doctors	talk	to	doctors	and	doctors	listen	to	doctors”	(INT	C	37012),	although	this	explicit	level	of	trust	and	respect	across	professional	disciplines	was	not	observed	across	all	sites,	or	even	consistently	at	site	B.			In	my	observations,	the	process	of	prioritising,	negotiating	and	juggling	the	demands	of	surgery	and	decision-making	appeared	to	be	fluid	and	temporal.		Decisions	tended	to	be	made	or	led	by	the	surgeon	group	or	the	surgeon	in	charge.		The	decision,	and	the	group	knowledge,	were	mobilised	in	the	rest	of	the	department.		Despite	this	continuing	presence,	managerial	knowledge	and	objects	such	as	budgets	and	forecasts	did	not	appear	to	be	considered	as	important	for	decision-making	by	the	surgeons	in	my	study.			
5.4.7 Leading	lights	and	opinion	leaders		In	the	same	way	that	intra-group	mentors	were	important	for	making	decisions	and	establishing	norms	and	standards	within	hospitals,	national	opinion	leaders	appeared	to	set	precedents	for	acceptable	knowledge	for	the	wider	orthopaedic	community.		Opinion	leaders	in	the	orthopaedic	surgical	specialty	were	surgeons	who	were	nominated	by	their	colleagues	as	educationally	or	professionally	influential	to	practice.		The	selection	of	opinion	leaders	in	my	study	was	subjective	and	was	determined	by	the	surgeons	themselves.				During	my	fieldwork,	different	individuals	were	quoted	as	legitimate	providers	of	evidence.		Examples	of	opinion	leaders	mentioned	during	observations	included	editors	of	prominent	orthopaedic	journals	(site	B),	leaders	of	academic	departments	(site	A)	and	Chairs	of	professional	societies	(Site	C).		Opinion	leaders	could	also	be	historical	figures	who	“changed	the	face	of	surgery”,	for	example	John	Charnley	was	used	as	a	classic	example	of	a	surgeon	who	conducted	a	best	practice	approach	to	surgery	that	should	be	modelled	within	the	group	(OBS	notes	site	A	gen).				
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Where	possible,	I	attempted	to	interview	the	so-called	opinion	leaders	and	leading	lights.		The	consultant	surgeon	below	describes	his	beliefs	about	being	viewed	as	a	leading	light	in	the	domain	of	orthopaedic	surgery	research:		
	
“He	said,	“You	just	do	PR,	don’t	you,	really?”	and	actually	that’s	incredibly	insightful.	So	it’s	the	
person	that	stands	up	and	talks	about	the	trials	to	the	clinicians	and	then	goes	back	and	talks	about	
the	trial	with	the	research	team	who	actually	make	it	happen.	So	it	is	very	much	about	just	being	a	
link	person.	So	...	and	understanding	across	both	sides	is	the	most	important	thing	but	yes,	there	
probably	is	an	element	of	if	you’re	the	sort	of	person	that	is	quite	comfortable	talking	to	those	both	
groups	really.	It’s	PR.	It’s	exactly	it.”	(INT	C	218008)		This	modest	approach	contradicted	the	views	of	this	surgeon’s	colleagues	who	described	his	approach	to	work	as	“amazing”	(OBS	notes	site	A	gen).		The	literature	review	demonstrated	that	opinion	leaders	can	have	a	significant	influence	on	the	practice	of	professionals	and	subsequently	on	patient	outcomes.	What	was	interesting	in	the	findings	was	the	inconsistency	in	the	apparent	weight	attached	to	the	views	of	opinion	leaders	across	the	three	sites.		The	consultant	from	site	B	quoted	below	recommended	I	seek	the	opinion	of	one	leading	light	surgeon,	whereas	a	different	surgeon	located	at	site	C	suggested	I	“steer	clear”	as	his	work	could	not	be	trusted.		It	appeared	that	this	surgeon	was	concerned	with	the	manufacturer-funded	support	the	particular	individual	receives	for	his	work.			
“But	he’s	a	very	successful	one,	do	you	know	(opinion	leader	name)?	Oh	fantastic,	when	I	say	strange	
man,	like,	he	never	sleeps	apparently,	he’s	like	that.	Yes,	no,	no	he’s	amazingly	productive	but	all	his	
trainees,	I’ve	met	a	few,	say	he	just	never	sleeps.	I	think	initially	he	has	about	four	hours	sleep	a	
night.”	(INT	C	37010)	
	It	was	not	always	obvious	in	what	circumstances	opinion	leaders	were	likely	to	influence	the	practice	of	their	peers.		For	example,	in	site	A	opinion	leaders	tended	to	stem	from	their	association	with	large	research	programmes	and	progression	in	the	field	through	their	academic	development.		Reference	to	
“opinion	leaders”	or	“showmen”	of	the	field	sometimes	varied,	as	their	evidence	and	knowledge	could	be	considered	early	adoption	or	false	innovation	and	therefore	not	valid	(OBS	notes	site	A	gen).		This	inconsistency	is	demonstrated	in	
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the	quotes	below,	the	first	surgeon	describes	his	struggle	with	“moving	forward”	and	then	being	“singled	out”	if	a	treatment	goes	wrong.		The	second	describes	how	early	adopters,	who	promote	new	techniques,	face	problems	when	national	registry	and	trial	evidence	proves	them	to	be	inadequate:				
“Yes,	and	it’s	a	fine	balance	because	you	don’t	want	to	stifle	innovation	because	that’s	what	pushes	
everything	forward	but	equally	you	don’t	want	everyone	to	jump	on	my	bandwagon	and	something	
then	turns	out	to	be	a	disaster	later	on.”	(INT	C	198005)	
	
…and	then	the	initial	adopters	and	the	early	innovators	produce	reports	that	are	in	uncontrolled	
setting	that	say	this	thing	is	a	good	thing	to	do,	and	then	eventually	the	National	Registry	type	data	
starts	appearing	and	then	the	randomisation	evidence	appears	and	then	use	goes	back	down	almost	
to	baseline	when	everybody	finds	out	that	it	was	****.”	(INT	C	218011)		Attitudes	across	the	groups	regarding	who	was	considered	an	opinion	leader	varied.		Those	surgeons	labelled	as	influential	to	orthopaedic	practice	in	one	site	(B)	were	considered	“arrogant	charlatans”	in	another	site	(C).		As	mentioned	in	the	example	earlier,	even	the	recommendations	of	the	Chair	of	the	professional	society	was	called	into	question	by	some	of	the	surgeons.		This	appeared	to	be	linked	to	the	established	norms	of	the	group	and	what	types	of	knowledge	they	privileged.		My	findings	revealed	the	challenges	that	would	be	faced	when	attempting	to	select	a	group	of	opinion	leaders	who	could	lead	the	way	and	be	a	respected	source	of	evidence	for	the	majority	of	orthopaedic	surgeons.		
5.4.8 Representatives	from	implant	manufacturing	companies	The	final	category	within	this	theme	highlights	the	apparent	authority	that	knowledge	from	the	pharmaceutical	and	implant	manufacturing	sector	holds	within	the	orthopaedic	departments.		Manufacturers	of	orthopaedic	implants	have	access	to	substantial	amounts	of	funding	to	produce	information	to	disseminate	across	hospitals.		This	appeared	to	influence	the	decision-making	process	of	orthopaedic	surgeons	with	regards	to	their	choice	of	implants	and	procedures.		The	presence	of	these	documents	and	promotional	materials	was	widespread	across	all	three	hospitals,	from	displays	on	corridor	walls	to	brochures	left	on	the	tables	of	the	orthopaedic	coffee	lounges.		There	is	always	the	potential	that	the	simple	presence	of	promotional	material	could	
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unconsciously	bias	the	opinion	of	surgeons.		However,	they	did	also	appear	to	overtly	influence	surgeon	decision-making	as	I	demonstrate	in	my	field	notes	below.		This	conversation	summary	reveals	a	surgeon	trying	to	convince	the	departmental	manager	to	buy	a	new	diagnostic	test	recommended	in	a	brochure	a	representative	had	given	him	the	previous	day:		
“Surgeon	to	me:	The	thing	I’m	going	to	go	and	do	after	speaking	to	you	now,	is	to	go	and	speak	to	
my	manager	to	see	if	she’ll	let	me	buy	a	test	for	a	patient.		
-We	walk	to	the	managers’	office	together	
Surgeon	to	manager:	There’s	a	test	that’s	just	become	available,	about	a	couple	of	months	ago.	It’s	
been	manufactured	by	(brand).	Look	here	is	the	brochure.	(Brand),	this	company,	have	just	
purchased	another	company	which	has	produced	a	test	that	will	tell	you	98	percent	accurate	in	
every	case!	-Surgeon	shows	the	brochure	to	the	departmental	manager.			
Manager	responds:	But	it	costs	a	bomb.	It’s	£500	a	test,	just	for	a	test	and	they	sell	them	in	boxes	of	
five.	So	it’s	£2500	for	a	little	box	of	five	tests.	
The	surgeon	then	gives	his	case	for	support:	I’ve	got	a	patient	…	well	a	colleague	of	mine	has	got	a	
patient	and	we’re	in	exactly	the	situation.	We’ve	got	to	make	a	decision,	because	she’s	now	four	
weeks	after	the	operation….	five	weeks	after	the	operation.	
-	The	manager	said	she	would	think	about	it	and	we	leave.		
Later	that	week	the	surgeon	invited	the	manufacturer	representative	into	the	hospital	to	meet	
directly	with	his	close	colleagues	to	review	the	test.	The	manager	did	not	attend	or	was	not	invited	
to	this	meeting.”	(OBS	notes	C/M	site	A)		
5.4.8.1 Representative	access	to	the	surgeons	There	was	variation	in	the	access	and	acceptability	of	representatives	from	implant	manufacturing	companies	across	the	three	sites.		For	example,	site	A	would	only	allow	representatives	into	theatres	who	were	from	the	company	that	was	already	contracted	to	supply	their	implants.		This	was	stipulated	in	the	terms	and	conditions	of	their	contract	with	the	implant	manufacturer	and	was	instilled	by	the	management	team	and	administrative	staff	who	worked	in	theatres.		The	contract	required	that	a	representative	was	in	the	hospital	every	day	and	could	be	used	as	a	source	of	evidence	for	surgeons	and	surgical	staff	regarding	implant	selection,	as	described	in	the	quote	below:		
“But	it’s	just	a	representative	and	they	are	there	to	help	and	that’s	the	idea.	Yes	and	then	what	
prosthesis	go	with	what	and	how	many	of	each	of	them	there	are	so	that	they	can	check	that	they’re	
in	the	cupboard.	And,	and	yes	so	the	reps	are	here.”	(INT	A	218014)		
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	However,	the	senior	nurse	in	charge	of	theatres	later	questioned	their	motivations	for	being	on-site	every	day.		He	suggested	that	it	was	not	to	“help	
out”,	but	rather	to	monitor	and	check	what	equipment	is	being	selected	during	surgery:		
“Yes	we’ve	gone	with	a	company	called	(brand)	now	for	all	kits	and	because	we’ve	gone	with	that	
for	feet	all	the	way	up	to,	to	necks	and	the	company	have	given	us	a	massive	discount.	40%	discount	
if	you	use	their	kit	and	their	kit	alone.		Oh	that’s	a	bugbear	isn’t	it,	their	kit	alone	so	they’ve	got,	so	
they	then,	they	then	put	a	representative	almost	in	the	hospital	permanently.	Who’s	there	to	help	
out	but	you	know	damn	well	that	they’re	there	to	make	sure	that	they	are	using	your	kit	and	if	not	
we’ll	be	penalised.	We	haven’t	yet.	But	yes.”	(INT	C	218013)		From	my	observations,	it	became	apparent	that	other	company	representatives	that	visited	site	A	would	have	to	go	via	the	management	team	and	procurement	office	prior	to	being	granted	access	the	surgeon	group.		The	two	quotes	below	illustrate	how	trying	to	limit	access	in	this	way	was	considered	positive	by	the	departmental	manager.		However,	I	noted	that	access	was	only	restricted	to	controlled	on-site	admittance	to	theatres	and	not	for	meetings	that	took	place	outside	the	hospital	department	such	as	in	the	cafe,	in	the	evenings	or	at	conferences.			
“I	get	all	the	orders	come	through	to	me	to	sign	off,	if	it’s	something	that	I	don’t	recognise	or	I	think	
I’m	not	paying,	I’ll	go	back	to	the	theatre’s	team	and	say	what’s	this	for.	Because	you	know	the	reps	
come	in	and	they’ll	try	and	flog	them	anything	you	know;	oh	this	is	great	and	it’s	all	new,	shiny	and	
flashy.	“Oh	I	want	it,	I	want	it”	sort	of	thing,	so	its	very	much,	we	are	really	tight	on	who	could	go	
into	theatre	in	terms	of	the	reps,	so	very	strict	on	the	visitors	policy.”	(INT	M	218014)		When	I	asked	her	if	the	representatives	try	and	work	around	the	policy,	she	said:	
	
“No,	they	try	but	I	usually	find	out	somewhere	along	the	line,	but	I	think	yeah,	I	usually	find	out	one	
way	or	another.	Somebody	will	tell	me,	they	think	that	they’re	going	to	get	away	with	it	and	usually	
I	catch	up	with	them	before	it	gets	to	where	it	needs	to	be.	So	like	(surgeon	name)	would	just	use	
(brand)	hip	and	knee	replacement	or	resurfacing	or	something	and	it’s,	I	find	out	and	ask,	“what	are	
you	doing”;	(and	the	surgeons	ask)	“how	did	you	know?”	or	you	know,	sort	of	thing,	like	oh	you	need	
to	come	and	discuss	it,	I’m	not	saying	it	won’t	happen.”	(INT	M	218014)	
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	Site	B	and	site	C	appeared	to	have	no	restrictions	placed	on	the	representatives’	access	to	the	orthopaedic	offices	and	theatres.		Site	C	did	promote	(via	a	sign	on	the	door)	that	representatives	would	be	seen	by	appointment	only.		Observations	at	each	hospital,	including	site	A,	revealed	that	representatives	from	multiple	companies	had	access	to	surgeons,	administrators	and	managers.		These	individuals	were	responsible	for	making	decisions	that	could	potentially	impact	upon	patient	care,	particularly	for	the	selection	of	implants.		I	observed	representatives	in	theatre	during	operations,	in	pre-	and	post-operation	preparation	areas,	in	the	implant	storage	room,	hovering	by	corridors,	staff	coffee	lounges	and	in	shared	office	spaces.		What	was	interesting	to	me	was	revealed	in	an	interview	with	a	theatre	nurse	quoted	below.		She	stated	that	representatives	would	often	compete	over	their	“patch”	to	try	to	prevent	colleagues	from	other	companies	gaining	access	to	‘their’	site.		Together	this	demonstrates	the	strong	commercial	influence	in	the	orthopaedic	specialty.		
“Both	are	there.	They	come	in	very	helpful;	there’s	definitely	2	camps	I	think.	We	were	heavily	
involved,	well	we	weren’t	involved	with	(brand)	we	used	a	lot	of	(brand)	products;	we	had	no	
financial	backing	or	support	from	(brand)	at	all	–	we	used	a	lot	of	their	products.	And	we	didn’t	
realise,	I	didn’t	realise	until	a	few	years	later,	why	the	reps	weren’t	coming	here,	and	people	were	
saying,	“This	is	my	patch,	get	out”.”	(INT	C	37016	)		This	lack	of	control	over	access	of	representatives	to	frontline	delivery	of	orthopaedic	surgery	was	an	unanticipated	finding	at	the	start	of	the	study.		It	was	not	a	strong	theme	in	the	systematic	review	of	literature	(Grove	et	al,	2016).		During	the	interviews,	the	surgeons	would	often	suggest	that	they	found	the	presence	of	the	representatives	helpful	to	decision-making.		The	quotes	below	came	from	consultant	surgeons	located	across	the	hospital	sites.		They	demonstrate	the	range	of	views	regarding	knowledge	that	originates	from	this	source:			
“I	had	a	go,	I	asked	(surgeon	colleague)	to	help	me	with	the	case,	and	you	know,	she	had	a	huge	
defect	but	we	thought	we’d	get	away	with	it,	and	we	didn’t.	And	we	were	just	scratching	our	heads	
and	the	rep	for	this	was	in	theatre	and	he	said,	“I’ll	help	you	with	that.”	Then	you	pay	a	bit	more	
		 146	
attention	because	you’ve	got	a	definite	case,	we’ve	got	a	problem,	and	we	looked	at	it	and	it’s	very	
impressive.	And	now	we’ve	done	3	of	those;	I’ve	done	3	in	the	last	sort	of	18	months.	(Other	surgeon	
colleague)	done	one,	so	in	that	sense	we’re	looking	at	new	technology	you	know,	every	now	and	
then,	if	you	think	there’s	a	demand	for	it.”	(INT	C	198001)	
	
“There	are	some	reps	who	are	basically	good	in	the	sense	that	they	make	sure	the	kit	you	want	is	
there.	And	other	reps	who	effectively	try	and	tell	you	what	to	do,	which	is	irritating	when	you’ve	
been	in	a	post	20-odd	years,	but	that’s	probably	the	guy’s	characters.	I	think	the	reps	can	be	very	
helpful	to	the	nursing	staff,	because	you	know,	when	we	started	the	(brand)	was	a	stem,	then	you	
had	a	socket,	you’ve	got	2	sides	to	the	socket,	and	effectively	about	4	or	5	stems	and	that’s	what	you	
need	on	the	shelf.	Nowadays,	because	everything’s	modular,	even	the	primaries	are	modular,	there’s	
so	much	tackle	and	I	think	the	reps	can	help	the	theatre	staff	a	lot	more	than	they	can	help	us.	Yes.	I	
mean	other	ones,	the	ones	you	get	on	well	with	and	they	do	a	good	job.”(INT	C	198003)	
5.4.8.2 The	influence	of	manufacturer	knowledge	on	decision-making		The	extent	to	which	the	orthopaedic	surgeons	in	my	study	were	really	influenced	by	the	representative	and	materials	supplied	by	companies,	or	how	this	evidence	is	weighed	against	other	sources	during	decision-making,	for	example	evidence	from	journal	articles,	is	unclear	from	my	case	study	data.		It	appears	from	the	interviews	that	surgeons	on	the	whole	consider	the	representatives	have	limited	influence	on	their	practice.		The	consultant	below	was	responsible	for	leading	the	single	supplier	project	within	his	Trust.		He	describes	the	offers	made	by	the	company	as	“opaque”	and	states	why	he	believes	this	evidence	source	lacks	the	transparency	that	is	required	to	make	decisions	for	orthopaedic	services:			
“Transparency	about	price	costing,	because	the	costing	not	only	involves	what	you	pay	for	the	
prosthesis	and	to	get	it	on	the	shelf,	there	are	all	sorts	of	other	little	sweeteners	that	manufacturers	
put	into	the	equation	like	representative	availability,	servicing,	free	loan	kits,	there	are	all	sorts	of	
other	little	layers	less	quantifiable	that	would	be	introduced	into	the	equation	that	will	make	it	not	
a	simple	ABC	decision	and	then	when	these	decisions	become	opaque,	they	also	become	much	more	
subject	to	interference	by	individuals	who	want	to	see	their	favoured	brand	prosthesis	
manufacturer	on	the	shelf,	and	so	you	start	justifying	it	by	other	sort	of	fringe	benefits,	if	you	like.	So	
I	think	it	becomes	very	difficult	to	make	these	decisions	easily	and	transparency	obviously	is	the	only	
way	to	go	forward,	I	think.”	(INT	C	218003)		Data	from	observations	and	interviews	with	administrators	responsible	for	implant	ordering,	and	managers	responsible	for	procurement	and	payment	of	
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implant	invoices,	would	suggest	that	the	representatives	did	have	some	influence	on	the	surgeons’	practice	and	decisions	regarding	implants.		The	quote	below	gives	a	narrative	account	of	the	close	relationship	between	evidence	from	implant	manufacturers,	clinical	decisions	and	practice.		A	manager	explains	the	level	of	involvement	of	manufacturer	representatives	in	his	Trust	with	a	recent	example	of	a	representative	influencing	the	selection	of	an	implant:		
“In	theory,	the	way	it	has	been	working,	up	until	recently	at	least,	is	pretty	much	–	because	nobody	
was	really	policing	it	–	I	could	have	gone	and	got	you	a	rep	from	anywhere.		Or	a	rep	could	have	
wandered	into	theatre,	spoken	to	a	surgeon	directly,	persuaded	him	that	this	is	a	piece	of	kit	we	
want	to	trial,	and	the	next	thing	you	know	two	weeks	later	the	rep’s	in,	they’re	trialling	this	piece	of	
kit.		And	then	the	consultant’s	saying,	“Oh	it’s	really	good,”	and	the	rep	says,	“Yeah,	it’s	the	same	
price	as	what	you’ve	got	now.”	So	the	consultant	comes	and,	you	know,	bangs	on	somebody’s	door	
and	says,	“We	need	some	of	this,	it’s	the	same	price	as	what	you’ve	got	now,”	and	then	somebody’s	
just	gone	–	and	this	has	happened	–	“That’s	fine,	just	use	it.”	And	that’s	when	we	find	out	we	had	a	
revision	case	that	cost	us	£13,000	for	the	kit.	Because	nobody’s	actually	checked	how	much	this	kit	
was	going	to	cost	(as	opposed	to	just	the	implant).	Because	we	know,	for	example,	with	that	guy	
who	had	the	£13,000	thing	that	actually...	Because	when	the	consultant	found	out	he	was	actually	
mortified	that	he’d	spent	£13,000	and	I	don’t	think	the	rep...	Yeah,	the	rep	may	no	longer	be	with	us	
if	the	consultant’s	got	hold	of	him.	But	actually,	having	looked	at	the...(total	cost)	And	he	actually	
said	in	one...	but	he	said	in	the	meeting,	he	said,	“Well	if	I’d	have	known	that	I’d	have	done	it	the	old	
way	that	I	was	doing	before,	because,	yes,	it	was	nice	but	it	wasn’t	thirteen	grand	nice.”	(INT	M	
37004)	
	A	theatre	manager	at	site	B	reported	a	similar	trend.		However,	she	had	taken	steps	to	prevent	it	from	happening	in	the	future	because	of	the	wider	impact	that	it	had	on	the	Trust	and	the	fact	that	her	“job	was	on	the	line”.		She	suggests	that	the	only	way	to	reduce	representative	influence	was	to	stop	paying	their	invoices	
(INT	M	119014).		The	managers	and	administrators	were	able	to	recognise	some	benefit	in	having	representatives	on	site,	particularly	for	complex	surgery	or	during	staff	shortages	as	in	the	case	below.		However,	perhaps	appropriately,	there	always	appeared	to	be	some	level	of	suspicion	regarding	their	presence,	for	example	the	manager	below	asks	the	representative	“why	are	you	here,	really?”:			
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“The	reps	are	here	all	the	time.	I’d	say	90%	of	comfort	for	the	staff,	not	so	much	for	the	consultant.		
If	there	is	a	lot	of	instance,	I	mean	if	you	see	a	revision	case,	you	know,	sometimes	it’s	complicated	
you	know,	it’s	like	there’s	20,	30	trays	open.	And	it’s	complex	surgery	so	I	think	that	the	rep’s	there	
for	a	reason.	If	the	rep	...	if	a	rep	turned	up	and	I	asked	him	why	he	or	she	was	here	then	...	and	they	
said,	“Oh	he’s	doing	two	knees,”	I’d	go,	yeah	but	you	know,	they’re	primary	knees,	he’s	done	
hundreds	so	why	are	you	here,	really?.	Well	I	think	if	I	turned	round	to	you	and	said	I	catch	him	
every	time,	I’d	be	lying	because	I	don’t.”	(INT	M	37002)	
5.4.8.3 Surgeon	beliefs	about	their	relationships	with	representatives		Manufacturers	of	orthopaedic	implants	employ	a	substantial	workforce	to	ensure	they	have	a	presence	in	hospitals.		They	have	significant	budgets	for	marketing	activities.		It	might	be	expected	that	surgeons	develop	relationships	with	the	individual	representatives.		My	study	demonstrates	that	surgeon	groups	at	each	site	had	varying	levels	of	relationship	with	the	implant	representatives.		These	ranged	from	an	external	outsider	to	long-term	colleagues	and	close	friends.		These	relationships	were	only	discussed	during	interviews	with	staff	who	were	not	orthopaedic	surgeons.		For	example,	departmental	managers	explained	the	positive	relationships	some	surgeons	at	sites	B	and	C	had.		They	revealed	how	surgeons	“like	to	work	for”	particular	companies	and	know	the	representatives	“personally”	(INT	M	37005).		At	site	A,	it	appeared	from	my	data	that	the	influence	of	manufacturers	had	not	been	ruled	out	entirely.		During	my	time	at	this	Trust,	multiple	sponsored	lunches	and	training	sessions	targeted	at	surgeon	groups	took	place	and	seemed	to	be	accepted	as	the	norm	within	the	specialty.		My	observations	of	theatre	space	revealed	a	strong	presence	of	the	allocated	representative,	who	would	often	offer	advice	and	recommendations	about	implants	and	kit	to	the	surgeons	and	surgical	staff.				It	is	important	to	note	that	there	is	a	significant	range	of	implants	within	one	company’s	offering.		Although	site	A	was	contractually	restricted	to	using	implants	from	one	manufacturer,	there	was	an	opportunity,	planned	or	not,	to	select	implants,	devices	and	kit	from	a	wide	range	of	price	options.		The	implants	used	in	all	three	sites	ranged	from	relatively	cheap	well-evidenced	and	ODEP	
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10A	rated	devices,	to	expensive	new	hip	replacements	or	surgical	innovations	that	had	not	been	formally	tested	and	lacked	long-term	survival	data.				Interviews	conducted	at	site	C	revealed	that	representatives	could	be	useful	and	add	value	to	the	information	available	to	the	department,	and	I	observed	surgeons	and	other	clinical	staff,	particularly	surgical	nurses,	seeking	out	their	opinions	during	the	planning	and	setting	up	of	surgery.		For	example,	they	could	“access	information	about	implants,	combinations	and	their	use	without	[us]	
having	to	go	and	look	it	up	[for	ourselves]”	(OBS	notes	site	C	gen).				At	site	B,	the	surgeons	worked	across	two	locations	(B1	and	B2).		Because	of	this	structure,	each	group	of	surgeons	had	their	“own	representative”	of	whom	they	appeared	highly	protective.		They	did	not	want	to	share	access	across	the	sites	
(OBS	notes	site	B	gen).		The	contact	with	representatives	appeared	to	be	a	source	of	conflict	in	site	B,	but	was	considered	an	important	source	of	evidence	without	which	the	surgeon	group	could	not	function.		For	example,	in	one	instance	I	observed	a	surgeon	cancel	a	patient	surgery	because	the	representative	could	not	be	present	(OBS	notes	site	B	gen).				This	entire	theme	is	controversial	and	subjective,	but	very	important	for	discussions	about	service	delivery	within	the	NHS.		It	might	help	to	understand	the	varied	use	of	different	sources	of	information	on	which	orthopaedic	surgeons	base	their	decisions	when	acquiring	new	implants,	techniques	and	technologies.		As	described	by	the	procurement	manager	earlier,	transparency	in	the	process	appears	to	be	lacking	and	this	was	observed	across	all	three	sites.		However,	evidentially,	orthopaedic	departments	which	have	the	highest	awareness	of	implant	usage	data	and	ordering	are	in	the	best	position	to	control	what	is	used	in	practice.		
5.4.9 Evidence	and	explanations	of	the	variation	across	groups	This	theme	described	the	relationships	between	groups,	how	members	of	each	group	define	their	group	boundaries	and	what	knowledge	is	accepted	within	groups.		The	relationships	can	be	explained	by	the	theory	of	Legitimate	
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Peripheral	Participation	and	Communities	of	Practice	which	were	described	in	detail	in	Chapter	2.			My	findings	suggest	that	surgeons	can	enact	LPP	at	any	stage	in	their	career,	not	just	from	the	junior	to	senior	level.		This	appeared	to	encourage	the	formation	of	a	variety	of	CoP.		For	example,	groups	in	this	study	were	established	through	their	physical	location	in	site	B,	their	surgical	specialty	in	Site	A	i.e.,	hip	surgeon	versus	hip	revision	surgeon,	their	level	of	academic	interest	in	site	C,	and	by	their	position	within	their	organisation	across	all	sites,	as	well	as	via	their	affiliation	to	professional	societies	as	in	site	B1.		This	demonstrates	that	the	intention	of	the	individual	surgeons	to	engage	with	a	group	and	follow	the	group	norms	appeared	to	be	configured	through	a	process	of	becoming	a	full	participant	in	the	sociocultural	practice	of	that	group.		According	to	CoP	theory,	if	this	process	does	not	occur,	the	individual	remains	an	outsider	who	does	not	have	the	relevant	knowledge	and	skills	to	belong.				Across	all	sites,	the	departmental	managers	were	outsiders	because	they	did	not	possess	the	knowledge,	skills,	discretion	and	superiority	of	orthopaedic	surgery	which	would	have	otherwise	legitimised	their	belonging.		Departmental	managers	I	interviewed	were	all	aware	of	their	outsider	status	and	their	position	outside	the	knowledge	boundary,	as	presented	in	the	quote	below:		
	
“First	of	all	we	just	don’t	we	just	(a)	don’t	have	the	knowledge	of,	you	know,	all	the	information	and	
things	that	we	got	and	all	the	procurement	stuff,	so	we	don’t	have	the	knowledge.	And	(b)	I	think	the	
thing	is,	I	don’t	have	the	medical	kind	of	experience”.	(INT	M	37005)		They	would	often	refer	to	themselves	as	“not	being	clinical”	(INT	M	37004).	This	phrase	was	continually	used	during	interviews.		It	appeared	to	be	a	qualifying	statement	or	defence	mechanism	for	the	managers’	decision-making	and	behaviour,	rather	than	a	positive	difference	in	role	type.		For	example,	possessing	managerial	knowledge	of	the	hospital	and	local	network	was	essential	for	managerial	as	opposed	to	clinical	decisions,	but	this	was	underplayed.		Distinguishing	themselves	as	not	clinical	demonstrates	how	the	members	of	the	surgeon	group	exerted	power	over	membership	of	their	group.		
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CoP	literature	predicts	that	existing	members	create	the	knowledge	and	group	norms	that	make	membership	possible	or	not.			
5.4.9.1 Developing	meaning	for	the	group		Groups	of	surgeons	appeared	to	have	the	power	to	renegotiate	meaning	and	to	construct	new	meanings	for	their	group	as	circumstances	changed.		In	site	C,	the	‘innovative	insider	surgeons’	became	‘outsider	mavericks’	of	practice	when	their	newly	introduced,	yet	unproven,	implant	technologies	had	negative	outcomes	for	patients	in	subsequent	years.		It	was	important	to	understand	the	overarching	group	identity	for	each	group,	and	how	this	related	to	surgeons’	knowledge	and	learning	as	a	group.			Surgeons	in	site	A	negotiated	their	group	identity	and	were	keen	to	demonstrate	that	they	performed	evidence-based	practice.		They	appeared	to	be	responsible	for	defining	the	norms	and	characterising	meaning	for	the	group	by	implementing	the	findings	of	their	own	RCTs	into	their	clinical	practice.		This	message	came	across	in	many	of	the	surgeon	interviews	I	conducted	in	site	A.		The	differences	between	group	meanings	were	evident	when	I	investigated	the	definition	and	meaning	attached	to	EBM	and	the	conduct	of	RCTs	for	surgeons	working	at	sites	A	and	C.				Through	observation,	I	learned	that	site	A	took	a	“pragmatic	view	of	RCTs”	and	implemented	‘what	worked’	for	their	context	(OBS	notes	A	gen).		This	differed	from	the	academic	surgeon	group	in	site	C,	who	conducted	research	which	was	not	directly	transferable	into	their	practice.		Interestingly,	the	surgeons	working	in	site	C	tended	to	define	EBM	as	the	use	of	ODEP	rated	implants	in	practice.		This	suggested	a	national	view	of	evidence,	rather	than	the	contextual	view	which	site	A	took.		Although	both	groups	suggested	they	practiced	EBM,	meanings	differed	and	therefore	the	knowledge	between	the	groups	might	not	be	easily	mobilised.		There	was	a	variety	of	responses	from	the	surgeon	groups	making	a	distinction	between	a	“pragmatic”	(INT	C	218008),	an	“evidence-based”	
(INT	C	190004)	and	a	“research	attached	to	clinical	work”	(INT	C	190003)	approach	to	practice.		
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5.4.9.2 Central	and	periphery	membership	in	groups		The	notion	of	centre	and	periphery	membership	in	groups	seems	logical	in	theory.		In	practice,	the	groups	I	observed	did	not	appear	to	have	a	tangible	structure	which	could	be	designated	as	the	periphery	or	the	centre.		For	example,	particular	surgeons	in	the	three	sites	did	not	physically	sit	on	the	periphery	at	group	meetings.		However,	my	observations	of	the	discussions	that	took	place	in	the	hospitals	revealed	who	were	the	core	group	members.		It	appeared	that	certain	surgeons	“spoke	more	often”	and	it	looked	as	though	their	“opinions	were	
valued	by	others”	in	the	group,	because	they	were	not	interrupted	or	argued	against	(OBS	notes	site	TPM).				Group	membership	for	the	surgeons	might	not	necessarily	be	defined	by	the	position	of	the	group	members.		This	is	because	within	orthopaedic	surgery,	knowledge	is	a	closed	domain	and	there	is	an	objective	amount	of	learning	that	needs	to	take	place	for	someone	to	be	called	an	orthopaedic	surgeon.		Membership	of	the	group	evolved	over	time.		In	site	A,	a	new	consultant	was	able	to	learn	the	group	norms	to	move	from	his	position	on	the	periphery	to	full	participation	as	defined	by	other	members.		According	to	this	surgeon,	he	had	to	actively	take	part	in	the	trials	that	were	under	way	at	the	hospital	because	he	understood	that	this	type	of	work	was	important	to	the	group.			
	This	process	of	learning	the	principles	of	EBM	appeared	to	allow	this	surgeon	to	gain	access	to	a	group	by	developing	knowledge,	understanding	and	involvement	in	RCTs.		He	was	aware	of	the	specific	meanings	and	group	norms	that	helped	to	define	the	group	as	a	standalone	and	bounded	community	of	practitioners	which	required	members	to	conduct	RCTs	within	their	practice.		
5.4.10 CoP	use	of	knowledge	for	decision-making	The	literature	described	in	Chapter	2	suggests	that	communities	form	so	that	knowledge	can	be	exchanged	between	group	members.		The	surgeon	group	at	site	A	had	recently	decided	to	change	the	method	of	fixing	an	orthopaedic	implant	based	on	the	results	of	one	of	its	key	members’	clinical	trials.	According	to	conversations	with	the	surgeons,	this	did	not	involve	changes	to	the	clinical	pathway	or	involvement	of	the	management	team.		Instead,	as	a	community	they	
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decided	to	perform	a	technique	in	a	different	way,	and	then	enacted	that	decision.		This	change	in	practice	was	acceptable	within	the	community	because	the	group	had	a	shared	understanding	of	what	the	results	of	the	RCTs	meant	for	practice.		In	addition	to	professional	clinical	education	and	training,	I	observed	various	knowledge	skills	that	appeared	to	be	important	for	a	wider	definition	of	professional	orthopaedic	practice.		They	included	the	technical	skills	of	surgery,	i.e.,	how	to	perform	a	hip	replacement,	but	also	implicit	knowledge	that	enabled	surgeons	to	function	within	the	hospital	organisation	that	has	rules,	processes	and	professional	hierarchies.			However,	knowing	what	knowledge	is	accepted	might	become	problematic	when	the	epistemic	cultures	between	different	groups	and	different	hospitals	do	not	align.		Time	spent	at	the	three	hospitals	revealed	that	the	surgeons	at	site	A	appeared	to	learn,	share	and	produce	knowledge	related	to	EBM,	whereas	surgeons	in	site	B	seemed	to	focus	on	operational	efficiency	and	throughput.		The	surgeons	at	site	B	tended	to	emphasise	learning	and	knowledge	production	to	make	their	theatres	and	surgical	list	planning	more	efficient.		This	knowledge	was	grounded	in	evidence	from	the	group’s	practice	and	examination	of	data	at	the	hospital	level,	not	from	academic	institutions	and	multi-centre	RCTs.			Across	the	three	sites,	I	sought	to	understand	how	knowledge	and	evidence	was	produced	through	negotiation	amongst	surgical	colleagues.		Over	time,	it	appeared	that	some	surgeons	regarded	evidence	as	the	best	way	to	do	things	in	their	context	(site	C).		Others	privileged	knowledge	produced	over	time,	as	the	group	solved	problems	of	orthopaedic	practice	through	clinical	trials	(site	A).		Surgeons	at	site	B	appeared	to	concentrate	their	efforts	on	improving	service	provision,	efficiency	and	local	learning,	for	example	they	created	a	triage	service	and	had	a	project	underway	to	improve	the	post-surgery	pathway.		These	types	of	improvement	activity	were	not	observed	in	the	other	hospitals	to	the	same	extent.		In	all	three	sites,	group	norms	appeared	to	mutually	reinforce	the	‘correct’	sources	of	evidence,	knowledge,	interaction	and	experiences	for	the	
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group.		These	patterns	of	behaviour	varied	considerably	and	reflect	manifestations	of	the	underlying	systems	of	meaning	and	practice	held	by	each	of	the	CoP.		
5.4.10.1 Sustaining	CoP	and	membership	to	groups	CoP	consist	of,	and	depend	on,	the	membership	of	its	members	to	survive.			What	was	important	for	the	surgeon	groups	was	that	once	the	CoP	was	established	in	their	hospital,	its	members	were	responsible	for	continually	reproducing	it	in	order	to	prevent	it	from	disappearing.		This	was	particularly	apparent	in	site	C,	where	surgeons	would	often	not	make	important	group	decisions	without	consultation	with	their	peers	at	the	team	meeting	(OBS	notes	
site	C	gen).			Within	each	hospital,	more	than	one	CoP	existed,	and	it	became	obvious	over	the	course	of	the	observation	and	studying	as	to	which	surgeons	belonged	to	which	group.		For	example,	at	site	A	two	CoPs	had	evolved,	one	senior	member	of	a	CoP	would	openly	mock	the	‘leader’	and	the	principles	of	the	other.		Junior	surgeons	in	site	B	reported	feeling	uncomfortable	when	they	worked	alongside	surgeons	from	the	other	CoP.		The	distinction	in	this	group	was	a	strong	reporting	hierarchy	as	the	norm,	compared	to	a	flatter	structure	in	the	opposing	CoP.		The	surgeon	quoted	below	commented	on	the	accepted	personality	styles	and	behaviours	within	one	CoP:			
“A	couple	of	personalities	that	you	think,	you	know	maybe	not,	yes.		There	are	the	three	specialists	
and	maybe	one	of	them	I	would	choose	not	to	go	to	whereas	the	other	two	I	wouldn’t	have	a	
problem	with	at	all	but	other	than	that	I	still	wouldn’t,	you	know,	he’s	a	good	surgeon.	It’s	just	his	
personality.	But	everybody	throws	their	toys	out	the	pram	at	some	point”.	(INT	C	31013)	
5.4.10.2 Outsiders	and	movement	within	CoP	Across	all	the	CoP	that	I	observed,	the	members	of	the	group	appeared	to	create	the	norms	that	had	to	be	learned	and	accepted	by	outsiders	to	establish	their	legitimate	access.		For	example,	in	site	A,	these	norms	were	an	interest	in	EBM	and	the	application	of	research	in	clinical	practice.		Surgeons	were	aware	of	the	requirements	for	membership	and	strived	to	become	insiders.				
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There	were	strong	goals	for	the	learners	who	sat	on	the	periphery,	as	they	had	to	develop	an	initial	view	of	what	each	CoP	stood	for	and	what	could	be	gained	by	joining.		On	the	other	hand,	it	appeared	that	an	awareness	of	what	knowledge	needed	to	be	learned	could	discourage	some	surgeons	from	aligning	to	a	CoP	and	inspired	them	to	look	elsewhere.		In	the	case	below,	a	surgeon	focused	her	efforts	on	medical	education	to	legitimise	herself	with	another	respectable	group	within	the	department,	using	her	phrase	she	“got	to	sell	myself	as	teaching”:			
“But	this	was	the	perfect	job,	because	I’m	not	researchy	at	all.	I	was	always	told	that	would	be	a	bad	
thing.	No,	when	you	sell	yourself	as	a	consultant,	you’ve	got	to	sell	yourself	as	something…	so	I	got	to	
sell	myself	as	teaching.	I	love	it,	it’s	good.”	(INT	C	218005)			According	to	the	literature,	the	aim	of	any	outsider	of	a	CoP	is	to	become	a	respected	group	member	who	then	has	authority	within	the	group.		In	my	study,	it	appeared	that	the	surgeons	achieved	this	through	a	process	of	legitimate	peripherality	which	involved	them	learning	through	participation,	immersing	themselves	in	the	norms	and	culture	of	the	clinical	practice	of	the	hospital.				Group	norms	and	accepted	knowledge	can	change	over	time	as	different	individuals	move	from	the	periphery	to	the	centre.		New	knowledge	is	allowed	to	move	into	the	group	and	old	knowledge	decreases	and	becomes	less	important,	as	is	the	case	with	the	increasing	importance	attached	to	NICE	guidance.		Knowledge	was	important	in	becoming	part	of	the	CoP,	but	a	greater	appreciation	of	the	values	of	participation	in	the	community	appeared	to	develop	from	the	surgeon	becoming	a	part	of	the	group.			During	the	observations,	I	sensed	that	the	surgeons	attempted	to	maintain	a	strong	sense	of	individuality,	but	that	this	was	coupled	with	a	need	to	feel	part	of	a	powerful	clinical	group.		During	my	period	of	data	collection	I	did	not	encounter	any	surgeon	who	actively	wanted	to	be	a	lone	worker,	on	the	outside	of	their	community.		The	surgeons	appeared	to	gain	personal	and	professional	advantages	from	group	membership.			
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In	interviews,	surgeons	revealed	that	they	would	commit	time	and	effort,	and	be	willing	to	take	more	responsibility	for	their	group	tasks.		As	their	membership	roles	increased,	it	appeared	that	they	were	able	to	achieve	a	greater	sense	of	identity	within	the	group.		My	findings	suggest	that	the	development	of	surgeon	group	identity	was	intrinsically	linked	to	career	pathways,	and	their	ability	to	succeed	within	the	wider	profession.		There	was	an	inherent	importance	attached	to	being	on	the	inside	of	a	CoP;	the	sense	of	membership	was	essential.		
5.4.10.3 Variation	from	CoP	A	key	feature	was	that	learning	within	CoP	was	situated,	i.e.,	context-dependent.		Knowledge	and	evidence	could	not	be	considered	in	isolation,	manipulated	in	subjective	terms	or	analysed	as	separate	from	the	social	relationships	that	occurred	within	the	three	hospitals.		The	use	of	evidence	and	the	variation	that	played	out	between	the	groups	needs	to	be	considered	in	the	context	of	the	group	situation.		Therefore,	learning	and	knowledge	was	a	characteristic	of	the	community	within	which	it	developed.		This	might	help	to	explain	why	the	CoP	in	each	hospital	appeared	to	demonstrate	different	behaviours,	practices	and	methods	for	decision-making	in	hip	replacement.			Each	CoP	could	be	viewed	as	providing	the	surgeon	group	with	an	intrinsic	condition	for	the	existence	of	their	knowledge.		In	essence,	it	enabled	the	individuals	and	groups	to	distinguish	what	they	did	as	correct	and	made	sense	for	them.		Training	was	a	way	of	connecting	with	the	traditional	established	practice	of	the	other	surgeons	in	the	hospital	and	participating	in	the	social	life	of	the	CoP.		Groups	of	surgeons	appeared	to	share	an	understanding	of	what	they	were	doing	and	what	that	meant	for	their	practice	and	for	their	communities.		This	understanding	and	meaning	varied	between	my	case	studies	and	will	be	likely	to	be	different	in	different	hospitals,	cities,	regions	or	countries.		The	variation	I	observed	might	not	be	considered	‘right’	or	‘wrong’,	but	instead	reflected	norms	for	each	CoP.		
5.5 	Cross-case	analysis:	Groups		The	three	hospital	sites	varied	in	the	group-level	factors	across	their	different	CoP,	as	shown	in	Table	11.		
		 157	
	
Table	11.		Overview	of	the	group	level	factors	by	hospital	
Theme	features	 Site	A	 Site	B	 Site	C	Characteristics	and	professional	norms		 EBM	and	innovation		 Quality	improvement,	efficiency	and	financial	
savings		
Group	decision	making	
and	sharing	local	best	
practice		Professional	societies	and	networks			
Strong	influence	of	
clinical	academic	
institutions	in	the	field	
who	conduct	research	
Professional	societies,	in	
particular	the	BOA		
Professional	societies,	
particularly	the	
specialist	hip	societies		
Situational	learning	and	mentors		
Learning	was	through	
the	academic	training	
programme	that	all	
juniors	underwent	to	
some	extent.	Mentors	
were	the	Principle	
Investigators	of	the	trials	
at	the	site		
Learning	differed	across	
the	sites	and	juniors	had	
to	get	used	to	the	
different	methods	and	
systems	across	the	sites,	
plus	the	differing	
personality	styles	in	
each	group		
Learning	through	doing	
‘what	we	do’.	
Traditional	
apprenticeship-style	
training	to	establish	the	
local	practice	of	the	site		
Leading	lights	and	opinion	leaders			
Strong	influence	of	
clinical	academic	leaders	
who	conduct	and	publish	
high	quality	research	
Editors	of	leading	
orthopaedic	journals	
and	chair	of	the	BOA	
Chairs	of	the	
professional	society	and	
local	opinion	leaders	
Representatives	from	implant	manufacturing	companies		
Present	but	controlled.	
One	company	
representative	at	all	
times		
Mixed	across	sites.	
Access	was	allowed	but	
attempts	by	
management	to	control	
it	
Open	access,	no	
restriction	placed	on	
groups	in	terms	of	
company	access	or	
implant	selection	Legitimate	peripheral	participation		 Based	around	education	and	training	in	EBM	and	
involvement	in	research	
under	way	at	the	site		
Linked	to	each	location.	
However,	there	was	a	
strong	professional	
hierarchy	at	both	sites,	
hence	time	in	post	was	
associated	to	
participation	in	the	
groups	
Constructed	through	the	
‘old	boys’	network.	Only	
surgeons	who	aligned	to	
and	followed	the	norms	
were	allowed	into	the	
group		
CoP		 Two:	one	intrinsically	
linked	to	pragmatic	EBM,	
the	other	focused	on	
innovation	and	driving	
the	specialty	forward	
Two:	Conflicting	across	
sites	with	distinct	norms	
in	each		
One,	strong	group	
within	senior	surgeons.	
Tight	group	norms	
focused	on	teamwork	
and	sharing			
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5.6 	Summary	of	the	theme	The	key	message	in	this	theme	is	that	the	decision-making	and	behaviour	of	orthopaedic	professionals	was	inherently	linked,	and	conceivably	governed	by	their	group	membership.		The	distinct	groups	I	observed	resulted	from	different	behavioural	and	procedural	incentives	or	motivators	enacted	at	each	of	the	three	sites.		These	incentives	included	recognising	the	importance	of	research	in	practice,	the	weight	attached	to	implant	manufacturer	representatives,	maintaining	a	physical	position	within	a	set	location,	improving	separated	services,	and	upholding	the	strong	bonds	and	relationships	between	colleagues	to	ensure	effective	function.			Decision-making	and	practice	were	also	governed	by	the	norms	within	the	orthopaedic	surgeon	profession	as	a	whole.		These	wider	norms	created	a	sense	of	standard	practice	for	all	orthopaedic	surgeons.		However,	local	group	norms	appeared	to	be	essential	in	driving	routine	behaviour	at	each	hospital.		Determining	what	it	means	to	be	an	orthopaedic	surgeon	at	each	of	the	different	sites	A,	B	and	C	was	essential	for	my	study.		The	inherent	granularity	between	groups	of	surgeons	might	produce	variation	in	practice	when	each	is	compared	to	the	entire	profession.		While	we	may	depend	on	the	general	professional	norms	of	orthopaedics	to	constrain	some	deviant	decision-making	behaviour,	the	findings	presented	in	this	theme	imply	that	this	is	not	always	the	case.		Membership	of	professional	bodies	did	not	appear	to	be	able	to	ensure	the	success	of	established	ideals	such	as	the	practice	of	EBM.			The	BOA	states	that	their	membership	supports	orthopaedic	surgeons	to	focus	on	excellence	through	professional	practice,	training,	education	and	research.		The	findings	presented	here	have	suggested	that	it	is	the	individual	community	of	practitioners	which	decides	which	of	these	aims,	if	any,	they	emphasise	in	their	practice.		My	findings	suggest	that	even	highly	professionalised	individuals	may	make	decisions	based	on	their	own	egocentric	motives	rather	than	by	the	standards	of	their	professional	group.			However,	orthopaedic	surgeons	on	the	whole	did	not	appear	to	want	to	deviate	
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from	their	group	norms	and	felt	uncomfortable	doing	so.		Whether	the	recommendations	from	external	organisations	such	as	NICE	aligned	to	the	group	norms	seemed	largely	irrelevant	in	the	day-to-day	practice	of	orthopaedic	surgery.		Instead,	group	membership	and	alignment	of	practice	to	the	norms	of	the	other	members	of	their	group	were	vitally	important.		In	the	last	chapter	I	described	different	individual	characteristics.		In	this	chapter,	I	found	that	these	were	subsumed	by	the	importance	of	the	characteristics	of	the	groups,	the	LPP	and	the	CoP,	and	a	sense	of	belonging.		In	the	next	chapter,	I	investigate	orthopaedic	surgical	practice	at	the	next	level	–	the	organisational	level.				 	
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6 Results	3:	Knowledge,	Capacity	and	Contingency	in	
Organisations		
6.1 Introduction		This	theme	reflects	the	organisational	and	operational	issues	including	the	contingencies	and	constraints	in	the	sites	which	could	act	as	a	source	of	variation	in	the	decisions	made	within	the	hospitals,	and	that	acted	upon	the	three	organisations.		These	issues	represent	an	important	component	of	clinical	decision-making	within	orthopaedics	as	they	underpinned	the	routines	and	capabilities	of	practice	at	each	site,	i.e.,	the	scope	of	work	conducted.		Contingencies	and	constraints	included	the	financial	status	of	the	hospital,	pressure	to	reduce	costs,	staffing	issues,	service	planning	e.g.,	in	theatres,	and	the	need	to	improve	hospital	processes.		The	external	constraints	that	act	at	the	national	level	also	appeared	to	be	a	significant	influencer	on	practice,	such	as	the	large-scale	efficiency	savings.		These	are	described	in	the	next	results	chapter	(Chapter	7).		Of	particular	importance	for	the	organisational	level	of	analysis	was	the	influence	of	different	professional	hierarchies,	and	the	extent	to	which	individuals	working	in	each	hospital	were	socialised	into	the	norms	of	the	organisation.		In	this	section,	I	will	use	examples	to	highlight	how	the	organisational	culture,	and	capacity	for	knowledge	and	evidence	sharing,	influenced	the	practice	of	orthopaedic	surgery	and	clinical	decision-making	across	the	three	hospitals.			
6.2 Defining	concepts	and	determining	meaning	for	this	
chapter		Reports	from	the	three	hospitals	and	distinct	professional	groups	in	my	study	(the	managers,	clinicians	and	non-clinical	administrators)	illustrate	the	significance	of	the	assumed	definition	of	‘evidence’	and	the	use	of	evidence	in	orthopaedics.		There	was	a	mismatch	in	meanings	around	this	concept.		It	was	a	source	of	misunderstanding	and	sometimes	conflict	among	participants	and	professional	groups	in	the	three	organisations.		‘Evidence’	and	‘guidelines’	in	the	
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organisation,	and	who	was	considered	to	be	the	‘manager’	or	‘governing	body’,	were	the	concept	definitions	which	varied	most	across	and	within	the	sites.		During	the	interviews,	I	attempted	to	clarify	the	understanding	of	participants	regarding	the	concept	being	used.			‘Evidence’	in	health	and	‘knowledge	mobilisation’	are	contested	concepts,	as	illustrated	and	discussed	in	the	literature	review	(Chapters	2).		Their	meanings	varied	across	time	and	location.		This	was	certainly	the	case	in	my	findings	which	revealed	that	‘evidence’	could	encompass	everything	from	personal	experience	and	legacy	routines	within	the	hospital,	to	guidelines	produced	by	NICE.		The	meanings	attached	to	the	term	‘guidelines’	were	equally	ambiguous	as	they	depended	on	whose	guidelines,	and	therefore	whose	knowledge	was	privileged	by	the	organisation	and	its	workforce.		Throughout	my	empirical	work,	reference	was	made	to	NICE	guidelines,	guidelines	from	professional	societies	such	as	the	BOA,	internal	hospital	guidelines	and	specific	orthopaedic	department	guidelines.		Definitions	of	the	‘manager’	and	‘governing	body’	appeared	to	differ	according	to	the	cultural	norms	of	the	hospital.		They	ultimately	reflected	who	appeared	to	be	responsible	for	decision-making,	contingent	upon	which	individual(s)	or	organisation	held	the	position	of	power	within	each	Trust.		This	power	and	control	could	also	reside	outside	the	hospital,	for	example	with	the	local	CCG.			This	variability	in	concepts	and	meanings	reflected	some	of	the	implicit	assumptions	which	represent	the	organisational	knowledge	present	in	each	hospital	case	study.		Within	each	site,	these	assumptions	consisted	of	the	level	of	organisational	knowledge	of	staff,	their	position	within	the	hospital,	and	the	legacy	knowledge	which	appeared	to	belong	to	the	organisation	rather	than	to	the	people	who	worked	there.		Organisational	knowledge	appeared	to	reflect	knowledge	of	‘the	way	we	do	things	around	here’	and	appeared	to	have	substantial	sticking	power	within	the	Trusts.		This	type	of	knowledge	replicated	shared	customs	and	systems	of	the	hospital	staff	which	could	be	accessed	when	attempting	to	make	sense	of	organisational	functions,	to	understand	situations	and	circumstances	in	similar	and	characteristic	ways.	
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6.3 Hospital	strategy,	external	demands	and	environmental	
pressures		During	the	whole	period	of	data	collection,	it	was	difficult	to	examine	organisational	knowledge.		The	processes	at	work	were	highly	complex	and	changeable.		The	three	hospital	cases	appeared	to	construct	and	use	organisational	knowledge	in	a	variety	of	ways.		The	approach	they	chose	depended	on	which	type	of	organisational	knowledge	was	privileged,	how	the	Trusts	defined	strategy,	and	the	methods	(if	any)	they	used	to	perform	knowledge	mobilisation.		The	three	hospital	strategies	differed	in	their	organisational	focus,	from	personalisation	of	care,	to	innovation,	and	sustainability	for	the	future:		
“Provide	safe,	effective	and	personalised	care	
	
Improve	the	quality	of	care	through	innovation	to	deliver	improved	services	
	
To	make	a	difference	so	that	services	are	appropriate	in	the	future”	
(Doc	analy	Strategy	A	B	C.	NB	the	exact	text	was	changed	to	protect	hospital	identity)			Through	observations	of	day-to-day	practice	at	the	three	hospitals,	it	became	apparent	which	type	of	organisational	knowledge	tended	to	be	privileged.		Site	A	appeared	to	emphasise	biomedical	and	clinical	research	knowledge	and	therefore	aligned	organisational	processes	towards	EBM	and	best	practice.		Site	B	concentrated	its	efforts	on	improving	the	hospital	processes	and	achieving	efficiency	and	cost	savings.		Site	B	appeared	to	favour	managerial	knowledge	and	focused	efforts	on	the	achievement	of	organisational	outcomes,	e.g.,	reducing	their	financial	deficit.		Site	C	seemed	to	be	motivated	by	the	attainment	of	government	targets	and	quality	standards	set	out	by	national	bodies	including	NICE.		However,	the	clinical	staff	differed	at	site	C	as	they	appeared	to	privilege	knowledge	of	best	practice	at	a	more	concentrated	local	rather	than	national	level.		This	comparison	can	be	seen	in	the	two	interview	excerpts	below,	the	surgeon	at	site	A	states	that	“research	as	intricately	related”	to	work,	whereas	the	
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surgeon	from	site	C	revealed	that	work	to	map	local	services	needed	to	be	conducted	before	NICE	guidance	could	be	tackled:	
	
“Then	they	(the	board)	see	research	as	intricately	related	to	what	they	want	to	do	and	that’s	partly	
because	it	helps	improve	patient	outcomes	and	save	money	sometimes	with	cost	effectiveness	and	
stuff	and	partly	because	research,	this	whole	prestige	thing,	so	university	hospital	needs	to	be	doing	
…”	(INT	C	218008)		
“And	so	I	was	sort	of	working	on	the	governance	plan,	so	half	the	role	was	that	and	then	half	of	it	
was	working	on	NICE	guidance.		But	it	soon	became	clear	that	there	was	just	so	much	work	to	do	
around	NICE	in	terms	of	just	mapping	local	services.	Services	were	so	different,	you	know,	just	a	few	
miles	down	the	road,	that	just	having	a	sense	of	whether	we’re	compliant	or	not	compared	to	others	
was	a	massive	undertaking.”	(INT	M	19009)			The	strategy	and	processes	in	the	three	organisations	were	prone	to	change	depending	on	the	external	demands,	institutional	pressures	and	environmental	incentives	acting	on	the	organisation.		The	presence	of	an	organisational	strategy	did	not	appear	to	guarantee	that	it	would	be	used,	or	that	it	could	replace	the	entrenched	organisational	knowledge.		This	might	be	because	the	latter	guided	everyday	decision-making	within	the	sites,	and	the	two	existed	in	parallel.			An	organistion	can	be	defined	as	having	an	“articulated	purpose”	which	has	an	“established	mechanism”	to	achieve	(Miles	et	al,	1978).		In	other	words,	an	organisation	states	what	it	wants	to	be	through	its	vision	or	mission	statement,	and	what	it	will	do	to	get	there.		Healthcare	organisations	located	within	the	UK	public	sector	differ	slightly,	because	the	organisation	and	those	in	charge	may	not	always	be	responsible	for	establishing	the	articulated	purpose	or	goals.		Instead	local	or	national	policy-makers,	governing	bodies,	or	even	the	public,	may	directly	or	indirectly	set	the	goals.		The	three	hospitals	in	this	study	appeared	to	be	engaged	in	an	ongoing	process	of	questioning,	verifying	and	redefining	their	purpose,	depending	on	the	external	demands	being	placed	on	them	by	others.		These	others	extended	from	middle	management	right	up	to	government	level	decision-makers.		The	staff	at	each	of	the	organisations	had	to	constantly	modify	and	refine	their	structures	and	processes	to	meet	the	requests	set	by	others.		Sometimes	staff	had	a	sufficient	notice	period	to	make	changes,	as	
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in	the	case	below	when	the	local	CCG	decided	to	align	payment	structures	to	NICE	quality	standards:			
“At	the	time,	probably	three	years	ago	when	it	was	all	kicking	off,	I	went	round	quite	a	number	of	
bits	of	the	organisation	and	said,	“any	minute	now	we’re	going	to	have	to	really,	really	demonstrate	
that	we’re	compliant	with	NICE	Quality	Standards	because	we	won’t	get	any	money	if	we	don’t.”	
(INT	M	37003)		More	often,	I	observed	an	impending	change	happen	with	little	notice.		This	appeared	to	be	due	to	environmental	pressures	acting	on	the	hospital.		During	my	period	of	observation	at	Site	A,	the	organisation	had	to	cancel	or	relocate	all	elective	operations	to	meet	the	increased	demand	for	emergency	treatments.		This	was	not	part	of	their	organisational	strategy,	and	was	not	usual	practice.		At	the	time	it	caused	a	lot	of	upheaval	for	the	orthopaedic	department	who	had	scheduled	services	for	the	coming	weeks.		The	external	environmental	pressures	acting	on	the	hospital	were	an	unfortunate	consequence	of	increased	demand,	which	could	not	be	met	with	the	existing	resources	of	the	hospital.		Circumstances	like	this	had	to	be	reported	to	NHS	England	in	daily	situation	reports,	and	staff	reported	these	as	a	source	of	external	pressure	for	the	organisation.		The	guidance	for	completing	the	reports	state	that:		
	
“Delaying	ambulances	outside	A&E	as	a	result	of	a	temporary	mismatch	between	A&E/hospital	
capacity	and	numbers	of	elective/emergency	patients	arriving	is	not	acceptable,	and	that	hospitals	
should	implement	escalation	plans	including	cancelling	routine	operations.”	
(Doc	analy	DSIT	Guidance	2015)			In	addition	to	this,	the	orthopaedic	departments	had	to	report	on	the	number	of	cancelled	elective	operations	each	day	and	within	a	24-hour	period.		This	was	problematic	for	the	departmental	managers	who	described	constantly	“juggling	
everything…	from	staff	and	theatres…to	patients”	to	meet	the	ideal	target	of	zero	cancellations	(OBS	notes	site	B).		The	department	manager	(site	B)	provided	an	insightful	description	of	the	added	pressure	within	the	departments	which	stemmed	from	the	financial	penalties	of	cancellations.		It	reveals	how	clinical	activity	has	to	be	weighed	up	and	balanced	against	the	risk	of	being	“fined”:		
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“I’m	going	to	go,	“Okay.”		You	know,	“You	just	phone	me	and	say,	‘Look,	this	patient	didn’t	stop	their	
stuff	(anti-coagulants),	I’m	cancelling	the	case’.”	Fine.	You	know,	and	then	there	was	somebody	else	
said,	“Well	they	could	have	proceeded	with	that,	we	will	be	fined”	the	last	thing	anybody	should	be	
put	in	a	position	is	where	they’re	being	challenged	around	their	clinical	practice	by	somebody	who	
is	not	clinical	and	also	feeling	under	pressure	to	do	something	they’re	not	comfortable	with,	because	
if	that	goes...I’ve	already	said	it,	if	that	goes	wrong	I’ll	get	a	rap	on	the	knuckles	for	it.”	(INT	M	
37004)	
6.3.1 Organisational	contingencies	in	orthopaedic	services		There	was	a	constant	struggle	to	achieve	a	balance	in	service	delivery,	whether	that	was	balancing	clinical	and	managerial	needs	or	balancing	financial	pressure	with	the	resources	available.		This	balancing	appeared	to	be	an	ongoing	task	across	hospitals,	not	just	the	result	of	particularly	busy	periods.		
6.3.2 Internal	pressure	and	external	intervention		The	dynamic	process	of	adjusting	to	external	environmental	pressures	and	uncertainty,	whilst	managing	the	internal	institutional	interdependencies	was	complex	and	required	more	than	organisational	knowledge	to	resolve.		Contingent	pressures	were	clearly	present	in	the	language	used	during	meetings	within	the	hospitals,	as	highlighted	in	the	field	note	below:			
“Terms	such	as	“firefighting”	and	having	“reactive	services”	were	used	in	the	management	meeting	
to	describe	the	process	of	decision-making.”	(OBS	notes	CCG	site	3).			Sometimes	the	unscientific	approach	of	“suck	it	and	see”	was	taken	when	decision-makers	decided	to	try	something	new	to	discover	whether	it	might	be	successful	(OBS	notes	site	C	gen).		Although	this	contradicts	the	goals	of	EBM,	it	appeared	that	sometimes	the	practice-based	knowledge	of	‘what	works’	or	‘what	might	work’	was	all	that	was	available	to	the	decision-makers	because	of	the	complexity	of	the	context.		In	the	delivery	of	orthopaedic	services	across	the	three	sites,	I	observed	countless	instances	of	decision-making	when	tangible	evidence	and	knowledge	appeared	to	be	absent.		A	senior	manager	describes	this	flexible	approach	below,	and	uses	the	phrase	“well	you	can	do	it	if	you	want”	in	relation	to	NICE	guidelines:		
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“Yeah,	I	mean,	we	just	have	a	table	of...	a	table	against	the	recommendations	and	they	just	say,	“We	
do	do	this,	we	don’t	do	that.”		We	don’t	have	a	heavy	follow-up	‘culture’,	if	you	like,	in	terms	of	
whether	they’re	going	to	do	these	things	or	not.		Yeah.		But	when	you	just	say,	“Well	you	can	do	it	if	
you	want,”	it	adds	to	the	evidence	‘library’,	if	you	like,	doesn’t	it,	but	–	what	it	means?,	yeah.”	(INT	M	
37003)		However,	not	all	staff	found	such	a	flexible	environment	easy	to	work	in.		A	senior	nurse	described	to	me	the	difficulty	he	had	planning	services	without	sufficient	“quality	data”	to	make	decisions	about	a	new	service	(INT	C	37016).		Across	the	three	sites	it	was	important	to	examine	the	complexities	of	adjusting	to	the	internal	pressures	of	external	intervention,	for	example	the	release	of	a	new	piece	of	NICE	guidance.		I	searched	for	patterns	in	the	behaviour	of	the	organisation	and	the	workforce,	such	as	how	knowledge	was	spread	or	not	spread.		The	movement	of	knowledge	appeared	to	be	particularly	problematic.		For	example,	guidance	would	come	directly	from	NICE	through	update	emails	to	named	individuals	in	each	site;	however,	who	they	were	directed	to	and	whether	they	were	read	and	actioned	was	locally	dependent	(OBS	notes	site	B	gen).		The	quote	below	describes	the	non-spread	of	NICE	guidelines	in	site	B.		This	manager	provides	various	explanations	as	to	why	knowledge	mobilsation	failed	to	occur,	including,	a	lack	of	awareness,	insufficient	reporting	processes,	lack	of	follow	up	and	retroactive	planning	for	change.		He	refers	to	these	in	the	quote	as	“blockers	
to	implementation”:		
“	You	know,	where	is	this	information	sent	to,	because,	you	know,	governance	leads	are	great	but	
they’re	clinicians	and,	you	know,	they	do	have	other	jobs	to	do	and,	you	know,	it	might	not	
necessarily	always	be	the	top	thing	on	their	priority...	So	that’s	another	blocker	to	implementation,	
who	are	you	sending	the	guidelines	to?...	I	think	there	are	more	black	holes	like	this	here.	It	feels	like	
communication	seems	to	stop	somewhere…		“What,	there	are	NICE	guidelines?		No,	I	know	nothing	
about	them.”	That’s	an	organisational	issue.”	(INT	M	37004)	
6.3.3 Financial	pressures	in	orthopaedics			One	of	the	most	powerful	contingent	variables	found	across	all	three	hospitals	during	my	data	collection	was	the	apparent	influence	of	limited	organisational	finances.		This	was	coupled	with	the	expanding	cost	of,	and	demand	for,	orthopaedic	services	in	the	NHS.		This	issue	has	been	recognised	as	a	national	
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problem	for	the	UK,	as	indicated	in	the	abstract	from	a	BOA	report	released	during	my	empirical	work.		It	proposed	that	orthopaedics	services	are	in	a	“perfect	storm”	as	“demand	will	continue	to	outstrip	supply”:		
“Orthopaedic	referrals	from	GPs	to	secondary	care	providers	are	increasing	by	7-8%	per	annum	and	
show	no	signs	of	slowing…	trauma	and	orthopaedic	surgeons	make	up	33%	of	the	surgical	
workforce	and	are	responsible	for	25%	(rising	towards	26%)	of	all	surgical	interventions,	and	
further	demand	will	increase	this...	It	is	likely	that	the	number	of	hospitals	that	are	financially	
challenged	will	increase.	We	are	in	a	‘perfect	storm’	of	ever	rising	demand	and	financial	austerity.”	
(Doc	anlay	BOA	2015)		Hospitals	were	attempting	to	address	this	financial	austerity.		Every	site	I	visited	was	in	some	stage	of	a	‘rationalisation	process’	or	‘cost	improvement	scheme’,	in	which	the	orthopaedic	departments	were	expected	to	reduce	the	cost	of	service	delivery	whilst	maintaining	clinical	quality.		Orthopaedics	is	one	of	the	most	expensive	surgical	specialties,	alongside	cardiothoracic	surgery,	in	the	NHS	and	has	the	highest	number	of	consultant	surgeons	working	in	England	(RCS,	2014).	The	rationalisation	of	services	appeared	to	be	one	solution	to	the	supply	and	demand	problem.				My	observations	revealed	that	rationalisation	was	mainly	achieved	through	the	renegotiation	of	orthopaedic	implant	contracts	(site	A	and	B)	but	it	did	include	some	efficiency	savings	(site	B),	and	service	redesign	activity	(site	B	and	C).		Contingency	theory	is	useful	in	helping	to	demonstrate	some	of	the	associations	that	were	found	between	these	structural	and	contextual	variables.		In	site	C,	the	management	decided	to	close	protected	elective	orthopaedic	theatres	(structural)	to	streamline	costs	across	the	organisation	(contextual)	in	order	to	meet	the	financial	restrictions	established	by	Government	(OBS	notes	site	C	gen).			However,	contingency	theory	is	unable	to	explain	all	the	causal	connections	between	the	observed	context,	structure	and	behavioural	relationships	discovered	in	my	findings.		It	could	not	be	used	to	determine	whether	a	rationalisation	plan	to	achieve	financial	savings	would	work,	or	whether	the	approach	taken	by	site	A,	B	or	C	was	superior.		The	two	hospitals	that	had	
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completed	the	implant	rationalisation	process	(A	and	B)	were	able	to	provide	me	with	estimates	of	how	much	the	department	or	Trust	had	saved	through	their	improvement	programmes.		Managers	working	at	various	levels	within	the	two	hospitals	appear	to	suggest	that	relatively	large	savings	ranging	from	60k	to	500k	had	been	made	through	rationalisation	activities.		However,	these	figures	were	not	necessarily	tangible	savings	in	real	terms	which	could	be	invested	back	into	the	Trusts	(INT	M	37004).	
6.3.4 Variation	in	contingent	factors		The	variation	in	approaches	suggests	that	there	is	no	one	best	way	to	manage	an	organisation	and	achieve	success.		This	is	particularly	salient	in	healthcare	where	no	two	organisations	are	the	same.		The	three	sites	I	examined	had	overtly	different	approaches	in	how	they	functioned	as	organisations.		At	site	A	there	was	a	strong	managerial	presence	across	the	orthopaedic	department	and	surgeons	were	under	the	assumed	control	of	the	hospital	executive	and	clinical	director	(CD).		Reference	was	made	by	all	professional	groups	to	having	to	check	or	getting	things	“signed	off”	by	the	CD	(OBS	notes	site	A	gen).			Site	B	operated	as	two	separate	institutions	(B1	and	B2)	with	different	organisational	rules	and	norms.		Even	the	manager	responsible	for	both	departments	perceived	a	lack	of	control	over	the	department	where	he	was	not	physically	located.		Instead,	the	clinical	lead	or	the	most	senior	surgeon	appeared	to	take	on	the	role	of	manager	at	each	site	(OBS	notes	site	B	gen).		Similarly,	site	C	appeared	to	function	as	a	standalone	department	within	a	wider	organisation.		The	orthopaedic	department	here	was	essentially	in	a	separate	block	of	the	hospital,	and	management	was	based	elsewhere	on	site.		I	observed	that	this	physical	distance	contributed	to	the	two	professional	groups	not	interacting	
(OBS	notes	site	C	gen).		Findings	suggest	that	the	conditional	relationships	between	the	different	contingent	elements	of	the	organisation	and	how	these	fitted	together	within	the	organisational	structures	and	the	external	environment	were	important	for	the	success	or	failure	of	the	hospital.		Success	appeared	to	be	the	attainment	of	various	targets	that	were	mandated	and	monitored	by	Government.		These	may	
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not	necessarily	include	recommendations	for	services,	such	as	those	included	in	NICE	guidelines.		What	worked	for	each	of	the	three	hospitals	appeared	to	be	dependent	on	their	practice	context.			
6.3.5 Processes	of	organisational	change		Across	the	three	sites,	it	was	clear	that	the	organisational	contingencies	had	different	influences	across	the	varied	organisational	contexts.		Examining	them	as	an	outsider	provided	insight	and	understanding	of	the	levers	for	change	at	each	site.		For	example,	one	hospital	was	able	to	implement	the	new	clinical	guidance	for	hip	replacement	because	they	had	already	made	necessary	changes	to	routine	practice	through	research	and	established	protocols	(site	A),	whereas	others	appeared	to	struggle	to	make	notable	progress	because	guidelines	had	not	been	sent	to,	or	appraised	by,	the	department	manager	(site	B),	or	had	only	achieved	partial	implementation	due	to	the	apparently	different	priorities	and	jurisdiction	of	management	and	clinical	staff	(site	C).				My	interviews	and	observations	revealed	that	the	three	organisations	had	significantly	different	views	and	processes	for	implementing,	monitoring	and	governing	NICE	guidelines.		These	differences	might	have	contributed	to	the	variation	in	the	decision-making	practices	for	hip	replacement	across	the	sites.		I	have	included	three	detailed	descriptions	of	the	guideline	implementation	processes	in	Table	12	to	demonstrate	how	this	variation	played	out	in	practice.		 	
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Table	12.		Variation	in	NICE	guideline	implementation	processes	
Case	study	hospital		 NICE	implementation	processes	A	
(INT	A	
218015)	 “We	started	monitoring	NICE	implementation	in	the	trust	in	2011,	and	then	the	group	wasn’t	called	(name)	Group	at	that	time,	I’m	guessing	but	I	think	we	must	have	started	around	2012,	but	I’m	not	exactly	sure	about	that.	But	as	part	of	us	taking	on	that	project	
of	monitoring	NICE	guidance	implementation	then	a	group	was	formed	from	a	colleague	
of	mine	who’s	now	left.	Okay,	so,	when	NICE	issues	their	guidance,	they	issue	it	on	a	
monthly	basis,	so	it’s	always	the	fourth	Wednesday	of	the	month.	I’ve	gone	to	the	website,	
check	what	new	guidance	is	issued,	and	I	forward	a	list	of	that	guidance	to	(name)	who’s	
the	chair	of	(name)	Group,	and	(chair	name)	will	send	those	out.	He	will	look	at	the	
guidance	as	a	clinician,	for	him,	then,	it’s	easy	for	him	to	decide	which	specialty,	perhaps,	
he	might,	you	know,	colleagues	will	know	who	to	send	it	to,	and	he’ll	send	it	out	to	a	
relevant	lead.	TA’s	that’s	technology	appraisals,	go	to	(name).	She’s	our	high	cost	drugs	
pharmacist.	So	they’re	dealt	with	through	pharmacy	then,	because	TAs	are	pretty	much	
always	around	high	cost	drugs,	normally,	cancer,	cancer	drugs.	So	(name)	deals	with	those	
and	(chair	name)	deals	with	all	of	the	…	all	other	the	types	of	guidance.	So	they’ll	be	sent	
out	to	a	lead	who	then	we	hope	will	come	back	and	say,	yes,	I’ll	have	a	look	at	it.	I	mean,	
depending	on	which	it	is.	I	mean,	if	it’s	a	clinical	guideline,	public	health	guidance	or	
quality	standard,	there’s	recommendations	in	there,	and	normally	a	form	of	a	baseline	
assessment	with	the	recommendations	in.	It	makes	it	easier	for	them	to	fill	out	and,	sort	of,	
indicate	if	we’re	compliant	or	not.”			B	
(INT	A	
119009)	 “It’s	kind	of	grown	and	changed	over	the	years	so...	We	have	the	NICE	meeting	which	is	bi-monthly.	Any	new	guidance	that	has	come	out,	there	has	to	be	some	kind	of	response.	Well	there	was	some	new	guidance	this	time,	the	medicines	optimisation	is	new	guidance.	What	
the	process	is,	is	that	when	you	guidance	comes	out	and	this	group	says	that	it’s	relevant	
then	we	send	out	a	questionnaire	to	each	of	the	directorates.	So	I	send	this	out	to	the	
General	Manager	and	then	they	will	send	it	to	the	most	appropriate	person	in	that	
directorate.	Now,	this	is	one	of	the	processes	that	I’m	saying	that	we’ve	changed	over	the	
years.	Because	in	the	early	days	we’d	have	a	group	and	we’d	meet	and	we’d	discuss	if	we	
were	compliant	and	what	needed	to	happen;	what	we	do	now	is	send	this	questionnaire	
out,	and	we’ve	made	it	as	user-friendly	as	possible	so	everything...	I	don’t	know	whether	
I’ve	got	one	that	I	might	be	able	to	show	you.	We’ve	made	it	user-friendly	so	that	all	they	
have	to	do	is	tick	‘Yes’	and	‘No’.”			C	
(INT	A	
198002)	 “Right,	so	I	think	probably	this	standard	operating	procedure	would	explain	things	fairly	well.	Horizon	scanning,	I	mean,	that	basically	is	getting	it	from	the	NICE	website,	the	pre-releases,	and	also	the	commissioner	sends	things	through	but	the	NICE	website	is	always	
up	to	date.	I	actually	work	from	the	NICE	website	so	that’s	where	I	get	the	new	releases,	
but	I	understand	they	do	actually	email	my	colleague	with	new	releases	and	from	that	she	
disseminates	them.	So	I	very	much	still	work	from	the	website	and	don’t	rely	on	emails	that	
may	or	may	not	come	from	NICE	or	the	commissioner.	So	once	I	get	an	email,	then	I	email	
the	clinical	director	of	the	care	group	that	it	applies	to.	I	mean,	some	of	it	is	a	bit	trial	and	
error.	I	contact	those	people	to	ask,	you	know,	say,	for	example,	it’s	a	Gynae	piece	of	
guidance,	well,	I	would	know	that	but	if	I	didn’t	know	that	I	would	contact	the	CD	for	Obs	
and	Gynae	and	ask	them	to	nominate	a	lead	for	that	piece	of	guidance.	And	I	just	ask	them	
to	complete	that	(audit)…	So	whether	or	not	they	meet	the	standard	or	they’re	working	
towards	it,	evidence	and	that	comes	in	the	form	of	local	guidelines	or	just	saying	what	they	
do,	and	then	we	encourage	them	to	write	their	own	action	plan	and	this	is	what	they’re	not	
very	good	at	doing”					 	
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However,	I	found	conflict	in	the	data.		The	processes	described	in	Table	12	differed	compared	to	the	practice	I	actually	observed	in	the	organisations.		It	appeared	that	the	processes	attached	to	NICE	guidelines	and	governance	sat	with	managerial	and	administrative	staff,	not	with	clinical	staff.		Notes	from	my	observation	at	site	C	show	this	conflict,	demonstrating	that	clinical	staff	had	“never	seen”	the	organisation’s	NICE	process:	
	
“It	(NICE)	was	rarely	noted	as	an	influential	factor	in	the	day-to-day	activities	of	surgeons,	clinical	
and	non-clinical	staff	working	on	the	wards.	Staff	I	spoke	to	were	unaware	that	their	hospital	Trust	
had	a	NICE	process	unless	they	were	directly	involved	with	it.	Often	in	conversation	people	would	
say	things	like	“do	we	have	one?”	(a	process)	“I’ve	never	seen	it”.	This	was	concerning	as	it	appears	
that	a	lot	of	time	and	effort	goes	into	the	development	and	maintenance	of	these	processes	at	the	
Trusts.”	(OBS	notes	site	C	gen)		This	example	of	NICE	guideline	and	guidance	implementation	typifies	organisational	change	in	my	study.		The	three	hospitals	differed	in	their	approach	to	change	and	this	was	contingent	upon	their	social	environment	(who	held	power	to	make	a	change),	their	structures,	(did	they	have	the	resources	and	capacity	to	change)	and	the	attitudes	and	behaviour	of	the	members	of	staff	involved	(did	they	believe	in	it	and	were	they	expected	to	change).		This	emphasis	on	organisational	capacity	was	described	in	detail	in	Chapter	6,	when	I	introduced	the	concept	of	absorptive	capacity	(ACAP)	of	organisations.		
6.4 Organisational	capacity	to	implement	change	to	mobilise	
knowledge			As	described	in	the	literature	review,	an	organisation	is	likely	to	succeed	at	knowledge	mobilisation	when	the	capacity	of	their	internal	structures,	attitudes	and	behaviours	align	to	the	demands	of	the	environment,	and	hence	can	flex	and	adapt	when	required.		However,	this	notion	assumes	that	the	organisation	is	designed	to	meet	its	needs,	and	that	the	management	style	and	structure	is	appropriate	to	both	the	tasks	undertaken	and	the	culture	of	the	staff	who	work	there.		In	other	words,	does	the	organisation	have	the	ACAP	for	change,	and	for	the	mobilisation	and	implementation	of	knowledge	including	clinical	guidelines.		This	fit	between	design	and	delivery	was	not	always	apparent	in	the	hospitals	I	
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observed.		The	organisations,	their	physical	layout,	staffing	and	service	designs	had	evolved	over	time	and	did	not	always	appear	optimal.		The	clinician	quoted	below	demonstrates	how	the	lack	of	“senior	staff	in	A&E”	restricted	adherence	to	guidelines	in	site	B:		
	“So	this	one,	nerve	block.		They	want	everybody	to	give	nerve	block	when	they	come	to	A&E.		That	
doesn’t	happen	all	the	time	but	they	are	expecting	everybody	to	have	it.	But	if	you	don’t	have	some	
senior	staff	to	do	it	downstairs	in	A&E	then	you	won’t	be	able	to	do	it	but	most	of	them	and	one	of	
the	things	we	mainly	changed	was	we	were	doing	the	uncemented	hemiarthroplasty	before.		The	
NICE	guideline	was	to	put	a	cemented	stem	in;	and	that’s	debatable	here.	So	NICE,	I	don’t	know	how	
they	came	up	with	the	idea	to	say,	“You	need	to	cement	all	of	them”.”	(INT	C	37016)		External	demands	and	environmental	incentives,	such	as	the	implementation	of	new	guidelines,	compete	for	and	with	the	internal	institutional	pressures	and	targets.		I	observed	these	pressures	within	each	of	the	Trusts	and	they	appeared	to	reflect	the	sub-systems	within	the	hospitals.	Examples	included	how	the	clinical	departments	or	wards	differed	in	their	complexity,	their	specialisation	of	tasks	and	the	creation	of	functional	roles,	teams	and	procedures	within	the	organisations.		A	surgeon	described	“frustration”	over	the	internal	issue	of	bed	space.		He	states	that	it	impacted	on	patient	care	in	his	Trust	because	in	the	end,	out	of	the	“2	cases	[that	day]	we	did	the	least	important	of	the	two”	(INT	C198005).	
6.4.1 The	physical	and	structural	capacity	for	knowledge	mobilisation	in	
hospitals	Physical	capacity	of	the	hospital	in	site	B	appeared	to	influence	variation	in	service	delivery	for	this	Trust.		Sites	B1’s	orthopaedic	wards	were	split	across	two	floors	and	were	treated	as	independent	entities	with	their	own	scaled-down	organisational	knowledge.		This	was	in	addition	to	the	organisational	knowledge	held	at	site	B2,	as	the	ward	was	a	completely	distinct	unit	(OBS	notes	site	B	gen).		All	three	wards	were	essentially	part	of	the	same	organisation	(site	B).		It	might	be	expected	that	they	would	work	towards	the	same	goals,	using	the	same	processes.		However,	I	observed	that	each	of	the	wards	had	their	own	staffing,	procedures	and	intangible	ways	of	working,	i.e.,	their	own	organisational	knowledge	and	processes	for	mobilisation.		The	observation	extract	below	reveals	the	difficultly	staff	found	in	viewing	the	organisation	as	a	whole:			
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“I	shadowed	a	physiotherapist	(physio)	who	specialises	in	the	recovery	of	patients	with	hip	
replacement	at	site	B1.	She	talked	and	walked	me	through	the	layout	of	the	hospitals	and	the	
organisational	structure	spilt	across	the	sites.	She	referred	to	the	physios	at	site	B2	as	“them”.	The	
organisational	chart	showed	the	physios	working	across	both	sites	interchangeably	as	one	clinical	
group	but	they	did	not	do	this	in	practice.	Site	B1	physios	even	stuck	to	“their	floors”	because	they	
knew	what	they	had	to	do	(the	organisational	processes)	of	each	floor.	She	mentioned	that	it	was	
difficult	to	mix	the	physios	across	the	two	sites	because	most	of	them	didn’t	know	or	even	recognise	
the	surgeons	working	at	the	other	sites	so	couldn’t	easily	interact	with	them.	Sticking	to	“their	
floors”	meant	that	they	knew	what	to	do	and	who	to	speak	to	for	information	when	they	had	an	
issue.	Knowing	“my	role”	and	feeling	comfortable	speaking	to	“my	consultants”	outweighed	this	
physio’s	desire	to	work	across	both	sites.	Hence	it	made	the	service	delivery	easier	for	the	individual.	
It	appeared	that	this	unwritten	rule	was	accepted	as	the	norm	by	all	of	the	physios	in	site	B,	as	I	
never	saw	any	site	B1	physios	working	at	Site	B2	and	vice	versa.”	(OBS	note	site	B1	gen)		Across	all	three	sites,	I	found	differences	in	the	processes	of	decision-making,	the	level	of	information	that	was	shared	across	the	organisation	from	senior	management	to	front-line	staff,	the	chance	that	the	outcome	of	a	decision	was	accepted	by	others,	and	the	amount	of	disagreement	that	arose	across	professional	groups.		The	quote	below	demonstrates	the	level	of	disagreement	found	in	hospital	sites.		The	procurement	manager	at	site	B	discussed	problems	of	power	between	professional	groups	impacting	on	her	ability,	as	a	non-clinical	administrator,	to	enact	change	in	orthopaedic	theatres:	
	
“I	think	the	other	thing	is	that	it’s	not	that...	the	surgeon-facing	bit	is	not	easy	and	it’s	also	you	have	
to	be	really,	really	clear,	and	I	don’t	think	we	were	perhaps	as	clear	as	we	could	have	been	when	we	
first	started	because	there’s	a...	a	Theatre	Manager,	you	know,	how	much...		I	used	to	manage	T&O	
(trauma	and	orthopaedics)	so	I	do	know	it	quite	well	obviously	whether...	but	this	should	be	coming	
from	the	T&O	Manager	and	Specialty	Director	or	it	should	come	from	theatres	really	not	us.”	(INT	M	
37005)		There	was	variation	across	the	three	hospitals,	in	terms	of	their	ability	to	establish	and/or	change	mechanisms	to	achieve	organisational	goals.		The	more	efficient	hospital	departments	appeared	able	to	establish	new	ways	of	working.		However,	the	less	efficient	hospitals	often	struggled	to	make	changes	and	find	new	structures	and	processes.		This	was	demonstrated	by	a	surgeon	who	
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described	the	compounding	issues	he	faced	in	his	daily	work,	just	to	allow	him	to	conduct	the	necessary	operations	(INT	C	218008).		It	did	not	include	reference	to	any	additional	knowledge	work	or	guideline	implementation	activities	that	could	be	undertaken.			Intriguingly,	staff	working	in	the	more	efficient	hospital	did	not	necessarily	see	or	appreciate	the	changes	that	they	had	made.		The	consultant	quoted	below	is	from	site	A,	and	describes	his	frustration	at	the	time	it	takes	to	achieve	change	within	his	hospital:		
“Frustrations,	yes,	at	times	to	change	things.		We	always	blame	the	middle	man	I	think	because	you	
speak	to	the	board	and	you	go,	“That’s	a	really	great	idea,	go	and	make	that	happen,”…	[but]	it	only	
takes	one	person	to	delay	something	and	it	takes	ages	to	get	beyond	that.	So	the	NHS	if	full	of	that.	
It’s	just	nothing…	we	can’t	change	anything	quickly	it’s	too	big	a	machine.”	(INT	C	198005)		It	was	interesting	to	compare	this	belief	to	the	sites	where	no	progress	had	been	made	because	of	internal	politics,	or	where	change	had	led	to	unintended	consequences	such	as	staff	conflict	and	fallout	(B1	and	B2).		
6.4.2 Approach	to	change	knowledge	mobilisation	processes		The	patterns	in	the	data	help	to	describe,	and	therefore	may	help	to	predict,	the	knowledge	mobilisation	processes	the	organisations	would	undergo	when	they	need	to	adapt	and	change	in	the	future,	for	example,	if	new	guidelines	were	to	come	into	place	or	if	hospital	budgets	were	restricted	further.		I	anticipate	that	in	site	B,	the	manager	might	not	ever	be	in	a	position	to	receive	guideline	updates	from	senior	management	as	it	appeared	that	this	was	not	a	privileged	type	of	knowledge	in	this	Trust.		Without	a	change	to	the	internal	processes,	the	manager	would	be	responsible	for	searching	for	and	prioritising	relevant	guideline	updates	for	his	department.		During	my	observations,	I	noted	that	this	lack	of	emphasis	on	organisational	knowledge	grounded	in	clinical	guidelines	was	evident	across	the	Trust,	from	members	of	the	board	to	the	surgeons	working	on	the	wards.		Instead,	achieving	organisational	targets	appeared	to	take	precedence.			
		 175	
On	the	whole,	the	behaviour	of	the	organisation	at	site	B	appeared	to	be	the	command	and	control	approach.		This	differed	from	site	A,	who	tended	towards	a	more	encouraging	and	inclusive	approach	to	change.		Findings	revealed	differences	in	level	of	flexibility	in	the	organisational	norms	and	the	choice	of	organisational	behaviours.		These	appeared	to	be	associated	with	how	the	management	teams	believed	these	norms	and	behaviours	would	allow	for	the	effective	control	of	the	organisation.		As	an	example	taken	from	my	observations,	surgeons	in	site	A	were	actively	encouraged	to	innovate	in	practice	and	improve	their	treatments	within	the	context	of	research	programmes.		I	saw	discussions	about	clinical	problems,	and	surgeons	here	would	comment	“what	does	the	
evidence	say”	“can	it	be	trialed?...	lets	think	about	this”	(OBS	notes	site	A	TPM).		It	appeared	that	they	were	able	to	seamlessly	merge	their	academic	and	clinical	knowledge	bases	in	their	decision-making.				The	surgeon	groups	working	in	site	B	seemed	to	be	expected	to	conform	to	departmental	standards,	and	discouraged	or	even	reprimanded	for	operating	outside	established	protocols.		However,	this	control	appeared	not	always	to	be	achieved	in	practice;	I	observed	many	instances	when	individuals	would	just	‘say’	they	are	doing	a	task,	e.g.,	following	the	protocol,	rather	than	actually	doing	it.		The	administrative	staff	appeared	to	spend	time	back-tracking	and	completing	paperwork	and	computer	records	that	should	have	been	completed	(according	to	the	protocol)	by	the	clinical	team	during	operations	(OBS	notes	site	
B	code).		A	similar	situation	was	highlighted	in	an	interview	with	a	theatre	manager	who	tried	to	maintain	control	over	what	implants	were	used	in	her	site	but	found	she	had	to	“fight	every	second	of	the	way”	with	the	surgeons	to	achieve	the	task	(INT	C	11901).				However,	data	from	my	study	has	revealed	that	solving	organisational	problems	involves	more	than	streamlining	services	or	working	around	the	systems	that	are	entrenched	within	the	hospital.		At	site	B,	the	hospital	board	aimed	to	overcome	their	knowledge	mobilisation	problems	by	implementing	a	new	computer	software	programme.		During	the	meeting,	I	did	not	observe	any	explicit	evidence	to	suggest	that	this	would	be	an	effective	solution	to	their	
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problems.		I	later	discussed	these	plans	with	a	member	of	the	hospital	board	and	he	commented:				
“So	I	think	if	you	look	to	see	how	many	services	in	this	organisation	have	been	changed	as	a	result	of	
anything	that	NICE	have	done	it	will	be	relatively	few,	particularly	outside	the	context	of	peer	
review.	Having	said	all	that,	we	are	introducing	a	new	IT	system	here	which	will	have	clinical	
decision	support	within	it,	and	within	the	clinical	decision	support	process	best	evidence	will	be	
introduced	to	support	that.	And	that	will	include	NICE,	it	will	include	other	information	sources	like	
(software	name)	and	things	and	that	will	help,	and	inform	pathways,	etc,	that	we’ve	got	running.”	
(INT	M	37003)	
	It	appeared	to	me	that	his	concern	was	making	sure	the	IT	system	functioned,	rather	than	assessing	the	difference	it	made	to	the	use	of	guidance	in	practice	and	the	achievement	of	quality	standards.		Throughout	the	findings,	it	became	apparent	that	improving	organisational	capacity	is	difficult.		It	may	require	the	organisation	to	evolve	and	develop	as	a	homogenous	group,	however,	for	the	reasons	described	in	previous	results	chapters	this	may	be	an	insurmountable	task	within	the	healthcare	environment.		Such	an	adaptive	approach	to	change	might	require	understanding	and	working	with	organisational	knowledge,	rather	than	just	adding	additional	layers	of	process,	such	as	computer	systems	and	internal	targets.		During	my	observations,	I	saw	little	evidence	of	clinicians,	managers	and	administrators	working	together	towards	an	organisational	goal.		For	example,	individuals	would	attend	meetings	with	what	appeared	to	be	a	vested	interest	in	what	they	needed	from	the	decision-making	activity.		These	were	innate	issues	reflecting	the	organisational	cultures	of	the	NHS	Trusts	I	studied,	and	were	commonplace	across	all	three	sites.		
6.4.3 The	organisational	culture	of	the	hospitals		Interviewees	in	site	A	appeared	to	believe	that	culture	was	something	that	the	hospital	‘had’,	and	therefore	that	it	was	possible	to	change	and	manage	it	to	align	to	the	organisational	strategy.		The	quote	below	illustrates	that	at	site	A,	management	and	clinicians	actively	sought	to	employ	academic	consultants	to	uphold	and	maintain	their	research	culture:	
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“So	we’ve	yes,	approached	excellent	people	from	all	over	the	country	who	want	to	come	and	work	in	
our	environment.		So	the	Trust	exec	see	that	as	really	important.”	(INT	C	218008)		Site	C	differed,	as	their	culture	appeared	to	be	something	that	the	organisation	‘is’.	Staff	working	here	were	accepting	of	the	culture	in	which	they	worked.		I	did	not	observe	any	particular	action	to	try	to	resolve	it.		Staff	I	interviewed	seemed	to	be	resigned	to	the	belief	that	change	was	impossible,	through	the	use	of	phrases	such	as	“but	there	is	nothing	‘I’	can	do	about	it”,	or	more	worryingly	“I	
will	just	leave	and	go	to	(name	of	different	hospital)”	(OBS	notes	site	B	gen).		More	so	than	in	either	of	the	other	two	sites	was	‘that’s	the	way	we	do	things	here’	given	as	a	reason	for	decisions	that	had	been	made,	or	actions	that	had	been	taken.				In	site	B,	it	was	necessary	to	uncover	the	implicit	processes	and	constructed	meanings	staff	gave	for	their	behaviour	and	how	these	changed,	helped	or	hindered	organisational	control.		The	key	driver	here	appeared	to	be	the	clinical	community	and	the	power	and	discretion	this	community	held	over	knowledge,	decision-making	and	practice.		One	recurrent	issue	that	influenced	the	organisational	culture	was	who	the	staff	believed	they	worked	for.		The	observation	note	below	reveals	how	this	could	be	Site	B	as	the	organisation,	but	more	likely	staff	would	refer	to	themselves	by	the	split	site	name	of	B1	or	B2:				
“Site	B	has	two	conflicting	cultures.	Site	B1	is	the	large	modern	hospital	(the	big	brother	in	a	
deprived	area)	whereas	site	B2	is	the	smaller	district	general	hospital	(the	little	sister	in	an	affluent	
area).	The	staff,	particularly	those	that	had	worked	for	the	organisation	for	a	long	time,	seemed	
reluctant	to	want	to	accept	that	they	worked	under	the	larger	Trusts	name.	This	was	because	Site	
B1	was	the	county	named	hospital,	and	hence	the	name	that	was	taken	for	the	Trust	when	they	
merged.	Accepting	the	new	name	meant	that	site	B2	somehow	lost	their	identity,	which	they	
counteracted	by	continuing	to	say	they	worked	for	the	old	site	name.	Staff	always	referred	to	
themselves	as	B1	or	B2	and	even	corrected	me	if	I	called	them	the	joint	Trust	name.”	(OBS	notes	Site	
B1	B2	summary)	
	These	underlying	assumptions	represented	the	unconscious	principles	that	structured	the	thinking	and	behavior	of	the	staff	working	within	the	
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organisation.		This	played	out	in	their	ability	to	share	knowledge	and	work	together:		
	
“Staff	from	site	B1	and	B2	seem	to	not	want	to	physically	work	or	share	documents	in	meetings	that	
came	from	the	other	site…the	places	are	very	different	in	terms	of	the	B1/B2	divide...B2	is	seen	as	
this	lovely	(place)	where	pavements	are	paved	with	gold	and	B1	the	poor	relation.”	(OBS	notes	Site	
B1	B2	summary)			These	assumptions	and	principles	develop	into	the	organisational	knowledge	of	the	Trust,	and	appeared	to	work	at	both	conscious	and	unconscious	level	to	drive	behaviour	and	the	decisions	that	were	made	in	the	Trust.		The	culture	at	site	B	might	be	linked	to	the	structural	contingences	of	practice	and	the	legacy	knowledge	of	what	had	gone	before	when	it	was	two	separate	organisations.		This	contrasts	with	the	explicit	protocols	and	established	hospital	processes	in	site	A,	or	the	strong	shared	professional	norms	that	appeared	to	be	established	in	site	C.		
6.4.4 Clinical	autonomy	and	organisational	sub-cultures		The	entrenched	beliefs	and	values	of	organisational	culture	that	were	described	in	the	literature	review	chapters	(Chapter	2)	may	be	more	difficult	to	change.		My	data	revealed	that	the	organisational	culture	may	be	one	of	the	factors	which	enabled	the	orthopaedic	departments	to	resist	external	influence	by	policy-making	organisations	such	as	NICE.		My	findings	uncovered	the	limited	capability	to	change	the	power	and	culture	of	clinical	autonomy	held	by	surgeons	across	the	three	hospitals.		The	clinical	professional	groups	appeared	to	maintain	their	elevated	position,	despite	the	organisational	changes	and	cost	saving	programmes	that	were	under	way	at	each	site.				However,	the	observed	organisational	cultures	were	not	consistent	across	or	within	the	sites.		Instead,	distinct	sub-cultures	developed	(See	Chapter	5)	and	were	often	linked	to	the	professional	groups	within	the	hospitals.		The	clinicians	consciously	and	unconsciously	appeared	to	differentiate	themselves	from	each	other	through	their	behaviour,	attitudes	and	language.		This	differentiation	is	highlighted	in	the	observation	note	below,	which	describes	surgeons	in	a	meeting	using	technical	language	which	was	not	understood	by	everyone	
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attending	the	meeting:		
“During	the	(rationalisation)	meeting	the	surgeons	used	the	specific	product	names	rather	than	the	
brand	names	or	generic	terms	for	the	implant	devices,	for	example	they	referred	to	the	“CMK”	or	the	
“SP3”.	I	struggled	to	keep	up	with	the	conversation	despite	being	fairly	knowledgably	about	the	
device	names	because	of	the	recent	review	I	was	involved	in.	It	was	clear	that	the	managerial	staff	
did	not	know	either	as	the	conversation	seemed	very	one	way.	They	were	being	talked	at,	rather	
than	talked	to.	This	acted	as	a	knowledge	divide	which	helped	to	separate	and	elevate	the	surgeons’	
talk	from	the	managers.”	(OBS	notes	ration	meeting	Site	B1)		
	I	asked	one	of	the	managers	afterwards	how	she	felt	the	meeting	went,	as	expected	she	found	it	“difficult”	and	needed	to	ask	for	clarification	regarding	the	implant	selections.		Her	response	is	detailed	below:		
“I	couldn’t	believe	[it]...	And	after	the	meeting...	It	was	a	very	difficult	meeting	and	I	am	feeling	quite	
deflated.	And	then	thinking	about	it	afterwards	thinking.	What	they’ve	said	has	forced	them	down	
this	route	really…	you’ve	got	to	be	so	careful	and	you’ve	got	to	ask	the	stupid	things	like,	“Does	this	
piece	go	with	this	piece	and	this	piece...?”	(INT	M	37005)		Opposition	between	the	sub-cultures	was	evident,	particularly	between	the	clinical	and	non-clinical	staff.		This	appeared	to	be	a	norm	of	NHS	culture	as	it	was	observed	at	all	of	the	three	sites	I	studied	to	varying	degrees.		Of	course,	ideally	managers	would	be	proficient	in	resolving	conflict.		For	instance,	they	would	be	able	to	create	the	structures	and	processes	that	could	guide	and	control	activities	within	hospitals,	i.e.,	the	day-to-day	processes,	without	simultaneously	allowing	the	norms	and	behaviors	of	sub-cultures	to	become	so	ingrained	and	fixed	that	future	innovation	and	change	was	restricted.			
6.4.5 Non-compliance	with	processes		The	key	finding	here	is	that,	as	might	be	expected,	change	required	not	only	a	change	in	organisational	structures	and	procedures,	but	also	a	change	in	the	attitudes	and	values	of	the	workforce.		All	three	sites	had	structures	and	processes	in	place	to	implement	change	and	to	try	to	control	hospital	activities,	for	example	each	site	had	governance	processes	to	implement	clinical	guidelines.		Nevertheless,	the	organisational	norms	and	level	of	compliance	with	these	processes	varied,	particularly	amongst	senior	clinical	staff.		I	found	this	to	be	the	
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case	when	the	hospitals	were	implementing	new	or	updated	NICE	guidance.		The	administrators	who	were	responsible	for	these	processes	at	all	three	of	the	sites	reported	problems	with	clinical	engagement	and	compliance	with	the	processes.		The	quote	below	reveals	the	multiple	issues	at	play	and	the	variation	that	was	commonplace.		When	asked	if	the	identified	clinical	leads	responded	to	the	requests	about	NICE	guidance	implementation,	the	administrator	at	Site	A	said:			
“Some	we	do,	but	then	some	we	don’t	get	any	back,	and	then	we	have	a	procedure	then	to	follow	up	
non-compliance,	or	non-response	to	our	emails.	But	it’s	then	that,	if	they	say,	“Yes,	we’ve	met	it”,	it’s	
the	evidence	to	show	that	they	are	actually	meeting	it.	Yes,	a	lot	of	it,	you	know,	it	is	down	to,	you	
know,	just	taking	the	word	that,	you	know,	that	a	consultant’s	going	to	come	back	and	say,	“Yes,	
we’re	compliant	to	this”,	[it’s]	not	good	enough.”	(INT	A	218015)	
	It	was	interesting	that	an	email	from	the	consultant	was	“not	good	enough”	to	demonstrate	that	compliance	to	the	process	had	been	achieved	in	site	A.		This	was	not	the	case	in	site	C,	as	described	by	the	administrator	responsible	for	NICE	guidelines	in	that	Trust:		
	
“We	do	have	a	process.	We	ask	them	to	complete	that	form	initially	to	say…I	mean,	we	hope	that	
they’ll	say	at	least	that,	that	they	intend	to	become	fully	compliant.	I	think	not	all	the	quality	
standards	get	implemented	within	two	years	but	they	seem	to	be	working	towards	it	so	that’s	
acceptable.	But	however,	if	they	tick	six	or	seven,	an	exception	report	is	required,	which	is	that	one	
there,	so	basically	they’ve	just	got	to	say…Why,	yes,	in	a	word…	The	people	who	are	best	at	filling	
out	these	are	nurses,	midwives,	rather	than	consultants.	I	think	they	take	more	time.	The	medical	
staff	are	not	good	at	doing	it.	They	just	don’t	have	the	protected	time.	And	again	that’s	
understandable.”	(INT	A	198002)	
	This	finding	is	supported	by	my	reflections	which	describes	“tick	box	compliance”	to	NICE	guidance	that	seemed	to	be	the	norm	at	site	C:	
	
“Despite	this	reported	process,	I	asked	to	look	at	the	report	for	the	particular	hip	replacement	
guidance	I	was	interested	in	(TA304).	The	administrator	looked	it	up	on	the	database	as	it	was	
highlighted	green	and	she	told	me	it	was	compliant.	Out	of	interest	I	asked	to	see	what	evidence	the	
department	had	provided	to	show	their	compliance.	It	turned	out	that	the	lead	surgeon	in	this	
hospital	has	written	“we	are	compliant	J	(signed	first	name)”.	I	asked	if	this	was	sufficient	evidence	
and	the	administrator	said	yes,	they	have	to	take	the	clinician’s	word	for	it.	I	thought	this	was	a	
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classic	case	of	tick	box	compliance	and	was	not	really	evidence	of	anything	other	than	getting	a	
response	to	a	question.”	(OBS	notes	Site	C	notes	from	INT	A	198002)						Lastly,	the	situation	at	site	B	appeared	to	mirror	that	found	in	site	C.		This	administrator	asks	the	consultants	“is	it	relevant?”	“do	you	think	we	are	
compliant?”	and	accepts	a	‘yes’	or	‘no’	response	as	sufficient:	
	
“So	you	know	at	the	very	least	they’re	going	to...	you	know.	They’re	going	to	read	that.		So	anyway,	
and	then	we	ask	them...		So	they	normally	give...	The	director	will	give	it	to	the	person	that	is	most	
specialist,	I	guess,	you	know,	in	their	area,	and	then	it’ll	say,	‘Is	it	relevant?		Do	you	think	that	we	are	
compliant?		If	not,	why	do	you	not	think	that	we’re	compliant?		Please	state.		Can	you	evidence	that	
we	are	compliant?	Can	you	tell	us	of	some	pieces	of	work	to	evidence	that	we	are	compliant	with	
this?		Do	you	see	there	being	any	training	needs?’		It’s	that	kind	of	stuff.		But	it’s	a	‘Yes/No’	with	a	
comment	rather	than	asking	them	to	produce	a	statement,	you	know,	and	that’s	one	of	the	things	
that	we	found	didn’t	work,	you’d	just	sit	there	waiting	for	things	to	come	back	and	it	just	doesn’t	
happen.”	(INT	A	119009)	
	Elsewhere	this	administrator	used	the	words	“professional	responsibility”	and	“duty”.		This	expectation	of	action	and	obligation	of	the	clinicians	with	regards	to	NICE	guidance	was	not	evident	in	the	interviews	with	clinical	staff.		Instead,	one	senior	surgeon	who	sat	on	the	surgical	board	in	the	Trust	referred	to	NICE	guidance	as	“another	layer	of	administration”(INT	C	37003).			Together,	these	findings	demonstrate	two	distinct	sets	of	beliefs,	attitudes	and	considerations	of	knowledge	between	the	organisational	sub-cultures	in	this	site.		They	were	working	at	polar	opposite	points	of	view,	both	appearing	to	believe	that	NICE	guidance	was	the	responsibility	of	another	sub-group.					The	narratives	above	demonstrate	the	lack	of	an	evidence-based	feedback	loop	between	administrators,	managers	and	clinicians.		This	seemed	to	be	accepted	within	the	culture	of	the	organisations.		However,	site	A	commented	that	they	were	making	changes	to	their	policy	to	try	to	establish	more	effective	knowledge	mobilisation	processes.		Organisational	culture	appears	to	be	an	important	factor	in	understanding	the	ability	of	a	hospital	to	achieve	performance	targets	in	line	with	the	organisational	strategy.		
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6.4.6 The	absence	of	lasting	relationships		The	clinical	and	non-clinical	staff	differed	culturally	and	formed	noticeable	sub-groups,	but	needed	to	be	receptive	to	working	in	the	shared	organisational	culture.		Developing	a	functional	organisational	culture	is	an	important	but	seemingly	difficult	task,	as	it	is	the	end	product	of	the	actions	and	experiences	of	many	social	groups	and	their	interactions.		It	would	be	expected	that	an	organisation	is	more	likely	to	develop	a	strong	culture	if	they	have	a	stable	and	homogeneous	membership	and	stay	together	for	a	long	period	of	time.		However,	this	was	not	the	case	in	the	hospitals	I	visited.		Staff	turnover	appeared	to	be	high,	particularly	within	management	and	administrative	roles.		This	was	revealed	via	discussions	with	both	clinical	and	non-clinical	staff.		The	clinical	staff	refer	to	the	situation	as	“going	in	circles”,	whereas	the	manager	states	that	surgeons	can	see	non-clinical	staff	as	“transient”	which	impacts	on	their	engagement:			
“There	had	been	quite	a	lot	of	HR	issues	with	them,	the	way	they	(the	surgeons)	behaved,	I	think	
they	hadn’t	had	a	set	manager	which	doesn’t	help,	they’d	several,	so	they	get	used	to	somebody	and	
then	they’d	go...	when	I	first	came	here	(CD	name)	said	to	me	you’ll	be	here	18	months	and	you’ll	be	
off,	you	know,	they	generally	think	that	you’re	going	to	be	here	twelve	or	18	months	and	you’d	go	so	
they	don’t...	So	I	think	sometimes	that’s	why	you	don’t	necessarily	get	the	engagement	with	you	
because	they	just	see	you	as	transient.”	(INT	M	218014)		This	level	of	management	and	administrative	turnover	hindered	the	opportunity	to	build	a	strong	organisational	culture	across	all	members	in	the	hospitals.		Staff	appeared	to	have	limited	time	and	sometimes	limited	interest	in	developing	patterns	of	behaviour	and	shared	values,	beliefs	and	assumptions	across	groups	in	their	organisation,	instead	choosing	to	“stick	with	their	own	kind”	because	they	did	not	want	to	invest	time	and	knowledge	in	a	person	who	they	believed	was	going	to	leave	in	the	near	future	(OBS	notes	site	A	general).		The	clinical	staff,	on	the	other	hand,	would	remain	in	post	for	long	periods	of	time.		It	was	easier	for	them	to	build	relationships,	particularly	once	they	had	achieved	the	consultant	role.			
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6.4.7 Conflict	between	the	sub-cultures		My	literature	reviews	demonstrate	that	a	strong	culture	encourages	staff	to	feel	that	they	belong	to	a	hospital,	because	they	have	shared	identity,	values	and	goals,	and	limited	conflicts	of	interest.		Instances	observed	during	data	collection	demonstrated	weak	overall	organisational	culture	as	staff	orientated	themselves	and	their	work	towards	the	goals	of	their	department,	their	personal	ideals	or	that	of	their	professional	group,	before	those	of	the	hospital.		The	excerpt	below	demonstrates	this	inward	facing	orientation.		A	procurement	manager	describes	surgeons	“hiding	behind”	the	notion	that	the	patient	is	the	focus	of	their	work,	rather	than	tackling	the	efficiency	and	purchasing	decisions.		The	quote	reveals	the	problems	he	faced	when	trying	to	merge	the	clinical	and	managerial	knowledge	and	sub-cultures	in	order	to	reduce	the	amount	spent	on	hip	replacement	implants:			
“If	we’re	going	to	get	more	work	from	the	CCGs,	if	we’re	actually	going	to	create	efficiency,	we	have	
to	have	some	overall	purchasing	strategy.	But	at	the	local	level,	trying	to	get	a	surgeon	that	has	a	
very	good	rating	on	a	particular	hip	to	change.	That	becomes	–	impossible.”	(INT	M	119002)	
	Across	all	three	sites,	formal	controls	and	governance	protocols	were	established	to	try	to	maintain	and	internalise	the	behaviour	that	was	desired	by	the	management	of	the	organisation,	for	example,	having	an	established	‘Procedure	for	Implementing	NICE	Guidance’	in	place	at	site	C	that	had	to	be	reported	against	at	board	meetings	(Doc	analy	site	C	NICE).		Often	this	command	and	control	approach	only	resulted	in	‘work	arounds’	by	clinical	staff	and	conflict	between	sub-groups	and	the	organisation.		This	conflict	was	illustrated	by	a	lead	nurse	in	theatre	who	described	the	need	to	“manage	and	manipulate”	the	surgeons	to	behave	in	a	certain	way:				
“They	are,	surgeons	anyway	are	a	difficult	group	to	manipulate	but	orthopaedic	surgeons	are	a	very	
difficult	group	to	manage	and	manipulate	so	you’ve	got	to	learn	how	to,	to	sort	of	make	them	
recognise	it.		It’s	got	to	be	something	unique	for	them.”	(INT	M	119014)		The	sense	of	conflict	between	sub-cultures	appeared	to	result	in	the	formation	of	attitudes,	beliefs	and	actions	that	were	at	odds	with	the	organisational	culture	
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and	strategy	of	the	hospital.		This	was	the	case	at	site	B	and	C	where	what	had	formed	at	these	sites	were	independent	orthopaedic	departments	which	appeared	to	function	as	standalone	units.				This	appeared	not	to	be	the	case	at	site	A;	however,	there	were	also	differences	in	organisational	sub-cultures	in	this	hospital.		There	were	distinct	attitudes	and	behaviours	of	two	new	consultants	in	site	A	when	they	had	to	take	on	new	organisational	responsibilities.		This	illustrates	how	staff	entering	the	organisation	from	elsewhere	needed	to	learn	the	organisational	hospital	dynamics,	and	where	they	might	want	to	sit	within	the	organisational	structure.				Managers	working	across	the	three	sites	appeared	to	find	it	difficult	to	meaningfully	integrate	themselves	into	the	orthopaedic	departments.		The	quote	below	shows	how	this	resulted	in	problems	encouraging	the	management	staff	to	take	an	active	role	in	the	organisational	planning	and	management	of	the	“one	
service”	at	site	B:		
“And	there	is	very	much	this	thing...	and	this	definitely	is	in	orthopaedics	and	I	don’t	know	whether	it	
is	applicable	to	other	parts	of	the	organisation...	but	we	keep	talking	about,	you	know,	“We	are	one	
Trust	and	we	are	one	service.”	And	even	members	of	my	own	management	team,	[we’ve]	got	one	
based	here	(site	B2)	and	one	based	at	(site	B1),	and	the	one	at	(site	B1)	does	come	over	here	
because	everything	happens	here,	meetings	and	that,	but	the	one	who’s	based	here	(site	B1)	goes	to	
(site	B2)	only	if	I	send	her	for	a	meeting,	and	still	she’s,	“Well	they	work	very	differently	at	(site	
B2),”.”	(INT	M	37004)	
6.4.8 Sub-culture	reference	groups		As	described	in	Chapter	5,	the	attitudes	of	the	professional	groups	were	formed	and	reinforced	by	their	positive	identification	with	their	reference	group.		In	all	three	hospitals	I	studied,	the	orthopaedic	surgeon	reference	group	appeared	to	be	other	orthopaedic	surgeons	in	their	department,	not	the	organisational	culture	of	the	hospital.		The	function	of	the	reference	group	was	to	assist	the	members	in	forming	identities,	attitudes	and	knowledge	similar	to	other	members	of	their	CoP.		Therefore,	the	findings	suggest	that	when	organisational	decisions	have	to	be	made,	the	surgeons	tended	to	align	the	options	which	most	suited	the	standards	of	their	group.		You	can	see	this	reflected	in	the	observation	
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field	note	below.		During	the	rationalisation	meetings	the	surgeons	provided	“excuses”	not	to	change	their	practice	and	methods	of	working,	which	halted	organisational	progress:		
“The	surgeons	attended	the	meeting	and	seemed	to	be	reluctant	to	even	consider	what	was	being	
presented	by	the	management	before	they	started.	Not	all	surgeons	who	were	expected	actually	
attended.	They	did	not	want	change	in	any	form	and	were	providing	excuses	as	to	why	the	planned	
rationalisation	would	not	work	before	the	evidence	had	even	been	presented.	They	seemed	
unwilling	to	work	together	(surgeons	from	B1	and	B2)	or	work	with	the	procurement	managers.	
The	manager	who	was	leading	the	meeting	only	got	approximately	two	thirds	through	her	
presentation	before	she	ended	the	meeting	as	she	knew	she	was	not	making	any	progress.	Everyone	
seemed	to	be	getting	more	agitated.	The	surgeons	were	talking	amongst	their	own	groups	and	
disagreeing	and	disrupting	the	conversation.”	(OBS	notes	ration	meeting	Site	B)				What	became	clear	in	the	findings	was	that	changing	or	establishing	organisational	culture	might	not	be	achievable	through	top-down	command	and	control,	as	demonstrated	in	site	B	above,	or	by	a	reliance	on	staff	advocacy	of	the	organisational	strategy.		Approaches	to	change	organisational	culture	to	improve	knowledge	mobilisation	and	evidence	use	appeared	to	need	to	focus	in	on	the	sub-cultures	that	existed	within	the	hospitals,	and	the	individual	attitudes	and	beliefs	of	the	staff	and	their	reference	groups.			They	also	needed	to	be	part	of	a	wider	transformation	to	challenge	counterproductive	organisational	knowledge	and	assumptions	that	could	be	made,	for	example	the	suspicion,	agendas	and	ulterior	motives	that	were	associated	with	the	implementation	of	NICE	guidance.		Attempts	to	make	superficial	changes	to	high-level	issues	in	isolation,	such	as	implementing	an	updated	clinical	guideline,	appeared	to	have	limited	impact	in	all	sites	as	they	did	not	take	account	of	the	sub	culture(s)	of	the	organisation,	or	of	its	structure,	available	resources,	clinical	autonomy,	management	control	and	staffing	–	all	issues	which	appeared	to	dictate	the	ability	of	the	hospital	to	function.		
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6.5 Types	of	knowledge	that	influenced	decision-making	in	the	
organisation		I	identified	two	distinct	types	of	knowledge	which	acted	at	the	level	of	the	organisation.		They	represented	an	important	component	of	decision-making	for	orthopaedics	across	the	three	hospitals.		They	are	referred	to	as	managerial	knowledge	and	organisational	knowledge.		These	knowledge	types	appeared	to	influence	how	decisions	were	made	and	therefore	the	actions	and	behaviours	of	staff	working	within	the	three	hospitals.		Each	knowledge	type	will	be	discussed	below	with	examples	taken	from	the	data.		
6.5.1 The	influence	of	managerial	knowledge	in	this	study	Managerial	knowledge	characterised	the	routines	and	capabilities	of	practice	for	the	individual	orthopaedic	departments.		The	findings	revealed	a	distinction	between	managerial	knowledge	that	came	from	inside	or	outside	the	orthopaedic	departments	in	the	organisations.		These	were	seen	as	two	distinct	sources	of	evidence,	although	it	appeared	that	a	clinical	weighting	added	to	the	dominance	of	the	orthopaedic	managerial	knowledge.		For	example,	knowledge	from	the	clinical	director	of	orthopaedics	contested	the	knowledge	that	came	from	the	general	hospital	governance	board.				However,	this	seemed	to	be	dependent	on	the	accepted	definition	of	who	‘the	management’	was	in	each	organisation.		In	some	instances	this	tended	to	be	the	same	entity	(site	A),	but	it	could	be	separated	between	management	and	clinical	staff	(site	C)	or	held	by	an	individual	in	an	unofficial	role	(site	B).		This	apparent	flexibility	in	‘management’	was	observed	across	all	three	cases.		The	excerpt	below	demonstrates	how	staff	working	in	site	B	had	a	designated	organisational	structure,	but	in	practice	the	lines	of	reporting	differed.		The	manager	quoted	below	reveals	the	difference	between	the	“theory”	and	actual	“reality”	of	management	at	site	B:			
“Okay,	so	in	terms	of	organisation,	the	way	it	works	here	is	they	have	in	theory	a	service	line	clinical	
leadership	model.	So	Trauma	and	Orthopaedics	is	led	by	a	Specialty	Director	(SD)	who’s	Mr	(name)	
but	who...	And	technically	I	work	for	him,	but	really	we	work	as	part	of	a	tri,	so	myself,	the	SD	and	
the	Matron	all	work	together.	And,	yeah,	the	SD	is	ultimately	the	person	responsible	for	the	service	
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line	which	is	just	Trauma	and	Orthopaedics	and	Orthotics.	However,	in	reality,	I	report	to	the	
(name),	so	they	have	at	a	divisional	level	a	person	who	maintains	overall	responsibility	for	the	
whole	division,	I	suppose,	who’s	the	person	I	report	to.	So	that’s	how	it	works,	I	guess,	in	terms	of	
structure.”	(INT	M	37004)				It	appeared	that	the	management	at	site	B	had	little	control	over	the	clinical	staff.	Instead,	they	focused	on	the	administrative	functions	and	the	business	side	of	the	organisation.		The	Speciality	Director	(SD)	mentioned	above	was	theoretically	responsible	for	the	clinical	management	at	this	hospital.		However,	the	coffee	lounge	conversations	I	observed	in	this	site	revealed	management	provided	by	the	SD	only	on	paper.		One	surgeon	suggested	that	the	SD’s	management	was	in	“title	only”.		This	was	supported	by	my	observations,	as	I	did	not	see	him	attend	monthly	departmental	meetings	(OBS	notes	site	B	T&O).		This	perceived	lack	of	control	might	be	one	reason	why	the	two	distinct	groups	of	surgeons	at	site	B1	and	B2	had	been	allowed	to	form	and	function	independently.			Managerial	knowledge	is	subjective	and	experiential,	and	was	often	not	written	down	in	a	codified	format	for	healthcare	staff	to	access.		The	tacit	nature	of	this	managerial	knowledge	appeared	to	make	it	difficult	to	mobilise	knowledge	between	and	across	the	organisation,	individual	departments,	or	professional	boundaries	within	the	same	organisation.		This	might	have	contributed	to	the	differences	I	observed	in	the	understanding,	interpretation	and	use	of	the	knowledge	for	the	delivery	of	orthopaedic	services.		In	the	excerpts	below,	I	give	an	example	of	how	different	types	of	knowledge	interacted;	the	knowledge	from	managers	in	“hospital	guidelines”,	linked	to	“cost	savings”	appeared	to	have	little	relevance	for	the	two	relatively	junior	surgeons	in	their	daily	practice.		Both,	instead	reference	the	“consultant”	decision	as	being	more	important:			
“Like	a,	the	hospital	has	got	the	same	sort	of	hospital	guidelines	and	they	spot	links	to	all	the	NICE	
guidelines	and	things	so	it’s	is	easily	accessible.	But	it	depends	I	guess	what	question	you	want	an	
answer	to	and	I	guess	in	orthopaedics,	apart	from	the	sort	of	medical	side	of	things,	what	drugs	and	
things	we	use,	in	terms	of	orthopaedic	decision	making,	it	is	based	on	certain	principles	and	you	
generally	sort	of	follow	whatever	your	consultant	practices.”	(INT	C	218010)	
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“Yes,	I	mean	I	think	cost	savings	is	something	which,	in	a	sense	it	should	come	in	to	the	hospital’s	
decision	making	as	to	what	they	suggest	people	use	and	ultimately,	you	know,	once	you	are	a	
consultant,	you	should	be	involved	in	that	process,	certainly	to	decide	what	implants	we	are	using	or	
what	other	sort	of	equipment	we	are	using	and	things	like	that,	so	that	should	be	based	on	
consultant’s	discussion	with	management	etcetera	but	I	think	at	my	level	(junior	doctor),	I	don’t	
think,	you	know,	we	just	sort	of	use	what	we	are	given	to	be	honest,	yes.”	(INT	C	198001)	
6.5.1.1 Uncertainty	in	managerial	knowledge	Uncertainty	existed	in	determining	what	the	accepted	levels	of	cost,	safety	or	quality	were	for	the	department	and	the	organisation	in	each	hospital.		These	definitions	varied	not	only	across	the	three	departments,	but	also	within	each	hospital	site.		This	appeared	to	result	in	a	tendency	for	the	person	responsible	for	decision-making	to	revert	to	the	norms	of	their	professional	group	or	colleagues,	rather	than	the	organisation’s	plans	that	management	promoted	as	the	ideal.				This	uncertainty	is	shown	in	the	quote	below	provided	by	the	senior	nurse	on	the	orthopaedic	ward	at	site	C.		He	describes	how	his	authority	to	make	decisions	was	uncertain,	and	depended	on	the	presence	or	absence	of	doctors	on	the	ward.		When	doctors	were	present	it	was	“their	job	to	manage”	and	make	decisions,	and	he	did	not	“try	to	get	involved”	even	though	he	could.		However,	when	doctors	were	absent	he	had	to	“manage	the	whole	thing”:		
“Medically,	medically	yes,	yes	it’s	straightforward.	They	are	planned	surgeries.	So	they	have	been,	
they	know	what’s	coming.	If	it’s	a	medical	problem	I	don’t	try	to	get	involved.	I	can	manage	but	I	
don’t	want	to	do	that.	The	SHO’s	job	to	manage	it,	but	overall	they	can’t	do	it	if	nobody’s	there.	But	
sometimes	these	complications	that	happen,	and	I	have	to	manage	the	whole	thing.”	(INT	C	37016)	
	Uncertainty	appeared	to	be	present	in	decisions	made	by	managers	as	well	as	by	the	clinical	staff.		The	logistics	and	procurement	manager	at	site	B	explained	how	he	had	to	balance	finances	and	government	targets	within	his	Trust	to	enable	him	to	provide	a	service,	he	described	this	process	as	“very	difficult”:		
“It’s	very	difficult,	we	went	through	a	procurement	stage	four	years	ago	where	we	had	to	save	some	
money,	we	were,	you	know,	like	any	Trust	it’s	a	business,	you	don’t	like	to	think	it	is	but	it	is	a	
business,	you	know,	you’ve	got	your	QIPP	(The	Quality,	Innovation,	Productivity	and	Prevention	
		 189	
programme)	commitments	that	you	have	to	reach	every	year,	you’ve	got	targets	that	you	have	to	
do.	Because	you	have	to	look	at...	you	have	to	have	a	certain	look	at	rationalisation”(INT	M	37002)	Important	managerial	knowledge	was	held	by	middle-level	managers	within	the	three	hospitals.		This	appeared	to	be	the	knowledge	used	for	the	day-to-day	functioning	of	orthopaedic	departments,	but	was	only	accessed	by	clinicians	when	they	felt	it	was	necessary.		My	observations	revealed	that	each	hospital	had	a	single	person,	generally	called	the	Trauma	and	Orthopaedic	Manager,	who	was	responsible	for	managing	the	department.		However,	their	ability	to	influence	decision-making	on	the	wards	was	questionable.		In	each	case,	the	person	was	non-clinical	and	in	two	of	the	three	sites	(B	and	C)	their	desk	space	was	not	co-located	with	the	surgeons.		In	site	A,	the	manager’s	office	was	located	in	the	orthopaedic	ward.		This	appeared	to	help	facilitate	the	relationship	between	the	surgeons	and	the	manager.		I	observed	increased	amounts	of	communication	between	the	surgeons	and	the	manager	at	this	site	(she	had	a	visible	presence	on	the	ward	and	appeared	to	be	able	to	approach	the	surgeons	when	required).				
6.5.2 Organisational	knowledge	as	a	distinct	type	of	evidence		As	I	described	earlier	in	this	chapter,	organisational	knowledge	appeared	to	shape	the	way	the	organisation	behaved	as	a	whole	rather	than	at	a	departmental	level	or	funding	stream.		The	knowledge	and	skills	of	the	individuals	who	managed	the	entire	hospital	appeared	to	be	considered	valuable,	but	they	seemed	intangible	across	the	three	organisations.		Senior	management	activities,	such	as	governance	and	financial	planning,	happened	in	the	background	and	did	not	appear	to	be	visible	to	the	front-line	staff.		The	surgeons	seemed	to	appreciate	that	without	the	senior	managers	and	administrators,	the	hospitals	could	not	function	as	an	organisation,	and	would	often	make	reference	to	the	“executive”	or	“board”	(OBS	notes	site	A	and	C	gen).		To	me,	this	group	of	managers	were	characterised	by	interviewees	as	a	faceless	entity,	rather	than	a	collection	of	named	individuals.				Nevertheless,	whenever	decisions	were	made	on	what	was	best	for	the	patient	or	patient	group,	organisational	knowledge,	perhaps	rightly,	appeared	to	be	considered	less	important	than	clinical	knowledge.		This	was	particularly	
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apparent	when	I	examined	the	cost	of	service	provision.		It	was	important	for	the	surgeons	to	consider	the	cost	of	orthopaedic	implants	in	general	terms,	as	described	below	“cost	does	come	into	play,	in	a	smaller	amount”.		However,	in	the	reality	of	practice,	cost	was	rarely	considered	in	decision-making,	particularly	for	implant	selection.			
“Definitely.	Yeah,	no,	it	does.	I	mean	I	don’t	think	it	should	ever	compromise	quality,	so	to	me	
number	one,	top	of	the	list	is	new	quality	so	if	there’s	something	that	a	patient’s	going	to	benefit	
from	which	is	more	expensive,	but	actually	that’s	a	better	prosthesis	or	a	better	operation,	then	
yeah,	I	will	not	think	of	cost	at	that	stage	at	all.	So	cost	does	come	into	play,	in	a	smaller	
amount.”(INT	C	218002)		The	key	sentence	in	the	quote	below	illustrates	how	clinical	knowledge	is	privileged	over	organisational	knowledge,	when	the	respondent	says	“Unfortunately	there’s,	in	medicine	there’s	always	a	way	of	justifying	whatever	
(implants)	you	want”.		I	asked	if	he	knew	the	cost	of	the	implants	he	used:		
“Probably	not	enough	detail	but	we	know	that	most	of	the	instruments	and	implants	that	you	use	in	
elective	orthopaedics	are	expensive	and	we	know	that	the	newer	ones	tend	to	be	more	expensive.	
You’re	given	quite	a	lot	of	autonomy	as	a	surgeon	so	you	are	allowed,	often	allowed	to	pick	those	
devices,	less	so	now	than	you	used	to	be	able	to	because	increasingly	other	people	make	those	
decisions	and	it’s	supposed	to	be	based	on	evidence.	It	often	usually	is	actually	but	still	you	are	given	
some	ability	to,	to	pick	what	you	want	to	use.	As	long	as	you	can	justify	it.	And	there’s	lots	of	ways	to	
justify	it.	Unfortunately	there’s,	in	medicine	there’s	always	a	way	of	justifying	whatever	you	want	in	
my	experience.	To	the	commissioners	you	can	often,	often	justify	it.”	(INT	C	218011)		The	senior	managers	and	their	knowledge	domains	appeared	to	be	respected	as	part	of	the	whole	service	delivery	process,	but	were	outside	what	the	clinicians	considered	as	the	core	business.		Organisational	knowledge	seemed	to	have	little	impact	on	the	ability	of	the	surgeons	to	treat	patients	day-to-day.		Instead,	they	clearly	believed	that	they	would	do	what	they	thought	was	necessary	for	the	patient	in	front	of	them	at	the	time	of	decision-making	and	“spend	the	extra	
amount	to	get	that	particular	kit	that	you	require	for	that	case”	(INT	C	218002).	
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This	personalisation	of	services	was	apparent	across	all	three	sites	I	visited,	even	in	site	A	where	the	implants	had	been	standardised.		The	surgeons	were	able	to	request	“special	case”	implants	or	kit	‘on	loan’	which	I	later	learned,	was	at	a	significant	cost	to	the	organisation	(OBS	notes	site	A	gen).		This	demonstrates	that	organisational	knowledge	was	not	able	to	compete	with	clinical	knowledge	which	the	surgeons	used	when	making	decisions	for	patients.			On	occasion,	I	came	across	surgeons	who	believed	that	it	was	their	responsibility	to	get	involved	in	organisational	decisions.		The	surgeon	quoted	below	was	from	site	A;	his	motivation	for	actively	taking	part	in	this	level	of	decision-making	was	because	he	believed	the	managers	did	not	have	the	appropriate	knowledge	to	do	so.		When	referring	to	the	senior	managers’	decision-making	processes	he	suggested	that	“those	people	won’t	know	what	the	clinical	problems	are	so	they	
might	make	the	wrong	decisions”…which	is	“dangerous	for	patients”.		Again,	this	helps	to	represent	the	divide	between	groups	and	their	knowledge	types:		
“So	yes,	I	do	get	involved	which	is	not	always	a	particularly	pleasant	thing	to	be	involved	in	it’s	just	a	
lot	of	nagging	and	hassling	and	negotiation,	but	I	think	if	the	clinicians	…	I	firmly	believe	that	we	
should	be	involved	because	if	the	clinicians	don’t	take	responsibility	for	what	they	spend	then	
someone	else	has	to	and	those	people	won’t	know	what	the	clinical	problems	are	so	they	might	
make	the	wrong	decisions.”	(INT	C	218008)	
6.5.2.1 Organisational	authority	over	knowledge		It	might	be	expected	that	the	privileging	of	organisational	knowledge	in	the	field	of	orthopaedics	would	be	increasing,	due	to	the	rising	demand	for	treatments	from	patients,	coupled	with	the	pressures	to	reduce	resource	use	from	Government.		However,	this	appeared	to	not	be	the	case	in	my	empirical	work.		Instead,	the	findings	suggest	that	the	influence	of	this	type	of	knowledge	in	clinical	practice	fluctuated.		This	depended	on	the	level	of	authority	that	management	held	over	other	staff	in	the	three	organisations.		At	site	C,	managerial	and	organisational	knowledge	held	very	little	power	over	the	decision-making	of	the	surgeons,	largely	because	they	appeared	not	to	share	information	and	knowledge	across	professional	groups.			
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Site	B	appeared	to	have	the	greatest	boundary	between	managers	and	clinical	staff.		However,	the	tensions	might	have	been	reinforced	at	the	time	of	study,	because	they	were	yet	to	complete	their	rationalisation	process.		One	consultant	surgeon	believed	that	organisational	knowledge	was	forced	upon	the	surgeons	from	above,	and	that	the	biggest	influencer	on	decision-making	for	his	organisation	was	“price”(INT	C	37011).		Across	all	three	sites,	I	noticed	a	distinction	between	the	organisational	knowledge	that	came	from	within	the	department,	i.e.,	from	the	ward	managers,	and	knowledge	that	came	from	the	wider	NHS	organisation.		The	organisational	knowledge	had	a	wider	structural	emphasis	and	it	appeared	to	be	ingrained	in	the	routines	of	the	hospitals.		However,	the	individuals	themselves	did	not	necessarily	acknowledge	that	this	type	of	knowledge	was	an	influence	on	their	behaviour	and	decision-making.				The	knowledge	appeared	to	exist	in	the	day-to-day	processes	themselves,	and	in	the	individual	actors	who	were	tasked	with	making	the	decisions.		However,	this	appeared	to	be	flexible,	for	example,	during	a	theatre	planning	meeting	at	site	A;			
“Theatre	planning	meetings	ensure	the	“effective	planning	and	management	of	operating	sessions	
to	improve	services	to	patients	and	ensure	optimum	use	of	operating	theatre	capacity”	(Doc	site	A	
Theatre	Operating	List	Session	Scheduling	Policy).	A	theatre	manager	told	me	that	planning	helped		
“reduce	waiting	times	for	patients	and	avoid	cancellations”.	But	it	was	not	simple.	Theatres	were	
expected	to	run	between	9.30am	and	5.30pm	but	the	reality	of	this	changed,	and	time	changes	
materialised	each	day.	The	situation	became	even	more	complex	when	any	emergencies	came	in.	
She	said,	“trying	to	get	us	more	time	and	space,	is	kind	of	a	balancing	act”.	(OBS	notes	site	A	
theatre)	
	I	observed	decision-making	according	to	patient	prioritisation	brokered	against	resource	availability	in	the	Trust.		The	excerpt	below	represents	a	decision	which	called	for	organisational	knowledge,	of	the	“time	and	space”	available	in	theatre,	and	clinical	knowledge	of	which	patients	have	or	should	have	“priority”.		However,	even	the	consultant	in	charge	stated	that	this	decision	was	“bigger	than	
me…I	can't	answer	this,	this	is	bigger	than	me”:		
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“Theatre	managers	would	read	through	planned	operations	and	suggest	a	theatre,	time	and	
surgeon	in	a	directive	manner;	“Mr	(name)	can	have	him”	or	“we	cant	do	him	today	we	don’t	have	
space”.	I	asked	if	consultants	ever	disagreed	with	his	planning.	He	said	“Sometimes,	they	trust	us,	
they	know	that	the	reason	they’ve	got	us	is	that	we	have	ideas	as	to	who’s	waiting	and	who	takes	
clinical	priority,	but	ultimately	if	I	can't	make	a	decision	because	I’ve	got	eight	(priority)	patients	
we	leave	it	to	the	consultant,	some	are	more	proactive	than	others.”	I	ask	what	happens,	he	recalls	
“Some	of	them	(say),	“This	is	bigger	than	me,	I	can't	answer	this,	this	is	bigger	than	me”	and	I	sort	of	
said,	“Well	if	it’s	bigger	than	you	it’s	a	whole	lot	bigger	than	me.”	(OBS	notes	site	A	theatre)	
	It	was	interesting	to	observe	how	the	role	of	decision-maker	was	passed	back	and	forth	between	the	manager	and	the	consultants	during	this	meeting.		The	lines	of	responsibility	were	not	explicit,	and	the	boundaries	blurred	depending	on	the	patient	prioritisation	and	available	resources	each	day.		The	way	that	these	decisions	happened	in	context	and	their	outcome	appeared	to	depend	on	a	combination	of	tacit	managerial	and	organisational	knowledge	to	make	decisions	at	a	certain	point	in	time.		This	might	be	a	source	of	variation	in	the	practice	of	orthopaedic	surgery	both	within	and	across	the	hospitals	that	I	studied.				However,	the	variation	that	was	present	should	not	be	deemed	poor	practice,	as	often	there	were	a	valid	contextual	reason	for	the	decisions.		As	shown	in	the	field	note	above,	not	all	of	the	eight	patients	that	needed	to	be	treated	that	day	could	be	treated,	due	to	lack	of	resource	in	the	hospital.		Instead,	variation	appeared	to	result	from	the	managerial	and	organisational	knowledge	types	at	work,	these	included	the	scheduling	and	categorisation	of	patients	as	‘for’,	or	‘not	for’	surgery	(access	to	treatment),	levels	of	treatment	delay	(waiting	times)	and	the	selection	of	orthopaedic	implants	for	patients	(quality	of	treatment	provided).			Because	of	the	greater	weight	given	to	knowledge	emanating	from	other	orthopaedic	surgeons,	decisions	tended	to	be	made	using	clinical	knowledge	on	behalf	of	the	orthopaedic	surgeons	as	a	powerful	socialised	group,	not	by	managers	using	managerial	and	organisational	knowledge	for	the	benefit	of	the	hospital	as	an	entire	organisation.		
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There	were	many	instances	during	my	period	of	observation	where	non-clinical	managers	working	in	the	hospitals	appeared	to	struggle	to	counteract	or	challenge	the	prestige	and	autonomy	that	clinical	staff	held.		This	was	an	area	of	conflict	for	mid-level	and	senior	managers	who	were	unable	to	proceed	towards	their	goals,	if	these	contested	the	surgical	plan	or	ideals.		An	assumed	level	of	acceptance	developed	a	‘glass	ceiling’	effect	where	organisational	decisions	only	appeared	to	proceed	so	far,	before	the	professional	clinical	gatekeepers	halted	plans	or	limited	what	could	be	achieved	in	practice.		
6.6 The	role	of	clinical	managers	for	improved	knowledge	
sharing		One	tactic	used	by	the	hospitals	in	an	attempt	to	address	this	conflict	and	overcome	the	lack	of	knowledge	mobilisation	was	employing	clinicians	into	senior	managerial,	or	hybrid	clinical-manager	roles.		The	rationale	for	these	boundary	spanning	roles	was	introduced	in	Chapter	2	with	the	discussion	of	boundary	spanners.		At	each	hospital	site,	there	was	a	clinical	director	in	charge	of	the	surgical	department,	who	also	maintained	his	or	her	clinical	role	in	the	orthopaedic	department.		It	was	extremely	important	to	these	individuals	that	they	were	able	to	maintain	their	clinical	position	in	the	organisation,	and	were	not	seen	to	be	moving	to	the	“dark	side”	of	management	(OBS	notes	site	A	gen).				A	senior	clinician	at	site	B	is	quoted	below,	describing	how	he	was	able	to	make	changes	in	his	Trust	by	introducing	a	“peer	review	process”	i.e.,	clinician-to-clinician	assessment,	rather	than	the	traditional	approach	of	management	auditing	the	performance	of	clinicians	against	a	guideline.		He	describes	this	novel	approach	as	“productive”:			
“Well,	I	mean,	the	only	thing	I’ve	done	with	NICE	was	I	was	the	clinical	lead	for	one	of	the	guidance	
documents	and	that...	I	mean,	that	was	productive	because	it	was	then	the	whole	national	process	
for	management.	A	programme	of	peer	review	was	then	constructed	around	the	document,	and	so	if	
you	weren’t	fulfilling	the...	So	in	our	organisation,	well	across	the	Trust,	we	would	have	a	peer	
review	process,	they	would	look	to	see	whether	you	complied	with	the	standards,	if	you	didn’t	then	
actions	at	various	levels	went	straight	back	to	the	Chief	Executive	and	things	were	done.”	(INT	C	
37003)		
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	A	surgeon	at	site	A	suggested	that	the	key	variable	in	achieving	effective	hybrid	roles,	and	hence	good	knowledge	sharing	between	the	orthopaedic	team	and	the	executive,	was	the	personality	of	the	clinical	managers.		He	is	described	below	as	
“just	very	opinionated”	but	this	individual	appeared	to	be	able	to	change	the	views	of	the	managers	and	improve	the	cross-functional	discussions:			
“So	if	you’ve	got	…	we	had	a	very,	very	effective	clinical	director	here	who’s	just	very	opinionated	
and	driven	and	had	very	firm	ideas	about	what	was	good	but	also	very	personable.		So	the	exec	liked	
him.	Which	was	hugely	powerful	and	so	we	went	from	a	department	that	seemed	to	be	kind	of	
important	because	we	were	big	and	there	was	a	lot	of	money	going	through	the	department	but	not	
particularly	on	the	management	side,	bit	too	much	autonomy	historically,	bit	too	vociferous,	
occasionally	troublemaking	group	to	being	seen	as	being	part	of	the	exec’s	team…yes	there’s	
tensions,	there's	always	going	to	be	between	the	senior	management	and	the	clinicians,	but	much	
better	than	we	had	previously.”	(INT	C	218008)		Despite	these	positive	narratives,	I	often	observed	a	lack	of	presence	of	the	senior	clinical	managers	at	management	meetings.		Attendance	could	not	always	be	guaranteed,	and	this	appeared	to	be	accepted	in	the	meetings	because	the	clinical	work	“had	to	come	first”	and	the	managers	felt	this	“was	understandable”	
(OBS	notes	site	A	gen).		There	seemed	to	be	no	apparent	response	or	reprimand	for	the	lack	of	attendance	(OBS	notes	site	A	CG	meeting;	OBS	notes	site	B	meeting).			Individuals	in	these	clinician-managerial	roles	appeared	to	develop	personal	tensions	when	trying	to	make	decisions	that	conflicted	with	their	personal	goals	of	practice,	against	those	that	were	for	the	best	interest	of	the	hospital.		One	surgeon	at	site	A	had	to	try	to	improve	knowledge	sharing	by	acting	as	the	go-between.		He	described	the	role	as	expanding	into	the	management	realm	to	include	“everything	from	human	resource	issues	in	the	department	to	discipline	
issues	and	professional	conduct	issues	through	to	the	finances”	(INT	C	218008).		Surgeons	at	site	C	appeared	to	believe	that	these	boundary	spanning	roles	could	help	ease	the	divide	between	the	different	professional	groups.		The	surgeon	below	describes	how	they	helped	to	share	the	importance	of	managerial	and	
		 196	
organisational	knowledge	regarding	“budgets”,	“profit”	and	“investment”	with	the	clinical	teams:			
“So	actually	that	one-to-one	relationship	(with	the	manager)	and	how	we	talk	to	each	other	is	how	
it	works	really	and	we	are	now	I	think	trusted	to	do	the	right	thing	and	that	we	are	interested	in	
keeping	budget	under	control	and	only	expanding	where	it’s	profitable	to	do	so	for	the	Trust.”	(INT	
C	198005)			However,	his	colleague	gave	a	slightly	different	view.		Instead,	this	surgeon	stated	that	the	“perception	that	you’re	trying”	to	understand	managerial	knowledge	was	more	influential	in	getting	acceptance	from	the	management	team:		
“So	if	you’re	seen	to	…	make	the	effort	to	understand	what	the	managers’	position	is	and	why	they’re	
trying	to	drive	particular	changes	and	particular	ways,	they’ll	much	more	respect	you.”	(INT	C	
198003)	
	One	particular	issue	that	I	observed	across	all	three	sites	was	the	surgeon	manager	appearing	to	advocate	for	their	own	preferred	hip	implant	choices,	during	the	implant	rationalisation	or	prioritisation	meetings.		Their	privileged	position	in	both	management	and	clinical	camps	gave	an	assumed	weight	and	power	to	their	point	of	view.		However,	at	site	B	this	resulted	in	tensions	with	other	surgeons	who	saw	the	potential	vested	interest.		This	is	described	below	when	a	colleague	of	the	clinical	manager	said	“he’s	going	to	get	what	he	
wants…How	can	he	have	what	he	wants?”	in	reference	to	implant	selection	decisions	(INT	M	37005).		Brokering	the	equally	important	and	valid	sources	of	evidence	and	knowledge	during	decision-making	was	a	difficult	task	for	clinical	managers.		Knowledge	that	was	not	considered	important	(external	and	non-clinical),	often	appeared	to	be	poorly	absorbed	or	ignored	by	the	medical	professional	groups.		The	individual	clinical	managers	also	did	not	want	to	take	sole	responsibility	for	managerial	decisions.		This	appeared	to	be	because	of	their	clinical	roles,	and	the	impact	that	outcomes	might	have	on	their	relationship	with	clinical	colleagues.			
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	For	example,	the	surgeons	at	site	C	did	not	want	to	lose	the	respect	of	their	colleagues	by	stepping	outside	their	profession	and	appearing	to	prioritise	the	managerial	or	organisational	knowledge	over	their	clinical	knowledge.		Individual	representatives	working	here,	in	particular	wanted	to	“check	back”	with	their	colleagues	before	making	an	important	decision	at	a	planning	meeting	
(OBS	notes	site	C	gen),	for	fear	of	being	blamed	if	or	when	something	went	wrong	or	was	not	appropriate.		In	both	cases,	the	decision-makers	seemed	to	prefer	making	decisions	through	consensus	by	committee	in	practice.	
6.7 Professional	hierarchies	in	the	Trusts	There	was	significant	importance	attached	to	clinical	knowledge	across	all	three	Trusts,	and	this	appeared	to	be	linked	to	the	medical	hierarchy.		This	hierarchy	appeared	to	limit	the	impact	that	external	knowledge	could	potentially	have	in	practice,	and	the	mobilisation	that	could	take	place	in	the	organisation	because	of	the	power	that	surgeons	held	over	managers	who	were	responsible	for	overseeing	the	workings	of	the	hospital.			Organisational	culture	appeared	to	reinforce	this	situation.		It	appeared	to	help	establish	a	sense	of	organisational	membership	for	the	surgeons,	which	was	grounded	in	‘where	you	work’	as	well	as	‘what	you	do’.	Within	two	(A	and	C)	of	the	three	hospitals	there	was	a	sense	of	organisational	membership,	as	staff	referred	to	themselves	as	belonging	to	their	Trust	as	well	as	being	members	of	their	profession.		At	the	start	of	the	majority	of	my	interviews,	surgeons	would	say,	“I	am	an	orthopaedic	surgeon	at	site	X”.				Despite	a	general	sense	of	organisational	membership,	the	professionals	in	site	A	and	the	split	B	sites	held	a	superior	layer	of	identity	that	appeared	to	be	defined	by	their	role,	i.e.,	what	they	do.		Being	a	surgeon,	and	being	an	orthopaedic	surgeon,	outplayed	or	trumped	being	a	member	of	the	Trust.		The	professionals	looked	to	be	able	to	establish	legitimacy,	higher	status,	discretion	and	knowledge	boundaries	around	‘first’	being	an	orthopaedic	surgeon.		This	might	limit	
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absorption	of	knowledge	from	external	sources,	but	also	transfer	of	knowledge	across	the	departments	and	in	the	organisation	more	generally.			
6.7.1 NICE	and	the	professional	hierarchy		The	lowest	professional	group	had	very	little	power	and	control	over	the	other	two	groups,	and	were	viewed	as	“just	the	administrators”	in	the	organisation	
(OBS	notes	site	B	gen).		Unfortunately,	it	was	this	lowest	group	who	was	responsible	for	the	implementation	of	NICE	guidance	across	all	three	case	study	sites.		I	did	not	encounter	a	single	senior	manager	or	clinician	whose	sole	responsibility	was	guideline	work,	although,	it	was	often	a	small	segment	of	a	wider	portfolio	of	tasks	for	which	they	were	responsible.			The	response	by	internal	hierarchies	appeared	to	be	consistent,	irrespective	of	the	type	of	evidence	being	produced	and	disseminated	by	the	administrators.		Internal	hospital	protocols	were	treated	in	the	same	way	as	the	clinical	guidelines	directly	obtained	from	external	bodies	such	as	NICE.		This	demonstrates	low	levels	of	absorptive	capacity	across	the	three	organisations,	as	they	were	not	in	a	position	to	actively	identify,	integrate,	transform	and	use	knowledge	from	external	bodies	in	practice.		The	summary	excerpt	below	details	my	reflections	from	attending	NICE	implementation	meetings	across	the	three	hospitals.		The	words	“being	ignored”	and	“overlooked”	by	clinical	staff	were	ever	present	in	my	findings	relating	to	this	topic:			
“At	each	site	there	was	an	individual	administrator	or	department	that	was	responsible	for	
implementing	NICE	guidance	(site	A	had	a	mixed	seniority	group	but	a	single	staff	grade	5	
administrator,	site	B	employed	two	staff	grade	6	administrators,	site	C	had	one	individual	who	was	
staff	grade	5).	At	NICE	guideline	meetings,	all	three	sites	reported	an	on-going	issue	of	requests	for	
action	being	ignored	or	overlooked	by	clinicians	in	the	hospital.	I	attended	more	than	one	of	these	
meetings	during	the	three-month	period	and	some	issues	had	been	on	the	agenda	for	months,	and	
were	not	resolved	before	I	left.	The	suggested	solution	to	this	was	to	escalate	the	issues	to	a	senior	
clinician	within	the	department,	with	the	hope	that	they	could	have	an	influence	down	the	
hierarchy.	If	this	was	unsuccessful	the	hospital	executive	responsible	for	governance	would	be	
notified	to	investigate	whether	a	risk	needed	to	be	registered.	Only	one	hospital	(site	A)	had	a	
formal	escalation	policy	that	I	could	access	and	read,	the	other	two	hospitals	relied	on	good	will	of	
other	clinicians	or	finding	the	“right	person”	to	act	as	a	lever	for	change.”	(OBS	notes	summary	NICE	
meeting	gen)	
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	Although	the	observation	note	above	applied	to	NICE	guidelines,	it	demonstrates	the	way	in	which	important	decision-making	processes	within	the	organisation	were	driven	by	the	acceptance	of	the	hierarchy	and	the	roles	of	clinicians.		This	did	not	represent	the	hierarchy	of	evidence	in	traditional	EBM	as	clinical	knowledge	always	held	more	weight.		For	instance	the	solution	quoted	above	was	to	“escalate	the	issues	to	a	senior	clinician”.		However,	this	did	not	ensure	that	it	was	actioned.		The	administrators	and	managers	were	unable	to	act	and	move	forward	until	the	response	from	the	clinical	group	had	been	received.		Often,	I	observed	that	the	response	would	not	be	obtained	despite	multiple	requests	over	time.				The	evidence	from	NICE	guidance	frequently	appeared	not	to	align	to	the	socialised	knowledge	standards	within	the	hospitals.		In	this	sense,	the	codified	knowledge	in	guidelines	does	not	reflect	the	common	values,	language,	procedures	and	know-how	in	the	clinical	departments	or	issues	important	for	their	context	and	therefore	were	not	seen	as	a	priority.		The	excerpt	below	from	site	B	demonstrates	that	NICE	guidelines	were	valued	by	the	hospital	board	as	a	method	to	reduce	variation,	due	to	the	fact	that	they	“avoid(s)	people	getting	
confused”	and	avoid	“nurses	doing	the	wrong	thing”.		They	were	not	seen	as	a	way	to	crystallise	the	evidence-base.		This	manager	believed	he	would	“fail	to	
convince	the	consultant	body	in	this	organisation	that	guidelines	are	a	good	thing”:			
	
“So	the	problem	is	you	can	argue	about	the	pathway	until	you’re	blue	in	the	face.	We’re	internally	at	
a	sort	of	fairly	senior	level	very	convinced	that	reducing	variability	is	a	good	thing	to	do.		A	method	
of	achieving	reduced	variability	would	be	to	put	in	standard	pathways	and,	you	know,	Quality	
Standards	and	NICE	guidance	and	things	would	be	a	very	good	way	of	informing	those	pathways…	
it’s	just	by	doing	that	you	want	to	reduce	the	variability,	and	the	reduction	in	the	variability	avoids	
people	getting	confused	and	nurses	doing	the	wrong	thing	because	it’s	a	Tuesday	as	opposed	to	a	
Wednesday	or	whatever,	that’s	the	value	in	it	in	its	own	right,	but	I	certainly	singularly	fail	to	
convince	the	consultant	body	in	this	organisation	that	guidelines	are	a	good	thing.”	(INT	M	300515)		This	board	member	distinguished	between	nurses	and	consultants	in	the	likelihood	that	they	would	follow	guidelines,	reinforcing	evidence	I	have	
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collected	elsewhere	about	the	professional	hierarchy.		
6.8 	Cross-case	analysis:	Organisations		Each	of	the	hospitals	can	be	characterised	as	distinct,	displaying	individual	organisational	knowledge,	management	strategies,	structures	and	processes	regarding	their	use	of	knowledge	and	evidence.	Table	13	summarises	the	findings	presented	in	this	chapter	with	an	overview	of	a	variety	of	organisational	factors	between	hospitals.		
	
Table	13.		Overview	of	the	organisational	level	factors	by	hospital	
Knowledge,	Capacity	
And	Contingency	In	
Organisations		
A	 B	 C	
Organisational	strategy		 Innovation	and	quality	
improvement	
Personalised	care	for	
patients		
Sustainability	
External	demands	 Compliance	with	bodies	
such	as	NICE	and	to	
government	targets		
Achieving	government	
targets	such	as	best	
practice	tariffs	
Achieving	local	targets,	
for	example	set	by	the	
CCG	and	government	
targets	Environmental	pressures	 Increased	demand	on	the	entire	hospital	
organisation,	i.e.,	at	A&E,	
that	impacts	upon	
orthopaedics		
Increased	demand	for	
services	
Increased	demand	for	
services	not	matched	by	
the	prevision	of	
resources	(more	surgery	
less	theatre)		Rationalisation	process	(cost	contingency)		 Rationalisation	completed	–	very	tight	
control		
Rationalisation	under	
way	–	little	control	by	
departmental	
managers,	required	
senior	board	support		
Free-for-all,	
rationalisation	not	yet	
occurred	but	sense	that	
it	will	happen	soon		
Process	of	organisational	change	(NICE	implementation)		
Processes	in	place	with	
escalation	plans	to	senior	
management	to	ensure	
compliance		
Processes	in	place	with	
optional	tick	box	
compliance		
Processes	in	place	with	
tick	box	compliance	
Organisational	culture	 Something	the	
organisation	has.	
Encouraging	and	
inclusive		
	
Something	the	
organisation	is.	
Command	and	control	
by	management		
Something	the	
organisation	is.	Led	by	
the	professionals,	i.e.,	
the	norms	of	the	
orthopaedic	group		Clinical	autonomy			 Medium		 High		 High		
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Organisational	sub-cultures		 Present,	academic	surgeons	and	surgeons,	
managers	and	
administrators	
Present,	sub-groups	by	
physical	location.	Sub-
groups	surgeons	vs.	
managers	and	
administrators	within	
B1	and	B2	
Present,	surgeons	vs.	
managers	and	
administrators		
Conflict	within	the	sub-cultures		 Low	 High	across	site	and	within	sites		 High	between	management	and	
clinical	staff		Managerial	knowledge		 Recognised	as	important	
by	clinical	staff	but	not	
always	acted	on			
Focus	on	achieving	
targets	linked	to	
financial	incentives	and	
cost	savings		
Not	important,	local	
clinical	knowledge	
privileged		
Organisational	knowledge		 Recognised	as	important	by	clinical	staff	but	not	
always	acted	on.	Strong	
sense	that	biomedical	
and	clinical	research	
knowledge	was	standard	
practice	
Split	site	organisational	
knowledge	focused	on	
hospital	processes	and	
efficiency	
Government	targets	and	
benchmarking	is	
privileged	
Socialisation	of	professional	groups	 Strong	clinical	academic	professional	identity		 Strong	orthopaedic	professional	identity	at	
both	B1	and	B2	sites		
Strong	orthopaedic	
professional	identity	
Role	of	clinical	manager	 Yes,	focus	on	management	knowledge		 ‘On	paper	only’.	Role	was	established	but	
responsibilities	not	
always	achieved		
Yes,	focus	on	the	
surgeon	as	the	go-
between	with	the	
managers		Professional	hierarchy		 Flatter	structure		 Strong	within	the	two	
sites	
Strong	within	surgeons	
at	the	top.	Managers	
and	administrators	at	
the	bottom.	Flat	
structure	within	the	
clinical	group		
6.9 	Summary	of	the	theme	This	theme	has	highlighted	how	organisational	knowledge	and	the	capacity	and	contingences	of	the	hospital	influenced	the	use	of	evidence	for	decision-making	in	orthopaedic	practice.		Although	each	hospital	was	an	organisation	in	its	own	right,	each	demonstrated	varying	levels	of	fragmentation.		The	cross-case	analysis	revealed	that	this	included	fragmentation	between	locations	at	the	same	
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hospital	in	site	B,	as	well	as	fragmentation	between	professional	groups.		In	site	C,	there	was	a	distinct	sense	of	‘us	and	them’	between	the	management	of	the	hospital	and	the	clinical	staff.		Of	all	three	hospitals,	site	A	had	the	most	established	sense	of	organisational	identity,	but	the	orthopaedic	surgeons	remained	a	distinct	professional	group	with	their	own	ways	of	working	and	methods	for	privileging	evidence.			The	key	message	from	the	findings	presented	within	this	theme	is	that	decision-making	and	variation	in	practice	may	be	linked	to,	and	possibly	predicted	by,	the	knowledge,	organisational	capacity	and	contingences	of	the	hospital.		This	appeared	to	be	related	to	the	organisational	and	managerial	knowledge	that	was	present	in	the	three	sites,	and	how	much	impact	this	had,	or	did	not	have,	on	the	distinct	professional	groups.		Clinical	knowledge	was	privileged	over	other	knowledge	types.		However,	organisational	and	managerial	knowledge	seemed	to	hold	more	weight	in	site	A	than	either	B	or	C.		Across	all	three	sites,	I	noticed	a	distinction	between	the	organisational	knowledge	that	came	from	within	the	department,	and	knowledge	that	came	from	the	wider	NHS	organisation.			Organisational	knowledge	appeared	to	shape	the	perspectives	of	clinicians	working	in	that	hospital	when	compared	to	clinicians	working	in	the	other	locations,	for	example	the	general	attitude	of	the	organisation	towards	NICE	guidelines	at	site	A	was	that	they	are	integral	to	practice,	compared	to	sites	B	and	C	where	compliance	to	guidelines	was	considered	optional.		This	represented	the	characteristics	of	staff	present	in	each	of	the	hospitals.		As	described	in	Chapter	2,	organisational	knowledge	echoes	the	normative	processes	of	the	hospitals	and	replicates	the	common	education,	training	and	career	structures	of	the	organisations.		Organisational	knowledge	in	my	study	also	reflected	the	organisational	contingencies	which	acted	on	the	hospitals.		There	were	many	instances	of	resource	constraints	which	directly	influenced	decisions	made	by	staff.		The	most	common	issues	I	observed	included	time	pressures,	theatre	availability	across	the	Trust,	the	presence	of	protected	elective	beds,	surgical	waiting	lists	and	the	method	for	prioritising	patients	for	
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surgery.		I	found	no	clinical	guidelines	to	help	facilitate	decision-making	for	any	of	these	issues,	as	they	appeared	to	be	context-dependent	and	changed	daily.		Instead,	this	organisational	knowledge	and	its	solutions	developed	over	time	and	became	entrenched.		The	knowledge	then	existed	in	the	day-to-day	processes	themselves	and	in	the	individual	actors	who	were	tasked	with	making	the	decisions.			It	is	important	to	understand	the	different	patterns	of	socialisation	to	discover	how	individuals	act	in	different	ways	as	a	hospital	member	or	as	an	orthopaedic	surgeon.		This	changing	dynamic	was	very	difficult	to	unpick	in	the	findings.		It	would	be	helpful	to	be	able	to	predict	when	professionals	are	inclined	to	identify	with	their	organisation	and	its	aims,	as	opposed	to	when	they	identify	as	an	orthopaedic	surgeon	concerned	with	‘what	is	best	for	me	and	my	practice’.		However,	the	traditional	drivers	of	organisational	identification,	such	as	gaining	a	sense	of	prestige,	may	not	have	been	an	adequate	motivator	for	the	orthopaedic	surgeons	in	my	study.		They	appeared	to	fulfil	their	needs	for	prestige	elsewhere,	for	example,	through	their	personal	affiliation	and	membership	of	a	professional	society,	or	through	the	conduct	of	high-quality	research.			In	order	to	overcome	this	and	promote	knowledge	sharing,	the	organisations	might	need	to	provide	a	larger	value	proposition	to	the	surgeons	to	motivate	them	to	think	‘hospital	first’	rather	than	‘surgeon	first’.		However,	this	solution	was	not	observed	in	the	findings	from	any	of	the	hospitals	I	studied.		There	was	an	intrinsic	value	for	the	surgeons	in	having	networks	of	‘people	like	me’	within	their	Trusts	who	had	the	capacity	to	connect	with	others	in	positions	of	power	to	mobilise	the	knowledge	they	decided	was	important.				Being	a	surgeon	was	held	in	high	esteem	by	surgeons	and	other	staff	because	of	the	associated	norms	and	advantages	that	the	role	brings,	alongside	the	ability	to	maintain	a	higher	position	within	the	hospital	hierarchy.		This	inevitability	might	work	against	the	capability	of	the	hospital	and	its	managerial	and	administrative	staff	to	absorb	and	mobilise	knowledge	and	to	develop	as	an	organisation.		It	also	
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appeared	to	undermine	the	established	standardised	processes,	structures	and	mechanisms	set	up	to	try	to	achieve	organisational	strategy	and	collective	goals.		In	this	chapter	I	have	described	the	organisational	issues	that	influenced	decision-making	for	surgeons	in	my	study.		The	final	results	chapter	will	depict	the	regulatory	environment	in	which	individual	surgeons,	groups	and	organisations	functioned.				 	
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7 Results	4:	The	Influence	of	the	Regulatory	
Environment		
7.1 Introduction		This	theme	describes	the	regulatory	forces	acting	on	the	three	healthcare	organisations	during	the	period	of	data	collection.		These	forces	originate	outside	the	hospital,	and	are	referred	to	as	environmental	influencers	in	this	theme.		In	the	UK,	there	are	many	healthcare	organisations	which	are	largely	governed	by	the	same	regulatory	processes.		Within	my	study,	these	regulatory	forces	appeared	to	be	enacted	at	three	different	levels:	individual,	groups	and	organisations.		Despite	similar	environmental	pressures,	my	findings	revealed	that	the	organisational	response	varied.		These	apparent	differences	were	also	associated	with	how	each	hospital	dealt	with	regulation	from	policy-makers	and	from	professional	bodies,	which	drove	aspects	of	decision-making	for	the	hospitals	as	entire	organisations.		This	extends	my	previous	theme,	where	I	described	how	the	capacity	and	capability	of	an	organisation	to	deliver	healthcare	services	might	be	affected	by	the	wider	social	environment	and	existing	structures.			The	wider	social	environment	in	my	study	appeared	to	be	legitimised	by	the	established	regulatory	structures	that	I	observed.		This	process	of	legitimisation	sustained	the	knowledge	that	was	privileged	and	used	in	the	three	hospitals.		Organisational	traditions	in	healthcare	are	generated	by	the	national	regulatory	environment,	develop	over	time	and	are	accepted	and	maintained	within	hospitals	in	general.		This	meant	that	managers,	orthopaedic	surgeons	and	their	work	could	potentially	be	compared	across	the	three	sites.		This	allowed	me	to	examine	how	the	regulatory	environmental	forces	influenced	practice	for	the	sector	as	a	whole.				This	theme	presents	the	case	that	the	wider	environmental	influencers	in	the	NHS	impact	on	the	development	of	organisational	arrangements,	tasks,	roles,	knowledge	mobilisation,	and	management	of	knowledge	objects	and	evidence,	in	
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line	with	regulation.		This	alignment	appeared	to	take	precedence	over	and	above	the	pressure	to	achieve	internally-defined	organisational	success	and	standards.		In	this	theme,	I	will	use	examples	from	the	data	to	highlight	how	regulation	from	political	and	professional	authorities	influenced	the	use	and	uptake	of	evidence	in	the	three	sites.		I	will	demonstrate	how	these	wider	environmental	factors	affected	the	hospitals’	capacity	for	knowledge	and	evidence	mobilisation,	and	helped	to	determine	the	practice	of	orthopaedic	surgery	and	clinical	decision-making.			
7.2 Environmental	pressure	acting	on	hospitals				The	findings	presented	in	the	previous	three	results	chapters	have	shown	how	each	hospital	adopted	particular	structures	and	working	routines	because	of	three	types	of	pressure.		These	pressures	are	linked	to	the	statutory	obligations	of	the	organisation,	pressure	to	learn	from	and	imitate	others	with	the	same	professional	identity,	and	normative	pressure	which	originates	from	the	attitudes	and	approaches	of	similar	groups	of	people	working	in	the	organisation.		This	theme	focuses	on	pressure	from	the	wider	environment.			In	my	study,	statutory	obligations	extended	beyond	the	individual	hospital	and	orthopaedic	departments	and	could	include	regulation	by	the	professional	medical	authorities	and	regulation	of	the	hospitals	as	whole	organisations	that	deliver	healthcare.		Environmental	pressure	also	appeared	to	stem	from	less	formally-regulated	sources.		Considerations	regarding	hospital	“benchmarking”	for	clinical	outcomes	against	other	hospitals,	and	the	ability	to	achieve	
“performance	targets	above	the	standard”	set	by	regulators	were	also	mentioned	
(OBS	notes	site	A	gen).		An	example	of	this	was	found	at	hospital	A,	which	had	an	internal	standard	to	attain	a	100%	data	collection	target	for	hip	replacement	surgery,	whereas	sites	B	and	C	achieved	the	conventional	target	of	85%	that	was	established	by	the	national	regulator.		The	healthcare	sector	is	notorious	for	its	constant	organisational	change.		Changes	which	have	significant	impact	on	the	statutory	responsibilities	and	funding	arrangements	of	hospitals	are	regularly	introduced.		During	the	time	of	
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my	study,	changes	were	being	made	to	the	way	tariff	payments	were	received	for	hip	replacement	surgery	(Doc	analy	BPT).		Often	these	changes	are	linked	to	system-wide	organisational	issues	such	as	financial	accountability	and	effectiveness.		Achieving	these	changes,	such	as	those	made	to	the	tariff,	was	not	the	responsibility	of	a	single	person	in	the	three	hospitals.		This	shared	target	complicated	the	situation,	as	it	required	a	collective	understanding	of	what	was	required	and	collective	action	to	implement	a	change.		This	was	not	always	the	case	in	the	three	hospitals	as	fragmentation	appeared	to	be	the	norm.			The	traditions	and	structures	that	developed	in	each	hospital	over	time	helped	to	maintain	the	organisational	fragmentation	and	promote	its	survival.		An	example	is	the	established	status	and	autonomy	that	surgeons	held	over	decision-making	within	their	hospitals,	which	helped	to	ensure	that	administrators	and	managers	
“knew	their	place”	in	the	decision	hierarchy,	particularly	when	implant	rationalisation	programmes	were	under	way	(OBS	notes	site	B	gen).				Traditions	and	structures	such	as	this	appeared	to	make	organisational	change	difficult	to	accomplish.		They	formed	a	barrier	to	change,	and	may	have	a	negative	impact	on	the	competitive	position	of	the	organisation.		The	three	hospitals	were	required	to	abide	by	regulatory	targets	for	the	selection	of	hip	replacement	implants	and	therefore	they	were	all	able	to	achieve	a	certain	standard	level	of	practice.		This	is	similar	for	organisational	service	delivery,	for	example	to	be	a	designated	orthopaedic	trauma	centre	such	as	site	A	and	C,	hospitals	have	to	function	24	hours	a	day,	for	seven	days	a	week	and	have	consultant-led	specialists	teams	with	access	to	diagnostic	and	treatment	facilities	including	neurosurgery	and	radiology	(Doc	analy	NHS	choices).		Therefore,	it	would	make	sense	to	assume	that	all	orthopaedic	trauma	centres	in	the	country	function	in	much	the	same	way.		However,	my	findings	have	revealed	that	this	was	not	necessarily	the	case.		The	multiple	contingencies	and	constraints	of	practice	which	are	presented	and	discussed	in	the	other	three	results	chapters	appeared	to	influence	how	the	organisation	operates	as	a	whole	in	relation	to	their	wider	environmental	and	regulatory	context.		
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The	presence	of	environmental	regulatory	pressures,	traditions	and	structures,	appeared	to	work	both	for	and	against	knowledge	mobilisation	in	the	individual	hospitals	I	examined.		This	may	result	in	the	hospital	as	an	organisation	behaving	differently.		Regulation	helps	to	ensure	that	standard	levels	of	practice	for	safety,	quality	and	efficiency	are	reached,	but	will	limit	the	opportunity	for	innovation	and	change	in	service	delivery	outside	what	is	considered	the	normal	range.			
7.2.1 The	regulation	of	healthcare	professionals	in	England	All	three	hospital	sites	had	to	conform	and	achieve	the	minimum	professional	regulatory	standards	set	out	by	the	relevant	bodies	and	policy-makers.		Flexibility	appeared	to	be	influenced	by	how	each	hospital	met	the	requirements	of	regulators.		In	my	study,	the	‘environment’	encompassed	the	wider	delivery	of	healthcare	in	England,	which	is	governed	by	the	UK	Health	and	Social	Care	Regulators	(GMC,	2016).		At	the	time	I	conducted	the	empirical	work,	there	were	12	regulators.		Each	one	governed	the	individual	clinicians,	therapists	and	registered	staff	across	the	UK	(Doc	analy	GMC).		To	practise	as	a	clinician	in	the	NHS,	an	individual	has	to	be	registered	with	their	relevant	regulator,	otherwise	they	risk	being	prosecuted.		In	orthopaedics,	surgeons	have	to	be	registered	with	the	General	Medical	Council	(GMC)	and	with	their	Royal	College.		The	GMC	is	responsible	for	ensuring	that	surgeons	are	included	in	an	up-to-date	registry	of	qualified	doctors.		As	an	organisation,	they	aim	to	promote	high	standards	of	medical	education	and	training	and	deal	with	individuals	whose	fitness	to	practise	is	questioned	(Doc	
analy	RCS	2016).		Royal	Colleges,	such	as	The	Royal	College	of	Surgeons	of	England	(RCS),	on	the	other	hand,	are	professional	membership	organisations.		They	appeared	to	have	a	more	concentrated	responsibility	to	improve	surgical	standards.		They	develop	policies	and	good	practice	guidance	that	were	used	by	surgeons	working	in	the	three	hospitals,	for	example	the	‘Consent:	Supported	Decision-Making’	guidance	(Doc	analy	RCS	S&R).		Throughout	the	data	collection,	it	appeared	that	the	surgeons	took	pride	in	their	membership	of	their	professional	bodies	such	as	the	RCS,	and	surgical	specialty	groups	such	as	the	BOA.		The	BOA	and	the	RCS	were	upheld	as	organisations	that	could	and	should	be	trusted	to	regulate,	even	to	review	hospital	functions.	
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	During	my	data	collection,	it	appeared	that	the	surgeons	and	other	clinicians	were	reluctant	to	step	outside	their	professional	bodies’	regulations	and	guidelines.		I	also	did	not	observe	the	surgeons	or	associated	staff	going	against	the	standards	set	by	regulators	such	as	the	GMC.		I	assume	that	this	might	be	because	the	individual	risks	associated	with	violation	of	the	regulations	are	of	such	great	significance	to	clinical	careers.		For	example,	where	doctors	are	seen	as	posing	a	risk	to	patients	they	can	be	immediately	suspended	from	practice,	asked	to	retrain	or	in	serious	cases	be	‘struck	off’	the	medical	register.		The	pressure	of	regulation	on	the	practice	of	surgery	was	a	recurrent	theme	in	the	findings.		Surgeons	used	phrases	such	as	“be	shot	down	in	flames”,	“be	hauled	up”	and	“I’m	expendable”	to	depict	their	perception	of	negative	reporting	from	regulators	(INT	C	37010),	(INT	C	37011),	(INT	C	198005).		The	apprehension	surrounding	professional	regulation	was	evident	in	interviews	with	non-clinical	staff	working	in	the	hospitals.		When	asked	to	make	a	decision	about	an	operation,	the	manager	of	the	department	at	site	B	said	“it’s	
not	my	registration	on	the	line,	it’s	theirs”	and	suggests	that	this	might	be	a	problem	that	needs	to	be	“overcome”	(INT	M	37004).		This	strict	adherence	to	professional	regulation	was	counter	to	the	bending	of	the	rules	that	I	observed	regarding	regulation	as	applied	to	the	entire	organisation.		Throughout	the	data	collection	there	were	many	instances	of	non-compliance	or	avoidance	of	targets	set	by	government,	or	guidelines	established	by	independent	bodies	such	as	NICE,	or	regulation	promoted	by	the	Care	Quality	Commission	(CQC)	or	the	local	CCG	at	the	organisational	level.		A	CCG	lead	believed	it	was	easier	to	“go	round”	the	surgeons,	than	“try	and	go	through	them”	when	setting	up	contract	objectives	for	the	delivery	of	hip	replacement.		It	was	assumed	by	this	CCG	group	that	the	surgeons	would	find	a	way	to	deviate	from	the	contractual	obligations	that	were	agreed	(INT	M	218001).		At	first	glance,	it	appeared	that	the	rules	and	regulations	established	by	these	groups	might	not	be	as	important	to	individuals.		However,	it	seems	likely	that	
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they	were	easier	to	bend,	break	or	deviate	from,	or	because	any	penalty	was	not	enacted	at	an	individual	level.		In	the	findings,	ownership	of	regulation	from	the	CCG,	NICE	or	the	CQC	was	seen	as	spread	across	the	entire	organisation.			
7.2.2 The	regulation	of	healthcare	services	in	England		I	observed	two	types	of	regulatory	forces	acting	on	the	three	hospitals	during	my	observations.		Health	and	safety	aspects	were	managed	by	the	CQC,	whereas	the	market	regulators	were	the	Department	of	Health	(DH)	and	Monitor.				Monitor	was	established	to	administer	the	financial	performance	of	all	hospitals	which	had	achieved	foundation	Trust	status	(Doc	analy	Monitor	2016).		All	three	hospitals	in	this	study	were	Foundation	Trusts	and	were	regulated	by	both	the	CQC	and	Monitor.		It	appeared	that	the	aim	of	becoming	a	Foundation	Trust	was	to	have	greater	financial	control	for	the	decisions	made	within	the	Trust.		One	board	member	described	it	as	“achieving	freedom”	from	the	powers	of	Government	to	make	decisions	for	his	organisation	(OBS	notes	site	B	BRD).			CCGs	were	tasked	with	commissioning	services	during	my	study.		Their	selection	processes	appeared	to	have	led	to	variation	in	the	delivery	of	orthopaedic	services	across	the	three	areas,	and	even	distinct	at	hospital	sites.		I	observed	a	diversity	of	services	depending	on	commissioning	plans	in	that	area,	as	described	in	the	field	note	below:		
“A	triage	service	has	been	commissioned	at	site	B	so	that	patients	first	access	a	GP,	then	the	triage	
team	with	a	specialist	physiotherapist	and	finally	an	orthopaedic	surgeon	prior	to	being	considered	
for	a	hip	replacement.	A	pathway	to	support	this	three-step	process	has	been	set	up	and	agreed	by	
the	providers.	The	local	CCG	were	supportive	of	this	decision	because	it	“provided	more	appropriate	
points	of	access	and	treatment	for	musculoskeletal	patients”.”	(OBS	notes	site	B	Int).	
	The	commissioning	approach	appeared	to	cause	problems	for	the	staff	who	worked	in,	and	were	responsible	for,	individual	departments	such	as	the	triage	service	described	above.		They	reported	being	under	“constant	pressure”	to	justify	their	service	in	terms	of	achieving	outcomes	and	targets,	referred	to	during	observations	as	“delivering	on	the	contract”.		This	pressure	was	confounded	by	the	need	to	ensure	that	they	successfully	re-tendered	for	the	
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work	in	competition	with	other	providers	(OBS	notes	site	B	gen).		Even	though	patient	care	was	important	to	the	staff,	phrases	such	as	“contact	time”,	
“conversions”,	“time	to	consultant”	and	“throughput”	were	very	much	a	part	of	everyday	conversation	between	the	staff	during	my	observations,	particularly	amongst	AHPs	and	non-clinical	professions	(OBS	notes	site	B	gen).		The	importance	attached	to	the	business	of	NHS	practice	was	highlighted.		The	service	lead	at	site	B	described	her	difficulty	in	setting	up	the	initial	contract	as	a	
“big	learning	curve”	(INT	C	37012).	
	Regulators	were	established	to	control	market	processes	and	to	ensure	that	the	health	market	operates	for	the	benefit	of	the	NHS	patients.		In	line	with	this	system,	the	DH	established	what	was	called	a	tariff	so	that	hospitals	could	be	paid	according	to	the	hospital	activity	they	performed	(DH,	20120).		These	national	tariffs	were	a	common	topic	of	conversation	across	all	three	hospital	sites.		They	appeared	to	be	a	driver	of	many	decisions	that	were	made	by	all	the	professional	groups	working	in	the	hospitals.		Therefore,	the	tariffs	appeared	to	be	accepted	as	a	normal	part	of	hospital	business,	and	data	in	relation	to	tariff	targets	were	reported	against	in	many	of	the	management	meetings	I	attended	at	all	sites	(Doc	analy	Mins).			
7.2.2.1 Best	Practice	Tariff	for	hip	replacement		During	the	time	of	data	collection,	the	National	Joint	Registry	(NJR)	in	England	was	responsible	for	collating	the	data	and	determining	the	compliance	of	hospitals	with	the	Best	Practice	Tariff	(BPT)	for	primary	hip	replacements.		In	2014,	a	new	BPT	called	“Primary	hip	and	knee	replacement	outcomes”	was	introduced	(Doc	analy	BPT).		In	this	new	system,	payment	of	the	primary	hip	and	knee	replacements	BPT	was	linked	to	data	collected	in	the	NHS	England	Patient	Reported	Outcome	Measures	(PROMs)	programme	and	submitted	to	the	NJR	
(Doc	analy	BPT).			The	apparent	aim	of	the	BPT	was	to	reduce	the	unexplained	variation	which	exists	between	healthcare	organisations	according	to	surgery	outcomes.		For	the	hospitals	to	be	paid	the	tariff	they	had	to	achieve	the	following	targets	for	patient	data	collection:	
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“A	minimum	compliance	rate	of	75%	and	an	NJR	unknown	consent	rate	below	25%	(where	patient	
consent	was	recorded	as	a	‘yes’	or	‘no’),	pre-op	PROMs	response	rate	of	50%	or	more	and	the	
provider	achieving	an	average	health	gain	that	is	not	significantly	below	the	national	average.”	
(Doc	analy	Monitor	2015/16	National	Tariff	Payment	System)		These	compliance	ratings	are	linked	to	the	delivery	of	services	according	to	established	clinical	pathways.		The	pathways	are	intended	to	cover	the	pre-operative	assessment,	through	to	admission	and	post	discharge.		However,	the	actual	pathways	that	were	used	in	practice	varied	across	sites	A,	B	and	C,	for	example	site	B	had	a	triage	service	for	patients	prior	to	a	surgical	appointment.		An	excerpt	from	the	pathway	at	site	C	for	osteoarthritis	(OA)	of	the	hip	is	presented	in	Figure	9	for	illustration;	it	includes	the	treatment	for	hip	replacement	(Doc	analy	site	C).		This	pathway	is	simple	and	very	linear,	I	observed	the	same	situation	at	sites	B	and	A.		Pathways	covered	the	basic	practice	that	could	be	provided	to	patients,	rather	than	describing	the	reality	of	services.		
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Figure	9.		A	segment	of	the	OA	pathway	for	hip	replacement	at	site	C	
7.2.2.2 Regulation	and	financial	incentives		Environmental	regulation,	set	out	in	schemes	such	as	the	BPT,	advocate	for	the	timely	and	coordinated	multidisciplinary	care	of	patients.		They	aim	to	improve	outcomes	for	patients	undergoing	hip	replacement.		However,	the	BPT	appeared	
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to	be	very	much	associated	with	a	financial	incentive	for	hospitals	in	my	study	and	all	three	hospitals	were	able	to	achieve	the	target	(see	Box	2).		This	was	not	the	case	for	all	hospitals	across	the	country	during	the	time	of	the	empirical	work.		Implementation	and	achievement	of	regulation	was	variable,	for	example	the	NJR	reported	that	22	out	of	144	hospitals	did	not	achieve	BPT	compliance	targets	for	2016	(Jan-Mar)	and	three	failed	to	achieve	the	consent	targets	(Doc	
analy	NJR	2016),	which	meant	that	they	would	not	have	been	paid	the	associated	top	up	fees	in	that	year.			The	aim	of	the	BPT	is	to	standardise	care.		BPT	is	an	evidence-based	approach	and,	ideally,	a	hospital	would	design	evidence-based	services	so	that	patient	pathways	are	comparable	to	the	‘ideal’	BPT	patient	pathway.		The	findings	of	my	study	suggest	that	the	reality	of	achieving	this	in	practice	across	the	three	hospitals	was	small.		The	hospitals	did	not	appear	to	be	in	a	strong	position	to	develop	their	patient	pathways.		A	clinical	lead	working	at	site	B,	responsible	for	pathway	development,	described	the	experience	as	“a	quandary	about	who	
owned	(it)”.		She	suggests	that	staff	“missed	the	bigger	picture”	and	treated	it	as	another	‘tick	box’	exercise	(INT	C	37012).		On	the	whole,	the	interview	data	indicates	that	surgeons	and	healthcare	professionals	were	broadly	receptive	to	the	idea	of	regulation	and	incentives	such	as	the	BPT,	although	surgeons	were	poor	at	completing	the	forms	and	lacked	awareness	of	the	costs	of	individual	treatments.		To	a	certain	extent,	this	calls	into	question	the	ability	of	the	BPT	to	incentivise	evidence-based	care	amongst	clinicians,	although	high	compliance	rates	suggest	that	the	targets	were	achievable	and	achieved	in	my	case	study	hospitals.		
7.2.2.3 Hospital	monitoring	and	the	Care	Quality	Commission		The	CQC	was	established	to	regulate	healthcare	provision	for	England.		This	regulatory	body	was	discussed	on	more	than	one	occasion	by	administrative,	managerial	and	clinical	staff	in	all	three	hospitals	(Doc	analys	CQC).		Unlike	the	targets	set	out	in	the	BPT,	those	defined	by	the	CQC	were	not	automatically	tied	to	financial	incentives	for	Trusts.			
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The	requests	made	by	the	CQC	were	somewhat	unpredictable	and	harder	to	plan	for,	compared	to	targets	such	as	the	tariff.		Hospital	inspections	conducted	by	the	CQC	could	be	both	announced	and	unannounced.	However,	the	hospitals	did	appear	to	know	when	an	inspection	would	take	place	and	were	asked	to	provide	a	significant	amount	of	information	to	the	CQC	beforehand	(OBS	notes	site	C	gen).		This	information	was	in	addition	to	the	regulatory	data	collected	by	the	Health	and	Social	Care	Information	Centre,	the	Royal	Colleges,	the	CCGs,	Healthwatch	and	the	National	Audit.		Staff	working	in	the	hospitals	had	mixed	attitudes	towards	the	CQC	and	their	inspections.			From	the	outside,	it	appeared	that	this	type	of	regulation	through	inspection	was	counter-intuitive,	and	drove	behaviour	outside	the	normal	day-to-day	practice	of	the	clinical,	administrative	and	managerial	staff	and	which	was	generally	unrelated	to	mechanisms	of	knowledge	mobilisation	or	use	of	evidence.			In	their	key	documents,	the	CQC	state	that	they:			“Make	sure	health	and	social	care	services	provide	people	with	safe,	effective,	compassionate,	high-
quality	care	and	we	encourage	care	services	to	improve.	We	monitor,	inspect	and	regulate	services	
to	make	sure	they	meet	fundamental	standards	of	quality	and	safety	and	we	publish	what	we	find,	
including	performance	ratings	to	help	people	choose	care.”	(Doc	Analy	CQC	About	us)			The	aim	of	their	inspections	is	to	answer	the	following	five	key	questions	listed	in	Table	14	which	are	used	to	evaluate	services	(Doc	Analys	CQC	About	us).		The	responses	to	these	questions	for	sites	A,	B	and	C	are	presented	in	Appendix	6.		
Table	14.		CQC's	five	key	questions	
No.	 CQC	inspection	question		1	 Are	they	safe?	2	 Are	they	effective?	3	 Are	they	caring?	4	 Are	they	responsive	to	people’s	needs?	5	 Are	they	well	led?	
	These	lines	of	enquiry	are	investigated	exhaustively	from	the	wards	to	the	
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executive	board	and	could	be	influenced	by	the	data	gathered	during	the	pre-inspection	planning.		During	an	inspection,	a	multitude	of	topics	are	reviewed	including	care	planning,	risk	registers	and	discrimination	and	equality	of	services	amongst	others.		What	was	particularly	important	for	my	empirical	work	was	that	the	CQC	are	expected	to	discover:		
“How	are	relevant	and	current	evidence-based	guidance,	standards,	best	practice	and	legislation	
identified	and	used	to	develop	how	services,	care	and	treatment	are	delivered?	(This	includes	
information	from	NICE	and	other	expert	and	professional	bodies).”	(Doc	analy	National	Health	
Executive,	Hospital	Inspections)		
	During	the	interviews	with	the	NICE	guideline	administrators,	I	was	interested	in	understanding	how	this	objective	was	achieved	and	the	impact	that	it	had	on	their	work	and	everyday	decision-making.		The	interview	findings	reported	an	element	of	“chasing	their	tail”	to	ensure	that	all	necessary	boxes	were	ticked	ready	for	CQC	inspections	(OBS	notes	site	B	gen).		Respondents	varied	in	their	descriptions	of	the	processes	each	hospital	used	to	respond	to	the	CQC.		These	ranged	from	not	knowing	the	requirements	(site	A)	to	having	a	formal	policy	(site	B)	and	a	specialised	computer	system	at	site	C.		Quotes	are	displayed	in	Table	15.		
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Table	15.		Participant	description	of	the	processes	used	to	respond	to	CQC	requests	
Hospital		 Quote		Site	A		 “I	don’t	know	the	requirements	(of	the	CQC).	That’s	the	honest	answer.	For	me	I	think	it	would	be	if	we	didn’t	have	some	sort	of	policy	and	to	show	how	we’re	looking	at	NICE,	even,	it’s	not	all	NICE	guidance,	it’s	not	actually,	other	than	TAs	that	are	mandatory	to	be	implemented,	the	other	types	of	NICE	guidance	isn’t,	but	we	
wouldn’t	look	very	good	as	a	trust	if	we	didn’t.	So,	I	think	then	when	CQC,	when	inspectors	come	in,	if	we	didn’t	have	something	like	this	in	place	how	would	we	show	
the	evidence	and,	you	know,	we	need	to	show	that	we	are	adhering	to	the	majority	of	NICE	guidance	I	think.”	(INT	A	218015)	Site	B	 “So	this	just	goes	through	steps	to	implementing	guidance,	roles	and	responsibilities	of	all	these	people,	and	these	are	the	appendix	which	I’ve	also	printed	out	for	
them	(CQC).	So	these	are	the	guidelines	that	we…	So	I	try	to	pull	out	relevant	standards	from	the	guideline,	it’s	quite	a	challenge	really.	And	the	NICE	audit	standards,	
I	didn’t	find	they	always	chose	the	right	standards	toward	it,	you	know,	or	if	they	did,	they	still	needed	to	be	more…they	weren’t	extensive	enough	always.	So	what	
have	we	got?	For	the	CQC,	you	know	about	that	visit,	so	this	is	what	was	implemented.	NICE	guidance	process.”	(INT	A	198002)		
“In	fact,	we’ve	just	had	a	CQC	visit	and	they	haven’t	mentioned	NICE,	have	they?		They	mentioned	National	Audit	but	not	NICE,	for	example.		And	that’s	a	regulator,	
isn’t	it?		(Laughs)	They	don’t	say,	“You’re	not	following	NICE	guidance,”	they’d	probably	say,	“You’re	missing	the	National	Audit	Standards”	or	“You’re...		And	they	have	
a	whole	thing	on	effectiveness.”	(INT	M	37003)	Site	C	 “So	that	took	up	a	hell	of	a	lot	of	time	to	sort.		We’ve	got	a	NICE	database	which	is	something	that	I...	in	my	little	pipedream	that	I’ve	been	doing	this	job	I	thought	it	
would	be	really	good	to	have	this	database	so	that	when	they	say,	“Oh	CQC	are	coming	in	next	week,	send	me	all	this	stuff,”	and	you’re	sending	all	this	stuff	via	email,	
that	you	could	just	say,	“Right,	what	would	you	like	to	see?”	and	this	person	would	say,	“Hmm,	show	me	what	you’ve	got	on	depression	in	adults,”	you	know,	“What	did	
you	do	on	that?”		So	we’d	press	a	button,	it’d	run	a	report	and	it’d	show	you	the	review,	the	audit,	the	action	plans,	you	know,	and	it’d	have	everything	there,	you	
haven’t	got	to	sort	of	just	forward	millions	of	documents	and	stuff.	But	you	know,	you	just	need	someone	to	just	maintain	these	processes	because,	as	I	say,	it’s	getting	
bigger	and	bigger.”	(INT	A	119009)				
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7.2.2.4 CQC	at	the	three	hospitals			During	my	time	at	the	hospital	sites,	each	was	in	a	different	stage	of	the	inspection	process.		Ratings	from	these	CQC	reports	are	detailed	in	Appendix	6.		One	hospital	was	just	about	to	receive	an	inspection	(site	A)	and	a	second	was	being	inspected	during	the	period	of	observation	(site	B).		The	final	site	had	not	been	inspected	since	2013.		Site	A	performed	better	on	the	effectiveness	measure,	and	both	A	and	B	performed	equally	on	safety,	but	overall	both	sites	“required	improvement”	(Doc	analy	CQC	ABC).			Whereas	the	BPT	focuses	data	collection	on	quality	measures	and	financial	incentives,	the	CQC	concentrates	on	the	quality	and	safety	of	services.		The	main	driver	to	achieve	compliance	with	the	CQC	recommendations	for	healthcare	providers	is	preventing	civil	enforcement	action.		The	CQC’s	enforcement	policy	describes	the	significant	power	they	have	over	healthcare	organisations,	and	hence	why	they	are	able	to	achieve	such	a	level	of	control	in	this	sector	(CQC,	2015).			The	power	of	the	CQC	to	make	changes	to	hospitals	range	from	them	formalising	the	organisation’s	administrative	details	e.g.,	ensuring	the	hospital	has	an	audit	procedure,	to	restricting	risky	services	or	requiring	that	a	hospital	makes	specific	improvements.		They	also	rank	the	changes	that	need	to	occur	in	terms	of	their	urgency.		For	example,	“extreme	issues”	can	result	in	urgent	cancellation,	suspension	or	removal	of	services	in	hospitals	(Doc	analy	CQC).		These	extreme	issues	are	the	stories	often	reported	in	the	media	when	hospitals	or	wards	are	forced	to	close.					The	CQC	then	monitors	hospitals	to	see	whether	the	concerns	are	ongoing,	referred	to	as	a	“systemic	failing”	or	something	that	can	be	dealt	with	by	the	hospital	themselves	(Doc	analy	CQC).		As	part	of	this	improvement	process,	the	hospitals	are	expected	to	find	out	whether	they	are	compliant	with	the	essential	standards	and	where	the	gaps	are	and	how	they	expect	to	resolve	them.		The	additional	work	this	process	creates	was	described	as	a	“hugely	disruptive	force”	
(OBS	notes	site	C	AHP).		One	surgical	lead	I	interviewed	revealed	that	a	negative	
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inspection	from	the	regulators	actually	benefited	his	practice	and	his	organisation	in	the	long	run.		He	described	how	being	an	“outlier”	was	
“uncomfortable”	at	first,	but	turned	into	“an	opportunity	to	change	things”	(INT	C	
218008).		External	regulation	by	organisations	such	as	the	CQC	helps	to	explain	the	increased	strain	that	many	hospitals,	including	the	ones	I	studied,	are	put	under	by	the	regulators	during	a	period	of	inspection.		It	sets	the	context	for	the	competing	interests	in	play	in	a	hospital	at	any	one	time.		In	the	findings,	it	appeared	that	the	demands	associated	with	the	process	of	regulation	could	not	be	ignored	or	postponed	in	the	same	way	as	others.		Most	staff	seemed	to	recognise	the	relationship	between	this	type	of	regulation	and	the	organisational	ability	to	survive.		I	observed	the	NICE	administrators	at	site	B	privileging	the	CQC	preparation	over	their	normal	daily	tasks.			In	the	worst	case,	it	is	possible	that	monetary	fines	and	public	warnings	are	issued	to	hospitals	which	could	damage	their	reputation.		When	this	type	of	regulatory	pressure	is	measured	against	the	achievement	of	clinical	guideline	recommendations	and	evidence-based	practice,	it	is	clear	that	the	balance	may	change.		Priority	will	inevitability	be	placed	on	achieving	the	CQC’s	must	do’s	before	NICE’s	to-do’s.			
7.2.3 Environmental	regulation	in	decision-making	and	knowledge	
mobilisation		The	findings	revealed	a	discernable	presence	of	the	national	targets	and	regulatory	bodies	in	the	three	sites.		The	targets	and	standards	established	by	the	regulators	appeared	to	drive	behaviour	and	processes	within	the	hospitals,	although	more	so	for	the	managerial	staff	than	the	clinical	professionals.		The	power	and	control	of	different	professional	groups	was	played	out	differently	within	the	three	hospitals,	and	this	had	an	impact	on	the	evidence	use	and	knowledge	mobilisation	for	clinical	practice.			
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7.2.3.1 Regulatory	Influence	on	managers		The	regulatory	power	exerted	from	outside	the	organisation	appeared	to	restrict	the	service	improvements	that	mid-level	managers	were	able	to	achieve	in	practice,	for	example	in	monitoring	quality	standards	established	by	NICE.		As	discussed	in	Chapter	6,	managerial	knowledge	in	this	study	was	tied	to	meeting	the	internal	pressures	and	demands	acting	on	the	hospitals.		This	included	pressure	from	organisations	such	as	NICE,	but	can	be	expanded	to	include	the	external	regulation	described	in	this	chapter.		It	appeared	that	external	regulation	could	be	repackaged	and	sanctioned	internally,	therefore	mobilising	knowledge	from	policy-makers	into	practice.			
7.2.3.2 Regulatory	influence	on	clinical	professionals	Orthopaedic	surgeons	as	professionals	had	an	obligation	to	their	profession	which	helped	validate	their	privileged	status	in	the	three	hospitals.		The	findings	demonstrated	that,	unlike	managers,	the	surgeons	in	this	study	did	not	need	to	rely	on	organisational	bureaucracy	to	exert	power	and	hold	discretion	over	decisions.		Professional	hierarchy	appeared	to	be	particularly	important	to	their	practice.		The	specialist	knowledge	of	surgery	is	enduring	and	in	many	respects,	superseded	the	managerial	and	organisational	knowledge	located	within	each	of	the	hospitals.		The	distinction	between	what	type	of	knowledge	was	privileged	appeared	to	work	against	the	traditions	of	evidence-based	decision	making.		The	notion	that	“NICE	guidance	simply	is	something	you	use	as	a	stick	to	beat	the	
person	with”	(INT	C	37003)	demonstrates	its	association	with	the	activity	and	responsibility	of	the	hospital	managers,	and	therefore	not	in	the	surgeons’	domain.				This	relationship	is	in	contrast	to	that	which	I	observed	between	the	surgeons	and	their	professional	regulators.		It	was	apparent	that	the	professional	bodies	and	the	GMC	were	able	to	exert	control	over	the	clinical	professionals	and	their	decisions.		A	surgeon	told	me	how	he	“needs	to	be	prepared	for	the	likelihood	that	
I	will	be	subject	to	at	least	one	investigation”	(INT	C	198005)	due	to	the	fact	that	he	performed	highly	specialised	hip	replacement	operations	with	non-standard	implants.		The	apprehension	regarding	regulation	and	sanction	from	the	GMC	was	not	something	that	the	hospital	level	regulation	or	hospital	hierarchies	were	
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able	to	achieve	to	the	same	extent.		The	findings	therefore	suggest	that	managers	and	clinical	professionals	may	struggle	to	develop	relationships	and	work	in	the	same	knowledge	space	to	achieve	targets	and	standards,	because	they	operate	under	different	professional	and	regulatory	powers.		
7.2.3.3 Attempts	to	shift	the	balance	of	power			In	the	literature	review,	I	described	the	increasing	presence	of	managers	and	the	managerialisation	of	healthcare.		The	data	revealed	that	this	might	have	fostered	conflict	between	the	work	of	clinical	professionals	and	managers,	and	therefore	may	have	reduced	knowledge	sharing.		However,	regulation	(e.g.,	CQC)	might	potentially	act	to	achieve	better	balance.			In	my	findings,	there	was	a	clear	distinction	between	the	practice	and	decision-making	of	clinical	professionals,	and	that	of	the	managers	responsible	for	the	achievement	of	organisational	regulation.		This	remained	a	persistent	thread	in	the	data	as	clinical	practice	appeared	to	be	protected	work	of	the	surgeon,	everything	outside	of	this	could	potentially	be	management	work.		It	did	not	appear	to	be	ring-fenced	in	the	same	way,	as	the	clinicians	had	their	distinct	regulatory	responsibilities	whereas	the	managers	took	on	whatever	was	left.		The	meaning	of	management	was	ambiguous	and	intangible.		The	findings	were	unclear	regarding	where	the	boundaries	lay	between	the	responsibilities	of	hospital	managers	and	the	environmental	regulators	in	relation	to	regulation,	or	where	each	of	the	three	professional	groups	thought	they	should	be.		
7.2.3.4 The	hospital	as	a	business	The	three	hospitals	were	large	multi-divisional	organisations	controlled	by	executive	boards,	where	purchasers	and	providers	negotiated	processes	and	agreed	contracts,	for	example	with	the	implant	manufacturing	companies.		This	corporate	element	of	practice	also	had	a	strong	presence	in	the	data.		An	example	of	business	activity	during	my	study	was	the	implant	rationalisation	process	I	described	in	earlier.		This	appeared	to	have	been	driven	by	the	management	teams	but	did	not	appear	to	have	been	driven	by	regulation	over	implants,	for	example	ODEP	evidence	ratings.		It	seemed	as	though	the	cost	reduction	requirement	promulgated	by	NHS	England	was	the	main	factor	in	this	process.		The	existing	contracts	between	the	manufacturers	and	the	hospitals	were	being	
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negotiated	with	both	the	CCGs	and	the	implant	manufactures	by	the	management,	on	behalf	of	surgeons.		A	surgeon	recognised	the	changes	as	“a	
Trust	decision”	rather	than	a	clinical	decision	(INT	C	37011).			The	findings	from	all	three	hospitals	appear	to	predict	that	the	clinical	professionals	needed	to	become	accustomed	to	functioning	within	these	wider	strategic	and	budgetary	frameworks.		This	move	towards	business	thinking	and	regulation	appeared	to	have	been	accompanied	by	an	abundance	of	managers	and	industry	executives	who	have	entered	into	healthcare	with	a	remit	of	organising	and	running	the	hospital	as	a	business.		However,	it	seemed	that	only	one	of	the	three	hospital	sites	had	really	embraced	this	move	to	treating	the	hospital	more	like	a	business.		During	interviews	I	conducted	at	site	A,	participants	discussed	“running	it	as	a	business”	and	making	“cost	savings”	which	demonstrates	their	awareness	of	the	changes	(INT	M	218014),	(INT	C	218011).			At	sites	B	and	C,	on	the	other	hand,	I	found	little	evidence	of	clinical	staff	working	towards	this	new	model	of	healthcare	delivery.		Instead	it	appeared	that	they	would	try	to	resist	managerial	influence	by	actively	criticising	and	buffering	change	(site	B)	or	trying	to	ignore	it	and	hope	that	the	‘trend’	faded	(site	C).		These	clinicians	seemed	content	with	providing	the	services	they	were	used	to	providing.		
7.3 Summary	of	the	theme	Throughout	my	empirical	work,	multiple	environmental	regulators	were	mentioned	in	the	interviews,	observations	and	documentation.		These	included	both	government	regulators	whose	focus	appeared	to	be	within	the	realm	of	management,	and	the	specific	healthcare	regulators	whose	responsibility	is	to	monitor	the	practice	of	orthopaedic	surgery	as	a	clinical	profession.		Targets	and	standards	set	by	regulators	were	linked	to	incentives	or	disincentives	for	the	three	hospitals	(for	example	the	BPT	rewarded	the	hospitals	for	increasing	their	productivity,	and	therefore	should	have	encouraged	them	to	improve	efficiency	with	stricter	control	of	costs).		However,	the	anticipated	response	to	the	incentives	was	not	necessarily	the	case	in	the	hospitals	I	examined.		
		 223	
	Linking	targets	and	standards	to	financial	incentives	or	penalties	is	often	referred	to	as	‘pay	for	performance’	and	has	been	the	focus	of	academic	research	(See	Campbell	et	al,	2009).		The	findings	of	this	study	revealed	that	the	impact	of	financial	incentives	and	regulation	designed	and	enacted	at	the	environmental	level	were	influenced	by	the	individuals	and	groups	working	in	the	organisation.		It	appeared	that	clinical	staff,	especially	orthopaedic	surgeons	working	in	a	hospital,	needed	to	be	able	to	understand	the	costs	and	benefits	of	a	business	or	operational	approach	such	as	the	BPT.		Throughout	this	chapter	I	have	presented	data	to	suggest	that	this	may	not	be	the	case	for	two	reasons.				Firstly,	the	clinical	professionals	in	my	study	tended	to	view	regulation	as	a	management	responsibility,	and	therefore	outside	of	their	clinical	knowledge	domain.		The	consequence	of	this	interpretation	for	my	study	was	that	targets,	protocols	and	standards	could	be	avoided.		Their	priority	for	practice	appeared	to	be	reduced	in	comparison	to	the	privileged	clinical	work.		The	clinical	professionals	were	also	unclear	about	the	cost	and	quality	of	treatments	and	how	they	related	to	payments,	regulation	and	fines.		In	situations	such	as	this,	where	costs	are	ambiguous	or	intangible,	incentives	grounded	in	increased	revenue	for	the	entire	organisation	may	have	a	smaller	impact	than	incentives	paid	directly	to	individual	surgeons	or	orthopaedic	departments.			Secondly,	administrative	staff	were	more	likely	to	be	given	the	task	of	data	collection	for	regulation	in	the	three	sites.		Through	the	interviews	and	observations,	these	staff	groups	appeared	to	be	unaware	of	the	consequences	of	not	collecting	or	adequately	recording	accurate	data	that	could	impact	on	regulatory	targets	and	standards.		More	importantly,	the	administrators	and	managers	reported	not	being	able	to	challenge	the	clinical	professionals	regarding	the	data	collection.		This	represents	the	lack	of	knowledge	mobilisation	from	regulators	and	managers	to	other	professional	groups	in	the	hospital	regarding	the	costs	and	benefits	of	interventions,	and	thus	ensuring	they	have	a	suitable	practice	in	response	to	external	regulators.				
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At	the	time	of	my	study,	national	organisations	such	as	the	CQC,	Monitor	and	NICE	were	governed	with	the	responsibility	to	reduce	variation	and	improve	the	quality	of	healthcare	organisations.		However,	the	challenges	and	contingent	nature	of	regulatory	responses	by	the	three	hospital	sites	reflect	the	problems	of	attempting	to	prioritise	external	demands	and	pressure,	over	and	above	those	faced	‘on	the	ground’	by	individuals,	professional	groups	or	specific	hospital	organisations.			Knowledge	mobilisation	and	evidence-based	decision-making	can	be	viewed	as	conceptual	or	theoretical	problems.		However,	in	my	findings,	they	represented	real-life	knowledge	problems	because	I	identified	distinct	types	of	knowledge	that	appeared	not	to	be	assimilated	and	absorbed	in	practice.		Some	knowledge	types	were	brokered	or	privileged	over	others	depending	on	the	requirements	of	the	regulators	at	the	time.			Each	professional	group	had	different	regulators	and	their	importance	to	practice	was	inconsistent	across	the	three	hospitals.		In	the	hospitals,	knowledge	mobilisation	was	seen	as	a	practical	problem	to	be	solved	by	‘management’	through	specific	changes	using	a	practical	approach,	for	example	one	hospital	developed	a	NICE	database	which	could	generate	reports	for	the	CQC	inspection	(site	C).		These	practical	approaches	helped	in	some	way	to	make	knowledge	meaningful	and	relate	it	to	the	real-world	practice	of	healthcare	where	services	were	complex	and	messy.		However,	the	data	suggests	that	the	likelihood	of	finding	a	common	ground	for	valuable	and	effective	knowledge	sharing	around	regulation	as	standardised	practice	across	professional	groups	is	limited.		In	this	chapter	I	have	presented	the	final	level	of	analysis	in	my	study.		I	have	described	the	influence	of	the	regulatory	environment	for	orthopaedic	surgery	and	healthcare	more	generally.		The	next	chapter	is	the	discussion	where	I	will	summarise	the	broad	findings	of	the	research	to	demonstrate	how	I	have	answered	my	research	questions.		
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8 Discussion		
8.1 Introduction		In	this	chapter	I	summarise	the	research	findings	and	the	answers	to	the	research	questions.		I	discuss	my	overarching	themes,	my	contribution	to	knowledge	and	the	strengths	and	limitations	of	my	research.		Finally,	I	consider	the	implications	of	my	findings	for	policy,	practice	and	research.		
8.2 	The	evidence	and	knowledge	literature		My	research	spans	the	disciplinary	boundaries	between	clinical	and	organisational	sciences	as	I	investigated	EBM	and	knowledge	mobilisation	in	healthcare.		Specifically,	I	explored	how	evidence	and	knowledge	influenced	the	decisions	made	in	the	practice	of	orthopaedic	surgery	in	the	NHS.		
8.2.1 EBM	and	clinical	guidelines		Healthcare	policy	in	England	is	founded	on	EBM	and	encourages	clinicians	to	use	health-related	scientific	evidence	in	clinical	practice	(Sackett	et	al,	1996;	Niessen	et	al,	2000).		Policy-making	organisations	such	as	NICE	use	research	evidence	to	establish	national	priorities,	create	guidelines	and	make	decisions	based	on	equity	and	cost-effectiveness	(NICE,	2017).		Approaches	to	EBM	and	guideline	development	have	developed	and	expanded	the	boundaries	of	what	evidence-based	practice	encompasses	(Kelly	et	al,	2010).		In	the	NHS,	evidence-based	policy	is	exemplified	by	NICE	guidance	and	clinicians	and	healthcare	organisations	are	encouraged	to	implement	evidence	in	practice.		However,	the	complexity	of	the	NHS	has	meant	that	the	linear	dissemination	of	guidance	is	not	sufficient	to	change	behaviour	and	reduce	variation	(Dopson	et	al,	2001;	Greenhalgh	et	al,	2014;	Every-Palmer	and	Howick,	2014).		Too	often,	guideline	implementation	is	characterised	by	a	top-down	approach	and	evidently	there	is	still	disparity	in	NHS	practice	and	spending	(Davies	et	al,	2000a).			
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8.2.2 Knowledge	and	knowledge	mobilisation		To	overcome	these	challenges,	researchers	have	investigated	approaches	to	improve	evidence	use	in	practice	(Dopson	and	Fitzgerald,	2005).		One	approach	is	to	encourage	effective	knowledge	mobilisation	by	individuals	and	organisations	(Crilly	et	al,	2010).		In	healthcare,	knowledge	and	evidence	are	often	perceived	as	one	and	the	same	(Nutley	et	al,	2007).		However,	they	are	contested	concepts	in	both	the	literature	and	in	practice.		Distinctions	are	made	between	individual	tacit	knowledge	e.g.,	what	we	‘know’	and	‘do’,	and	explicit	clinical	knowledge	in	evidence-based	guidelines	(Nonaka,	1994;	Orlikowski	2002).		Weight	attached	to	tacit	knowledge	is	problematic	for	EBM,	where	context	is	removed	in	pursuit	of	RCTs	(Davies	et	al,	2000a).		Dopson	and	Fitzgerald	(2005)	demonstrated	the	need	to	understand	the	context-dependent	nature	of	healthcare	to	explain	differences	in	the	way	decisions	are	made.				The	problem	with	clinical	guidelines	is	that	they	do	not	automatically	align	to	evidence	and	knowledge	as	defined	by	clinicians.		The	inherent	complexity	and	context	dependant	nature	of	practice	means	that	it	becomes	impractical	to	prioritise	one	type	of	knowledge	over	the	others.		Research	demonstrates	that	professionals	define	evidence	differently	(Swan	et	al,	2012).		Clinical	guidelines	might	represent	one	type	of	evidence	accessible	to	healthcare	professionals,	but	do	not	reflect	the	practice-based	pragmatic	evidence	that	is	available.		Therefore,	guidelines	contribute	towards,	but	cannot	explain,	all	the	knowledge	that	influences	decisions.		Variation	occurs	in	practice	when	other	sources	of	evidence	and	knowledge	drive	decision-making.			I	used	the	lens	of	knowledge	mobilisation	to	identify	what	constitutes	evidence	and	knowledge	for	clinical	decision-makers	in	context,	and	how	EBM	is	mobilised	in	practice.		I	investigated	how	many	factors	across	the	knowledge	domain	interact	to	produce	a	system	where	there	is	variation	from	guidelines	despite	continued	effort	from	policy-makers	to	instil	their	use	in	practice.		
8.3 	Research	aim,	key	findings	and	summary	of	themes		The	aim	of	my	study	was	to	assess	the	role	of	EBM	in	orthopaedic	surgical	practice	decisions.		In	fulfilling	this	aim	I	discovered	that:	
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	Variation	from	evidence-based	guidelines	played	out	according	to	how	each	surgeon	brokered	the	wider	sources	of	evidence	to	deal	with	the	contingencies	and	constraints	inherent	in	orthopaedic	work.		Surgeons	privileged	other	sources	of	evidence	and	knowledge	which	were	mobilised	differently	by	individuals,	groups	and	organisations,	all	functioning	under	the	assumed	control	of	the	regulatory	environment.		Pragmatic	mechanisms	by	which	knowledge	is	mobilised	in	surgery	gave	more	weight	to	professional	networks	and	communities	of	practice	(CoP)	to	which	surgeons	belonged.		This	understanding	helps	to	explain	why	orthopaedic	surgeons	do	not	always	use	evidence	in	their	decision-making.		The	key	findings	of	the	research	include:	
• Identification	and	description	of	the	sources	of	evidence	and	knowledge	used	in	orthopaedic	practice		
• Illustration	of	how	the	brokering	and	mobilisation	of	knowledge	and	evidence	contributes	to	variation	
• Three	case	studies	which	produced	four	themes	reflecting	the	levels	(individual,	group,	organisational	and	regulation)	at	which	evidence	and	knowledge	were	enacted	in	practice:	
o Decision-making	varied	according	to	differing	beliefs	and	approaches	regarding	how	a	wider	‘evidence’	base	was	privileged	by	individual	decision-makers	in	context			
o Contingencies	of	practice	and	environmental	regulation	impacted	on	which	type	of	‘evidence’	was	selected		
o Organisational	constraints	and	established	approaches	to	knowledge	mobilisation	in	the	NHS	restricted	evidence-based	decision-making.		
8.3.1 Summary	of	themes		My	four	themes	represent	the	levels	at	which	evidence	was	used	and	knowledge	was	mobilised	in	practice.		They	reflect	the	complexity	of	knowledge	mobilisation	in	a	highly	professionalised	organisationally-regulated	context.			The	themes	characterise:	
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• Individual	decision-making	of	surgeons	
• Groups	and	networks	that	exist	in	hospitals	
• The	hospital	as	an	organisation		
• The	regulatory	environment	of	the	healthcare	sector.				I	demonstrate	that	evidence-based	practice	was	not	always	possible	or	preferable	in	the	three	cases.		Individual	surgeon	characteristics,	beliefs	and	values	differed,	as	did	the	meaning	of	evidence	for	the	surgeons,	managers	and	administrators	making	decisions	in	hospitals.		The	socialisation	of	distinct	professional	groups	was	important	as	it	influenced	the	process	of	decision-making	and	the	different	assumptions	that	were	central	to	decision	outcomes.				These	issues	are	important	to	consider	in	the	development,	presentation	and	dissemination	of	evidence-based	guidelines.		The	organisational	capacity	of	each	hospital	was	crucial	in	their	ability	to	achieve,	or	not	achieve,	effective	knowledge	mobilisation.		This	impacted	their	capacity	to	ensure	the	most	clinically	and	cost-effective	procedures	are	selected	to	treat	patients.	
8.4 	Summary	of	the	research	questions		This	section	demonstrates	how	the	three	research	questions	have	been	answered:		
RQ1.	What	types	of	evidence	and	knowledge	are	considered	important	by	
orthopaedic	surgeons	when	making	clinical	practice	decisions?		The	mixed	methods	systematic	review	identified	variation	in	the	approaches	and	techniques	for	evidence	use	in	decision-making.		I	discovered	various	types	of	evidence	and	knowledge	that	influenced	clinical	decisions.		These	included	external	evidence	created	by	healthcare	regulators,	e.g.,	CQC	and	GMC,	the	influence	of	the	media	and	‘the	press’,	evidence	from	the	knowledge	of	managers,	organisational	knowledge	that	exists	in	hospitals,	e.g.,	cultural	norms	and	processes.		Evidence	came	from	the	structure	and	location	of	the	hospital,	evidence	from	implant	manufacturing	companies,	knowledge	gained	through	
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socialisation	and	association	with	colleagues	and	evidence	from	the	professional	hierarchy.		The	opinions	of	leaders	and	professional	societies,	training	and	informal	education	and	evidence	linked	to	the	innate	‘feel’	of	surgery	were	also	considered	important.		Finally,	informal	experiential	knowledge	and	knowledge	gained	from	individual	patients	and	surgeons	were	important.		These	were	categorised	and	presented	in	a	conceptual	framework	(see	Figure	10).		
RQ2.	How	are	evidence	and	knowledge	mobilised	in	the	real-world	practice	of	
orthopaedic	surgery	in	the	NHS?	
	Case	studies	generated	a	comprehensive	understanding	of	evidence	and	knowledge	sharing	in	professionalised	organisations.		The	findings	revealed	that	all	surgeons	performed	‘evidence-based’	decision-making.		However,	they	applied	a	wider	definition	of	‘evidence’	than	anticipated	in	traditional	EBM.		Research	evidence	was	only	one	form	of	evidence	and	knowledge	considered	useful	in	context.		Interviews	and	observations	of	practice	allowed	me	to	explore	what	evidence	meant	to	surgeons,	and	therefore	what	this	wider	definition	of	evidence	represented.				Variation	in	practice	was	a	consequence	of	how	evidence	was	defined	and	privileged	by	surgeons,	staff	and	entire	hospitals.		I	identified	that	multiple	levels	of	practice	interacted	and	impacted	on	how	knowledge	was	identified,	adopted,	integrated	and	mobilised	in	surgical	work.		Levels	included	the	individual,	group	and	organisation,	which	were	considered	alongside	the	contingencies	of	practice	and	the	overarching	effect	of	environmental	regulation	prominent	throughout	my	study.				
RQ3.	What	are	the	key	dimensions	of	knowledge	mobilisation	which	
influence	variation	in	decision-making	in	the	orthopaedic	surgery	NHS	
environment?			I	identified	three	key	dimensions	which	influenced	knowledge	mobilisation	and	hence	variation	in	decision-making.		These	were	the	individual	surgeon	
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characteristics	(gold-standards,	mavericks	and	innovators),	the	socialisation	of	medical	professionals	and	the	organisational	capacity	of	the	hospital.		I	explored	how	these	were	enacted	across	all	three	levels	as	surgeons	deal	with	the	contingency	in	their	work	and	make	decisions	in	the	presence	of	regulation.		The	dimensions	represent	potential	areas	for	improvement	in	how	evidence	is	presented	and	disseminated	across	the	NHS	orthopaedic	surgery	environment.		My	research	has	indicated	that	‘evidence’	in	real-world	practice	is	multifaceted	and	contextually	contingent,	therefore	traditional	linear	codified	approaches	are	not	appropriate.		I	have	signified	the	need	to	tightly	define	the	type	of	evidence	and	approach	to	knowledge	mobilisation	which	interventions	are	trying	to	achieve,	when	focused	on	individual	clinicians,	professional	groups	or	organisational	capacity	issues.			
8.5 Extended	case	profiles	In	Table	16	I	discuss	the	important	discoveries	from	the	three	case	studies.		I	briefly	describe	their	overarching	approach	to	knowledge	mobilisation.		Generating	this	narrow	focus	was	essential	to	understanding	the	dynamics	present	in	single	settings	(Yin,	1884).		However,	comparison	across	cases	was	essential	to	look	beyond	my	initial	impressions	and	see	my	findings	through	multiple	lenses.		This	generated	key	dimensions	regarding	the	relationship	between	knowledge	mobilisation	and	evidence	that	are	described	in	the	next	section	(Eisenhardt,	1989).		
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Table	16.		Case	study	description	and	their	approach	to	knowledge	mobilisation	
Case	 Description	and	approach	to	knowledge	mobilisation	
Case	A:	
‘beyond’	EBM	
decision-making			
Case	study	site	A	was	specifically	designated	as	an	academic	orthopaedic	department.		It	was	an	orthopaedic	trauma	centre	in	a	Foundation	Trust,	linked	to	an	Academic	Health	Science	Network.		The	orthopaedic	department	had	an	ongoing	working	partnership	with	the	local	University	Medical	School,	which	had	a	satellite	campus	within	the	hospital.		It	was	also	responsible	for	the	training	of	junior	surgeons	because	of	its	status	as	a	teaching	hospital.		In	this	department,	there	was	an	integrated	clinical	academic	training	scheme	for	orthopaedics.		Therefore,	most	orthopaedic	surgeons	working	in	case	A	had	some	basic	training	in	EBM,	or	had	gone	on	to	complete	post-graduate	studies	including	MDs	or	PhDs.		The	research	teams	in	site	A	were	led	by	Professors	of	Orthopaedic	Surgery	who	conducted	effectiveness	and	cost-effectiveness	studies,	mainly	national	RCTs,	of	various	orthopaedic	techniques	and	treatments.		Many	of	the	surgeons	held	joint	academic-clinical	posts	at	the	Trust	and	at	the	University.				Case	A’s	overarching	approach	to	knowledge	mobilisation	was	that	evidence-based	decision-making	was	suitable,	but	not	sufficient	for	their	practice.		The	surgeons	working	here	went	‘beyond’	traditional	EBM	and	focused	on	pragmatic	EBM.		This	practice-based	approach	to	EBM	considered	the	important	point	that	knowing	what	to	do,	how	to	do	it,	and	the	likely	outcome	of	an	orthopaedic	intervention	was	only	part	of	the	knowledge	picture,	to	which	research	contributed	a	small	portion.		This	site,	more	than	the	other	two,	appeared	to	have	a	positive	view	of	NICE	guidance	and	what	it	set	out	to	achieve	in	the	healthcare	sector.		Some	surgeons	working	here	had	even	been	involved	in	guideline	development	groups	for	policy-makers.	However,	case	A	demonstrated	how	macro	policy	initiatives	from	organisations	such	as	NICE,	competed	with	the	reality	of	frontline	delivery	of	orthopaedic	services.			Contingent	factors	acted	as	additional	sources	of	evidence	that	influenced	clinical	decisions	within	this	site.		Research	and	the	findings	from	RCTs	were	not	the	only	knowledge	domains	to	be	considered.		The	managerial,	organisational	and	regulatory	constraints	were	important,	and	the	surgeons	appeared	to	work	within	a	restricted	framework	or	practice.		In	general,	case	A	had	strict	limits	placed	on	the	hip	implants	that	could	be	used	during	operations.		This	was	a	direct	consequence	of	the	rationalisation	of	services	due	to	cost.		However,	there	was	some	scope	for	variation	under	the	remit	of	innovation	and	research.		For	example,	surgeons	working	here	altered	their	immediate	practice	due	to	the	findings	of	one	of	their	RCTs.		What	mattered	in	site	A	was	that	knowledge	could	be	mobilised	from	policy	or	research	into	practice,	but	it	had	to	fit	within	the	existing	organisational	frameworks	and	decision-making	processes	to	make	it	useable.				
Case	B:	
‘it	depends’	
approach	produced	
by	the	binary	
characteristics			
Case	study	site	B	was	a	small	District	General	Hospital	Foundation	Trust	with	a	specialist	practitioner	triage	service.		The	distinguishing	feature	in	Case	B	was	that	the	hospital	functioned	as	two	split	sites	(B1	and	B2).		The	services	were	separated	across	two	hospital	buildings	which	were	approximately	20	miles	apart.		The	physical	divide	in	location	appeared	to	foster	a	divide	in	approaches	to	knowledge	mobilisation	which	I	observed.		There	was	an	‘it	depends’	approach	to	decision-making	by	the	two	seemingly	independent	orthopaedic	departments.			Case	B	was	not	affiliated	to	an	orthopaedic	academic	department	or	University,	and	was	not	a	teaching	hospital.		It	represented	a	standard	orthopaedic	department	and	the	clinical	team	provided	general	orthopaedic	treatments	to	the	local	population.		It	was	supported	by	a	group	of	designated	Allied	Health	Professionals.		This	group	provided	a	specialist	musculoskeletal	assessment	interface	between	General	Practitioners,	patients	and	the	orthopaedic	department.				The	evidence	used	for	decision-making	in	Case	B	appeared	not	to	originate	from	research	or	the	findings	from	RCTs.		Regulation	and	guidelines	from	NICE	were	also	not	privileged	as	sources	of	evidence,	and	they	were	often	considered	in	a	negative	light.		What	mattered	for	case	B	was	the	dynamics	of	
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organisational	change	and	leadership	in	the	two	orthopaedic	departments.		The	characteristics	of	the	individual	orthopaedic	surgeons	and	the	binary	characteristics	of	the	groups	of	surgeons	working	at	each	site	meant	that	knowledge	mobilisation	across	the	organisation	was	difficult.				Surgeons	at	sites	B1	and	B2	made	decisions	that	were	influenced	by	historic	organisational	ways	of	working,	and	by	the	beliefs	and	practices	of	the	surgeon	‘in	charge’.		This	was	emphasised	in	my	findings	through	the	process	of	rationalisation	of	hip	implants	which	took	place	during	my	study.		The	distinct	groups	appeared	to	struggle	to	work	together	and	share	knowledge.		This	was	because	the	specific	contexts	that	clinicians	were	socialised	into	differed	at	each	site.		This	socialisation	reflected	the	behaviour	and	norms	that	guided	or	regulated	the	action	and	decision-making	of	individuals,	for	example	sites	B1	and	B2	had	different	norms	regarding	their	professional	hierarchy.		The	development	of	the	multidisciplinary	team	in	the	specialist-practitioner	triage	service	went	some	way	to	addressing	the	difficulties	at	one	hospital.		The	staff	working	here	had	experience	of	planning	and	delivering	different	service	designs	which	had	required	the	various	professional	groups	to	work	together.		However,	this	was	not	the	case	at	the	other	hospital	where	the	routine	separation	between	professional	specialties	and	departments	endured.			
Case	C:		
‘socialised	decision-
making’;	evidence	
was	discretionary				
Case	study	site	C	was	a	large	orthopaedic	department	in	a	teaching	hospital	Foundation	Trust	with	a	specialist	trauma	centre.		Unlike	site	A,	it	was	not	a	designated	academic	orthopaedic	department	with	a	specific	clinical	academic	training	scheme.		However,	it	was	one	of	the	largest	orthopaedic	surgery	units	in	the	country	and	conducted	many	specialised	hip	implant	revision	operations.		Site	C	was	a	teaching	hospital	and	therefore	only	had	a	small	academic	team	that	carried	out	research,	development	and	training.		The	clinicians	working	here	decided	to	participate	in	academic	work	depending	on	their	own	capacity	and	personal	preferences;	it	was	not	the	departmental	norm	as	was	the	case	in	site	A.			Case	C	appeared	to	be	a	closed	orthopaedic	unit.		It	was	closed	to	the	influence	of	administrators	and	managers	working	in	the	Trust,	and	closed	to	pressure	from	external	policy-makers.		It	seemed	to	be	closed	to	knowledge	mobilisation	from	‘outside’.		There	was	a	defined	‘inside’	group	of	surgeons	who	had	been	working	in	the	hospital	for	their	entire	careers	who	were	relatively	separate	from	‘outside	knowledge’.		What	mattered	for	case	C	was	that	decision-making	practice	was	socialised.		The	importance	attached	to	evidence	from	‘outside’	was	up	to	the	discretion	of	the	group	members.		In	case	C,	the	NICE	guidelines	might	be	deemed	important	for	decision-making	or	not.		Knowledge	from	policy-making	organisations	had	to	compete	with	the	complex	social	systems	that	existed	in	the	hospital,	although	there	was	a	wide	range	of	political,	individual	psychological	and	organisational	factors	which	were	influential	to	decision-making	across	all	of	the	cases.		‘What	worked’	for	this	discrete	group	of	surgeons	in	case	C	appeared	to	take	precedence	in	the	decision-making	process.		Definitions	of	‘what	worked’	were	grounded	in	the	experience	of	surgical	work	in	practice,	and	legacy	knowledge	about	the	organisational	functions	that	had	developed	as	a	consequence	of	working	there	for	a	long	period	of	time.		Also	important	for	case	C	was	the	knowledge	mobilised	from	senior	to	junior	orthopaedic	surgeons.		This	behavioral	modeling	via	the	professional	hierarchy	appeared	to	influence	decision-making	of	junior	surgeons,	who	then	went	onto	do	what	‘my	consultant’	did.		The	growth	of	research	activity	in	case	C,	and	the	focus	and	priority	it	had	over	practice,	was	adapted	to	the	needs	of	the	surgeon	group,	rather	than	something	that	might	be	imposed	on	them	from	the	outside.			
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8.6 	Key	dimensions	for	EBM	and	knowledge	mobilisation	in	
orthopaedic	surgery		This	section	provides	a	representational	picture	of	knowledge	mobilisation	and	the	privileging	of	evidence	that	took	place	throughout	the	study.		I	discuss	the	findings	from	the	case	studies	and	then	draw	on	these	to	provide	a	theoretical	explanation	of	variation	in	practice	of	decision-making	for	orthopaedic	surgery.		
8.6.1 Summary	of	empirical	findings	I	conducted	case	studies	using	mixed	qualitative	methods	to	identify	how	evidence	is	assembled,	understood	and	mobilisation	in	decisions	for	the	treatment	of	patients	receiving	hip	replacement	surgery.		The	mixed	methods	used	in	each	case	(interviews,	observations	and	document	analysis)	enabled	me	to	observe	first-hand	the	social,	cultural	and	knowledge	context	of	evidence	use	in	the	NHS	hospitals.		The	cases	may	not	reflect	the	entire	knowledge	mobilisation	process	but	present	a	snapshot	of	what	occurred	in	the	hospitals	when	my	study	was	conducted.		Figure	10	presents	the	sources	of	evidence	and	knowledge	identified	in	the	context	of	practice.		My	overarching	discovery	is	an	understanding	of	how	a	more	inclusive	definition	of	evidence	is	required	in	orthopaedic	surgery.		This	wider	definition	allows	me	to	appreciate	how	decision-makers	in	context	privilege	various	sources	of	evidence	and	knowledge	differently.		What	was	important	to	the	decision-maker	was	not	always	evidence-based	guidelines.		It	could	equally	be	any	type	of	evidence	or	knowledge	that	was	identified,	interacting	with	the	contingencies	of	practice	and	the	pressure	from	environmental	regulation.				
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Figure	10.	Sources	of	evidence	and	knowledge	identified	during	the	case	studies			The	different	types	of	evidence	and	knowledge	were	mutually	exclusive	and	the	process	of	privileging	one	over	another	in	a	contextual	hierarchy	of	evidence	was	flexible	and	adaptable.		Figure	11	presents	an	empirical	summary	of	the	research	and	displays	the	diverse	types	of	knowledge	identified	during	my	study	and	how	they	interacted	in	context.		It	demonstrates	the	three	key	dimensions	for	‘evidence’	based	decision-making	in	my	research:		
• Individual	surgeon	characteristics		
• Socialisation	of	medical	professionals		
• Organisational	capacity	of	the	hospital			
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Regulatory	forces	were	enacted	on	individuals,	groups	and	organisations	equally.		The	findings	did	not	show	that	one	level	or	one	case	was	influenced	by	regulation	more	than	any	other.		The	distinguishing	features	were	how	the	individuals,	groups	and	organisations	influenced	the	brokering	of	knowledge	and	evidence	for	practice	in	the	context	of	regulation.		The	interaction	and	privileging	of	evidence	at	each	site	impacted	on	the	decisions	that	were	made.		This	dynamic	approach	to	the	mobilisation	of	evidence	and	knowledge	generated	variation	in	decision-making	processes.		For	example,	in	Figure	11	the	larger	size	of	Case	A’s	‘organisational	capacity’	circle	signifies	the	importance	of	this	dimension	in	this	site.		Decision-making	here	was	dominated	by	the	organisational	capacity	of	the	hospital	to	practice	and	promote	EBM.		This	was	reinforced	and	maintained	by	surgeon	groups	who	worked	together	in	a	socialised	environment	where	EBM	was	the	norm.		Case	B	differed:	organisational	capacity	had	limited	influence	compared	to	the	dominant	force	of	the	distinct	surgeon	groups	and	the	socialisation	of	the	professionals	in	the	two	hospital	sites	(B1	and	B2).		At	Site	B,	the	surgeons	remained	at	the	top	of	the	professional	hierarchy	and	managers	and	administrators	had	little	authority	over	decisions.		Case	C	varied	again,	but	aligned	more	to	Case	B	than	A.		Here,	surgeons	led	decision-making	and	established	the	importance	attached	to	different	types	of	evidence	and	knowledge.		There	were	significant	individual	surgeon	characteristics	at	site	C,	but	the	knowledge	of	the	entire	group	as	a	CoP	dominated.		The	capacity	of	this	organisation	to	promote	evidence-based	decision-making	was	limited	because	an	orthopaedic	‘insider-outsider’	dynamic	prevailed.			
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Figure	11.		The	process	of	knowledge	mobilisation	into	'evidence'-based	clinical	decisions	
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8.7 	Key	dimensions	of	knowledge	mobilisation		In	my	study,	three	key	dimensions	were	identified	which	drove	variation	in	evidence-based	decision-making	for	orthopaedic	surgery.		In	the	literature	review	I	introduced	theories	from	knowledge	mobilisation	which	focused	on	individual	mindlines	(Gabbay	and	LeMay,	2004;2011),	groups	in	Communities	of	Practice	(Lave	and	Wenger,	1991)	and	those	linked	to	organisational	boundaries,	and	capacity	(Carlile,	2002;2004,	Cohen	and	Levinthal,	1989;1990,	Zahra	and	George,	2002).		In	this	section	I	discuss	the	relationship	between	these	existing	theories	and	the	key	dimensions	of	knowledge	mobilisation	found	in	this	study.		
8.7.1 Individual	surgeon	characteristics		A	strong	influential	factor	for	decision-making	was	the	individual	beliefs	that	surgeons	hold	about	evidence	and	knowledge.		This	included	their	beliefs	regarding	what	constitutes	evidence	in	practice,	e.g.,	RCT	evidence	or	experiential	knowledge.		In	Chapter	4,	I	described	three	characteristic	surgeon	types	which	represented	stereotypical	types	of	surgeon	in	my	study	(gold-standards,	mavericks	and	innovators).		I	collected	examples	of	characteristic	types	of	decision-making	across	all	three	cases.			Each	surgeon	type	displayed	characteristic	methods	for	knowledge	mobilisation	and	privileged	different	forms	of	evidence	and	knowledge	in	their	decision-making	processes.		Gold-standard	surgeons	privileged	EBM	and	standardisation	in	their	practice.		Maverick	surgeons	considered	retrospective	investigations	of	their	own	practice	important	as	they	valued	their	own	experience	and	that	of	opinion	leaders,	above	other	forms	of	evidence.		Innovators	wanted	to	move	the	specialty	forward	through	innovation	in	surgical	techniques	and	devices.		However,	I	found	uncontrolled	innovation	that	was	not	evaluated	in	the	context	of	clinical	trials	and	was	therefore	considered	dangerous	by	other	surgeons.				Surgeons	selected	and	privileged	knowledge	in	different	ways	which	played	out	in	how	they	functioned	as	a	group	and	within	the	larger	organisation.		The	anticipated,	and	actual,	differences	between	the	decision-making	of	the	three	surgeon	types	could	have	led	to	variation	in	practice.		The	influence	of	characteristic	patterns	of	behaviour	has	been	identified	in	previous	literature	
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(Fisher	et	al,	2010).		This	implicit	impact	on	decision-making	practices	was	evident	throughout	the	findings.		It	required	an	understanding	of	a	network	of	factors	that	were	amalgamated	in	the	head	of	the	surgeon	and	weighed	up	against	each	other.		This	process	was	described	by	Gabbay	and	Le	May	(2004)	as	the	development	and	use	of	clinical	mindlines.		Mindlines	demonstrate	a	more	flexible,	complex,	and	adaptable	approach	to	evidence	and	knowledge	compared	to	clinical	guidelines	because	they	are	produced	bottom-up	by	individuals.		This	would	suggest	that	mindlines	can	better	absorb	change	and	become	fit	for	purpose	in	a	way	that	guidelines	never	will	(Sausman	et	al,	2016).				However,	my	findings	revealed	that	mindlines	were	important	but	not	sufficient	in	understanding	the	entirety	of	knowledge	mobilisation	in	orthopaedic	practice.		The	surgeons’	mindlines	were	ultimately	controlled	by	the	local	organisational	demands	and	environmental	contexts.		For	example,	the	constraints	of	orthopaedic	practice	around	hip	implant	purchasing	restricted	the	surgeons’	ideal	choice	of	implant.		Throughout	the	study,	I	gave	examples	of	situations	where	the	characteristics	of	the	surgeon	and	their	mindlines	were	undermined.		Therefore,	I	demonstrate	the	importance	of	viewing	each	key	dimension	for	knowledge	mobilisation	in	the	context	of	the	other	two.		
8.7.2 Socialisation	of	medical	professionals		The	distinct	occupational	norms	between	the	different	professional	groups	in	my	study	appeared	to	drive	variation	in	decision-making	practice.		Groups	of	orthopaedic	professionals	shared	specialised	knowledge	of	surgery,	and	collective	tacit	knowledge	of	what	it	meant	to	be	a	surgeon	working	in	their	particular	organisation	(Borg	Anderson,	2009).		This	was	different	from	the	knowledge	possessed	by	non-surgeons	working	in	the	same	environment.				The	surgeons’	job	title	and	identity	enabled	them	to	distinguish	themselves,	their	norms	and	knowledge	from	that	held	by	other	groups.		The	significance	attached	to	professional	identity	has	been	described	previously	(Mosher,	1968;	Roberts	and	Dietrich,	1999;	Freidson,	2001).		Surgeons	were	able	to	assert	control	and	authority	over	surgical	decisions	because	they	believed	they	possessed	the	expert	knowledge.		They	were	also	more	inclined	to	privilege	knowledge	and	
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evidence	that	came	from	professional	societies	over	and	above	that	presented	in	NICE	guidance.		It	was	as	though	surgeons	had	an	innate	sense	of	belonging	to	the	societies	which	made	the	transfer	and	adoption	of	knowledge	from	these	external	organisations	easier	to	achieve.		Evidence	enacted	through	NICE	guidance	was	viewed	as	imposed	from	‘outside’	and	therefore	existed	in	a	different	knowledge	space.		A	similar	boundary	was	found	in	the	weight	assigned	to	knowledge	and	evidence	from	orthopaedic	opinion	leaders,	and	has	been	reported	elsewhere	(Hiss	et	al,	1978;	Jamtvedt	et	al,	2006).				In	the	literature	review,	I	introduced	the	theory	of	Communities	of	Practice	(Lave	and	Wenger,	1991).		This	theory	was	fundamental	to	explaining	the	knowledge	mobilisation	that	occurred	between	the	groups	of	surgeons	in	my	study.		CoP	theory	suggests	that	in	order	to	absorb	and	mobilise	knowledge,	the	person	who	is	acquiring	knowledge	needs	to	do	more	than	observe	a	group	in	action.		Instead,	they	learn	via	active	participation	and	by	absorbing	and	being	absorbed	into	the	context	and	culture	of	a	group	(Lave	and	Wenger,	1991).		In	my	study,	I	found	that	over	time,	the	contexts	and	cultures	of	the	groups	became	embedded	in	the	hospitals,	and	the	individual	surgeons	could	intuitively	understand	what	it	was	to	be	part	of	their	particular	community.				The	formation	of	a	CoP	was	an	important	component	of	the	‘socialisation	of	professionals’	dimension	(Lave	and	Wenger,	1991).		Each	CoP	had	its	own	sociocultural	practices	which	were	identifiable	in	each	hospital.		Surgeons	became	members	of	a	CoP	by	developing	and	mastering	the	knowledge	and	skills	of	their	particular	community,	e.g.,	EBM	at	site	A.		This	process	of	knowledge	mobilisation	moves	away	from	the	traditional	model	of	medical	education	and	training	which	is	grounded	on	knowledge	acquisition	through	passive	learning	and	observation	of	senior	colleagues.			The	surgeons	in	each	CoP	were	able	to	interact	with	their	colleagues	using	their	understanding	of	the	contingencies	of	their	practice	to	produce	knowledge	that	was	easily	shared	within	their	group.		This	facilitated	evidence	sharing	between	group	members	as	surgeons	had	a	shared	language	and	understanding	of	what	
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evidence	meant	to	them.		Therefore,	the	environment	into	which	they	were	socialised	was	important	for	decision-making.		It	could	be	a	small	CoP	operating	within	a	hospital,	but	also	a	larger	CoP	which	formed	around	particular	interests.		Each	CoP	helped	to	create	the	norms	which	guided	decision-making	and	the	privileging	of	evidence	for	the	members.		More	importantly,	the	CoP	put	boundaries	around	‘what’	evidence	and	‘whose’	evidence	could	be	considered	important.		This	restricted	access	and	knowledge	sharing	with	other	professional	groups,	such	as	the	managers	and	administrators.		The	norms	of	practice	enabled	surgeons	to	retain	autonomy	and	power	over	their	surgical	knowledge	to	restrict	the	influence	of	managers	and	administrators,	therefore	limiting	the	impact	of	evidence-based	guidance	in	their	practice.		
8.7.3 Organisational	capacity	of	the	hospital		Organisational	capacity	reflects	the	impact	each	hospital	had	on	the	mobilisation	of	knowledge	within	their	organisation.		Decision-making	was	strongly	influenced	by	the	ability	of	each	organisation	to	identify,	integrate,	transform	and	use	knowledge	in	practice.		The	contingencies,	constrains	and	functional	structures	of	practice	influenced	the	evidence-based	decision-making	that	took	place.		These	included	the	financial	status	of	the	hospital,	technical	resources	available,	the	power	of	management	and	governance,	and	the	presence	of	organisational	processes.				In	Chapter	2,	I	described	different	types	of	knowledge	boundary	which	have	to	be	crossed	to	achieve	knowledge	mobilisation	in	organisations.		They	include,	
syntactic,	semantic	and	pragmatic	boundaries	(Carlile,	2004).		I	found	examples	of	each	type	in	my	study	and	they	were	critical	in	the	mobilisation	of	knowledge	across	the	organisation.		In	my	study,	the	boundaries	could	be	characterised	by	their	functional	area,	e.g.,	around	hip	surgery	or	specialised	revision	surgery,	the	problem	being	solved,	e.g.,	a	cost	reduction	project	or	a	quality	improvement	project,	or	by	a	particular	working	practice,	e.g.,	physiotherapy	versus	medicine.		As	anticipated	in	the	literature,	syntactic	boundaries	were	the	easiest	to	cross	because	the	surgeons	shared	a	common	set	of	ideas	and	values	regarding	the	process	of	decision-making	in	their	surgical	context	(Carlile,	2004).		
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Semantic	boundaries	were	slightly	more	challenging,	as	described	in	the	findings	individuals	working	on	either	side	of	a	semantic	boundary	(e.g.,	non-clinical	managers	vs.	clinical	managers)	did	not	share	the	same	identity	or	values	which	led	to	differences	in	interpretation	and	understanding	of	information	contained	in	clinical	guidelines.		In	my	study,	pragmatic	boundaries	between	the	different	professional	groups	were	almost	impossible	to	overcome.		The	surgeons,	managers	and	administrators	failed	to	work	across	pragmatic	boundaries	to	achieve	effective	knowledge	mobilisation	within	their	organisation.		Instead,	mobilisation	occurred	between	individuals	or	within	distinct	professional	groups.		To	improve	knowledge	mobilisation,	the	groups	needed	to	develop	a	common	ground	where	some	understanding	is	shared	to	enable	joint	work.		However,	this	was	not	easy	to	achieve	as	individuals	and	groups	were	invested	in	their	own	ways	of	thinking	and	behaving	and	knowledge	sharing	was	restricted.				It	may	be	possible	to	overcome	a	lack	of	knowledge	sharing	in	an	organisation	by	improving	the	organisations	absorptive	capacity	(ACAP).		This	theory	describes	the	ability	of	a	hospital	to	identify,	integrate,	transform	and	use	knowledge	in	practice	(Cohen	and	Lenventhal,	1989;	1990;	Zahra	and	George,	2002).		In	my	study,	the	biggest	challenge	to	ACAP	was	the	integration	of	new	external	knowledge	into	the	hospital.		Knowledge	was	ignored	or	minimised,	rather	than	identified	and	integrated	into	practice.		Unless	evidence	and	knowledge	use	was	enforced	via	regulation,	the	three	hospitals	had	limited	ability	to	actively	learn	and	improve	their	services.		Therefore,	they	demonstrated	low	levels	of	ACAP,	and	limited	levels	of	Potential	ACAP,	i.e.,	they	had	NICE	implementation	processes	but	did	not	always	engage	in	these	processes.		The	hospitals	varied	in	the	extent	of	meaningful	change	they	were	able	to	achieve	through	functional	organisational	processes.		The	ACAP	component	of	‘Identifying	and	accessing	knowledge’	was	generally	the	role	of	the	NICE	administrators	not	the	clinical	professionals.		Managers,	administrators	and	clinicians	all	performed	‘analysis	and	interpretation	of	new	knowledge’	and	evidence,	but	only	when	it	was	deemed	appropriate	for	them.				
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This	was	the	level	of	ACAP	that	all	three	hospitals	had	reached.		Going	beyond	this	to	transform	knowledge	(e.g.,	NICE	guidance)	within	the	organisation	was	rarely,	if	ever	observed.		This	would	require	knowledge	and	evidence	to	be	incorporated	into	the	day-to-day	workings	of	the	hospital	and	to	become	organisational	knowledge	in	its	own	right,	rather	than	something	that	originated	from	elsewhere.		External	knowledge	was	not	trusted	or	valued	because	of	the	implicit	structural,	cultural,	hierarchical	and	professional	contingencies	at	play.		These	factors	influenced	evidence-based	decision-making	in	ways	that	were	not	explicit	to	the	knowledge	provider,	receiver	or	decision-maker.		The	organisations	lacked	an	in-depth	understanding	of	these	complexities,	which	restricted	their	ability	to	act	and	achieve	progression	towards	effective	knowledge	mobilisation.			There	were	also	differences	in	organisational	cultures	at	the	hospitals.		Culture	influenced	practice	and	how	staff	privileged	knowledge	and	evidence.		This	has	been	reported	previously	(Deal	and	Kennedy,	2008;	Davies	et	al,	2000b).		Hospitals	differed	in	the	extent	to	which	staff	believed	they	were	able	change	and	manage	their	culture	in	order	to	align	to	an	organisational	strategy	focused	around	EBM.		Some	were	resigned	to	the	view	that	change	was	impossible,	which	made	it	difficult	to	establish	norms	which	privilege	clinical	evidence.		The	professional	hierarchy	restricted	knowledge	used	for	organisational	decisions.		Knowledge	possessed	by	surgical	professionals	allowed	them	to	develop	a	level	of	prestige,	discretion	and	autonomy	over	decisions	that	were	made	(Carr-Saunders	and	Wilson,	1933).		Organisational	decisions	only	proceeded	so	far	before	the	professional	gatekeepers	limited	what	could	be	achieved.		This	restricted	the	impact	that	knowledge	acquired	‘outside	of	orthopaedics’	could	have,	as	greater	weight	was	given	to	knowledge	originating	from	‘inside’.			
8.8 	Knowledge	mobilisation	applied	to	EBM			This	section	will	discuss	the	contribution	of	my	study	in	evidence-based	decision-making	to	the	existing	knowledge	mobilisation	literature.			
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There	is	a	well-established	literature	regarding	the	importance	of	implementing	clinical	evidence	into	practice	(Sackett	et	al,	1996;	Davidoff	et	al,	1995;	Schunemann	and	Bone,	2003;	Dopson	et	al	2003),	and	research	has	established	the	significance	of	context	in	enabling	effective	evidence-based	decision-making	(Dopson	and	Fitzgerald,	2005;	Gabbey	and	Le	May,	2004;	2011,	Sausman	et	al,	2016).		However,	variation	in	practice	still	remains	(Grove	et	al,	2016).		My	research	indicated	that	this	is	due	to	a	wider	definition	of	‘evidence’	which	exists	in	clinical	practice.		This	includes	EBM,	but	also	management	and	organisational	knowledge	amongst	others.		Literature	regarding	how	these	other	sources	of	evidence	and	knowledge	are	implemented	in	practice	is	less	well-established	(Walshe	and	Rundall,	2001;	Gkeredakis	et	al,	2011;	Crilly	et	al,	2013).			I	have	explained	the	wider	‘evidence-based’	decision-making	found	in	my	study	using	a	knowledge	mobilisation	perspective.		I	provided	an	understanding	of	how	individual,	groups	and	organisational	knowledge	interacts	when	situated	within	the	regulatory	and	political	environment	of	healthcare.		Previously,	knowledge	mobilisation	has	been	investigated	in	healthcare	and	other	professionalised	organisations,	but	has	tended	to	be	explained	as	a	consequence	of	distinct	levels	of	influence	operating	in	isolation.			Systematic	reviews	have	explored	the	cross-overs	and	gaps	between	the	traditionally	separate	literatures.		Early	reviews	(Mitton	et	al,	2007;	Nicolini	et	al,	2008)	focused	the	mobilisation	of	research	evidence	between	producers	and	users.		They	identified	barriers	and	enablers	to	knowledge	mobilisation,	linked	to	the	individual	and	organisational	levels	such	as	experience,	relationships	and	modes	of	communication	(Mitton	et	al,	2007).		Nicolini	and	colleagues	(2008)	described	barriers	and	enablers	which	included	conflict,	leadership,	interdisciplinary	memberships	and	relationships,	shared	values	and	structures.		These	findings	were	largely	replicated	in	my	study	throughout	the	individual,	groups	and	organisational	levels.			Later	Contandriopoulos	and	colleagues	(2010)	explored	knowledge	mobilisation	at	organisational	and	policymaking	levels.		They	reported	three	key	issues	linked	
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to	politics,	economics	and	social	structures,	therefore	providing	a	higher	level	of	abstraction.		They	called	for	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	context	in	which	knowledge	mobilisation	occurs	in	order	to	design	interventions	which	aim	to	maximise	knowledge	use	(Contandriopoulos	et	al,	2010).		My	study	has	sought	to	provide	this	context-dependent	evidence.		Oborn	and	colleagues	(2013b)	provided	a	narrative	review	of	knowledge	mobilisation	literature	along	three	frames	(linear	transfer,	social	process	and	contextual	issues)	to	incorporate	theory	from	management	into	healthcare.		I	have	extended	this	to	demonstrate	why	much	of	the	EBM	literature	endorsing	one	particular	technique	or	process	(e.g.,	clinical	guidance)	is	not	fit	for	purpose,	because	context	dictates	what	knowledge	mobilisation	could	take	place.		Recently,	Ferlie	and	colleagues	(2012)	took	a	critical	stance	to	examine	health	and	management	literature	and	classified	four	key	domains	focused	on	group	and	organisational	issues.		These	were	different	types	of	knowledge,	theoretical	discourse,	the	disciplinary	field	and	the	organisational	form.		They	highlighted	barriers,	CoP	and	organisational	learning,	culture	and	communication	as	important	for	knowledge	mobilisation	(Ferlie	et	al,	2012).		My	research	adds	to	this	complex	understanding	by	recognising	alternative	sources	of	evidence	used	in	clinical	decisions	which	encompass	the	organisational	and	social	science	perspectives.		Acknowledging	that	more	than	one	type	of	knowledge	or	evidence	could	be	selected	amongst	a	wide	range	of	options	helps	in	understanding	why	some	knowledge	is	mobilised	more	easily	than	others.			Davies	and	colleagues	(2015)	reviewed	the	macro	perspective	regarding	how	knowledge	is	mobilised	from	research	and	policy	institutions.		This	aligns	to	my	regulatory	environment	but	does	not	cover	the	specific	influence	of	medical	regulation	on	knowledge	mobilisation	in	healthcare.		Davies	and	colleagues	(2015)	identified	six	domains:	the	purpose	and	goals,	knowledge,	connections	and	configurations	between	people	and	organisations,	people,	roles	and	positions,	actions	and	resources	available,	and	the	context	of	operation.		The	key	finding	was	the	interaction	between	the	domains	which	produced	a	dynamic	picture	of	knowledge	creation,	communication,	and	action.		
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	This	body	of	literature	describes	a	multitude	of	factors	which	are	important	for	evidence-based	practice	(Dopson	and	Fitzgerald,	2005),	and	research	into	the	knowledge	mobilisation	process	has	extended	this	(Oborn	et	al,	2013b).		However,	it	has	tended	to	do	so	in	isolation	(e.g.,	Gabbay	and	LeMay,	2004;	2011),	with	a	focus	on	the	explicit	components	of	knowledge	(Ward	et	al,	2012)	or	by	selecting	certain	segments	of	the	knowledge	domain	to	examine	whilst	excluding	others	(Contandriopoulos	et	al,	2010,	Oborn	et	al,	2013b).		The	literature	makes	reference	to	the	importance	of	the	context	in	which	EBM	takes	place	(Dopson	and	Fitzgerald,	2005;	Gabbay	and	Le	May,	2004).		However,	the	definitions	and	descriptions	of	context	are	not	explicit.		My	study	provides	an	investigation	of	the	constraints	and	contingencies	of	context	which	were	crucial	in	understanding	how	and	why	knowledge	mobilisation	did	or	did	not	occur.		I	have	shown	how	knowledge	mobilisation	can	be	enabled	or	constrained	depending	on	the	nature	and	formalisations	of	knowledge	and	role	of	individuals	as	well	as	the	functional	and	social	interactions	in	organisations.		It	was	the	flexible	and	adaptable	knowledge-dependent	context	in	which	decisions	were	made	that	resulted	in	variation	in	clinical	practice	decisions.			I	have	extended	the	existing	EBM	literature	by	taking	a	knowledge	mobilisation	perspective.		I	have	explained	how	knowledge	was	mobilised	for	decision-making	in	a	professionalised	context	as	a	consequence	of	the	interaction	between	all	four	levels	of	analysis,	i.e.,	across	the	entire	knowledge	domain.		I	have	moved	beyond	the	narrow	focus	of	the	gap	between	clinical	research	and	practice	to	include	the	knowledge	of	the	individual	in	their	specific	situation,	the	tacit	knowledge	that	is	held	by	groups	of	practitioners,	the	complex	processes	and	structures	within	organisations,	all	situated	within	a	constantly	changing	regulatory	environment	made	up	of	multiple	stakeholders,	e.g.,	policy-makers,	academics,	clinical	practitioners	and	industry.			
8.9 	Original	contribution		My	study	has	generated	a	number	of	original	contributions	to	the	field	of	EBM	and	knowledge	mobilisation	in	the	professionalised	context	of	healthcare.	
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	Primarily,	my	research	provides	an	empirical	cross-sectional	study	of	knowledge	mobilisation	using	NICE	guidelines	in	three	NHS	hospitals	in	England.		It	demonstrates	the	real-world	practice	of	knowledge	mobilisation	for	clinical	decisions.		In	my	research,	implementation	of	NICE	clinical	guidelines	was	used	as	an	empirical	tracer	to	investigate	the	knowledge	mobilisation	that	occurred	across	the	entire	knowledge	domain.		I	examined	the	influence	of	‘knowledge	generators’,	e.g.,	the	policy-makers,	through	hospital	organisations,	clinical	and	professional	groups,	right	down	to	the	individual	surgeons	working	in	hospitals	who	are	expected	to	adopt	and	implement	evidence	in	their	practice.			I	have	explained	knowledge	mobilisation	in	a	professionalised	context	as	a	consequence	of	the	interaction	between	four	levels	of	analysis:	national	regulation,	the	organisation,	the	group	and	the	individual.		This	interaction	led	to	contingent	knowledge	mobilisation	which	helps	to	explain	the	variation	in	clinical	practice	decisions.		A	key	contribution	of	the	work	is	the	development	of	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	the	interaction	between	three	key	dimensions	of	influence	(surgeon	characteristics,	socialisation	of	medical	professionals,	organisational	capacity)	when	situated	within	the	regulatory	and	political	arena.		These	three	dimensions	drove	variation	in	the	practice	of	decision-making	for	orthopaedic	surgery.			This	is	one	of	the	first	studies	that	combines	an	understanding	of	knowledge	mobilisation	from	different	literatures	(clinical	and	organisational	sciences)	in	evidence-based	decision-making	for	healthcare	across	individuals,	groups,	organisations	and	the	regulatory	environment.		This	produced	a	unifying	framework	of	knowledge	mobilisation	in	orthopaedics.		The	study	of	EBM	and	knowledge	mobilisation	in	healthcare	and	other	professionalised	organisations	has	tended	to	focus	on,	and	be	explained	at,	four	separate	levels	of	influence	operating	in	isolation.		Existing	literature	appears	to	centre	on	either	the	impact	of	individuals	or	groups,	or	on	organisational	dynamics	or	the	regulatory	
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political	forces	at	play.		My	study	brings	these	together	and	this	goes	beyond	what	has	been	explained	in	the	existing	EBM	and	knowledge	mobilisation	literature.				Finally,	I	have	made	a	contribution	to	the	knowledge	of	guideline	implementation	as	it	is	practised	in	the	real	world	of	the	NHS.		I	have	documented	the	experience	and	challenges	faced	in	planning	and	designing	complex	organisational	processes	to	meet	recommendations	made	by	NICE.		I	observed	the	successes	and	failures	of	trying	to	sanction	these	processes	within	NHS	hospitals.		I	have	provided	evidence	that	improving	healthcare	services	and	reducing	unwarranted	variation	in	practice	requires	more	than	the	passive	dissemination	of	codified	guidelines.		More	important	was	how	the	knowledge	and	evidence	from	individuals,	groups	and	organisations	were	valued	and	how	they	interacted	within	the	wider	healthcare	system.	
8.10 Strengths	and	limitations	of	the	research		I	discuss	the	general	strengths	and	limitations	of	my	study	and	focus	on	the	implications	of	the	design	and	analysis.		I	demonstrate	the	reliability	and	validity	of	my	findings.		
8.10.1 Broad	strengths		The	strength	of	my	research	was	the	access	I	achieved.		The	challenges	of	researching	elite	groups,	e.g.,	surgeons	have	been	discussed	previously	(Harvey,	2001).		Problems	are	often	linked	to	gaining	access	and	interview	strategies.		Whilst	I	did	not	encounter	insurmountable	access	issues,	the	interview	process	was	challenging	at	times	because	surgeons	did	not	want	to	discuss	their	decisions	‘on	tape’.		I	sensed	they	felt	their	decisions	were	being	judged,	the	surgeons	either	stating	that	I	(as	an	outsider)	lacked	the	expert	knowledge	to	make	a	judgement,	or	that	as	a	researcher	in	this	field,	I	would	tell	them	that	they	were	right	or	wrong.		To	overcome	this,	I	establish	a	rapport	with	surgeons;	sometimes	this	was	relatively	easy,	however,	other	interviews	felt	formal	and	constrained.		This	pattern	was	linked	to	whether	they	believed	they	were	the	expert	knowledge	holder	or	not.		Interview	location	was	important.		Interviews	in	private	rooms	rather	than	on	hospital	wards,	theatres	or	shared	offices	were	
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more	candid.				The	extended	insight	gained	from	being	embedded	in	the	hospitals	over	a	twelve	month	period	is	a	research	strength.		This	involvement	helped	me	to	demonstrate	the	decisive	and	autonomous	nature	of	surgeons.		Over	time,	I	learned	how	they	maintained	an	inherent	flexibility	in	their	work	and	were	averse	to	being	questioned	by	others.		At	the	end	of	my	data	collection,	the	surgeons	were	more	likely	to	talk	to	me	as	a	person	rather	than	as	a	researcher	who	was	casting	judgement	on	their	views.		This	was	useful	in	helping	me	to	develop	my	findings.		
8.10.2 Design	and	analysis		
8.10.2.1 Design	considerations		I	conducted	mixed	qualitative	methods	in	my	three	empirical	cases.		I	took	a	cross-section	of	surgeons	and	staff	within	each	case	to	illuminate	the	complex	relationships	between	professional	hierarchies	and	the	differences	in	evidence	and	practice.		This	helped	to	reduce	the	bias	and	confounding	associated	with	interviewing	a	single	professional	group.		A	robust	understanding	of	the	factors	which	influenced	surgeon	and	staff	knowledge	and	behaviour	was	achieved	through	the	use	of	observations	and	interviews,	supplemented	with	document	analysis.		This	enabled	me	to	consider	my	findings	in	the	context	of	orthopaedic	surgery,	and	to	contextualise	them	in	terms	of	knowledge	of	evidence,	theory	and	practice.		This	is	consistent	with	the	pragmatic	view	of	Johnson	and	Onwuegbuzie	(2004).			The	cases	were	entirely	qualitative,	but	the	concurrent	triangulation	strategy	approach	to	mixing	methods	outlined	by	Creswell	(2009)	provided	a	helpful	framework	to	follow	(Creswell,	2009).		This	ensured	that	data	was	collected	simultaneously.		Where	possible,	each	type	of	data	was	treated	equally	in	the	analysis.		However,	the	observations	and	interviews	tended	to	carry	more	weight	in	the	findings.		Data	collection	was	not	fully	predefined,	which	allowed	for	progressive	focusing.				The	limitations	of	my	research	design	relate	to	the	small	sample	of	hospitals.		At	
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the	beginning	of	the	research,	136	acute	Trusts	were	functioning	in	the	NHS	and	I	selected	three	of	these.		However,	I	chose	three	distinct	types	of	Trust	and	aimed	to	provide	significant	depth	of	investigation	(rather	than	breadth)	in	each	case.		I	interviewed	similar	numbers	of	professional	groups	at	each	hospital	to	achieve	a	balanced	professional	representation	in	the	data.		This	also	allowed	for	cross-checking	between	the	different	narratives.		Nevertheless,	the	small	numbers	generate	questions	regarding	the	generalisability	of	my	findings.		It	could	be	that	my	cases	are	limited	and	cannot	feasibly	be	compared	elsewhere.		However,	the	understanding	generated	through	my	research	of	EBM	and	knowledge	mobilisation	has	strong	internal	validity,	therefore	I	believe	it	has	wider	generalisability	at	a	higher	conceptual	level.			A	second	limitation	was	the	exclusion	of	the	private	sector.		Many	of	the	surgeons	included	in	my	study	maintained	a	private	orthopaedic	practice.		This	may	have	been	a	driving	force	in	their	clinical	decisions	that	I	was	unable	to	understand	in	significant	detail.		It	might	influence	the	relationship	between	professional	type	and	evidence-based	decision-making.		A	longitudinal	design	which	examines	both	sectors	would	enable	me	to	explore	these	potential	relationships	further.			
8.10.2.2 Analysis	considerations	I	consider	the	data	analysis	techniques	a	strength.		I	transcribed	a	small	sample	of	my	interviews	with	the	remainder	professionally	transcribed.		I	identified	mistakes	iteratively	during	the	coding	and	analysis,	and	verified	potential	mistakes	using	digital	recordings.		I	developed	a	coding	frame	to	restrict	code	drift	in	their	meaning.		My	coding	technique	was	rigorous	as	I	cross-checked	my	codes	with	field	notes	made	at	the	time.		I	revised	codes	that	did	not	fit	and	re-labelled	and	reorganised	them	iteratively	as	the	analysis	progressed.		I	checked	and	rechecked	the	codes	throughout	the	analysis	to	ensure	the	consistency	of	their	meaning	against	the	coding	frame.				I	conducted	an	independent	cross-check	of	a	sample	of	interview	codes	and	one	interview	transcript	with	my	supervisory	team.		We	discussed	the	similarities	and	differences,	and	decided	if	any	codes	were	redundant.		The	importance	of	
		 250	
‘inter-rater	reliability’	in	qualitative	research	is	debated.		All	views	are,	to	varying	degrees,	subjective	and	therefore	present	different	perspectives,	hence	agreement	and	disagreement	is	not	the	focus	(Pope	et	al,	2000;	Madill	et	al,	2000;	Joffe	and	Yardley,	2003).		Instead	it	was	important	to	understand	and	appreciate	the	diversity	of	views	that	might	have	added	insight	into	my	interpretation	of	the	data.			Limitations	of	the	case	studies	derive	from	excluding	non-NHS	surgeons	and	NHS	patients.		Narratives	from	these	two	groups	might	have	added	another	perspective	to	the	research,	e.g.,	the	view	of	the	patients.		Another	limitation	is	that	I	did	not	explicitly	focus	on	the	implementation	of	the	updated	NICE	guidance	for	hip	replacement	(TA	304)	as	intended	at	the	beginning.		As	the	study	progressed,	I	purposefully	decided	to	discuss	NICE	‘in	general’	to	obtain	a	wider	range	of	views,	and	to	include	those	participants	who	had	not	seen	or	read	the	update.		While	some	interviewees	mentioned	the	guidance	update,	it	might	have	benefitted	my	study	to	examine	the	opinions	regarding	the	specific	recommendations	in	the	guidance.	
8.10.3 Reliability	and	validity	of	findings		I	define	reliability	as	how	accurately	the	findings	represent	the	participants’	realities	of	the	social	phenomena,	and	the	extent	to	which	they	are	credible	to	them	(Schwandt,	1997).		Validity	refers	to	the	inferences	drawn	from	the	data	not	to	the	raw	data	itself	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson,	1983;	Lincoln	and	Guba,	1985;	Merriam,	1998).		I	aligned	my	research	to	the	nine	aspects	of	qualitative	reliability	and	validity	introduced	by	Creswell	(2009).		I	describe	how	I	aimed	to	meet	each	of	the	criteria	in	Table	17.		
Table	17.		Creswell's	(2009)	nine	aspects	of	quality,	reliability	and	validity	in	relation	to	
my	research	
Criteria		 Description	of	how	the	criteria	was	met	
Triangulation		
	
This	is	the	procedure	where	researchers	search	for	convergence	among	multiple	sources	of	information	to	form	themes	in	a	study	(Creswell,	2009).		In	my	study,	I	aimed	to	triangulate	data	from	three	sources.		These	were	interpreted	together	to	find	common	themes	by	eliminating	the	overlapping	areas.		This	process	allowed	me	to	corroborate	evidence	from	the	interviews,	observations	and	documents.		The	findings	have	improved	validity	because	I	relied	on	multiple	forms	of	evidence	rather	
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than	a	single	incident	or	data	point	in	the	study.			
Disconfirming	
evidence		
	
I	searched	for	disconfirming	or	negative	evidence	within	my	study.		First,	I	established	the	preliminary	categories	and	then	searched	through	the	data	for	evidence	that	was	consistent	with	what	I	found,	or	which	contrasted	the	categories	and	themes.		This	process	required	me	to	examine	the	multiple	perspectives	of	a	theme	or	category.		This	was	an	important	step	because	it	provided	further	support	to	the	credibility	of	the	findings.	
	
Researcher	
reflexivity		
	
In	the	methods	section	of	the	thesis,	I	disclosed	my	assumptions,	beliefs,	and	potential	biases	that	might	have	been	important	to	the	research.		It	was	essential	to	acknowledge	and	describe	my	beliefs	and	biases	early	in	the	research	process,	to	allow	readers	to	understand	my	position	before	reading	the	findings.	
	
Member	checking		
	
Where	possible	I	conducted	member	checking.		It	consisted	of	taking	both	data	and	interpretations	back	to	the	participants	in	the	study,	so	that	they	could	confirm	the	credibility	of	the	information	and	my	narrative	account.		I	asked	each	participant	if	they	would	like	a	copy	of	their	transcript	(raw	data)	and	my	final	results.		I	also	presented	the	preliminary	findings	of	the	research	to	a	selected	group	of	individuals	in	each	case	study	so	that	they	could	comment	on	the	accuracy	of	the	work.		They	could	also	check	that	the	themes	made	sense	to	them,	and	whether	the	overall	account	was	realistic.		By	doing	this,	the	participants	added	credibility	to	the	research	by	having	a	chance	to	respond	to	both	the	data	and	the	final	results.		
	
Prolonged	
engagement	in	the	
field		
	
Creswell	(2009)	suggests	that	researchers	can	increase	the	validity	of	their	study	by	staying	in	the	research	field	for	a	prolonged	period	of	time.		Within	the	limits	of	time	and	resource	of	my	PhD,	I	conducted	three	months	of	repeated	observation	at	each	site.		This	enabled	me	to	build	a	sense	of	trust	with	participants	and	find	the	right	gatekeepers	to	allow	access	to	people	and	sites.		Over	time,	I	established	rapport,	so	the	interview	participants	were	comfortable	with	the	topic	and	were	able	to	ask	questions.		The	most	important	element	of	my	prolonged	engagement	was	that	it	allowed	me	time	to	solidify	my	findings.		I	was	able	to	check	and	double-check	my	data	and	ideas,	and	to	compare	interview	findings	with	observational	data	and	documents.		Creswell	(2009)	commented	that	the	longer	a	researcher	stays	in	the	field,	the	more	the	pluralistic	perspectives	will	be	heard	from	participants,	and	this	was	absolutely	the	case	in	my	study.		The	mixed	perspectives	I	gained	over	time	gave	me	a	better	understanding	of	the	context	in	which	the	surgeons	made	decisions.		
	
Collaboration		
	
Collaboration	implies	that	the	participants	are	involved	in	the	study	as	co-researchers	or	in	less	formal	arrangements.		Validity	is	gained	from	building	the	participant	views	into	the	study	which	then	adds	further	credibility	to	the	narrative	accounts.		This	is	a	weakness	of	my	study	as	I	was	not	able	to	include	participants	in	many	of	the	research	activities	(writing	objectives,	interview	questions,	data	analysis	and	
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interpretation).		However,	I	was	able	to	pilot	my	interview	topic	guide	with	a	small	group	of	surgeons	to	ensure	that	it	made	sense	and	was	appropriate	to	the	context	I	was	examining.		
	
	
	
The	audit	trail	
	
I	made	a	considerable	effort	to	ensure	that	the	audit	trail	of	my	study	was	strong	so	that	credibility	could	be	tested	if	required.		I	established	protocols	of	the	data	collection	process.		I	provided	clear	documentation	of	all	research	decisions	and	activities	as	they	progressed.		I	kept	research	logs	of	all	the	interviews	and	observations	that	were	conducted,	and	the	documents	that	I	collected.		I	selected	a	data	analysis	procedure	(OSOP)	so	that	categories	and	themes	could	be	clearly	understood	and	examined	by	an	external	person	(Ziebland	and	McPherson,	2006).		I	also	included	an	overview	diagram	of	the	data	structure	to	show	how	the	codes	became	categories	and	themes.		The	goal	of	establishing	my	audit	trail	was	to	make	sure	that	both	the	processes	and	product	of	the	research	were	sound	and	that	my	findings	are	trustworthy.		
	
Thick,	rich	
description		
	
I	aimed	to	provide	detailed	descriptions	of	the	setting	and	the	participants	of	my	study	in	the	methods	section.		I	also	provided	thick	descriptions	of	the	four	themes	of	the	qualitative	work	in	the	results	chapters.		According	to	Creswell	(2009),	the	purpose	of	a	thick	description	is	that	it	give	the	“readers	the	feeling	that	they	have	experienced,	or	could	experience,	the	events	being	described	in	a	study.”		I	tried	to	achieve	this	by	providing	as	much	detail	as	possible	about	each	case,	particularly	through	the	use	of	my	observation	notes.		Rich	descriptions	also	help	the	readers	of	my	thesis	to	determine	the	applicability	of	the	findings	to	other	settings,	e.g.,	other	surgical	specialties,	or	similar	contexts,	i.e.,	other	hospitals.		
	
Peer	debriefing		
	
I	conducted	peer	debriefing	at	each	of	the	three	hospital	sites.		The	debriefing	meetings	were	attended	by	members	of	the	department,	the	hospital	managers	and	people	who	had	taken	part	in	the	interviews.		These	sessions	provided	an	overview	of	the	data,	the	research	process	and	the	preliminary	findings.		The	meetings	were	useful	in	providing	me	with	feedback	on	the	study.		In	particular,	where	I	could	make	changes	to	improve	the	work	or	the	way	it	can	be	disseminated.		The	research	was	also	presented	to	three	academic	communities	for	comment,	therefore	adding	credibility	to	a	study	in	terms	of	methods	and	theoretical	implications.		
		
8.11 Research	implications	for	policy,	practice	and	research		
8.11.1 Implications	for	policy		Over	the	last	20	years,	there	have	been	significant	changes	in	the	way	policy-making	organisations	such	as	NICE	create	and	disseminate	guidance	to	improve	
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health	and	social	care.		I	have	learnt	that	what	has	remained	fairly	constant	is	how	codified	knowledge	in	guidance	is	transferred	in	a	linear	fashion	to	clinicians	working	in	healthcare	organisations.		My	study	has	demonstrated	that	this	approach	is	limited	in	improving	evidence	use	and	reducing	variation	in	practice.			I	have	raised	issues	regarding	whether	NICE	guidelines	are	ever	appropriate	for	the	field	of	orthopaedics.		This	is	not	because	the	evidence	they	contain	is	unusable.		Instead,	the	way	evidence	was	privileged	by	surgeons	meant	that	guidelines	were	rarely	accessed	as	a	beneficial	knowledge	source.		Surgeons	were	not	concerned	about	what	guidelines	recommended.		What	was	important	was	their	definition	of	evidence,	and	how	this	interacted	in	their	group	and	wider	organisation.		In	my	study,	‘one	size’	guidance	could	never	‘fit	all’	the	levels	of	analysis	and	therefore	had	limited	value	in	their	specific	circumstance.			Nevertheless,	evidence	in	guidelines	represents	best	practice	and	NICE	must	produce	recommendations	for	healthcare.		I	have	provided	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	current	modes	of	transfer	are	ineffective.		Changes	could	be	made	to	the	process	of	guideline	creation,	dissemination	or	even	regulation.		Improvements	need	to	be	made	to	how	clinical,	managerial	and	administrative	staff	working	in	hospitals	see	and	think	about	evidence	from	guidelines.		They	could	benefit	from	understanding	that	knowledge	about	knowledge	and	its	use	could	be	valuable	for	their	organisation,	e.g.,	it	would	help	tailor	approaches	to	knowledge	mobilisation	in	specific	clinical	areas	that	are	context-specific.		
8.11.2 Implications	for	practice		Improvement	interventions	are	needed	to	help	users	and	producers	of	evidence	identify	‘where	they	are	at’,	and	therefore	‘what	types’	of	evidence	and	knowledge	uptake	are	likely	to	be	possible	in	their	practice	or	organisation.		I	identified	multiple	sources	of	evidence	used	in	real-world	evidence-based	decision-making	processes.		They	held	equal	weight	for	the	surgeons	and	were	positioned	in	a	knowledge	hierarchy	that	was	sophisticated,	dynamic	and	changeable,	depending	on	the	contingencies	of	the	current	context.		More	importantly	they	bore	little	relation	to	traditional	hierarchies	of	evidence.		I	did	
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not	encounter	any	situation	where	NICE	guidance	was	able	to	close	the	gap	and	provide	a	solution	to	a	decision.				Individuals,	groups	and	organisations	expected	to	use	NICE	guidance	could	take	a	more	transparent	approach	in	understanding	the	evidence	and	how	it	guides	guidelines.		This	may	help	them	to	decide	whether	guideline	recommendations	are	appropriate	in	their	context.		If	not,	other	evidence	sources	such	as	clinical	experience	could	take	precedence	and	be	shared,	explained	and	understood,	rather	than	frowned	upon	by	managers	and	administrators	and	recorded	as	an	organisational	‘risk’.		Encouraging	open	decision-making	processes	might	enable	those	on	all	sides	of	the	knowledge	boundary	to	understand	and	accept	why	certain	options	are	taken,	especially	if	they	varied	from	guideline	recommendations.			Practitioners	could	acknowledge	the	difference	between	certain	types	of	knowledge	as	positive	or	negative	to	patient	care.		Where	possible,	they	should	focus	on	reducing	undesirable	types	of	evidence	and	knowledge	present	in	their	organisation.		In	my	study,	evidence	from	implant	manufactures	negatively	impacted	practice.		This	could	be	an	area	for	improvement	work.		However,	surgeons	were	often	unaware	or	ambivalent	to	the	consequence	of	their	decisions	because	processes	were	not	open,	transparent	or	subject	to	feedback	loops.				Practice-based	knowledge	was	rarely	shared	between	the	groups	in	my	study.		Individuals	from	all	professional	groups	could	be	encouraged	to	openly	consider	the	benefits	of	increasing	the	use	of	this	type	of	evidence	for	clinical	decision-making.		Awareness	of	what	is	‘happening	on	the	ground’	reflect	the	contingencies	or	constraints	of	practice	and	might	help	to	improve	decision-making	processes.		This	would	be	difficult	in	my	case	study	hospitals,	given	the	different	organisational	cultures	and	divides	between	professional	groups.		The	groups	of	surgeons	working	in	CoP	retained	authority	over	the	knowledge	that	was	accepted	and	used	in	practice.		This	group	level	influence	is	an	area	where	the	biggest	changes	can	potentially	be	made.		
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 I	identified	key	contextual	dimensions	that	could	be	targeted	to	optimise	the	uptake	of	evidence	in	orthopaedic	practice.		Those	responsible	for	guideline	implementation	should	examine	the	contingencies	of	practice	within	their	department	to	uncover	‘who’	or	‘what’	is	driving	decisions.		In	my	study,	organisational	issues	such	as	the	availability	of	staff	restricted	an	orthopaedic	department	in	achieving	national	targets	(Monitor,	2013).		These	factors	were	not	directly	associated	with	the	type	of	knowledge	that	is	privileged	in	practice,	rather	the	organisational	limits	within	the	hospital.			Regulation	was	a	valuable	mechanism	as	it	achieved	a	desired	outcome	for	achieving	targets	and	controlling	the	behaviour	of	the	surgeons.		However,	moving	towards	regulation	as	the	norm	did	not	appear	to	be	a	desirable	option	for	most	of	the	professional	groups	in	my	study.		Knowledge	and	evidence	from	regulators	did	not	hold	the	same	positive	status	that	could	be	achieved	by	knowledge	and	evidence	that	originated	from	colleagues.		Restricting	the	discretion	and	authority	of	clinical	professionals	by	increasing	regulatory	power	would	not	be	recommended.		Instead,	other	mechanisms,	which	take	advantage	of	the	positive	associations	for	improving	evidence-based	practice	between	colleagues,	would	be	encouraged.		
8.11.3 Implications	for	research		Research	into	the	moderating	and	mediating	effects	of	the	different	types	of	knowledge	on	decision-making	is	needed	to	further	explore	the	pathways	that	lead	to	positive	or	negative	decision-making	practices.		The	processes	of	knowledge	mobilisation	found	in	my	study	between	individuals,	groups	and	organisations	have	identified	that	the	evidence	considered	important	to	practice	can	and	does	change	often.		This	was	dependent	on	the	context	in	which	it	was	examined.		Understanding	context	and	the	diverse	types	of	knowledge	will	be	essential	in	influencing	behavior	change	in	practice.		It	may	be	possible	to	foster	an	environment	where	positive	decision-making	practices	become	the	norm.		The	control	exerted	by	the	CoP	was	an	unexpected	finding.		In	the	context	of	orthopaedics,	this	provides	insight	into	the	approaches	for	knowledge	mobilisation	targeted	at	the	CoP	as	an	area	for	improvement.		Research	into	how	
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CoP	could	promote	the	uptake	of	NICE	guidance	in	practice	would	be	an	important	area	for	investigation.				I	found	that	the	hierarchies	of	knowledge	used	in	practice	held	little	relation	to	the	traditional	hierarchy	of	evidence	in	EBM.		Therefore,	deviation	from	the	evidence	in	NICE	guidance	could	be	justified	and	is	at	times	appropriate.		This	shifting	hierarchy	of	evidence	challenges	the	traditional	view	that	certain	types	of	clinical	evidence	should	be	privileged	over	others.		I	have	illustrated	that	this	assumption	was	of	no	benefit	in	decision-making	for	surgeons	working	in	contingent	environments.		It	was	not	easy	or	even	possible	for	a	surgeon	to	disregard	other	knowledge	in	favour	of	clinical	evidence.		Research	can	investigate	how	to	encourage	evidence	in	the	form	of	EBM	to	be	incorporated	into	decisions	made	in	the	context	of	practice.			Finally,	the	integration	of	the	levels	of	analysis	was	useful	for	understanding	surgical	decision-making.		The	next	step	is	to	examine	learning	within	organisations	to	try	to	increase	the	capacity	of	hospitals	to	identify,	integrate,	transform	and	use	knowledge	across	all	levels	of	practice.		Single	interventions	targeted	at	clinicians,	or	NICE	protocols	developed	by	administrators,	were	unable	to	achieve	meaningful	change	in	my	research	due	to	the	fact	that	they	did	not	span	the	entire	knowledge	domain.		Knowledge	did	not	flow	evenly	across	the	disciplinary	and	organisational	boundaries.		This	leads	me	to	question	what	type	of	knowledge	mobilisation	strategies	would	make	for	more	successful	guideline	implementation	programmes.				Investigating	the	nature	of	the	diverse	boundaries	and	their	influence	on	the	mobilisation	process	will	be	important	for	further	progress	in	the	field.		This	will	include	examination	of	professional	power	dynamics	associated	with	knowledge,	and	how	it	is	constituted	and	its	relationship	with	practice.		For	example,	I	demonstrated	how	professionals	were	able	to	contradict	and	undermine	explicit	knowledge	emerging	from	EBM.		There	is	a	considerable	amount	of	research	to	be	conducted	to	identify,	design,	implement	and	evaluate	programmes	that	deliver	organisational	knowledge	mobilisation	strategies.		
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8.12 Chapter	summary		In	this	chapter	I	have	discussed	the	research	process	and	highlighted	the	broad	findings	of	the	study.		I	have	answered	my	research	questions	and	summarised	the	three	case	studies	and	four	empirical	themes.		I	discussed	my	contribution	to	knowledge,	the	strengths	and	limitations	of	the	study	and	the	implications	for	policy,	practice	and	research.			The	aim	of	my	study	was	to	assess	the	role	of	EBM	in	orthopaedic	surgical	practice	decisions.		To	achieve	this,	I	identified	and	described	the	sources	of	evidence	and	knowledge	used	in	everyday	surgical	work	and	illustrated	how	the	brokering	and	mobilisation	of	knowledge	and	evidence	contributes	to	variation	in	practice.		My	in-depth	and	inter-disciplinary	exploration	has	revealed	how	many	distinct	and	diverse	types	of	evidence	and	knowledge	were	mobilised	in	the	context	of	clinical	practice.				I	have	explained	knowledge	mobilisation	in	a	highly-professionalised	organisationally-regulated	context	as	a	consequence	of	the	interaction	between	four	levels	of	analysis:	the	individual,	group,	organisation	and	national	regulation.		This	interaction	led	to	contingent	knowledge	mobilisation	which	helps	to	explain	the	variation	in	clinical	practice	decisions.		I	discovered	three	key	dimensions	for	‘evidence-based’	decision-making	which	were	important	drivers	for	knowledge	used	in	practice.		These	were	the	individual	surgeon	characteristics,	the	socialisation	of	medical	professionals	and	the	organisational	capacity	of	the	hospital.			I	have	demonstrated	that	the	mobilisation	of	knowledge	in	surgery	gives	more	weight	to	the	professional	networks	and	CoP	to	which	surgeons	belong.		Codified	evidence	in	clinical	guidelines	challenge	the	discretion	and	autonomy	held	by	the	individual	surgeons	and	their	groups.		Therefore,	knowledge	gained	through	socialisation	with	colleagues	and	the	evidence	privileged	via	professional	hierarchies	governed	decision-making	practices.		This	rationalises	why	orthopaedic	surgeons	do	not	always	use	clinical	evidence	in	decision-making.		
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The	implications	of	my	findings	are	that	guidelines	from	policy-makers	are	not	always	appropriate	for	practice.		The	brokering	of	clinical	evidence	alongside	other	sources	of	knowledge	by	the	surgeons	meant	that	EBM	was	rarely	viewed	as	beneficial.		This	could	be	tackled	in	practice	through	improvement	interventions	to	help	users	and	producers	of	evidence	scrutinise	their	organisational	knowledge	capacity	and	uncover	what	types	of	knowledge	uptake	are	likely	to	be	possible	in	their	organisation.				Key	contextual	factors	need	to	be	identified	to	target	and	optimise	the	uptake	of	evidence	in	different	types	of	practice.		Research	could	assist	in	this	process	by	exploring	the	moderating	and	mediating	effects	of	knowledge	on	decision-making	to	understand	what	creates	effective	practices.		Evidence	use	and	uptake	in	CoP	could	be	an	insightful	area	of	further	investigation.		This	will	build	on	the	important	findings	of	my	study	which	revealed	the	complexity	of	knowledge	mobilisation	in	a	highly	professionalised	organisationally	regulated	context.				 	
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9 Conclusion		
9.1 Introduction		This	chapter	demonstrates	how	the	research	questions	have	been	answered	and	defines	the	contribution	to	knowledge	of	this	work.		The	aim	of	my	study	was	to	assess	the	role	of	EBM	in	orthopaedic	surgical	practice	decisions.		I	examined	three	orthopaedic	departments	located	in	NHS	hospitals.		Case	study	data	was	analysed	and	four	themes	were	presented	which	reflect	the	four	levels	at	which	knowledge	was	enacted	in	practice.		The	findings	revealed	distinct	sources	evidence	and	knowledge	used	in	surgical	practice	decisions.		Variation	from	clinical	guidelines	was	played	out	according	to	how	each	surgeon	brokered	and	mobilised	evidence	and	knowledge	to	deal	with	the	contingencies	and	constraints	that	were	inherent	in	orthopaedic	work.				I	have	demonstrated	that	the	uptake	of	clinical	evidence	was	not	achieved,	and	instead	guidelines	challenged	the	autonomy	and	discretion	of	clinicians.		The	pragmatic	mechanisms	by	which	knowledge	is	mobilised	in	surgery	gives	more	weight	to	the	professional	networks	and	CoP	to	which	the	surgeons	belonged.		This	understanding	helps	to	explain	why	orthopaedic	surgeons	do	not	always	use	evidence	in	their	decision-making.	
9.2 Answers	to	the	three	research	questions	
RQ1	What	types	of	evidence	and	knowledge	are	considered	important	by	
orthopaedic	surgeons	when	making	clinical	practice	decisions?		During	the	three	case	studies	a	wide	array	of	types	of	evidence	and	knowledge	were	identified	which	influenced	clinical	decisions.		These	included	formal	codified	knowledge,	managerial	and	organisational	knowledge,	socialised	knowledge	of	colleagues,	cultural	and	political	norms,	training	and	education,	experiential	knowledge	and	knowledge	from	implant	manufacturing	companies	amongst	other.		The	different	types	of	evidence	and	knowledge	were	mutually	
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exclusive	and	the	process	of	privileging	one	over	another	in	a	contextual	hierarchy	of	evidence	was	flexible	and	adaptable.					
RQ2.	How	are	evidence	and	knowledge	mobilised	in	the	real-world	practice	of	
orthopaedic	surgery	in	the	NHS?			Case	studies	revealed	that	all	surgeons	performed	‘evidence’-based	decision-making	in	their	work.		However,	clinical	evidence	was	only	one	form	of	evidence	important	in	this	context.		Multiple	levels	of	practice	interacted	and	impacted	on	how	knowledge	was	identified,	adopted,	integrated	and	mobilised	in	surgical	work.		These	were	the	individual,	group	and	organisational	influences,	which	functioned	within	the	contingencies	of	practice	and	the	overarching	regulation	of	healthcare.		Variation	in	practice	was	a	consequence	of	how	evidence	was	defined	and	privileged	by	surgeons,	non-clinical	professionals	and	the	entire	hospital.				
RQ3.	What	are	the	key	dimensions	of	knowledge	mobilisation	which	influence	
variation	in	decision-making	in	the	orthopaedic	surgery	NHS	environment?			Three	key	dimensions	influenced	variation	across	all	the	levels	in	the	practice	of	decision-making.		These	were	the	individual	surgeon	characteristics	(gold-standards,	mavericks	and	innovators),	the	socialisation	of	medical	professionals	and	the	organisational	capacity	of	the	hospital.		They	represent	potential	areas	for	improvement	in	the	way	evidence	is	presented	and	disseminated	across	the	three	cases.		‘Evidence’	in	real-world	practice	is	multifaceted	and	contextually	contingent.		Therefore,	traditional	linear	codified	approaches	to	dissemination	are	not	appropriate.		
9.3 Contribution	of	my	research		My	research	provides	an	empirical	study	of	knowledge	mobilisation	using	NICE	guidelines	collected	cross-sectionally	in	three	NHS	hospitals	in	England.		I	explored	EBM	from	a	knowledge	mobilisation	perspective	to	provide	a	unifying	framework	of	the	process	of	knowledge	mobilisation	into	clinical-decisions.		
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	I	have	extended	the	existing	EBM	literature	by	taking	a	knowledge	mobilisation	perspective	(Dopson	et	al,	2003;	Dopson	and	Fitzgerald,	2005;	Mitton	et	al,	2007;	Nicolini	et	al,	2008;	Contandriopoulos,	et	al	2010;	Ferlie	et	al,	2012;	Davies	et	al,	2015,	Oborn	et	al,	2013b).		I	explained	how	knowledge	is	mobilised	for	decision-making	in	a	professionalised	context	as	a	consequence	of	the	interaction	between	four	levels	of	analysis	across	the	entire	knowledge	domain.		I	have	moved	beyond	the	narrow	focus	of	the	gap	between	clinical	research	and	practice	(Sackett	et	al,	1996;	Davidoff	et	al,	1995;	Schunemann	and	Bone,	2003)	to	include	the	knowledge	of	the	individual	in	context,	the	tacit	knowledge	held	by	groups,	the	complex	processes	and	structures	within	organisations,	all	situated	within	a	constantly	changing	regulatory	environment	made	up	of	multiple	stakeholders,	policy-makers,	academics,	clinical	practitioners,	and	industry.		I	have	illustrated	the	contingencies	and	constraints	of	healthcare	context	that	are	crucial	for	understanding	how	and	why	knowledge	mobilisation	occurs	or	not.		It	was	the	flexible	and	adaptable	knowledge-dependent	context	in	which	decisions	were	made	that	resulted	in	variation	in	clinical	practice	decisions.		The	interaction	between	the	individuals,	groups,	organisations	and	the	regulatory	environment	led	to	contingent	knowledge	mobilisation	and	differences	in	the	processes	of	decision-making.		I	provide	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	the	interplay	and	interaction	between	individual	surgeon	characteristics,	the	socialisation	of	medical	professionals	and	the	organisational	capacity	of	hospitals.		I	described	the	process	of	knowledge	mobilisation	in	clinical	decisions	when	situated	within	the	regulatory	and	political	arena.			I	have	contributed	to	the	knowledge	of	guideline	implementation	as	it	is	practised	in	the	real	world	of	the	NHS.		I	provided	evidence	that	improving	healthcare	services	and	reducing	unwarranted	variation	in	practice	requires	more	than	the	passive	dissemination	of	codified	guidelines.		I	have	demonstrated	that	knowledge	from	individuals,	groups	and	organisations	is	valued	differently	and	this	has	implications	across	all	levels	of	knowledge	mobilisation.		
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9.4 Summary		I	investigated	the	implementation	of	NICE	clinical	guidelines	in	orthopaedic	decision-making.		This	empirical	tracer	illustrated	how	knowledge	mobilisation	occurs	throughout	all	levels	of	the	knowledge	domain	and	in	the	interaction	between	individuals,	groups,	organisations	and	the	regulatory	environment.		Previously,	the	study	of	knowledge	mobilisation	and	EBM	has	focussed	on,	and	been	explained	as	a	consequence	of,	four	separate	levels	of	influence	(individual,	group,	organisation	and	regulatory	environment)	operating	in	isolation.		My	research	extends	this	by	presenting	the	entire	complexity	of	knowledge	mobilisation	in	this	highly	professionalised	organisationally-regulated	context.				My	in-depth	and	inter-disciplinary	exploration	has	revealed	how	distinct	and	diverse	types	of	knowledge	were	continually	mobilised	in	practice.		In	surgery,	more	weight	is	given	to	professional	networks	and	the	CoP	to	which	orthopaedic	surgeons	belong.		Surgeons	vary	considerably	in	the	extent	to	which	they	use	clinical	evidence	in	decision-making.		EBM	was	rarely	viewed	as	beneficial	and	guidelines	from	policy-makers	were	not	always	appropriate	for	practice.			Evidence-based	clinical	guidelines	remain	essential	to	ensure	healthcare	services	deliver	the	most	clinical	and	cost-effective	interventions	and	procedures	to	patients.		The	future	success	of	clinical	guidelines	requires	users	of	evidence	to	scrutinise	their	organisational	capacity	to	uncover	what	types	of	knowledge	uptake	are	likely	to	be	possible	in	their	organisation.		We	need	to	identify	the	key	contextual	factors	that	should	be	targeted	and	optimised	to	improve	uptake	of	evidence	in	different	types	of	practice.		The	mobilisation	of	evidence	and	knowledge	in	Communities	of	Practice	will	be	an	exciting	starting	point	for	further	investigation.		 	
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No.	 Section	in	the	document	 Content	1	 6.3.3.1	Case	study	research	 Published	study	protocol	Copy	of:	Grove,	A.,	Currie,	G.,	
and	Clarke,	A.,	2015.	The	
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Box	2.		Study	regulatory	context:	ODEP	rating	and	Best	Practice	Tariff	(BPT)	rating		
Orthopaedic	Device	
Evaluation	Panel	(ODEP)	
Explanation		A	general	explanation	of	the	ODEP	ratings	used	to	rate	hip	implants	
	3	 6.3.4.1	Ethics		 Copies	of	ethical	approval		Ethical	approval	was	granted	by	the	University	of	Warwick	Biomedical	Research	Ethics	Committee	on	the	[reference	no:	REGO-2014-645]	and	via	the	R&D	department	of	each	of	my	three	hospital	sites	4	 6.3.4.3.1	Interviews	 Participant	information	
sheet	Each	potential	participant	was	given	this	participant	information	sheet	which	detailed	the	nature	of	the	study	and	what	would	be	expected	of	them	5	 6.3.4.3.1	Interviews	 Interview	topic	guide	
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This	guide	was	used	during	interviews.		It	is	divided	into	two	parts,	1)	structured	questions	aimed	at	obtaining	general	information	2)	unstructured	questions	about	experiences,	beliefs	and	attitudes	towards	evidence	and	clinical	practice	6		 10.2.2.4	CQC	at	the	hospitals		 CQC	reports	from	three	hospital	sites		Ratings	from	the	CQC	reports	of	hospital	sites	A,	B	and	C	at	the	time	the	study	was	conducted	7	 As	referenced	on	page	v	 Supplementary	articles	
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Appendix	2.		Orthopaedic	Device	Evaluation	Panel	Explanation			ODEP	is	an	organisation	established	in	2002	to	monitor	the	evidence	(presented	to	it	by	the	implant	manufacturer)	for	different	types	of	hip	implants	(hip	femoral	stems	and	hip	acetabular	cups	rated	separately).		They	assess	implants	against	benchmarks	set	by	NICE	for	implant	survivorship.		Initially,	the	NICE	benchmark	was	of	a	replacement	rate	of	less	than	1	in	10	(10%)	at	10	years.				An	ODEP	Rating	consisted	of	a	NUMBER	and	a	LETTER.			The	number	represents	the	number	of	years	for	which	the	product's	performance	has	been	evidenced:	10:	ten	years	of	evidence	-	full	compliance	with	NICE	benchmark.	7	(or	5	or	3):	seven	(or	five	or	three)	years	of	evidence	-	product	is	on-track	to	achieve	the	10	year	benchmark,	but	has	not	yet	got	sufficient	data	to	evidence	performance	at	10	years.	Implants	are	expected	to	progress	through	3,	5,	7	and	10	year	ratings	as	data	become	available;	failure	to	follow	this	progression	within	a	defined	timescale	will	result	in	removal	of	a	product’s	ODEP	rating.				The	letter	represents	the	strength	of	evidence	(data)	presented	by	the	manufacturer:		A:	strong	evidence	-	generally	higher	numbers	of	patients	(giving	greater	confidence	in	the	results	presented),	with	all	patients	being	subject	to	follow-up	(their	outcomes	recorded).	B:	acceptable	evidence	-	smaller	numbers	of	patients	than	the	A	rating	(giving	less	confidence	in	the	results	than	A),	but	sufficient	data	to	demonstrate	compliance.		Following	revised	guidelines	from	NICE	in	February	2014,	the	benchmark	replacement	rate	of	less	than	1	in	20	(5%)	at	10	years	was	defined,	and	a	STAR	was	added	to	the	ODEP	Rating	system.		
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The	star	is	awarded	where	products	are	evidenced	to	comply	with	this	benchmark.	A*	represents	very	strong	evidence	above	A	and	B.	Ratings	without	a	star	signify	compliance	to	the	prior	NICE	guidance	of	a	replacement	rate	of	less	than	1	in	10	(10%)	at	10	years	(ODEP,	2017).				 	
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Appendix	3.		Ethical	approval		University	of	Warwick	Biomedical	Research	Ethics	Committee	
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Case	study	A:	
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Case	study	B:		
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Case	study	C:		
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Appendix	4.		Participant	information	sheet	
											 	 	 	 	 		Division	of	Health	Sciences		University	of	Warwick	Coventry,	CV4	7AL	
Contact	name:	Amy	Grove	
Telephone:	02476	151584	
Mobile:	07779612101		
Email:	A.L.Grove@warwick.ac.uk	
 
Participant	Information	Sheet		
	
Title	of	Study:	Implementation	of	NICE	clinical	guidance	in	UK	practice:	
elective	orthopaedic	surgery	for	the	treatment	of	end	stage	arthritis	with	
total	hip	replacement.	
	The	purpose	of	this	sheet	is	to	ensure	that	you	understand	the	information	about	the	study	and	are	able	to	make	an	informed	choice	as	to	whether	you	should	take	part	or	not.				
A	brief	study	outline	of	the	study	is	included	for	your	information		This	qualitative	research	project	will	aim	to	investigate	the	use	of	evidence	based	practice	in	NHS	orthopeadic	surgery.	In	particular	it	will	explore	decision-making	for	hip	replacement	by	orthopeadic	surgeons	and	associated	surgical	staff	and	managers.			The	research	uses	three	types	of	data	collection,	observation,	interview	and	analysis	of	key	documentation.	This	particular	request	for	is	for	participation	in	the	interviews.	We	hope	that	the	findings	will	inform	the	design	of	an	intervention	aimed	at	improving	the	design,	dissemination,	uptake	and	understanding	of	evidence	based	guidance	for	orthopeadic	practice	in	the	NHS.			
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What	do	I	have	to	do	to	take	part?	You	will	take	part	in	an	interview	with	Amy	Grove,	the	lead	investigator	for	this	research.		The	interview	will	be	carried	out	to	access	your	experience,	attitudes	and	views	of	evidence	based	practice	and	decision	making	in	orthopeadic	surgery.		
Are	my	personal	details	at	risk	by	taking	part?	No.	I	will	allocate	you	a	unique	code	to	complete	the	interview	and	none	of	your	personal	details	are	requested,	this	effectively	makes	your	responses	anonymous.	All	information	collected	during	the	course	of	the	research	will	be	strictly	confidential.	Any	information	which	leaves	the	hospital	will	have	your	details	removed	so	that	you	cannot	be	recognised	from	it.	
Why	have	I	been	chosen	to	take	part	in	the	project?	You	have	been	chosen	because	you	work	in	or	are	involved	with	the	practice	of	the	orthopedics	department	in	your	hospital.	I	am	interested	in	studying	and	comparing	the	views	and	experiences	of	staff	in	relation	to	decisions,	evidence,	policy	and	practice	within	the	NHS.	
Do	I	have	to	take	part	in	the	project?	No.	It	is	up	to	you	whether	or	not	to	take	part.	You	also	have	the	right	to	withdraw	from	the	research	process	at	any	time.		You	will	be	able	to	withdraw	your	data	up	until	the	point	at	which	data	synthesis	begins.		Then	data	withdrawal	will	no	longer	be	possible.		You	can	request	withdrawal	by	contacting	the	lead	researcher	(Amy	Grove)	if	you	wish	to	withdraw	after	the	interview	focus.	If	you	wish	to	withdraw	beforehand	you	can	inform	Amy	Grove	at	any	time	prior	to	the	scheduled	date.				
What	are	the	possible	disadvantages	and	risks	of	taking	part?	There	are	no	specific	disadvantages	to	taking	part	in	the	project.	
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What	are	the	possible	benefits	to	you	of	taking	part?	There	are	no	specific	benefits	in	taking	part.	However,	the	information	I	get	from	this	project	will	help	to	inform	the	production	and	dissemination	of	evidence	in	the	future.		
What	happens	if	I	want	to	complain	or	have	concerns	about	this	research?	If	you	wish	to	complain,	or	have	any	concerns	about	any	aspect	of	the	way	you	have	been	approached	or	treated	during	the	course	of	this	project,	you	may	contact		Jo	Horsburgh	Deputy	Registrar	Deputy	Registrar's	Office		University	of	Warwick	Coventry	CV4	8UW		Email:	J.Horsburgh@warwick.ac.uk	
PA	–	Natasha	Lynch	Tel:	024	765	22706	Email:	n.lynch@warwick.ac.uk		
What	will	happen	to	the	results	of	the	project?	At	the	end	of	the	project	I	will	publish	the	findings	in	medical	journals	and	at	medical	conferences.	You	will	not	be	identified	in	any	reports	or	publications	resulting	from	the	study.	If	you	would	like	to	obtain	a	copy	of	the	published	results,	please	contact	Amy	Grove	(02476-151584).	
Who	has	reviewed	this	project?	This	project	has	been	reviewed	by	National	Institute	for	Healthcare	Research:	Doctoral	Research	Fellowship	Programme	and	Warwick	University	Biomedical	&	Scientific	Research,	ethics	Committee.		
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What	should	I	do	now?	If	 you	 agree	 to	 take	 part	 in	 the	 project	 then	 please	 proceed	 to	 completing	 the	consent	form.	If	you	do	not	wish	to	take	part	you	do	not	need	to	do	anything	more.				 	
		 297	
Appendix	5.		Interview	topic	guide			This	is	an	emergent	process	using	an	abductive	research	strategy	that	allows	theory	to	emerge	from	data	collected	and	previous	research	at	each	progressive	phase.		I	will	use	progressive	focusing	to	develop	themes	and	questions	as	the	interviews	advance.		However,	for	the	processes	of	ethical	review,	some	of	the	topics	that	I	anticipate	discussing	during	interview	will	include:		1.	Questions	to	understand	surgeons’	and	staff	approach	to	clinical	evidence	2.	What	strategies	are	used	by	professionals	when	making	clinical	decisions	3.	Questions	to	explore	the	implementation	of	clinical	guidance	from	the	individual’s	perspective	4.	What	they	consider	the	extent	of	their	involvement	and	impact	upon	surgical	practice	5.	Questions	to	gather	professional	narratives	to	understand	the	influence	of	pre-existing	regulatory	practice	6.	Exploration	of	the	importance,	implementation	and	integration	of	clinical	guidance	in	practice.					 	
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Appendix	6.		CQC	reports	from	three	hospital	sites		
	Displayed	below	are	the	CQC	ratings	from	the	CQC	reports	of	hospital	sites	A,	B	(B1	and	B2)	and	C	at	the	time	the	study	was	conducted.		The	questions	are	different	at	site	A	due	to	the	report	being	conducted	earlier	than	site	B	and	C.			Site	A:	
		Site	B1:	
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		Site	B2:	
		Site	C:		
